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Synopsis 
What I have called the Ideal of Cultivation is a fundamental ethical principle of civilisation, 
originated by aristocratic warriors in Greek antiquity who held that the true purpose of humanity is to 
perfect nature. 
It was then professed that individuals and even entire peoples could consciously develop and improve 
themselves in a way that was thought to obey the original lawful impulses of nature, a process which 
was likened to those of agriculture and animal husbandry. 
Subsequently the cognate idea of a politics of cultivation arose which deemed that society should be 
organised specifically to produce more virtuous or perfect human types. Given their fundamental 
association with Hellenism both ideas have been revisited constantly in the intellectual history of the 
west, and most notably during the great secular periods, the Renaissance and Enlightenment when 
active attempts were made to retrieve the ideals of antiquity. Both ideas were particularly pervasive in 
the German enlightenment, the Aufklärung, and were assimilated by the succeeding Romantic 
generation. 
In nineteenth century Germany, when interest in these ideas was quickly waning, the German 
philosopher Friedrich Nietzsche acquired an unswerving attachment to them and made the service of 
them his life's work. 
The intention of this essay is to trace methodically the appearance of the Ideal of Cultivation in 
Nietzsche's philosophy and politics, and to outline his responses to a world which was abandoning the 
principles in which he deeply believed. This essay should be regarded as a case study in the long 
history of a fundamental ethical idea rather than one about the philosopher Nietzsche. 
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Foreword 
All eyes up. A table is overturned on the other side of the room: a flurry of punches traded, an ethical 
debate is taking place. 
What is the best way of living? The best way of looking at our place in the world? Old questions, 
furious scenes and all the regulars are at it again. There's the journalist, a low-minded thug, flailing 
wildly at anyone who knows better. Not much science in it, but sometimes he connects and staggers a 
foe, or friend, or anyone else near enough. In the thick of it the theologian, a slow, lumbering fellow, 
throws predictable punches that are easily dodged. By his side the puny armed professional 
philosopher mumbles quietly through his beard and fires a few feeble jabs. His attention is diverted 
when some foreign philosophers, gouty old kick boxers, enter the fray. 
Their method of fighting abhors him, so he lunges after them and they indulge a separate, ferocious 
but technically incommensurate sortilege in a corner of the room. Nobody watches. Most eyes are 
fixed on the culture-critic who entertains with his clever feints, and imaginative footwork. This super-
subtle fellow has flair. He blacks the eye of the theologian, but is laid out by a windmill from the 
journalist. The crowd spills around the brawlers, and when they've had their fill they take up playing 
cards. Which is where they began. 
Over by the window the historian of ideas suppresses a yawn. Restless and uncomfortable, it's as if he 
is debating whether to dive in and smack someone, or play policeman. Why the fuss? Don't these 
people remember anything? This same fight happened here a year ago, and ten years before that. 
Before this the fight happened at a frequency of thirty seven year intervals for nearly four hundred 
years and even three thousand years ago more or less the same kind of people were having a go. The 
same punches traded; the same profanities. Why are they still fighting? They are acting as though 
there were actually answers to these questions; at least answers that are more correct. Should we stop 
fighting just because we've done it before? Let them play. These innocents are making history, or 
making it continue. The historian finishes his drink and leaves the room. The professional philosopher 
lurches from a spiteful kidney punch as he passes. 
The historian is passive. He can‟t help it. It is the outcome of the ironic and disconsolate position of 
the long view, or what Braudel, albeit in the context of material history, calls la longue durée. 
Pointing to the long continuity of the material civilisations of the Mediterranean, he sees the fact that 
underneath the surface play of history with its events, personalities and peoples certain structures - 
fundamental ways of living and therefore of thinking remain. In each generation it is repeated with a 
slightly altered emphasis or variation, but as Agamemnon said of Helen, the same whore as of old. 
Déjà vu afflicts the world of ideas, that is to say, ethical ideas. It does not do this in the realm of 
technique and science, where there is progress and complexity. Ethical ideas do not progress. They do 
not become more complex or interesting. They are simply strategies or ways we use to justify our 
actions and the way we live. There is a natural dialectic in it. The entire thought of a civilisation, 
whether superstitious, religious, philosophic, or scientific in procedure, arises out of or is in some way 
related to these ideas, which are by many turns related to its material structure.  
The complex of environmental, genetic, biological, biographical and historical influences may make 
each person's subjectivity unique, and supply history with an apparently unceasing variety of 
responses and suppositions about the world. But in the end there are not so many fundamentally 
different ways that you can live. And therefore, not so many fundamentally different ways you can 
value a life. That is why totally separate peoples in similar circumstances produce similar responses, 
solutions and stratagems to evaluate and to justify their lives. 
If you were to think of ideas as shapes and studied their morphology over the longest duration there is 
not a lot that changes. History is a description of change. This history is a description of what doesn't. 
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1 - Elements of the Ideal of Cultivation 
The ethical system I am referring is known by other terms like culture, self-improvement, self-
perfection, perfectionism, the liberal education, or perhaps the German Bildung, the Greek paideia or 
the Latin humanitas. Let‟s use another name so all these other terms don‟t get in the way. Each 
implies a local tradition, a different set of emphases not found elsewhere. But underneath are common 
assumptions, just as species diverge but remain related to a common ancestor. 
The ideal of cultivation is a genus in the family of ethical systems, and comprises many species. 
The Latin etymology of the word culture has been a metaphor for the Ideal of Cultivation for nearly 
three thousand years. The process of perfecting of human nature has always seemed to resemble the 
practice of agriculture. The idea that minds and bodies improved by education or breeding were like 
plants grown in tilled fields appealed to Greek, then Roman intellectuals and their successors in the 
west. Thus the noun culture or cultura deriving from the Latin colere means to till the earth. Its past 
participle is cultus whence the noun cultus, as in cultus deorum and cultus agri which became cultura 
agri or agriculture - the first art of civilisation, the first significant productive activity of humanity 
that exploits the potential of nature. 
In literary history we attribute this equation to Cicero but it was no doubt already widely in use. His 
phrase, cultura animi in the Tusculanarum Disputationum, refers to the cultivation of the mind or 
spirit. “A field, though fertile," he says, "cannot be productive without cultivation, nor a mind without 
teaching. The cultivation of the mind is the business of philosophy. It removes imperfections, roots 
and all, and prepares minds for seed sowing. It imparts to them, as one might say, sows things which 
when come to maturity will produce abundant fruit.”1 One thousand years later, Renaissance 
humanists adopted the word and eventually it gave rise to its vernacular variants in European 
languages: cultura, Kultur, culture, etc. Since the word culture in modern English has far too many 
tangential associations, let‟s use the term cultivation.2 
The Ideal of Cultivation is not a coherent idea, but an orientation toward the world; a pattern of 
consciousness that can exist only when we build cities and live in permanent settlements. Sedentary 
life shapes our perceptions and expectations in ways not accessible to hunter gatherers or horse riding 
nomads. Not all civilisations have thought this idea, but it could not possibly have been thought 
anywhere but in a civilisation. That is to say, civilisation in a strictly technical sense, as it derives 
from civitas, Latin for city, or city-state. 
Civilised peoples make the city the centre of their material existence. The city's novelty is in 
concentrating population in permanent settlement through agriculture and animal husbandry. It then 
makes possible the erection of grand, permanent edifices, vast public works such as irrigation canals, 
the invention of writing, codification of law, increased division of labour and complex social 
stratifications, the expansive tendencies of imperialism or colonisation through military conquest, 
trade and exploration; the advance of techniques to manipulate nature; the emergence of the state as 
the predominant social institution and the development of political activity.  
To say that civilisation itself must encourage development of an Ideal of Cultivation is perhaps banal 
when so many other different and competing ethical ideas, and in some sense all ethical thought could 
be attributed to the same fact. But it is not banal from the perspective of deep historical time: where 
civilisation is a stunningly recent event in the life of our species. When we apply this insight to the 
work of a modern thinker like Nietzsche it can illuminate ideas that have grown invisible because of 
their familiarity. 
Rational Consciousness: the Idea of Physis 
Defiance of nature is what distinguishes the simplest civilisation. Hunter-gatherers excel in adapting 
themselves to harsh environments; civilisation excels in adapting the environment for its purposes. It 
is about mastery and control not just making do with what is there. That is why the technology of 
civilisation is superior. 
Underlying all of its technologies however is the practice of agriculture. Without agriculture as the 
main form of subsistence, civilisation cannot happen, because only agriculture can promise ongoing 
and predictable subsistence. It enables us to readjust perceptions of reality from rudimentary needs, 
toward more elaborate desires, and new types of social arrangements. 
Agriculture causes non-civilised forms of consciousness to break down. Non-civilised peoples believe 
                                                                
1 Cited in Kathleen Freeman,God, Man and the State: Greek Concepts, London, 1952, p.180. 
2 Kant, Immanuel, Education, tr. A. Churton, Ann Arbor:Michigan, 1960. 
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events are caused entirely by magical forces or spirits acting within the material world. This animistic 
consciousness sees natural processes and human actions as the caprice of animate forces. Though it is 
easy for the animist to suppose that the world acts according to desires, as he himself does, his sense 
of causality is encouraged by close dependence on his habitat, which he is powerless to change. 
In civilisation, technology transforms habitat, and makes us confident of our powers. Even if animism 
never wholly disappears, its influence wanes once technique becomes complex and effective. A 
modern woman may check her horoscope before she begins the day, but she takes the pill before she 
sees her boyfriend. Successful technique depends on the discovery that nature takes a predictable 
course after a certain action is performed. These are sequences of causality to which even gods are 
subject and which mankind can exploit. In the process of learning, classifying and organising them 
we dispense with myth and reduce magical forces to simple mechanisms. The more our technique 
advances, the more rationalistic we become, as in Alexandrian Greece, or early modern Europe. 
Likewise, as we surround ourselves with structures and artefacts of our own making, the wilderness 
seems separate and more foreign to us. The physical environment of the civilised world is a mosaic of 
boundaries, stone walls, straight roads, cultivated fields. The geometry of buildings and artefacts 
never seen in the chaos of the forest or steppe identifies limits and proportions to which the animist is 
not accustomed. Bounded and buffered by superficial regularity, civilised man, who is engaged in a 
ceaseless eternal struggle against entropy, imagines that nature too must have the same character, that 
it too must be lawful and comprehensible, in other words, rational. 
This belief, developed by Hellenic civilisation more than any predecessor, is the foundation of an 
Ideal of Cultivation. You cannot wish to perfect nature if you think it is capricious and unregulated, or 
if you cannot expect predictable effects from specific actions. Hellenic civilisation, based on the polis 
or city-state, and unusually prone to political turmoil, was also more than usually obsessed with 
regulation. Its aspiration for order was encouraged by the material environment of the civilisation and 
by the need for a stable intellectual reference point about which to construct a society. Initially this 
was provided by animist myths, but as these retreated, rationalist principles were sought that were 
universal and applicable to every polis. Eventually Greeks assumed that nature had distinctive and 
comprehensible patterns of growth and that reason was a quality of nature, unfolding itself in its 
forms. From this point on it was possible to relate ethical behaviour to natural processes, and thus to 
link ethical speculation to a rationalist cosmology. 
In the animist phase, we feel that it is best for us to follow the example of the gods as does, for 
example, Hebrew and Christian belief. In the rationalist order we seek to behave like nature. In this 
order it is the height of reason and good sense to become as natural as possible. By obeying nature's 
laws you achieve a higher form of being for both nature and yourself. Man, it is held, should strive for 
nature's perfection and represent that perfection in his life, as he is the only creature able to do 
consciously what nature already does unconsciously. 
The belief that you can justify yourself by relating your actions to the widest motions of the cosmos, 
what may be termed the principle of physis, is the next fundamental step in creating the Ideal of 
Cultivation and will be discussed in detail later. For the moment, let us consider what we might mean 
when we seek to perfect nature. 
Perfecting Nature 
There are two ways people can look at the task of perfecting nature. The first supposes that there are 
pre-existing ideal forms in the world that we must conform to as closely as possible. The second 
assumes that there is no particular end or ideal state, but that perfection consists in continually 
improving and evolving from what already exists. 
First idea - closed and harmonic 
The first idea is an extension of our tendency to simplify and organise sensory data by storing it in 
symbolic form. 
Because we represent the world to each other through spoken, written and gestured symbols, we 
sometimes we deceive ourselves into believing that symbols have a life of their own. We say table, 
and make a shadowy image in our mind that is the universal table. You and I don‟t share precisely the 
same image but it is enough for us to agree about what we are referring to: a flat plane supported by 
three or more legs. All the varieties of tables we have ever seen are encapsulated in our imagination 
by this image. 
But what if, as happened in antiquity, some philosopher turns the trick and supposes that all the 
varieties of tables there are were only outward manifestations or corruptions of a universal ideal table 
that lies not just in our imagination, but inherently in nature. 
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In antiquity this belief was pervasive. Many Greek thinkers taught that everything in nature contained 
an ideal telos or destiny to which it tended by specific laws of development. The aim of every 
organism, including man, was to grow to the completeness already promised it at its conception. This 
was the highest excellence and virtue. Accordingly, to see perfection would be to see a thing when it 
can become no more, i.e. when it reaches a state that approximates the ideal behind it. Perfection in 
this sense could be regarded as the completion of quality, in the same way as infinity can be regarded 
as the completion of dimension. This first type of perfection then, consists in abolishing resistance 
and arriving at a state of order and peace. 
Perhaps the same understanding is behind Greek adoration of the circle: simple, uniform, harmonious, 
closed, yet infinite. In ethical discourse the circle could be equated to the quality of sophrysune. 
Originally this meant a harmonious, healthy state of mind but later signified tact, balance, or healthy 
control of the faculties. It is evident that the Greeks began to imagine that living itself could be a 
crafted object whose end was purification and approximation to an ideal type. 
The belief that all phenomena are representations of transcendent idealities already resting behind 
them is implicit in Plato‟s philosophy of forms and has supported varieties of idealist speculation to 
the present. For Plato and his sympathisers, the ethical injunction to perfect nature would consist in 
working towards a pre-existing ideal which mankind must first discover.  
Second idea - open-ended and progressive 
There is a second way of understanding perfection, which holds that excellence is neither immutable 
nor eternal, but in constant renewal. Perfection arises by imposing an ideal upon the real, rather than 
by pursuing the ideal reality that is within nature. The completion of perfection can never happen 
because when one ideal position is reached a better one is observed a little further on. This process 
may be thought of as ceaseless perfecting rather than striving for perfection. It assumes that the forms 
of nature can be graded hierarchically from the simple to most complex, with the lowest species of at 
the bottom and immortal divinities at the top. However were we to assume that the hierarchy was 
static and permanent, and all things happy to remain within their forms, there could be no demand for 
perfection. It can only occur when we assume that forms can change within themselves and achieve 
new ways of being, when hierarchy is seen to be in motion and that all things are struggling from a 
lowly toward a more complex and excellent state. 
The injunction that follows is obvious. If mankind is midway in the scale of beings, higher than 
animals but lower than gods, he is incomplete. That state of incompletion is an invitation to 
improvement and goodness would always consist in acquiring some quality of higher nature or 
divinity. It is a positive moral advantage that man is not already perfect or immortal, since if he were 
already divine he would not be able to justify himself. But even if mankind already sits at nature‟s 
pinnacle, it is possible for mankind to justify itself by developing further, into a new species perhaps, 
or else by presenting mankind as nature's tool for bettering itself. As nature's highest being we could 
strive to improve all being. Perfecting would always consist in mastering technique and ceaselessly, 
restlessly, overcoming resistance. 
This understanding of perfection, already evident in antiquity, has become the preferred form in the 
West since the Middle Ages. In the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries it supported new varieties of 
the Ideal of Cultivation and a new and dominating competitor we know today as the idea of progress. 
The idea of progress holds that the process of perfecting is linear and accretive, but it does not seek to 
achieve the same things as an ideal of cultivation. In general it holds the goal of our endeavour to be 
the promotion of happiness by conquering nature to increase of our comfort and material welfare. 
Progress consists in making life as easy and as comfortable, or as just and as equitable, as possible, 
but the Ideal of Cultivation assumes that perfection can only enhance moral, intellectual and spiritual 
excellence. Our growing power over nature should result in the improvement of the soul, the mind, 
the virtue, the inner quality of man, and the elevation of the value of his actions. 
Both ways of understanding how nature can be perfected, one closed and harmonic and the other 
open-ended and progressive, have held education to be the primary method for improving the nature 
of mankind, and of raising the level of nature. Terms for education and for cultivation or culture, such 
as Bildung or Paideia have almost always been synonymous. In antiquity, education was most often 
compared in its effects on man to those of agriculture upon plants. Greek thinkers praised education 
extravagantly using this metaphor. Antiphon states that "the first thing, I believe, for mankind is 
education. Whenever anyone does the beginning of anything correctly, it is likely also that the end 
will be right. As one sows so can one expect to reap. If in a young body one sows a noble education, 
this lives and flourishes through the whole of his life, and neither rain nor drought destroy it."3 
More than two thousand years later adherents to the ideal still hold this line. Immanuel Kant, whose 
ethical philosophy it sustains, explicitly advises that "in education lies the great secret of the 
                                                                
3 Cited in Kathleen Freeman,God, Man and the State: Greek Concepts, London, 1952, p.180. 
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perfecting of human nature.”4 Accordingly the education of humanity, the process of acquiring and 
passing on knowledge and skill, completes what already is given to it by nature. 
Division of labour  
Agriculture changes our relation to nature and makes new social formations possible. The more 
efficiently that food is produced the greater the number of people who can live alongside each other. 
Larger numbers jostle uneasily in forms of social organisation like the tribe or clan, which have been 
the archetypal social form and the source of human evolution. The tribe is a small vessel and cannot 
hold such numbers. By forcing more people into one place civilisation loosens tribal bonds and makes 
new social constellations possible. 
A civilisation that develops and diversifies its productive base - pottery, metal making and working 
are typical – creates too much knowledge for any one mind and too much work for one pair of hands. 
To keep that knowledge, and do that work it is efficient to assign it to specialists. In the tribe there is 
already specialisation between sexes and individuals, but in civilisation whole classes and castes 
emerge based upon the function they perform. At a bare minimum civilisation needs a lower caste to 
support, either grudgingly as free citizens or sullenly as slaves, a numerically smaller class that is free 
from the burden of subsistence. The non-productive class may be further stratified by the services or 
functions it performs, as warriors, scribes, merchants, artisans, priests...  
By this means existence is functionalised. You are no longer a human but a representative of your 
role. Role becomes personal destiny every time one generation passes it on to the next. In Europe‟s 
Middle Ages, being born into a guild sealed what you did with your life. It was an arranged marriage. 
The agony of modern teenagers who do not know what to study and have no idea what they want to 
do was unknown. Even so, once modern teenagers do cross that Rubicon, they can afterwards attest 
that they are a C# developer or project manager. 
In civilisation, vocational ethics appear that honour the values or skills of specific castes or trades; the 
potter justifies himself by his fine pots, the scribe by his learning, the merchant by his wealth. Each 
vocation seeking its own excellence may be seen as a type of perfectionism, but cannot be regarded as 
an Ideal of Cultivation. This demands a more open-ended view of human possibility, which holds that 
specialism works against our best interests and impairs our completeness. The highest estimation of 
universal abilities is one of the enduring elements of every Ideal of Cultivation. 
The ideal of cultivation is a reaction against the functionalising of existence. 
So while civilisation produces a division of labour and increases the number of specialists, there is 
also a reaction to this process as certain classes disassociate themselves from it: maybe a warrior 
aristocracy with the power of arms, or priests or scribes with the power to manipulate symbols or, in 
some instances, merchants, with the power of the purse. 
Ruling castes, whether military, intellectual or economic in character and mostly all three, have the 
benefit of a universal outlook not expected of those in trades. This is natural when you are perched on 
the top of the tree and have leisure and perspective to observe all that is happening below. Upper 
classes estimate the virtues of command most highly and sneer at detailed work. As administrators 
they are expected to take the widest possible view and not encumber themselves with minutiae. 
Broader knowledge makes them adaptable, capable of not one, but many excellences. 
If not equipped for many tasks by nature, they receive an education that trains them to be. Since 
ruling classes do not struggle for their needs and can lead a leisured existence, they can ornament 
their behaviour with codes of honour that would encumber those who daily confront necessity. 
Leisure encourages virtuosity, as much in the skills of command as pastimes. A martial nobility or 
bourgeoisie admires soldierly skill, strength, bravery, and fortitude, but also honours its adornment by 
courtly manners, noble intentions, well-roundedness, fine dress, and poetry and music. It is not 
incidental that it is to professional warriors that the world owes its earliest examples of high culture. 
The Homeric hoplites, the troubadours of Provençal, the Samurai of Japan were martial castes who 
sought to show excellence in artistic accomplishment as well as in deeds. 
Ruling classes and castes are the originators and retainers of ideals of cultivation, and present their 
prejudices and proclivities as values of universal validity. 
Individuality in civilisation 
Civilisation liberates the individual from the family or clan and subjects the clan to the rule of the 
state. Ideals of cultivation may be individualist or corporatist, but all pre-suppose a degree of self-
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reflection not available to hunter gatherers or simple farmers. 
The tribe member does not see his life as something separate; it is subject to laws and privileges 
seldom questioned. If conflict occurs, it results from power struggles between clans or tribes, and not, 
as occurs in civilisation, between different religions or ideologies or different ways of thinking about 
how power or wealth should be distributed. Diversification of social interactions in civilisation 
weakens and simplifies the tyranny of tribal kinship, and unconscious attachment to the clan. 
Great populations in one place multiply the number and types of social interactions possible, which in 
turn, force individuals to make choices and divide their loyalties. Subjective innocence is lost. 
Individuals can defect from the group and think of their existence as something separate and entire in 
itself. In the populous cosmopolitan cities of Hellenistic Greece and the Roman Empire, individuals 
could be atomised, and receive an impression of themselves as self-contained beings. Self-
consciousness, whose increase is proportionate to the existence of individuality, underlies every 
attempt to formulate an ethical system like an Ideal of Cultivation.  
In the tribal group there is moral thinking not ethical thinking. In tight social structures how you act 
within yourself does not matter as much as how you behave in relation to others. Ethical thought is 
about the best life you can lead for yourself. It can only occur when the bonds holding together the 
tribe loosen and introspection undermines moral thinking. In the introspective Hellenistic civilisation, 
every variety of belief from naive religion to extreme scepticism was available. Probably the same 
variety as exists today, and certainly no less sophisticated. 
Once the individual becomes the focus of ethical thinking, there is a parallel demand for universal 
standards. Individuals are tiny slender things, and seek ethical support in the wider world. The more 
atomised they feel, the more they are likely to give their destiny cosmic dimensions, and the more 
they calibrate their own value against universal standards that apply to all people of all nations. 
Self conscious individuals, unlike unconscious group members, magnify the value of their existence, 
sometimes more highly than the group itself. At the same time groups in which the value of 
individuality is raised can even justify themselves by honouring their precepts and memory of great 
heroes. Peoples prone to hero-worship, who celebrate and pride themselves in the deeds or thoughts 
of the great men they have produced, judge the quality of other peoples accordingly. This is quite 
different to peoples that deify individuals such as kings or emperors impersonally; that is, worship 
individuals for their rank and power rather than for their achievements. 
That great traveller Herodotus noted that the Greeks - who did evolve an Ideal of Cultivation - 
admired and mythologised singularly excellent individuals, but "heroes - men, that is, who have been 
subsequently deified - have no place in the religion of Egypt" which, as far as we can tell, never 
produced such an ideal.5 Elsewhere he explicitly related the quality of its individuals to a nation's 
capacity for civilisation: "Round the Black Sea" he says, “are to be found, if we except Scythia, the 
most uncivilised nations in the world. No one could claim that the rest have any of the arts of civilised 
life, or have produced any man of distinction....."6 
The judgement that individuals of distinction determine how we should value the group, does not 
however necessarily mean that freedom for individuals was easy or welcome. In the polis any who 
performed great deeds were punished if their power or success threatened equilibrium. It was Athens, 
after all, that practiced ostracism and banned from the city many of its brightest and best simply 
because they were guilty of being too prominent. In spite of egalitarian checks and balances of this 
sort, we can say that any civilisation that celebrates talent is also prone to develop ideals of cultivation 
and perfectionism. When you think that mortals are able to become divine you are probably an 
optimistic view of human possibility and when great accomplishments are so honoured many would 
hope to justify themselves by realising them. 
The politics of cultivation 
Ideals of cultivation can be for individuals and an entire group. A group, like an individual, may 
believe that it can justify itself by perfecting its nature, and can consciously resolve to organise itself 
in a way so as to realise this end. In doing so it may see the group itself as the most important thing, 
or may decide that the purpose of the group is to make it favourable for the development of all 
individuals. 
Elaborate resolutions like this can only be made when the group is capable of politics, law-making, 
and statecraft. The premise that humanity en masse can be shaped and moulded through technical 
control can only occur within civilisation, which employs politics to maintain order or power and 
distribute goods, but also to cultivate its citizenry. The politics of cultivation supposes that humanity 
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can breed cultivated individuals by manipulating social structures. For this to occur, the tribe has to 
have been supplanted by the form of organisation known as the "state" which is itself the product of 
the synoecism of tribes or villages. 
As civilisations become more complex, the power and role of the state increases, with the result that it 
becomes the primary power affecting all decisions about how we conduct ourselves. Eventually the 
exercise of state power by individuals or groups encourages the exhibition of virtuosity, and the view 
that the state itself can be regarded as a product of technique, and statecraft as a form of artistry. 
The Hellenic city-states were what 19th century German scholars called culture-states or state-
cultures7; states in which leaders and intellectuals consciously sought to create a superior citizenry by 
enacting laws to encourage virtuous behaviour. Most honoured among the Greeks were the real or 
mythical founders of cities: the great legislators – wise men like Solon or Lycurgus, who created the 
character of the nation through wisely drawn laws.  
Military aristocracies like that of Sparta actively practiced the politics of cultivation and its 
constitution was a model of it. Designed to make citizens militarily proficient (mainly to subdue the 
large helot population that kept the aristocracy fed)8 it inspired and guided radicals elsewhere like the 
Athenians Plato or Xenophon. For Spartans individual excellence was needed to protect the group: 
with the state‟s survival paramount, as Plutarch described it: "No man was allowed to live as he 
pleased, but... belonged entirely to their country, and not to themselves."9 This state, which produced 
little other than brave warriors, was regarded as a work in itself and a home for virtue. In states like 
Athens, intense public life required an active and resourceful citizenry, and virtue was more broadly 
defined. Afterwards, when Rome conquered the Mediterranean, Greek intellectuals like Polybius 
examined the republican constitution that had produced a new nation of virtuous heroes. 
In the polis ideals of cultivation were truly political in character, and aimed to breed virtue for the 
benefit of the group. Once the power of the polis was broken by the Macedonian and Roman empires, 
the politics of cultivation gave way to individualist ideals of cultivation. Imperial administrations 
could never be as intrusive or interested in shaping the quality of its citizenry as the city-states. 
Secular and non-secular orientations 
The material environment of civilisation stimulates new experiences of being and time and new 
expectations about the way life should be lived. Agriculture makes it possible for us to live in one 
place with food and drink across the seasons. Being in one place for long periods, means you invest 
more of yourself in that place: your labour, your attachments. You build durable structures to house 
and protect yourself and - something not really known to nomads - your property. And then, after you 
learn how to build permanent structures, you learn how to make a place sacred by what you build 
there. Stone structures inspire grander designs: tombs, temples or palaces that attest to the enduring 
power of peoples, princes or gods. 10 
Those who live in cities live in an object world of things that are made: of things that serve a practical 
purpose or that eternalise a symbol or meaning. We delight in these things: buildings, tools, artefacts 
sacred or ornamental, of this or earlier generations and in our capacity to make new or better ones. 
Each artefact or construction that is handed down links ancestors to descendents. Through the forms 
of writing, devised by a majority of civilisations, we extend the powers of human memory and give a 
permanent form to ideas and events, business transactions, heroic deeds. Through symbols the entire 
world, even thoughts, can be made thing-like - reified. History can be recorded and webs of 
significances can be woven around the buildings and artefacts they see before them. 
The intense material and emotional investment of civilised peoples' in the fabrication of objects, the 
production of deeds and the manipulation of symbols promotes a form of this-worldly spirituality. It 
honours the conviction that our responsibilities, energies and interest should be conferred on earthly 
life, and that there is no world of any consequence to us other than the one we inhabit daily. 
But even when the secular mood dominates in a civilisation, it remains in combat with the power of 
mythic consciousness, or other-worldliness. In the form of ecstatic religions like Christianity, 
Buddhism, and Islam, other-worldliness transforms and updates itself to respond to and accommodate 
secular civilisation. In essence it treats life in this world as a temporary prelude to a more significant 
existence that starts after death, and because death is not the end of life material or intellectual 
accomplishment in life matter little, and human action has little value other than in service to gods. 
                                                                
7 Jacob Burckhardt in particular focused his investigations on this phenomenon in his Reflections on History, tr. M.D.H., Edinburgh, 1943. 
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The theology of medieval Europe scorned human works and found impious the belief that men could 
surpass or perfect nature.  
 It is important to recognise that this is not just a battle between religion and secularism. Not all 
religion is captured by the mood and for long periods it can persist as an empty sham, in which 
observance matters more than feeling. Religion is not in itself inevitably other-worldly in character, 
for many variants even of ecstatic faiths have proposed that salvation could be found in this world. 
During the Renaissance and later in the Reformation theology could even conspire with philosophy to 
provide a reasoned ground for secular achievement, but every step in that direction necessarily lessens 
the importance of gods and raises the estimation of man; something astutely anticipated by the 
conservative Churchmen of Christianity's heyday. 
Civilisations dominated by religion can grow and prosper materially, as Sumeria and Egypt show, and 
whose greatest monuments were either tombs or homes for gods, whose state structures were 
dominated by priestly precepts and goals. But this is so only when there is a great deal of hypocrisy, 
when the forms of other-worldliness are aped, but the energies of the majority are intent on enjoyment 
of the fruits of the present. Even when the spell of other-worldliness takes hold and is widely believed 
it cannot stifle the self-interest of the merchant, the artisan, or the land-owner, or the aggression of the 
war-lord. Civilisations of fundamentally other-worldly orientation still require a vigorous secular base 
if they are not to decline, or become subject to external predation.  
The this-worldly response to mortality provides the most favourable foundation for an Ideal of 
Cultivation, because it demands a confidence in human powers that is not to be found among 
devotees of the other-world. But this is not enough. This-worldliness may simply encourage 
hedonism and enjoyment of earthly pleasures while we can, which is unlikely to result in formulation 
of an Ideal of Cultivation, since the latter makes considerable ethical demands and is unable to 
promise spontaneous happiness. Like the foundation of civilisation itself, it has little to do with the 
desire for happiness, since it requires a restlessness that can only stem from dissatisfaction. In periods 
of cultural advance people are not happier, but they are more vigorous. It was during the Greek 
enlightenment that the tragic drama developed. Holding life a chaotic misery to be encountered in a 
spirit of dignity or nobility, the quality of writing exceeded that of the less turbulent but "happier" age 
of Alexandrian imperialism, when only domestic comedy remained a vital medium of expression. 
It is only in the most developed phases of a civilisation that the search for happiness becomes 
paramount. Either that, or the spirit of the epigoni, the latecomers, sets in and kills the secular mood. 
In late antiquity individuals either embraced the eudaimonic doctrines of the philosophic schools or 
journeyed to mystical other-worlds, of the sort promised by Christianity. Secular despair removed of 
hope or promise (the kind that has charmed poets of all civilisations) is also hostile to the goals of 
cultivation. If it were thought that mortality made all human endeavour insignificant and empty, and 
that men cannot influence the world for the better, or that the cosmos is utterly indifferent to their 
fortunes, then who would want to help themselves or labour for their self-improvement? 
To operate effectively an Ideal of Cultivation needs both hope and of hopelessness. It needs the fear 
of death, but not the paralysing belief in the pointlessness of all endeavour. It needs a belief that some 
form of immortality is realisable: in the enduring artefacts and objects of civilisation we can, through 
things made or deeds performed, continue to exist for generations to come.  
Although the desire to live on in the memory of descendents continues and deepens tendencies to 
ancestor worship in tribal society, its objects of reverence are exclusive and rare. Ancestor worship 
honours any dead patriarch or matriarch, but to be the revered objects of posterity you need to have 
done something noteworthy: you must have merited fame. It is this elitism embodied in Heraclitus' 
declaration that "The best men prefer one thing to all others - everlasting fame to things mortal..." 11 
and appositely in Schiller's suggestion that "all that is common sinks down to Orcus unheard"12 
The desire by some to achieve everlasting glory means that most exist only in order to be conduits for 
justification of an elect few. Posterity cannot ever serve the majority of individuals because, not 
everyone can be remembered for their deeds. However all individuals can achieve modest forms of 
immortality if they can see themselves as part of larger achievements or structures: a twig in a family 
genealogy perhaps; as a valued servant of the state, or a shopkeeper in a great and successful nation. 
The relationship between the renowned elect and the anonymous majority is mutually sustaining. 
Nations are grateful to their great individuals for in their glory all, down to the least, can bask and 
assume some credit. 
                                                                
11 Heraclitus, The First Philosophers of Greece, Translation of the Remaining Fragments of the Pre-Socratic Philosophers by A. Fairbanks, London, 
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Posterity 
The quest for living or posthumous glory incites passionate undertakings as much as the drives for 
sex, wealth or power. It begins on the battlefield, with the expectation that your deeds will be 
celebrated, maybe by poets. In Greece, Homer's epics tempt the bellicose. It was with Achilles that 
Alexander contended, as later conquerors from Caesar to Napoleon sought to outshine Alexander.  
The cult of heroism in war is a model for other forms of achievement. The poets who celebrate heroes 
become heroes as poets and so battlefield glitter transfers to literature, art, philosophy or science. 
When Greek and Roman poets openly laboured for immortal fame, posterity became went beyond 
great deeds, becoming a series of intellectual productions with a palpable and powerful afterlife. The 
reward of knowing you will be remembered, and the satisfaction of seeing your actions or productions 
benefiting those to come has tempted many engaged in culture. Good deeds are said to have a 
cumulative effect; whereby those selfless and noble enough to work for posterity enrich future 
generations by their efforts.  
It is plain how belief in posterity is needed to support an Ideal of Cultivation. Recognition of 
achievement encourages us to develop ourselves as part of an ongoing project handed from generation 
to generation, like the expanding Republic of Genius of the humanists, to which every nation 
contributes its finest individuals. 
The need for culture to be supported by a faith in the immortality of posterity was observed by 
Diderot, most astute of all the philosophes, who describes "posterity" as "being for the philosopher 
what the other world is for the religious."13 It is, he says, the “sole encouragement, the sole support, 
the sole consolation... of men in a thousand unhappy circumstances."14 He goes so far as to doubt 
whether people would wish to live by an Ideal of Cultivation at all if it were not for the mutual 
recognition of the generations. “If our predecessors," he says, "have done nothing for us, and if we do 
nothing for our descendents, it is almost in vain that nature wills that man should be perfectible."15 
The result would be "no more ambition, no more monuments, poets, historians, perhaps no more 
warriors or wars. Everyone would cultivate his garden and plant his cabbages."16 Again he assures 
us that "if a comet collided with earth and destroyed the achievements of men to date - what effect 
would the knowledge of this event have on the conduct of men. Such knowledge would destroy all 
incentive to good or great action."17  
Appalled by his insight, Diderot could not shake off the horrible realisation that the highest spiritual 
achievements of civilisation are subject to the fickle and ephemeral operations of human memory, and 
that not even the monuments or arts of civilisation would suffice to cause people to recollect their 
debts to the past and future. It is inescapable that in a paltry few cerebra of a generation, the entire 
labour of humanity rests in trust. 
The Axial Age 
All civilisations increase human control of nature, but an Ideal of Cultivation can only be thought 
when people become conscious of the possibilities of that fact, and of their existence. Not all 
civilisations have been so self-aware and those that have - most notably China, India and Greece - did 
so when they were already old enough to have suffered cycles of decline and regeneration. What is 
remarkable is that all three did this independently, yet roughly contemporaneously, when many other 
fundamentally new intellectual currents were washing across civilisations from Europe to Asia.  
This event, which some regard as a world historical shift in consciousness, of which the Ideal of 
Cultivation is simply another result, occurred between the ninth and second centuries BC. For Karl 
Jaspers this axial or pivotal age came about when the peoples of a few civilisations began to forsake 
the sensibilities of their predecessors and attempted to compose religious and intellectual works that 
we have lived by and developed ever since. Homer, the tragedians and the philosophers of Greece, the 
prophets of Palestine, Zoroaster in Persia, the Upanishads and Buddha in India, and Confucius and 
Lao-tse in China all point to a related development. "The axis of world history seems to pass through 
the fifth century B.C., in the midst of the spiritual process between 800 and 200 B.C... The most 
extraordinary events are concentrated in this period. Confucius and Lao-tse were living in China, all 
the schools of Chinese philosophy came into being, including those of Mo-ti, Chuang-tse, Lieh-tsu 
and a host of others; India produced the Upanishads and Buddha and, like China, ran the whole 
gamut of philosophical possibilities down to scepticism, to materialism, sophism and nihilism; in Iran 
Zarathustra taught a challenging view of the world as a struggle between good and evil; in Palestine 
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the prophets made their appearance, from Elijah, by way of Isaiah and Jeremiah to Deutero-Isaiah; 
Greece witnessed the appearance of Homer, of the philosophers - Parmenides, Heraclitus and Plato - 
of the tragedians, Thucydides and Archemides. Everything implied by these names developed during 
these few centuries almost simultaneously in China, India, and the West, without any one of these 
regions knowing of the others."18 
The appearance in China, India, and Greece of philosophy as a way of thinking and acting pushes 
back mythical thought and brings forward rational inquiry and ethical religion. Older civilisations 
such as Sumeria and Egypt differ from non-civilisation more in technique than mentality. Their 
technological achievements excite, but their ventures in the realm of the spirit lack the lucidity and 
boldness of the axial civilisations. With some notable exceptions they remain curiously unconscious.  
In Greece, China, and India similar forms of social organisation and environmental circumstances 
precede the axial period. In no case did the new civilisation emerge sui generis; it inherited a fund of 
technical knowledge and powers, although in some cases only a portion of what had previously 
existed could have been available. The Greeks of the axial period emerged out of a dark ages, in 
which all about the ruins of ancient cities and palaces suggested a rapid, catastrophic collapse. The 
Mycenaean legacy was one of mythic memory and only a few of its discoveries lived on. For the later 
Indians the ancient cultures of Mohenjo-daro had vanished almost from recollection. 
Similarities also exist in the political organisation of the three civilisations. A commanding imperial 
structure did not arise until much later in their development; so politics was local in character, and 
many independent towns, city-states and territories contended for prestige and power in a context of 
common language and culture. Prosperity persisted alongside minor yet incessant party-strife, 
revolution and external war. In a milieu disposed to fragmentation the individual is either compelled 
into allegiances or isolated and released into self-inspection and introspection.  
The philosophies and religions of the axial-age are the fruit of intense and self-absorbed speculation. 
By applying intelligence in consistent appraisal of similar problems the people of the axial 
civilisations reach a layer of interpretation of experience which is residual and unchanging. According 
to Jaspers, “until today mankind has lived by what happened during the Axial Period, by what was 
thought and created during the period. In each new upward flight it returns in recollection to this 
period and is fired anew by it. Ever since then it has been the case that recollections and 
reawakenings of the potentialities of the Axial Period - renaissances - afford a spiritual impetus. 
Return to this beginning is the ever-recurrent event in China, India and the West."19 
Ever since the Axial age the intellectual life of western civilisation has been a process of forgetting, 
rediscovering and then modifying core beliefs then discovered. Even at the source there was never a 
single set of precepts for the Ideal of Cultivation. These changed as civilisations changed, although in 
accordance within easily recognisable typologies. But understanding the first developments in the 
history of the ideal will help us to describe the form of the ideal that Nietzsche in turn was to 
articulate. 
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2 - Types of the Ideal of Cultivation 
The Ideal of Cultivation took different forms in relation to the phases of Greek civilisation. Literary 
evidence is scant in the early stages but we have enough information to enable us to trace its evolution 
from Mycenae to the empire of Alexander. 
In this span most of the basic patterns of the Ideal of Cultivation that appear later in the west were 
conceived and acted upon: the Homeric courtly ideal, the republican or political ideal, the nationalist 
ideal of Pan-Hellenism, and the personalist cosmopolitan models of Hellenism.  
The most detailed and definitive investigation of the history and character of the Greek Ideal of 
Cultivation ever attempted is Werner Jaeger's three volume Paideia and in the following brief 
sketches, it is to this authority that we largely defer.20 
The Warrior or Courtly Ideal of Cultivation: Paideia and Areté 
The earliest Ideal of Cultivation in Greece appears after two profound events: the existence of a 
highly developed Mycenaean civilisation in the latter part of the second millennium BC, and its 
decline and disappearance, possibly after invasions by Greek-speaking but less technically developed 
invaders. The dark age that followed in peninsular Greece and its Aegean colonies lasted until about 
the eighth century BC, when appeared the first signs of a surge in original thought and creativity that 
was to become the Greek enlightenment. 
By the eighth century BC Mycenaean palaces were in ruins, but aristocratic culture and values were 
not. Homeric epics keep alive the memory of the courts and warriors long after they are gone. If they 
cannot speak reliably of that civilisation, they do provide, in the first phase of the Greek Ideal of 
Cultivation, powerful ethical guidance equivalent to that of the Old Testament in Jewish culture. But 
where the Bible takes the values of nomadic patriarchy as paradigm, Homeric epic idealises the 
values of landed nobility and offers as models for living the behaviour of Achaean warriors: their 
individuality, pride, personal honour, and technical excellence in combat. The earliest Hellenic Ideal 
of Cultivation invokes as the image of human perfection warrior heroes whose life and deeds 
transfigure existence and extend ideals of humanity to semi-divinity. 
Poetry and philosophy carry values beyond their material origins. The images of excellent men drawn 
by poets inspire emulation long after the society that originated them has waned. In tumultuous post-
Periclean Athens Plato complains jealously of those who regard Homer as the "educator of Greece", 
and seeks to replace poetic education with a philosophical one of his own.21 But values do not persist 
through poetry if there are not also many who share a penchant for warfare and valour. Mycenae was 
dominated by a palace culture, but the Greek civilisation of the eighth century BC was dominated by 
aristocratic classes of the polis or city-state whose values must have resembled those of their 
predecessors.  
In this period the terms areté and paideia - pivotal and enduring components of subsequent phases of 
the Ideal of Cultivation - were first employed to describe the highest ethical qualities. The word areté 
defines personal excellence or nobility, and was used in much the same way as the Renaissance 
Italian word virtù. Like virtù, areté did not have the moral connotations we associate with Christian 
goodness, but those of proficiency, talent, or valour tempered by a profound sense of honour.22 It was 
the supreme pride of the aristocracy or, as they called themselves, the Kaloikagathoi (from the 
compound of Kalos kai agathos - literally meaning the beautiful and the good), to value the qualities 
they believed they embodied: gentlemanly conduct, knightly valour, courtly refinement and artistic 
accomplishment, much as the minnesänger of the Middle Ages or the courtier of the Renaissance. 
The kaloskagothos was a synthetic individual able to master all he chose to do, save what was menial 
or specialist. He exercised daily and prided himself as much on his body as his intellect and learning. 
A strong sense of pride and honour, rather than moral codes, set him on the path to right conduct. All 
this in a person constituted areté. 
The process by which an individual acquired areté was called paideia (Paideia) which came to mean 
formation, education, or self-perfecting, though at the earliest period of its usage it referred to nothing 
more than child nurture or upbringing.23 Because areté was the dominant value of the dominant class 
it became the aim of education for all free citizens within the polis. That is to say, while education for 
the Greeks had simple utilitarian goals, as training among civilised and non-civilised peoples has 
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always had, its primary aim was to produce a specific ethical type. 
This is evident in their use of writing and reading which spread throughout Greece in the sixth and 
seventh centuries BC. Older civilisations like Egypt, Mesopotamia and perhaps the Minoan cultures 
of the Aegean had a longer history of literacy but developed the instruction of writing as a specialist 
training for officials and priests in the service of the state. In these civilisations literacy was the 
preserve of a scribal caste aware of the power and prestige it conferred on them and holding in 
contempt those condemned to manual labours. 
In the Greek city-states no specialist scholarly caste developed and therefore there was no scribal 
education. Citizens had to perform various duties in public service, so allocating literacy to one 
functional caste was not practical, hence the prevailing aristocratic contempt for the technician, the 
artisan, or specialised man. Greek schools were never sponsored by the state and were either run 
privately for poorer students or tuition was provided at home for the rich. To some extent, all citizens 
were teachers, and school classes were not conducted separated, as they are today, from outside 
observers who could interfere with, encourage, or condemn the instruction. 
In earlier civilisations you performed a function because you were literate, but the Greeks thought that 
reading or writing simply added to your humanity. If education had any purpose it was to fashion a 
synthetic individual who could realise any potential without impairing any other. So fashioned, a 
person might encounter and control life's contingencies. Paideia should show us, as the Athenian 
rhetorician Isocrates asserted, how to distinguish between "misfortunes" due to ignorance and others 
due to necessity. It should teach us to “guard against the former and bear the latter nobly."24 
Our actions and also our knowledge must reflect well roundedness, as the Sophists were to 
demonstrate with virtuosity. Social conventions limit what we can profess to know, but allow us to 
take pride in our discrimination and judgement in all affairs. This became a familiar point raised in 
praise of paideia. The educated man has unerring judgement. He quickly grasps the essentials of 
every problem and complements his insight with an understanding of the principles underlying the 
varieties of learning.  
Aristotle notes the difference between scientific knowledge and paideia, stating that a man subjected 
to the latter as opposed to the former can "judge correctly whether another man's explanation is right 
or wrong." He then goes on to point to this capacity as the very foundation of cultivation. “That is in 
fact what we think the generally cultured man is", he says, "and culture [paideia] is the ability to do 
that. Only we think the cultured man is able to judge about practically everything by himself, while 
the other man can do so only for one special field. For in special fields too there must be a cultured 
man corresponding to the universal type we have described. "25 
The cultivated man scorns the utility and effeminacy of utilitarian training because he is free and 
accustomed to leisure. He does not have to work for a living so can occupy himself with what is not 
immediately useful. Free citizens must be generally capable and adaptable, but also receptive to 
refined leisure. This ancient scruple of the idle warrior is reflected in the subjects pupils were taught, 
for although some had obvious practical benefits others, like music, manifestly did not. 
Aristotle‟s pedestrian intellect informs us of prevailing opinion, and advances this argument to 
support the contemporary practice of teaching pupils "useful" and "useless" subjects. In the Politics 
he observes that "the subjects nowadays regularly studied serve both virtue and utility..." and notes 
that "about four are generally taught to children, (1) Reading and Writing, (2) Physical Training, (3) 
Music, and (4), not always included, Drawing." Of these he says, "reading and writing and drawing 
are useful in daily life in a variety of ways, gymnastic because it aims to make men strong and brave. 
But about music there is a real question. Most men nowadays take part in music for the sake of the 
pleasure it gives; but some lay it down that music is fundamental in education on the ground that 
nature herself, as has often been said, aims at producing men not merely able to work properly but fit 
also for the life of cultivated leisure. And this latter, we repeat, is the basis of the whole business... 
There remains one purpose - to provide an occupation for leisure; and that is clearly the reason why 
they did introduce music into education, regarding it as an occupation of free men... Clearly then 
there is a form of education which we must provide for our sons, not as being useful or essential but 
elevated and gentlemanly.26 
The novelty of the Greeks was to believe that education was a foundation of virtue as opposed to 
mere training. Paideia was not just a preparation for life, but life‟s entire purpose: a justification for 
living. You can only live at the highest level by continually renewing yourself in the process of self-
perfection. In Jaeger‟s view, the Greeks "...relied wholly on this clear realisation of the natural 
principles governing human life, and the immanent laws by which man exercises his physical and 
intellectual powers. To use that knowledge as a formative force in education, and by it to shape the 
living man as the potter moulds clay... into a preconceived form - that was a bold creative idea which 
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could have been developed only by that nation of artists and philosophers. The greatest work of art 
they had to create was man."27 
When the worth of a life is measured how much it is subject to paideia, any person who has not 
enjoyed its benefits is deemed to have no value. This conviction was stated repeatedly in Greek 
literature before and after the fifth century enlightenment. If there were quarrels about how paideia 
should be conducted, its absolute value was never disputed. In the Timaeus Plato has Socrates remark 
that if the proper conditions combine in man “with any true nurture or education he attains the 
fullness and health of the perfect man, and escapes the worst disease of all; but if he neglects 
education (paideia) he walks lame while alive to the end of his journey, and returns imperfect and 
good for nothing to the world below."28Plato's pupil Aristotle is equally passionate. Once, when asked 
how the educated and uneducated differ: "As much..." he was said to have answered, “as the living 
from the dead."29 There is also the oft-cited anecdote of the philosopher Stilpo, who was in Megara 
when it was occupied by the forces of Demetrius. The conqueror ensured that Stilpo's house was 
preserved and all his plundered property returned to him. "But when he requested that a schedule of 
the lost property be drawn up, Stilpo denied that he had lost anything which really belonged to him, 
for no one had taken away his paideia.”30 
The shape of the Greek Ideal of Cultivation changes along with the shape of Greek civilisation, but 
the silhouette of the Mycanean aristocrat is never completely obscured. The prejudices of Mycanean 
aristocracy, exaggerated and absolute, are also those of the elites at every stage of Greek civilisation 
and in most that follow in the West, or wherever ardent lust for glory is tempered by refinement of 
manners. The earliest form of the Ideal of Cultivation is the ethos of the courtier or gentleman: 
balancing the extremes of the vita activa and vita otiosa (the traditional polarities of warrior culture 
where short durations of extreme action link longer durations of idleness) and opposing the vita 
contemplativa. If learning is needed to develop men to perfection, it must be checked by gymnastic 
exercise or warlike recreations.  
To be complete you need to develop your mind and body in equal measure. 
Age of the Polis - The Republican Ideal of Cultivation 
In the 7th and 6th centuries BC a civilisation rose from the ruins of Mycenae that differed to the one 
that preceded it. The basis of Mycenae was not so much the city as we understand it but extended 
fortresses, strongholds and palaces of many kings and kinglets. It is likely that enormous divisions 
would have existed between these aristocratic families, whose principal preoccupation was war, and 
the subject peoples who laboured to sustain them.  
In the next stage of Greek civilisation however, the city-state or polis held centre stage, and monarchy 
was rare. The polis was not the extended possession of a king, or god, but of a people and in it the 
gulf between aristocracy and other free citizens contracted, although all were economically dependent 
on a large slave class. Even where tyrants were in power, they were not regarded as having special 
right to rule, they were simply citizens who were more powerful than others. 
Within the city-state new economies of trade and manufacture supplied the wealth of an urban elite, a 
bourgeoisie which, though not having the lustre of the aristocrat‟s landed wealth, was a potent 
political force. Even the free-born artisan, despised for his manual labour by the aristocrat, could 
become wealthy and politically effective. 
This new citizenry - and it is for the first time that we can actually talk about citizenry in a political 
sense - acquired a corporate spirit based on their loyalty to the city. Religion too played a role, 
providing a mythos to support the secular civic order. Greek religion in the age of the polis served the 
state, rather than itself; an entire reversal of the practice of the ancient city-states of Mesopotamia. 
The polis was by no centre of harmony and cooperation. It lacked the bureaucratic apparatus of 
empires and kingdoms and therefore a professional administrative class. Public duties and offices 
were allocated to citizens. The amateurism of public service and the presence of a turbulent and 
independent populace multiplied parties and interests within the polis and consequently many 
competing opinions about how the state should be organised emerged. It was this place and time after 
all that supplied the West with all of its fundamental political ideas.  
Public offices were still mostly occupied by the aristocracy, but the people participated as never 
before in affairs of state. When the tyrannies that ruled most Greek states in the sixth century 
collapsed, political activity grew more frenetic. Each city's party of nobles contended with the 
bourgeoisie for power. To complicate matters, each polis also contended bitterly with its neighbours. 
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Commercial, military and diplomatic competition between city-states demanded the highest levels of 
leadership and service as smaller states were easily and not infrequently uprooted or destroyed. The 
fractious, destabilising and public nature of Greek politics gave capable individuals a new domain in 
which to advance themselves and every well born youth now aspired to be a statesman or leader. 
In keeping with newly awakened sources of civic devotion and responsibilities the model of areté 
shifted from the Mycanean hero to a different style of heroism. Although the polis still needed 
warriors, it also needed politicians. Cities realised that prosperity depended on political affairs being 
in the hands of the most adept. Thought was given to a more appropriate form of paideia to train such 
beings, and this brought on a pedagogical revolution around the second half of the fifth century that 
we associate with the sophists.  
These hired instructors invented what we would call today “higher education” for young adults where 
previously there had only ever been schooling for children.31 Little is known of their method but their 
teaching focussed on imparting technical political skills, philosophic reasoning and universal 
knowledge. The object of their pedagogy was to prepare students for public life. Decisively athletics 
and gymnastics were displaced from top positions in the pantheon of excellence by training of the 
intellect. The kaloskagathos now needed more than an appealing appearance. Intellectual training in 
rhetoric and philosophy provided students with skills in forensic elocution and dialectical reasoning.  
That rhetoric should find its way into sophist teachings is obvious. Power in the polis, with its volatile 
populace, belonged to those with a persuasive voice. Statesmen needed to know how to sway or 
steady a crowd, and posts in public administration, courts and the military all demanded skill in public 
speaking. In time oratory was practised as an art in itself and as another measure of the cultivated 
man. For Isocrates (436-338 BC), the greatest teacher of rhetoric in fourth century Athens, it even 
identified a deep and serious humanism far beyond the claims of political technique. "It is not," he 
says, by their "courage or wealth, or such advantages" which determine that a man has received 
paideia but "is made manifest most of all by their speech, and that this has proved itself to be the 
surest sign of culture in every one of us, and that those who are skilled in speech are not only men of 
power in their own cities but are also held in honour in other states."32 
Unlike rhetoric, philosophy had no immediate utility but it did serve to round out a student's 
knowledge of the world and develop a capacity for logic and clear thinking. No one could claim to be 
educated without having studied either subject. So even though the sophists' instruction had utilitarian 
ends, it did not exclude the aristocratic principles that guided paideia in the earlier epoch; namely, to 
develop men for their intrinsic worth, rather than fit them as cogs into the communal machine.  
When cities sought to extend their powers or assert themselves against rival states they did not 
intensify the division of labour, or increase the dependence of each individual on the whole. 
Universalism was preferred with each individual being capable of independent action. The prized 
self-sufficiency of the ancient hero remained. He just had to be brainy as well. This was the case even 
in states as corporate and as disciplined as Sparta, which after all achieved the most complete and 
rigorous educational system of all the Greeks. The intention of Sparta‟s educational practices was to 
breed not only an heroic nation, but a nation of heroes.33 
The Greeks were at the edge of the vast Persian Empire, and many Ionian cities in Asia Minor were 
its subjects. In the north was a wilderness inhabited by nomadic pastoralists. Although not united 
politically, they felt themselves superior in achievement and capacity to the oriental civilisations and 
the European pastoralists. They attributed their superiority not to any innate qualities but to the 
paideia they received through their political institutions and customs, believing Greek states were 
better able to breed areté in their citizens. 
The civilisation of the polis was profoundly concerned with the kind of paideia individuals received 
through school and training, but was also aware that this was only one of the means for breeding 
areté. Many observed that the political environment of a city: its customs, institutions and laws was 
also a kind of school that shaped continuously the sentiments and values of all its citizens. This 
awareness - what we have already called the politics of cultivation - incited debate throughout the 
Greek cities: argument raged over which kind of state constitution developed the most capable 
citizens. This awareness is obvious in the words Thucydides (460-c.400 BC) places in the mouth of 
Pericles (490-429 BC). In the famous Funeral Oration Pericles compares the achievements of Athens 
with other Greek states, and describes his city as "an education to Greece", for its citizens 
demonstrate universal capacities and self reliance:"... in my opinion each single one of our citizens in 
all the manifold aspects of life, is able to show himself the rightful lord and owner of his own person, 
and do this moreover with exceptional grace and exceptional versatility."34 
Pericles' Athens was what German scholars were to call a culture-state: one that actively seeks to 
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produce citizens capable of great works and deeds. The Greeks were the first to dream utopias, and 
were experimental and daring in their state-craft. The debate as to which state had the superior 
constitution fell to the two dominant powers of Greece: democratic Athens and oligarchic Sparta. The 
struggle for empire of these states during the Peloponnesian Wars (431-404 BC) was justified by 
ideological argument that parallels the Cold War. It was Athens' practice when it subdued a polis to 
install a "puppet" democracy, believing a party of the people would co-operate with the conqueror, 
while Sparta would invariably install an oligarchy based on the party of the nobles. 
The era of the polis was the classical age of Greek culture, the period of enlightenment during which 
daring innovations occurred in philosophy, literature, art, and architecture - all that we associate with 
"high culture" - and which remain important to the West today. The distinction conferred on 
individuals who performed public service of a high order extended to any who could bring a talent to 
perfection, and by so honouring themselves honour their city as well. 
The polis valued well-rounded ability, but also specific talents that were exceptionally developed. 
Barring barriers such as sex and serfdom it was a meritocracy that considered that the possession and 
perfection of talent conferred on one genuine nobility. Intellectual attainment was respected, but as 
part of the vita activa. Achievements of philosophy or literature were not things to be appreciated 
privately in a quiet room, but deeds in the world upon which all could gaze. The very style of poetical 
and philosophical works shows that they were to be read aloud or studied in public. 
With the exception of Renaissance Italy, the republican form of the Ideal of Cultivation has been the 
least commonly observed of the variants, particularly in its political form. The close similarities 
between the civilisation of the Greek city-states and those of the Italian Renaissance point to the 
reason. Both were heirs to older high civilisations that had become barbarised; both consisted of many 
competing city-states offering different constitutional forms; both had politically active and devoted 
citizenry; and both experienced an awakening of creative powers in all areas of life. In the 
Renaissance, the methodical retrieval and reformulation of Graeco-Roman culture actually enabled 
individuals to adopt consciously the values and culture of people who had lived in similar 
circumstances. 
Drawing on a wealth of contemporary and antique examples, the level of discussion of the politics of 
cultivation occurred at a pitch never since replicated, save in eighteenth century Germany. To some 
occurred the perception that the very civilisation of small city-states was more likely to produce 
individuals with areté than any other. Machiavelli (1469-1527), in his Arte della Guerra states that 
“where many states exist, there emerge many efficient men... where a great number of states no 
longer exist, virtù by necessity becomes gradually extinct, because the cause responsible for virtù 
among men has disappeared."35 For the Renaissance Italians the fundamental criterion to rate the 
superiority of a state or its constitution was always: how many poets, artists, heroes, or philosophers 
has it produced, how virtuous is its citizenry? Two models wee posed: the republican one favoured by 
the Florentines (inspired by the antique examples of Athens and republican Rome and modern 
Florence and Venice) and that of the benevolent tyrant favoured by the Lombard states.36 
Florentines like Leonardo Bruni (1492-1556) - better known as Aretino – were arrogantly aware that 
their city had exceeded all others in the production of genius, and saw their political institutions as the 
best source of areté in Italy, and in the known world. To explain why, Bruni advises: "Equal liberty 
exists for all...; the hope of winning public honours and ascending is the same for all, provided they 
possess industry and natural gifts and lead a serious minded and respected way of life; for our 
commonwealth require virtus and probitas in its citizens. Whoever has these qualifications is thought 
to be of sufficiently noble birth to participate in the government of the republic... it is marvellous to 
see how powerful this access to public office, once it is offered to a free people, proves to be in 
awakening the talents of the citizens..."For where men are given the hope of attaining honour in the 
state, they take courage and raise themselves to a higher plane; where they are deprived of that hope, 
they grow idle and lose their strength. Therefore, since such hope and opportunity are held out in our 
commonwealth, we need not be surprised that talent and industry distinguish themselves in the 
highest degree."37 
Bruni's comments identify the archetype of the republican model which perhaps most purely 
represented the Ideal of Cultivation of the polis, and which strikes us today as its classical expression. 
Pan-Hellenism - the National Ideal of Cultivation 
A new way of perceiving paideia occurred to some Greeks in the period between the close of the 
Peloponnesian wars and the conquest of Greece by the kingdom of Macedon in 338 BC. It was not to 
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figure significantly in Greek intellectual or political history, but it does hint at a way of thinking about 
the ideal that was to become significant in the West, most notably in nineteenth century Germany.  
The Persian Wars (490-479 BC) made the Greeks aware of their unity and difference from other 
peoples. Success in the face of extreme danger confirmed their superiority over undistinguished 
barbaroi. They concluded that it was their paideia which raised them above all others. The gymnastic 
and intellectual training of the freeborn and the fund of literature and arts in the Greek states was the 
one quality that they held in common, no matter how great their mutual enmity. The common esteem 
for paideia was evident in the ferocious campaigns of the Peloponnesian Wars, and would appear in 
the most unexpected guises. Plutarch relates how, after the disastrous loss of the Athenian fleet in the 
harbour of Syracuse in 413 BC, Athenian sailors and soldiers captured by the Syracusans were treated 
with leniency if they could recite refrains from Euripides. Some were given freedom in return for 
teaching their new masters all they could remember of his works.38 
Endless internecine war between the city-states forces some to ponder how to overcome the discord. 
Although there was never a call for political union, some did express a desire for a type of Pan-
Hellenism that would unleash the bloodlust of the Greeks upon foreigners rather than upon 
themselves. In the arguments for peace and common Pan-Hellenic purpose, paideia and the Greek 
language were invoked as the basis for Hellenic bonds.  
The Athenian rhetorician Isocrates advanced the most sustained and brilliant arguments for Pan-
Hellenism in precisely these terms. In his Panegyricus his first principle was that paideia was the one 
quality which all Greeks shared. In this respect he praises his own Athens for having "brought it 
about that the name "Hellenes" suggests no longer a race but an intelligence, and that the title 
"Hellenes" is applied rather to those who share our culture [paideia] than to those who share a 
common blood."39 The second was that the only hope for harmony among them, or at prevent least 
them sacking their own cities would lie in making common war against a barbaric and bountiful 
enemy like Persia. 
Isocrates' voice was dimly heard in the turmoil that followed and in the end the Greeks did not 
achieve unity: it was imposed on them by Macedon. Afterwards they did collectively engage in the 
conquest of Persia but only as ancillaries to the phalanxes of Alexander (356-323BC).  
This interlude intimates the first use of an Ideal of Cultivation to justify a national purpose, if we 
consider nation to imply, as it came to do in the modern west, a people of common language and 
customs. A hint of it is seen again in Machiavelli's appeal to the Renaissance Italian states to unite 
against the barbarians (French, Spanish, Swiss) - people of lesser attainments occupying the Italian 
peninsular.40 It was developed sustainedly by eighteenth and early nineteenth century intellectuals of 
the German principalities, who reconciled themselves with German political impotence by lauding the 
cultural achievements of their peoples. If Germans were not united politically, they were more 
profoundly united by the purpose of raising the cultural level of all mankind. When this argument was 
radically altered in the half century leading up to Germany's unification in 1871 it could no longer be 
classed as an ethical system relating to the Ideal of Cultivation.41 
Hellenism - the personal Ideal of Cultivation 
The conquest of the Greeks by Macedon inaugurated the next phase of their civilisation, which has 
become known as Hellenism. For three centuries Greek power, language and culture radiated from the 
Aegean east to India and west to France and Spain. Greek was the international language of culture 
and commerce and Greek art, letters, and architecture was universalised.  
As Hellenic culture westernised the orient, Greeks themselves were orientalised. The city-states 
submitted to the rule of potentates who fought over four or five larger pieces of Alexander's empire. 
At first Hellenism was vital and visionary: there were advances in learning, sciences, philosophy, 
administration and even in the conduct of war, which paradoxically grew less bloody as technique 
grew deadlier, mainly because it was no longer the citizenry who fought, but professional soldiers. By 
the second century BC, when most of Greece fell to Roman rule (c197-190BC), it was one of slow 
humiliating retreat; there was a general depopulation of Attica and the Peloponnese, a decline in 
belief in the Greek religions and a pervasive interest in oriental superstitions. 
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Subject to imperial powers, under Macedon and then Rome, the culture of the city-states is 
undermined. As local economic entities they prosper, and even preserve many of the features of the 
classical polis but, shorn of independence, they are no more than centres of local administration, 
deferring in all significant matters to imperial advice. 
Inside an empire of enormous power and breadth the culture of the polis lacks meaning. The degree of 
civic pride that remains amounts to little more than regional patriotism. In all respects the deep 
spiritual centre, civic religion, is jeopardised by the changing nature of public service. Service in the 
polis, military, administrative or diplomatic, was a patriotic duty expected of all citizens and therefore 
amateur in character. Under imperial systems it was professionalised. Each of the Hellenistic empires 
- Macedonian, Seleucid, and Egyptian, and later, Roman governors - created classes of functionaries 
to implement their objectives. Individuals who entered public life no longer served the patria, but the 
bureaucracy that sustained them. 
In Greece, a life in public affairs no longer offered the same prospects of achievement or renown. As 
Polybius (c.205-c.123 BC) observed, men of action instead turned to learning and literature.42 To the 
Romans the "noble Hellene" gradually became Graeculus: a clever, useful, but contemptible creature 
who tutors the children: the very caricature that Greeks once applied to civilised barbarians.  
The Ideal of Cultivation was adapted to the new circumstances and it became more important in life 
than perhaps it had ever been. As with all philosophy or religion in this period, it was turned inward 
turning, focusing away from the polis or public engagement, onto private existence. 
In this imperial phase the laws of each city-state, once ruthlessly and religiously observed, lost 
absolute significance. In many ways individuals were freer to act as they wished, if not participating 
usefully in public affairs. Cultural relativism became more pronounced as many travelled in the east 
and observed a diversity of laws and customs.  
Those who thought they needed it sought a zone of regulation away from the arbitrariness of human 
institutions that could apply wherever they travelled. A capacity for self-government and self-mastery 
was already important in earlier forms of paideia but in Hellenism it was given primacy. Human 
action had to be guaranteed by universal principles; people had to know that they were acting justly in 
accord with nature, that they were perfecting nature by obeying its laws. In some sense all of the 
major Hellenistic philosophical schools - Stoics, Epicureans, Cynics and Academics - were attempts 
to respond to this need, and in doing so drew heavily on the example and teachings of Socrates.43 
Though each school contended to own the educated mind, the ideal model of the cultivated man was 
the same. The hero of Hellenistic paideia was no longer the aristocratic warrior, or the statesman, but 
the sage; the wise man engaged in an inward search for knowledge and conquest of his will.44 
The inward turn partnered the decline of public life. No longer distracted by the vita activa, the 
educated, which now comprised the new classes of imperial functionaries and learned specialists, 
sought a worthy vita contemplativa. They exalted the development of the mind and the excellence of 
learning or settled down to comfortable development of the arts. Not accidentally the Hellenistic 
period was one in which occurred the greatest advance in Greek learning and the vitality that 
formerly entered other spheres now flowed unto it. Libraries and higher centres of learning were 
established in many cities such as, most famously, Alexandria. 
Personal paideia became a secular religion in which all Greek peoples could find their own salvation. 
Across Asia and the Mediterranean, or wherever they founded a colony or settled in an alien city, they 
would preserve their distinctiveness by erecting a gymnasium: at once a school and a sporting 
complex, and bring up their children in the forms of paideia. These centres were the focal point of 
Greek communal life and remained so into the early centuries of the first millennium. The emperor 
Trajan (53?-117AD) once sneered in a letter to Pliny, then his governor in Bythinia, "these poor 
Greeks all love a gymnasium.”45 
Eventually the Hellenist Ideal of Cultivation was adopted by the Roman upper classes and by other 
peoples of the Mediterranean. When Greece embarked on its Hellenistic phase, Rome was still a 
republican city-state with a profoundly felt civic religion, and practised a politics of cultivation aimed 
at producing virtuous rather than literary citizenry. The Romans were not as dextrous in intellect or 
art, but certainly outstripped the Greeks in the production of heroes.  
By 197 BC, when Rome‟s empire straddled Europe, Africa and Asia it was already acquainted with 
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the range of Greek culture and learning. The Roman elite shared a republican mindset and accepted 
that paideia (which they translated as humanitas46) and glorious attainments were rightful goals. But 
when their city entered its own imperial phase under Augustus in the first century BC their orientation 
became Hellenistic in character. Thereafter Greek and Roman cultures did not diverge significantly.  
From the Augustan age to the last period of high culture in the time of Trajan, Rome was 
intellectually dominant and more creative, and better preserved the ideal than the Greek states. As a 
centre of world administration it enjoyed for longer the stimulants of public service and power. This 
possibility was foreseen, according to Plutarch, as early the first century BC by Cicero's (106-43 BC) 
Rhodian teacher of rhetoric Apollonius who, on hearing his pupil declaim in Greek congratulated him 
but observed that it had made him sorry for the fate of Greece: "The only glories that were left to us", 
he was alleged to have said, "were our culture [paideia] and eloquence. Now I see these too are going 
to be taken over in your person by Rome.”47 
In the later phase of Hellenism and the Roman Empire, free born individuals - no longer pestered by 
the jealous demands of the city and no longer supported by the beliefs of their ancestors - are cast 
adrift to a degree not previously observed within civilisation. Inevitably they seek out intellectual and 
spiritual moorings to give them a sense of place and reason to be. There is no lack of alternatives in 
Hellenist civilisation. Personalist ethical systems abound in every form from sophisticated 
philosophies to the vilest superstitions. Members of the educated elite continue to invest their 
personal salvation in paideia, but there is an other-worldly resonance in everything they say and do, 
as they grow weary with secular forms and seek solace in faith. 
Epitaphs on tombs and funeral monuments from the period show, as Marrou observes, that the dead, 
either by prior express wish or on the initiative of their families are often represented as men of 
letters, orators, philosophers, amateur artists or musicians. "Thus cultural life came to be looked upon 
as a reflection and foretaste of the happy life enjoyed by the souls blessed with immortality - and not 
only that, but as the means of obtaining it: mental labour and the pursuit of science and art were a 
sure way of cleansing the soul from the stains of earthly passion and freeing it from the restricting 
bonds of matter. After devoting his whole life to the service of the Muses a man could confidently 
count on their patronage when he came to die; for they could summon him into their presence and 
lead him into the astral spheres along with all those other souls who had on earth been similarly 
prepared for that great honour... This kind of mysticism was not of course professed by all men of 
letters with the same consciousness and the same intrepid faith, but to some degree it affected the 
culture of them all: paideia - a thing divine - a heavenly game, a nobility of soul, was invested with a 
kind of sacred radiance that gave it a special dignity of a genuinely religious kind. In the deep 
confusion caused by the sudden collapse of ancient beliefs, it was the one true unshakeable value to 
which the mind of man could cling; and Hellenistic culture thus erected into an absolute, eventually 
became for many the equivalent of a religion."48 
In later antiquity the secular faith of paideia could not withstand other-worldly religion. Many cults, 
undemanding of intellect and offering more exalted promises than posterity or glory, attracted the 
upper classes, with the result that Christianity, the most virulent and audacious of them, displaced all 
competitors. 
Early Christian intellectuals recruiting from among the educated were well aware that they were 
fighting an Ideal of Cultivation. In De Spectaculis Tertullian (c. AD 150-220+) forcefully presents his 
other-worldly position: "We have no concern in this life except to depart from it as speedily as 
possible." "For what else is our prayer, but that of the apostle - to leave the world and to be at home 
with the Lord?"49 And in De Præscriptione he explicitly opposes the spiritual home of paideia against 
the home of Christianity: "What indeed has Athens to do with Jerusalem? What concord is there 
between the Academy [Plato's school] and the Church?"50 As the candles of ancient civilisation blew 
out in Europe and the Mediterranean, others remained attached to the classical legacy and sought to 
adapt it to Christian doctrine. In spite of its antipathy but because of its need, Christianity crudely 
preserved the forms of classical education, while suppressing its spirit. 
In the middle centuries of the first millennium individuals attached to paideia threw sand against the 
wind. The Byzantine emperor Julian (331-363) - designated the Apostate for his recalcitrance and 
perhaps the last self-confessed pagan ruler - could still defend Hellenic education against the 
Christians. In his epistle Against the Galilieans he declares: “...you yourselves know, it seems to me 
the very different effect on the intelligence of your writings as compared with ours; and that from 
studying yours no man could attain to excellence or even to ordinary goodness, whereas from 
studying ours every man would become better than before, even though he were without natural 
fitness. But when a man is naturally well endowed, and moreover receives the education of our 
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literature, he actually becomes as a gift of the gods to mankind, either by kindling the light of 
knowledge, or by founding some kind of political institution, or by routing numbers of his country's 
foes, or even by travelling far over the earth and far by sea, and thus proving himself a man of heroic 
mould..." 51 Thereafter, declarations of this sort by secular rulers are difficult to find.  
The Ideal of Cultivation in Europe 
The Ideal of Cultivation is not easily observed again in life or letters of the Latin west or the Greek 
east for another eight centuries, when civilisation again angled to the secular. As ever, some made to 
retrieve antique culture: in the Arab world after its conquests to Spain in the eight century and at the 
court of Charlemagne (742-814) who, himself illiterate, implemented a new educational system based 
on their literature. Byzantium held on to its inheritance but at a lower level of civilisation. Provence 
produced for nearly two centuries (1000-1200) a form of courtly aristocratic culture, but it was 
unconscious of its possibilities. None of these could be said to be a civilisation in which individuals 
sought, as their highest goal, to perfect their nature. 
Finally, in the Italian states, more vigorously secular than any others in Europe, the slow retrieval of 
fragments of the ancient literature caused the ideal to flicker back into consciousness. Their retrieval 
and propagation of antique literature placed at the disposal of the Europe the forms of the ideal 
already realised by the Greeks, and the new civilisation borrowed what was appropriate to its 
character. Antique values were reinterpreted or rediscovered in contemporary parallels.  
The civilisation of the Italian city-state resembled the Greek polis in many ways and was in sympathy 
with the republican ideal of cultivation. In the rest of Europe, in nations subject to courtly and 
imperial structures, the Hellenistic ideal was preferred, mainly by those educated by and employed 
within the church bureaucracy. Officials or scribes, empowered by their virtuosity in manipulating 
symbols, naturally overrated their value, and because their ideal also had to accommodate Christian 
doctrine, it rarely replicated the purely secular forms of early Hellenism. A concern with the 
perfection of the soul, or of Christian virtue was the form the compromise often took.  
Even so, no Ideal of Cultivation was as pervasive among the clerics or official classes of early modern 
Europe, for Christianity (Protestant and Catholic) continued to dominate the life of the spirit. In the 
courts of Europe the secular spirit was more assured, and the ideal of the courtier, refined and 
perfected in the courts of Italy's tyrant states, became attractive to all of Europe's aristocracies and 
integral to their general education. Emphasis on the classics for the training of young gentlemen 
became the standard. Paideia became important again in the lives of the upper classes of all nations 
that participated in the European enlightenment of the eighteenth century. It was in this century 
perhaps, at the apogee of the ancien regime, that ideals of cultivation again became important to 
educated people and nowhere more thoroughly than in Germany. 
The German Ideal of Cultivation: Bildung 
In eighteenth century German life and thought the Ideal of Cultivation was more alive than elsewhere 
in Europe, with its special character and force embodied in the word Bildung.52 This word is similar 
to the Greek paideia, in that it combines the separate meanings of the English words culture and 
education. Literally, it means to form or to shape and in many respects resembles the Hellenist 
version of the Ideal of Cultivation on account of its inwardness and concern with personal perfection.  
If the sage is the icon of Hellenist paideia, then the genius is the same for German Bildung. The 
Hellenist sage is self-regulating, self-governing and, using the divine light of reason, seeks to discover 
and consciously obey universal laws of nature rather than those of the state or religion. In German 
culture, the genius is a warrior fighting for nature against custom, who throws off the chains of 
tradition and creates rules that are more in harmony with his own nature rather than those of society. 
To a greater extent than the Hellenistic sage, the genius was concerned with accomplishments in art 
and culture. This flowed on to the majority of educated Germans who, if not endowed with genius, 
were content to quietly study, and nourish themselves on the productions of those who were. 
The profound difference between the German and Hellenist ideals however was in their 
understanding of what nature actually is. For the Greeks the cosmos was static and its laws 
unchanging, but for the Germans it was dynamic and hylozoic. Nature consists of blindly driving 
forces, or what became known as will (Wille), which generate all the forms of matter and life. The 
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genius is one who binds the blind forces of nature to a deliberate purpose; he can perfect nature by, in 
his own person, making it do consciously what it already did unknowingly.  
By seeking to illuminate nature and make it conscious not just in thought but in works of art and in 
the living of one's life, the genius justifies life and humanity. This was the abiding theme and task of 
philosophy in the eighteenth century German enlightenment, known as the Aufklärung.  
Bildung did not appear at once or wholly formed. It accommodated foreign influences such as 
Spinozism, the aesthetic theories of Lord Shaftesbury (1621-83), and most importantly, French 
courtly culture. All these were received because they could be digested within existing German 
culture. The purely intellectual contributions that gave Bildung its final form are easily identified.  
Clearly influential was Samuel Pufendorf's (1632-1694) De Jure Naturae et Gentium, which proposes 
"culture" to be the proper social task of man, thereby conferring on human duty a strongly secular and 
qualitative emphasis. Leibniz's (1646-1716) seminal work focuses on the possibility of human 
perfectibility and establishes a major precedent for hylozoism and voluntarism in German philosophy. 
The labours of the Aufklärer historians and literary figures like Klopstock (1724-1803) and Lessing 
(1729-81), furthers the belief in human perfectibility: of a perpetual improvement of mankind through 
education and cultivation. Aesthetics and the question of genius figure strongly in the preoccupations 
of the Aufklärers, particularly in the systematic work of Baumgarten (1714-62) and Hamann (1730-
88) and the dominant philosophical figure of German Enlightenment, Kant (1724-1804), shows a 
wide ranging concern for Bildung.  
Winckelman's (1717-68) researches into antiquity feed the German obsession with Greek classicism 
and paideia, and the paradoxical pedagogical practice of rearing children with one hand on Luther's 
Bible and the other on Homer's Iliad. Each of these threads gather in the synthesis achieved by the 
circle at Weimar and Jena, whose foremost members include Goethe (1749-1832), Herder (1744-
1803), Wieland (1733-1813) and Schiller (1759-1805) and whose collaboration produces the classical 
formulation of Bildung as a justification and programme for living.53 
Bildung remains intrinsic to the literary and philosophical activity of intellectuals like Fichte (1762-
1814), Schelling (1775-1854), Hegel (1770-1831) the Schlegels (1767-1845 and 1772-1829) until 
about the middle of the nineteenth century, where it figures prominently in the widely influential 
philosophies of Hegel and Schopenhauer (1788-1860). 
Beneath these intellectual developments and impressing on them a particular character were the 
abiding facts of German civilisation. From the Middle Ages until Napoleon ended the system in1806, 
most of Germany was a multitude of petty princedoms known as the Holy Roman Empire. 
Nominally, the princes were subject to the emperor, but his rule was loosely maintained. 
Administration of the individual states was left to the princes who employed their own bureaucracies 
for the purpose; with the exception of a few free-cities of moderate wealth, there was no deeper basis 
for civic values and the bourgeoisie remained small and powerless.  
By its nature this civilisation preferred Hellenistic or courtly models of the Ideal of Cultivation. After 
Napoleon the German states remained independent, albeit under the hegemony of either Austria or 
Prussia, until they were unified by Prussian arms in 1871. In this period Bildung was consistently 
invoked as the basis for the cultural unity of German states. As German liberalism and nationalism 
grew sentiments verging on the republican were sounded occasionally but the bureaucratic structures 
remained, and were even deepened in many areas of life. Bildung in Germany continued to retain its 
Hellenistic character. 
By the mid nineteenth century the value of Bildung to German intellectual life had waned 
dramatically, displaced by the values of a more recent civilisation. It was this event that 
fundamentally shaped the life and thought of Nietzsche, who came to intellectual maturity precisely 
in this period of transition.  
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3 - Nietzsche and the decline of Bildung 
As a pastor's son raised in the middle-sized Prussian town of Naumburg in the 1840's, Nietzsche is 
exposed intensely, from the earliest age, to the Ideal of Cultivation of the German enlightenment. It 
shows itself in his childhood play, schooling, and in the values of his family, friends and 
acquaintances. 
Family and Schooling 
His father dies before he is five, so he takes example from the fathers of his childhood friends, Krug 
and Pinder: both are officials for whom, outside of affairs of state, the pursuit of Bildung absorbs their 
leisure. At the Pinder‟s home, Nietzsche is introduced to the poetry of Goethe. Herr Pinder reads 
passages aloud to the children for hours at a time. He wants to instil in them the cadences of classical 
German. At the house of Herr Krug, who mixes in musical circles in Naumburg and knows 
Mendelssohn, Nietzsche learns about the musical masters. Music and literature are his leisure in 
childhood and adolescence and indispensible to him in adulthood. 
At a tender age he acquires the German obsession with Hellenism, another legacy of Aufklärung. At 
ten he collaborates with friends to write and enact a Greek play and, as his sister was to observe, their 
games often revolve around Greek subjects and motifs.54 
Early schooling at the Dom Gymnasium in Naumburg reinforces these obsessions. Hellenism and 
Bildung are intrinsic to the Prussian educational system due to reforms made shortly after the nation's 
defeat by Napoleon at Jena. Wilhelm von Humboldt (1767 - 1835), a thorough-going Aufklärer, keen 
to restore Prussian power and prestige, places classical studies at the centre of the new system of 
secondary and university education. He introduces an academically oriented stream of secondary 
schooling, as opposed to technical and vocational Realschule, also founded according to his 
specifications, called Gymnasia. It is a deliberate attempt to invoke the pedagogical goals and 
practices of paideia. The standard curriculum generally spans nine years with the expectation that 
pupils will go to university. Students are instructed in Latin, Greek, German, and the history and 
religions associated with each language; mathematics is a later addition. 
Each of these subjects is taught to encourage scientific detachment, and disdain specialised vocational 
training. The aim, to create an elite officialdom better able to run the Prussian power-state, reflects the 
inwardness of German Bildung. The needs of the Greek polis, seething with democratic and 
tyrannical passions, hardly resembles those of a Prussian state needing managers and scholars, rather 
than politicians. Prussia was not a patria, and its people did not participate in civic life. 
At fourteen, Nietzsche earns admission to Pforta, one of the older and most celebrated classical 
schools in Germany, having already produced such distinguished graduates as Klopstock, Novalis, 
Ranke, Fichte and the Schlegels. Through Prussian military regimen and complete immersion in 
studies of classical antiquity, the school strives to exclude students from the affairs of contemporary 
life. Newspapers are forbidden. The heavy intellectual and physical demands instil a desire to serve, 
and ensure that the political interests of students are extinguished.  
Outside of school Nietzsche maintains his literary and musical interests and, with the old friends in 
Naumburg, forms a cultural society named Germania. Each member of the group submits monthly 
contributions, poems, essays, architectural designs or musical compositions, for group criticism.55  
Those motivated by the Ideal of Cultivation typically yearn cultural fraternity: a society of the like-
minded devoted to conversation, learning, and mutual encouragement; the Platonic academy, the 
Renaissance court, the French salon as opposed to the more frequently encountered and touching 
reality: the isolated scholar burning candles at night and writing letters. It is noteworthy that he 
succeeded in organising such a fraternity in his youth as Nietzsche dreamed of accomplishing the 
same all his life, albeit without success. 
The name Germania pointed the eagerness of these young Pan-Germanists to raise the standard of 
their Kultur, echoed the hope of several generations devoted to Bildung that a second Hellas might 
awaken on German soil. When Nietzsche was finally confronted with the choice of a university 
career, it was by no means inevitable, but entirely in keeping with his scientific-humanistic training 
that he chooses to devote his future to classical philology. The prospect of state-service, other than in 
the capacity of university teacher did not attract him. Though finding distasteful the boozing, duelling 
and whoring practised by students in their fraternities, his time at universities in Bonn and Leipzig 
reinforced principles acquired in all his previous training. 
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Although the experience of Bildung in his childhood and youth and by the literature of the classical 
German writers who had forged and articulated it, underlay everything he wrote as a philosopher it 
does not infer that he was typical of his contemporaries. The Ideal of Cultivation was, during the very 
decades of his youth, rapidly losing its hold on the hearts and minds of aristocratic and middle class 
Germans. In the new nation Bildung was an anachronism.56 
The Decline of Bildung 
One factor displacing Bildung from German heads and hearts is the eminence of the state, especially 
the Prussian state, as an object of devotion. That object had always existed alongside the Ideal of 
Cultivation and in many respects was served by it. And even the earliest statements of State-worship 
appear in the writing of Thomasius57 its existence is a long term reality in Prussian political history.  
The rise of the Prussian state from provincial electorate to major European power in the space of two 
hundred years is an enigma of European history. The borders of centralising powers like France and 
England were imposed by geographical and cultural realities, but Prussia was a diverse group of 
territories that had little more in common than a monarch. Outside of France there were no large 
Francophone territories, likewise for England. But Prussia was surrounded by German as well as non-
German rivals… The Hohenzollern dynasty that ruled Prussia from the fifteenth century up until 
World War I drew around itself a civil and military bureaucracy based on duty and loyalty to the 
crown. These habits were later assimilated into the new German Reich that was created under the 
Prussian hammer. State-idolatry received systematic intellectual justification after the popularity of 
Hegelian philosophy in Germany during the middle decades of the nineteenth century but if the 
notion of state as ultimate good was too abstract to many Germans before unification it would be 
made concrete under Prussian rule.  
Napoleon‟s occupation of Germany caused an explosion of patriotic fervour that resulted in the Wars 
of Liberation. German patriotism caused many intellectuals to combine the concept of the state with 
that of nationality, and Germanity: the state not as a mere centralised power but as the political 
expression of the German Volk: a homeland with common language, manners and customs (in other 
words, Kultur). The insistence of these intellectuals that Germanity determine the borders of the new 
German Reich helped to hasten the demise of Bildung. The melding of the Prussian doctrine of state 
with the Romantic concept of nation had potent political appeal, and proved increasingly attractive to 
educated Germans particularly to German liberal movements. By the time the Prussian victory over 
France in the war of 1871 unified the nation the ethical imperatives of duty to the state and love of 
nation were naturally preferred. 
Displaced but not entirely supplanted, nor was it despised, even by the most ardent nationalists. If 
there were cases of antipathy to Bildung (as shown by Bismark who was for that matter was not even 
much of a German nationalist) it retained its prestige among the educated. General diffusion diluted it 
and once assimilated into the doctrine of nation-state, it transformed from a universal human duty into 
a cult of national culture and consciousness.  
Where once educated Germans might have regarded the awakening individual potential as a 
celebration of humanity (Humanität as Herder never ceased declaiming), nationalists saw it celebrate 
the achievements of German letters, art, science and scholarship - a chauvinism quite alien to the 
originally cosmopolitan nature of the ideal. It was then only a short step to the notorious propaganda 
campaigns of the Great War where the term Kultur stood for all the mysterious depth Germans 
possessed and the French and English did not. 
The end of the Aufklärer episode in Weimar, which could be dated from Goethe's death in 1832, 
ended the pursuit of personal cultivation in the manner of religious believers in personal salvation.58 
The belief that we must perfect the inner self is documented in the writings of artists and intellectuals 
at Weimar, and in the lives of some of the most outstanding individuals of the age. For self-absorbed 
poets such as Holderlin, academics such as Kant, and bureaucrats such as Wilhelm von Humboldt, it 
presented the only true path to improving the world and made a sharp distinction between worldly 
material success and the integrity of the inner life. Cultivation was a spiritual activity irreconcilable 
with overhasty acquisition of property and status. But goals that promise no material reward cannot be 
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pursued without leisure. 
The time demanded for learning, science or art is only provided by material security. There are 
always dedicated individuals who pursue their life task in contempt of poverty, but the fact is that the 
Bildung ethos was adopted only by wealthy Germans. In late eighteenth century Weimar, as in other 
states, the dominance of the monarchy or aristocracy over a comfortable and unpolitical middle class 
neutralised the potential conflict between Innerlichkeit and strivings for political or monetary goals. 
Since the bourgeoisie had little scope to express its political interests, it could turn its passion inwards 
and nurture culture in a realm of personal freedom. German humanism was no pale abstraction; it 
burned as a living force: "a moral command, directed at each individual, for the reconstruction of his 
personal life.”59 And though its true goal was personal freedom, the activity of the cultivated man 
was not without reward or recognition. Conspicuous examples of cultivation such as the academic, 
the bureaucrat, and the professional held a place of distinction only less than that of the aristocrat. 
Allowing able individuals of non-aristocratic classes to rise to positions of honour releases and 
defuses social tensions. According to De Tocqueville,60 the ancien régime suffered for obstinately and 
jealously withholding privileges from talented men of the lower estates. Although Frenchmen of 
humbler birth could hold powerful bureaucratic positions they did not share proportionately in 
honours and privileges. For De Tocqueville, this was one of the fuels that allowed the fire of 
revolution to burn. If relative harmony existed among classes in the eighteenth century Germany, 
changing economic and political attitudes in the next hundred years led to fractiousness and conflict. 
German industrial development was modest in the first decade of the nineteenth century, but by 1871 
its dimensions were awesome. The injection into the German economy of the French war indemnity 
helped German industrial production to outstrip that of its rival by the end of the same decade. 
The seductions of material progress insinuated new rules into social parlour games. Those creating 
the new Germany saw their material objectives and successes as worthy of regard. But the parvenu 
wears his wealth with unease; he looks about and behind to observe what appearance and behaviour 
becomes a wealthy man. Knowing that he is wanting in purity of blood, and seeing everywhere how 
old wealth commands the greatest courtesies, he imitates its manner and customs to justify and 
ennoble his status. If Bildung was the companion of status and distinction; would it not be appropriate 
to at least acquire the postures of cultivated behaviour? If you cannot, for want of capacity or desire, 
promote an inner perfection, can you not at least suggest cultivation by calculated display? 
Association of the idea of culture with that of social status was implicit and normal in the aristocratic 
structures of Weimar society.61 For Nietzsche's generation and those that followed, the visible signs of 
affluence and classical schooling were enough to identify the cultivated. "To illustrate current 
opinion in 1893, Friedrich Paulson quotes from a newspaper the sentence: "A man apparently 
belonging to the educated (cultivated) classes caused a stir through his unusual behaviour in the 
street.” It is implied here that education or cultivation, for which modern German characteristically 
uses the same word "Bildung", can be recognised by external signs, and the normal view at this time 
is, Paulsen says, that the educated do not work with their hands, that they dress and behave 
"properly" and can hold their own in conversation. It is a fairly reliable sign if they use foreign words 
correctly, and if they know foreign languages there is no doubt at all about their 'Bildung'.”62 
The extent of the young Nietzsche‟s devotional commitment to Weimar values, meant that there 
could be no greater impiety than to reduce them to cant and display; nothing more contemptible than 
to profess Bildung without sacrificing oneself on its alter. It was not the wholly uneducated who 
threatened the Ideal of Cultivation, but the half-educated, the false enthusiasts. The Bildungsphilister 
or culture philistine (a student expression used in German letters since the previous century) was the 
archfiend of his youthful demonology, and against this philistinism he directed his ferocious diatribes. 
In the first Untimely Meditation he tears like an enraged terrier at the ageing Hegelian and bible critic, 
David Strauss, whose recently published autobiographical work David Strauss, the Confessor and 
Writer gave heart to half-learned and complacent philistia.  
Shortly before the outbreak of World War I the sociologist Georg Simmel suggests an elemental 
cause for the decline of Bildung. Looking back over the previous century he sees in every aspect of 
modern life the effects of fragmenting divisions of labour. The hope of cultivating synthetic 
individuals shrinks as economic and national success is progressively ensured by specialists and 
experts. The productive demands of the new economic system, the explosion of knowledge, the 
modern state's expanding bureaucratic apparatus, the total compartmentalising trend taken together 
generates the ethos of the technician, who associates inner worth with the function that he performs. 
The technician justifies himself as a unit within a larger order; his raison d' être is embedded within 
his fragmented nature, his "one-sidedness". Writing fourteen years after Nietzsche's death, Simmel 
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observed: "If you were to ask educated people today by what ideals they live, most would give a 
specialised answer derived from their occupational experience. Only rarely would they speak of a 
cultural ideal which rules them as total human beings"63 
The close of the nineteenth century is a natural terminus for the Ideal of Cultivation in Germany. The 
attention of moderns is on brassier idols, to the despondence of a few of the learned, who believe they 
are fighting a rearguard action. The modern ethos is everywhere victorious and among those who 
would preserve culture, pessimism is standard. Each draws their isolation about them like a cloak, and 
pits a lonely voice against the clamour of millions.  
These postures were not exclusively Teutonic but Germany's rapid economic development forces the 
alarm to be sounded more stridently. For true believers the decline of interest in Bildung is not merely 
a personal disappointment; the value of human existence itself is at stake and barbarism is the only 
alternative. Wherever pessimism takes root, barbarism is deemed inescapable. In 1831 - the last year 
of his life - Goethe already intimates in apocalyptic cadences of what is nigh: “It is already here, we 
are in the midst of it, for wherein does barbarism consist unless in not appreciating what is 
excellent."64 
Five years later Karl Leberecht Immerman has occasion to describe his contemporaries, in language 
anticipating the young Nietzsche - as "epigones", whose every action betrays "a desolate irresolution 
and perturbation, a ridiculous quest for security, a distractedness, a chasing after one knows not 
what, a fear of terrors the more uncanny for having no form! It is as if mankind cast about in its boat 
on an overpowering sea, is suffering from a moral seasickness whose end can hardly be conceived." 
"It is necessary", he adds, "to have belonged at least partially to a different period to be entirely able 
to feel the contrast of both eras, the more recent of which began with the revolution..."65 
Forty years later the same complaints were still being sounded. After hearing reports of the events of 
1871 in Paris, Jacob Burckhardt, in peaceful and secluded Basel, predicted a future shaken by 
continual explosions. The French revolution had merely been a primer. In explicit reaction to the 
modern trend his historical researches focused on the ages of highest cultural attainment: imperial 
Athens, and most famously Renaissance Italy; aside from their merits as historical investigations, 
Burckhardt's works were implicitly ironic and gloomy reflections on contemporary Europe. 
Nietzsche's Isolation 
Why does Nietzsche attach himself to the Ideal of Cultivation when it is in decline rather than study 
law and make money? We are told he was a pious child, at least concerning religion; and, if he didn‟t 
stay that way with respect to Christianity, he did with respect to culture. This was a man who had to 
venerate and even cursory reading of his early notes and correspondence quickly reveals the extent of 
his zeal. 
In May 1871, news of the bloody and destructive Paris uprising reached him at the University of 
Basel, when he was then Professor of Philology. Like his colleague Jacob Burckhardt, he learned with 
horror that a great part of Paris, including the Tuileries, the Hôtel-de-Ville, the Cour des Comptes 
and, as rumour had it, the Louvre had gone up in flames (the latter had in fact been saved). On 27 
May he writes to Vischer-Bilfinger in Basel declaring that the reports from Paris have been "...so 
schrecklich, dass ich gar nicht mehr zu einer auch nur erträglichen Stimmung komme. Was ist man, 
solchen Erdbeben der Cultur gegenüber, als Gelehrter! Wie atomistisch fühlt man sich! Sein ganzes 
Leben und seine beste Kraft benutzt man, eine Periode der Cultur besser zu verstehen und besser zu 
erklären; wie erscheint dieser Beruf, wenn ein einziger unseliger Tag die kostbarsten Document 
solcher Perioden zu Asche verbrennt! "It is", he concluded, "the worst day of my life."66 
Returning to the subject a month later in a letter to Carl von Gersdorff, he uses explicitly religious 
terms: the communards responsible for the fires were "blasphemers" (Frevler), who were conveyors 
of a general "guilt" (Schuld):"I know what it means, the fight against culture. When I heard of the 
fires in Paris, I felt for several days annihilated and was overwhelmed by fears and doubts; the entire 
scholarly, scientific, philosophical and artistic existence seemed an absurdity, if a single day could 
wipe out the most glorious works of art, which cannot exist for the sake of poor human beings but 
which has higher missions to fulfil. But even when the pain was at its worst, I could not cast a stone 
against those blasphemers, who were to me only carriers of the general guilt..."67 
To have felt so religiously Nietzsche needed personal reasons to identify his existence with the values 
of Bildung. As a clever young man he excelled in the activities that belonged to Bildung; and his self-
esteem and expectation of rewards and honours could only be realised in a life devoted to higher 
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culture. This was also the world inhabited by those he admired and from whom he sought recognition.  
The asynchronism between Nietzsche's values and those which influential classes and individuals 
were adopting enables us to comprehend the self-acknowledged isolation that he began to experience. 
Early on he described himself as "untimely" (Unzeitgemasse), not of his age; his early published 
essays frankly declared this fact in their title: Unzeitgemasse Betrachtungen, or, Untimely 
Meditations. If he did not feel "at home" among contemporaries, he certainly did not identify himself 
with the Christian past. And if not the present and past? Increasingly in the later works he addresses 
himself to readers to come and actively prepares a posthumous existence. The smallness of his 
readership reinforces his hopes of the future; if he is not understood by his contemporaries, he surely 
belongs to what has not yet arrived. But the philosopher all deem radical, iconoclastic, a harbinger of 
twentieth century viewpoints, is really nothing more than an old fogey zealously attached to values 
his contemporaries were forsaking.  
When a particular group dominates a civilisation it controls the formation of customs, culture and 
institutions and its values become the order of things. But if it can no longer resist the advance of 
rivals, a state of transition results. Its values become questionable and questioned. In these twilight 
zones complex and surprising reactions result: individuals concerned only for their well-being drift 
wherever power or comfort leads them, flourishing as hypocrites. In others competing values coexist, 
even in ear-splitting discord, but without causing undue disturbance. For some, the fact that one belief 
is in doubt passes a taint on all others, and a condition of uncertainty results that we call nihilism. 
They may seek novel strategies to deal with the crisis and embrace ethical possibilities outside of the 
realities of their context. Among competing factions, an individual may side with one or another, or 
may call the entire dispute into question and submit it to examination from above the fray. Doubts are 
refined by questions of "whither" or "why" and philosophy becomes intensely concerned with the 
problem of worth, of the summum bonum, not merely for one historical moment, but for all time. 
These were the circumstances existing at the moment of antiquity's greatest philosophical revolution: 
that we associate today with the name and teachings of Socrates. 
In his youth Socrates experienced Athenian imperial expansion, and equated the values of the polis 
with virtue and achievement. As the city prospered the divisions between parties were checked. But 
from his middle age until his death at the close of the fifth century, Athenian confidence and 
supremacy crumbled. Afflicted by plague and defeat at the hands of Sparta and her allies, the city 
erupted in bloody political strife. Ethical speculation proliferates in uncertainty. Thus it was that the 
entire weight of Socrates‟ philosophical activity as directed at finding a new more certain ground for 
values. Neglectful and contemptuous of natural philosophy, seeing the affairs of state as the most 
pressing, equipped with a new technique of dialectical interrogation, he gathered a devoted following, 
but did not inspire what he had intended. Rather than one solid teaching he inspired competing 
schools all eager to prescribe ethical practice for individuals, rather than states.  
Nietzsche considers that Socrates situation so closely resembles his own that he confesses: "Socrates 
is so close to me that I am almost continually fighting with him.”68 It is Nietzsche's traditionalism that 
provokes his iconoclasm and enables him to see what is invisible to those blinded by the obfuscation 
of the zeitgeist. Not surprisingly, he values this isolation, regarding it as essential for every 
philosopher, who by nature must set himself apart to defeat the process of becoming: "What does a 
philosopher demand of himself first and last?"To overcome his time in himself, to become 
'timeless'."69 Nietzsche does not just criticise modernity, he exhorts his contemporaries back to the 
Ideal of Cultivation. He imagines that he can house the ideal inside a philosophical structure that will 
help it survive every inclemency. 
Estranged from his epoch, he casts about for allies and the like-minded: people with whom he can 
share the burden and secrets of his programme. In books of the recently or long dead he discovers 
kindred spirits: Schopenhauer, Hölderlin, Goethe and others. Among contemporaries, the most 
significant is Richard Wagner, with whom he enjoys the most important friendship of his life, for he 
imagines that Wagner shares a common purpose with him and believes the maestro of music-drama 
can inspire and lead a new German cultural movement and salvage culture from ruin. Only, the 
friendship is broken when the younger man sees more of Wagner's nature and intentions. The group 
the composer gathers in Bayreuth, aesthetes and idealists, anti-Semites, and German nationalists, are 
alien to everything Nietzsche understands as culture. When he abandons Bayreuth, he abandons the 
philosophy of his youth. 
Nietzsche courts another friendship without success, that of his colleague at Basel, Jacob Burckhardt, 
whom he suspects pursues a similar course of studies for similar ends. In an uncommonly humble 
letter of 1886, well into the last decade of his productive life, he recalls Burckhardt to their common 
purpose, explicitly referring to the Ideal of Cultivation: "...it seems to me that you have the same 
problems in view - that you are working on the same problems in a similar way, perhaps even more 
forcefully and deeply than I, because you are less loquacious. But then I am younger... The 
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mysterious conditions of any growth in culture, that extremely dubious relation between what is 
called the "improvement" of man (or even "humanisation") and the enlargement of the human type, 
above all, the contradiction between every moral concept and every scientific concept of life - 
enough, enough - here is a problem which we fortunately share with not very many persons, living or 
dead."70 Burckhardt was no activist, and despite his distaste for the new epoch expected that little 
could be done to contain or avert its momentum. His reticence distanced him from his younger 
colleague, for whom the decline of the Bildung ideal represented a fundamental affront and challenge. 
Activism 
From Bayreuth onwards Nietzsche leads the vita solitaria. Plagued by ill health and in search of more 
temperate climes, he cuts the figure of a Petrarchan humanist: travelling, writing, corresponding with 
some of the most eminent of his time: the lifestyle of unharnessed intellectuals since the Middle Ages. 
All this he manages on a small but adequate stipend from the University of Basel.  
He hopes that his books, which produce no significant income, might attract a brotherhood of 
scholars; a consideration that contributes to their personal tone and focus on matters that the author‟s 
ideal reader might also ponder. Books are "hooks" to catch friends in the cause of culture. Notably he 
seeks out individuals, as no group professes a similar concern. 
Unlike Marx, who promises to relieve the misery of an entire class, Nietzsche only nourishes the 
hopes of a dwindling band of aesthetes. His aristocratic radicalism, as his philosophy was termed by 
George Brandes, was not the political expression of a contemporary class. Neither aristocracy, nor 
haute bourgeoisie would rally to the banner. So, disavowing modern Europe's upper classes, he 
fancies the advent of a spiritual aristocracy, of intellectuals no doubt, who will rally to his name.  
All along he still wishes devoutly to have some practical effect on the world: "Symptoms of a decay of 
education [Bildung] are everywhere, a complete extirpation; haste, the subsiding waters of religion, 
national conflicts, science fragmenting and disintegrating, the contemptible cash and pleasure 
economy of the educated classes, their lack of love and grandeur. It is clearer and clearer to me that 
the learned classes are in every respect a part of this movement. They become more thoughtless and 
loveless with every day. Everything, art as well as science, serves the approaching barbarity. Where 
should we turn? The great deluge of barbarity is at the door: Since we really have nothing 
whatsoever with which to defend ourselves and are all a part of this movement. What is to be 
done?"71 
You ask what is to be done? And then you ask what are the means, the resources, the force to resist 
the debacle of culture? What can individuals do against the forces of an entire civilisation? One thing 
is clear: culture must no longer remain an event of the inner life; pure Innerlichkeit must be 
supplanted by action. The values of Bildung must be politicised.  
The younger Nietzsche's idea of action is scarcely revolutionary however and still bears the imprint of 
Bildung. For most Aufklärers change resulted from slow, cumulative reform, guided by enlightened 
rulers or ministries, and instilled by education. His youthful politics of cultivation was exclusively a 
politics of the spirit; artists, educators, philosophers being the agents to lead the reform: the age-old 
faith of idealists who think the world can be changed by changing our perception of value or reality 
and then reorganising or reshaping institutions. Nietzsche's public lectures On the Future of Our 
Educational Institutions, delivered as a twenty-eighth year old Professor of Classical Philology at 
Basel, amplify this theme. A new generation of spiritual teachers and leaders operating from within 
the educational institutions of Germany and capable of recognising genius and nurturing its growth 
will guide the reform of culture and this will transform the nation.  
Idealism invariably discovers a "political" method appropriate to itself. This is illustrated again by 
Nietzsche in 1870, the year of the Franco-Prussian war. Although a believer in the unity of a 
cultivated Europe, he was not inaccessible to patriotic conscience and his sentiments at the outbreak 
of hostilities in July of 1870 were manifestly anti-French. He debated whether to offer his services to 
the fatherland as soldier or as an ambulance driver. Because he had already acquired Swiss 
citizenship, he decided on serving in the second capacity since it overcame the complications of 
nationality. His period of service in the campaign was brief, cut short after contracting dysentery.  
Departing the front to convalesce "somewhere in an Alpine nook" he occupies himself with reflections 
on the rise and decline of Attic tragedy. After eager patriotic sacrifice such behaviour scarcely reflects 
political indifference or a flight from the realities of power politics. These studies were neither 
unpolitical, nor recreational. By understanding the social conditions that produced Hellenic tragedy he 
hoped to devise a plan to set Germany on a similar course of development, so that his nation might 
lead Europe to a new age of higher culture.  
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The Birth of Tragedy, the book that grew out of these studies, places the burden of hope on the 
shoulders of Richard Wagner, whose music-drama would school modern Germans in principles of 
tragic consciousness and feeling. Presumably, by being able to produce tragedy once again, we might 
stimulate the rebirth of Hellenism in all areas of life. This wayward political tract, written in an 
atmosphere acrid with the gun smoke of Realpolitik, actually posed that another Renaissance could be 
inspired by new German music. 
After breaking with Wagner, he was determined to be less idealistic. He renounced metaphysical 
comforts and in order to uproot every last vestige of idealism made sure his investigations of culture 
and society were defined - even exaggeratedly - in physiological terms. A more robust image of 
culture and the cultivated man demanded a more robust political stance.  
We must be wary therefore of accepting verbatim Nietzsche's claim to being the last "unpolitical 
German". This does not mean that he is uninterested in politics per se; merely distancing himself 
from the conduct of affairs in the German Reich: the petty politics of parties and nation states. His 
diatribes against Bismark and the House of Hohenzollern in the last few notes made before his 
collapse in January 1889 show no wont of political zeal. The hand on the pen is clearly the instrument 
of an enveloping hysteria, but even hysteria is instructive, with the last line of the fragments reading: 
"Indem, ich dich vernichte Hohenzollern, vernichte ich die Luge.”72 
The question of how society should be organised remains his fundamental concern and his outlook is 
one of Grosse Politik, or culture politics on the grand scale: continental developments and world 
historical events rather than the connivances of parties and of nation states.  
The Political Project 
Titanic self-reflection is the prerogative of philosophy and nowhere was this privilege more 
frequently exercised than by its German practitioners. Neither does Nietzsche deny himself his right 
and it should not trouble us if, during his last phase, he represents his thought as a decisive world-
historical moment. At an altitude of thought "six thousand feet beyond man and time", with the 
panorama of European values extending to every horizon, he meditates on the cloud shadows looming 
over the landscape below.  
As the nineteenth century hurries to its completion perturbations in the spirit of Europe betray a future 
punctuated by "tremendous wars, upheavals, explosions", the next two hundred years of Western 
history will witness the "advent of nihilism". Notebooks from Nietzsche's last productive years 
crackle like lightning before the storm: the whole of European culture, he warns, "has been moving as 
toward a catastrophe, with a tortured tension that is growing from decade to decade: restlessly, 
violently, headlong, like a river that wants to reach the end, that no longer reflects, that is afraid to 
reflect.”73 "Es wird Kriege geben, wie es noch keine auf Erden gab."74 Europe is unwilling to confront 
its future. Just as the question of "leadership of the earth" demands the greatest investment of 
intellectual capital it is squandered in hysterical passions of provincial immediacy.  
With a curious tension of dread and glee Nietzsche expects to witness a "tremendous stocktaking after 
the most terrible earthquake."75 One moment complaining of the pervasive ignorance of the crisis: 
“there never was a more important moment in history - but who knows a thing about it?", he then 
declares this imbalance to be altogether necessary "at a time when an undreamed of loftiness and 
freedom of intellectual passion is laying hold of the problem of humanity and is calling for a decision 
as to human destiny.”76 Acquainting readers with the experience of his "untimeliness", he matches 
himself to the greatness of the moment: "my aims and tasks are more embracing than anyone else's 
and what I call "great politics" gives at least a good standpoint and bird’s eye view for the present."77 
He is buoyed by the conviction his thought will mark the boundaries of a new world-historical epoch. 
If hyperbole strains the productions of his last years, his philosophy has a programmatic unity that 
underpins the polemical audacities and urgency of his writings. It is, so to speak, an intoxication 
arising from intense self-clarity. Swelling inner conviction belongs to those who believe they are at 
the crowning stages of a life-task. That Nietzsche possessed such a task cannot be doubted, for he had 
posed its existence on more than one occasion and always with dire seriousness: "I have an aim, 
which compels me to go on living and for the sake of which I must cope with even the most painful 
matters. Without this aim I would take things much more lightly - that is, I would stop living."78 
In its most momentous form he intends to inscribe on the nineteenth century mind the question: 
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Whither man? and set before humanity the proposition of self-rule: that man may forsake myopic 
enthusiasms, subdue the tyranny of blind accident, and direct his energies wholly at the most far-
reaching goals of the species."My life task is to prepare for humanity one supreme moment in which it 
can come to its senses, a Great Noon in which it will turn its gaze backwards and forwards, in which 
it will step from under the yoke of accident and priests, and for the first time set the question of the 
Why and Wherefore of humanity as a whole - this life task naturally follows out of the conviction that 
mankind does not get on the right road of it own accord, that it is by no means divinely ruled ..."79 
This Great Noon, or revaluation of all values, as he otherwise refers to it, is the summum bonum, the 
value of values that will guide his actions and carry him to his life task. From the juvenilia until his 
collapse, there are no breaks in the project's continuity. It is only that, with the completion of The Gay 
Science and Thus Spake Zarathustra by 1884, the sum total of creative responses to the project's 
requirements had been fully exhausted and they began to assume their definitive form and acquire a 
familiar terminology. The sea-changes that swept over him owe their origin simply to reassessments 
of the questions raised by his continuing life-task. 
The specific nature of that task is presented wholly in terms of the Ideal of Cultivation of the German 
Aufklärung, and it is thus the fate of Bildung or high culture that concerns him above all. He believes 
that, more than any contemporary, he has the breadth of vision to grasp the course and values of 
culture.80 From beginning to end Nietzsche never frames his political activism in any other way than 
to understand and promote the necessary conditions for high culture. We need only cite self-
clarifications from each period to demonstrate the persistence of his intention.  
Thus from the early period, prior to Human All Too Human, we hear: 
"My task: is to grasp the inner connection and necessity of every true culture, the protective and 
remedial measures of this culture, and its relation to the genius of the people..."81 and, 
"...We wished to make earnest endeavours to consider the best possible means of becoming men of 
culture."82 
From the middle period: 
"In any case, if mankind is not to destroy itself by such a conscious universal rule, there must be 
previously found, as a scientific standard for ecumenical aims, a knowledge of the conditions of 
culture superior to what has been attained hitherto. Herein lies the enormous task of the great minds 
of the next century."83 
"The earthly rule of man must be taken in hand by himself, his 'omniscience' must watch over the 
further fate of culture with a sharp eye."84 
And in the later period: 
"In place of 'sociology' a theory of the forms of domination... In place of 'society', the culture 
complex, as my chief interest (as a whole or in its parts)."85 
"And in all seriousness, nobody before me knew the right way, the way up; it is only beginning with 
me that there are hopes again, tasks, ways that can be prescribed for culture..."86 
In an unfinished essay of 1873, intended for the series of Untimely Meditations, he portrays the true 
philosopher as a physician of culture, who investigates its physiology and prescribes what needs to be 
done to enlarge the human spirit. More suspicious of the wisdom of philosophers in the later works, 
often associating it with decadence, he still applies the medical metaphor in positive descriptions of 
the philosopher‟s practice, settling finally on the image of the vivisector. "It seems to me more and 
more", he observes, "that the philosopher, being necessarily a man of tomorrow... has always found 
himself in contradiction to his today; his enemy has always been the ideal of today. Hitherto these 
extraordinary promoters of mankind who have been called philosophers have seldom felt themselves 
to be friends of knowledge but rather, disagreeable fools and question marks - have found their task... 
in being the bad conscience of their age. By laying the knife vivisectionally to the bosom of the very 
virtues of the age they betrayed what was their own secret: to know a new greatness of man, a new 
untrodden path to his enlargement.”87 
On other occasions he associates the duty of the philosopher with that of the statesman: a statesman of 
culture politics, a legislator of the future, an educator on the grand scale who, like Confucius, points 
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out a way of living for an entire people though, in better instances, for the purpose of higher 
cultivation. Each facet of the later Nietzsche's thoughts and imagery converge on the idea of a 
systematic political philosophy. The grand fantasies from this period - the concepts of übermensch, 
will to power, and the eternal recurrence - form an integrated system of value. They provide a 
positive programme for the future. The appearance of the most cultivated individual, the genius, in 
history should no longer be the result of happy chance but an attainment through conscious willing of 
that result and can only be achieved by organising society specifically for the purpose of breeding 
genius: "The problem I raise here is not what ought to succeed mankind in the sequence of the species 
(the human being is an end) but what type of human being one ought to breed, ought to will, as more 
valuable, more worthy of life, more certain of the future. This more valuable type has existed often 
enough already, but as a lucky accident, as an exception, never as willed."88 
The assertion that the thought experiments, psychological probing, creative dogma and polemic that 
compose Nietzsche's philosophy is shapeless, discontinuous, unsystematic - even contrivedly so - is 
scarcely credible. Nietzsche, well acquainted with the problems that his use of aphorism might pose, 
warned against interpreting this form of presentation as a sign of its incoherence; "Against the short-
sighted - do you think it is piecework because it is (and must be) offered to you in pieces? "89 
Nietzsche's perspectivism appears to undermine his intention to accomplish a revaluation of all values 
(Umwertung aller Werte). The purpose of revaluation (or trans -valuation as it has sometimes 
presented) is to establish an order of rank among value judgements. That these judgements are 
perspectival is immaterial, since to accomplish this it must be supposed that he has - or imagines he 
has - an Archimedean point of leverage that allows him to lift one idea of worth above another. But is 
this not at cross purposes with his equally methodical nihilism, which is fundamentally a levelling or 
equalising process of thought. This nihilism gathers momentum from the mid-point of his career and 
culminates in his systematic attempt at extirpating every anthropomorphism that reason and linguistic 
habit has implanted into nature - being, unity, causality, teleology. 
Nietzsche's plans are both at cross-purposes with and furthered by his nihilistic excavations. Radical 
scepticism was merely the preparatory clearing of ground before the work of construction could 
begin. To this end he allowed himself to become "the first perfect nihilist of Europe who, however, 
has even now lived through the whole of nihilism, to the end, leaving it behind, outside himself.”90 
Nihilism was not a goal, but the outcome of thinking towards one; a monster that philosophy must 
encounter in open combat, or preferably, accommodate within its framework. 
During his last productive decade Nietzsche was planning a systematic work to rival any in the 
tradition of German philosophy. Writing to Peter Gast in 1884, soon after the completion of most of 
Thus Spake Zarathustra he comments on the satisfactory progress of his work, and expresses the 
intention that "the next six years will be for working out a scheme which I sketched for my 
"philosophy.”91 In another letter of the same year to Malwida von Meysenburg, he supports that 
intention and adds - "now that I have built the portico to my philosophy, I must start working 
tirelessly until the main edifice stands finished before me."92 
Years later, he is still insisting on the "hundred weight of need" pressing upon him to "create a 
coherent structure of thought during the next few years.”93 Although he did not live to complete this 
work, the shape it might have taken can be observed in the notebooks of the 1880's presented as The 
Will to Power. These notes contain ideas not ventured or developed elsewhere, but do not depart from 
the flavour of works published during the same period. They supplement and make explicit 
connections that would have been drawn in a proposed systematic work. 
That system was unlikely to be metaphysical in content, owing little to transcendental perambulations 
and more to an encompassing political design. His philosophical activity is not in pursuit of 
immutable essences or utopian Truth; but for an aim and future for humanity. The first imperative 
therefore was to express an ideal of human worth, the second, to prescribe means for realising it. By 
studying the forms and trends of modern civilisation he gains the knowledge needed to design a 
politics of world-historical dimensions. The response to the question - Whither? must be grounded in 
the history and nature of man; it must attend to the interrelations between being and becoming, worth 
and worthlessness, knowledge and practice, illusion and actuality; it will digress into the traditional 
domains of philosophy only to secure what it requires. It must understand what in nature and man is 
necessary and what can be changed, as an image of worth must never surmount possibility.  
A world goal presupposes a cosmology; a solar system in which the goal blazes like the sun. All 
nature is politicised: even the atom. And everything about the organisation of society refers to back to 
what occurs in nature. A single task sprouts innumerable tendrils of enquiry and preparation; a living 
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system with its own laws of growth and stages of metamorphosis. With a coherent philosophical 
structure Nietzsche hopes to encase his thought in its final and perfect transformation, entertaining 
this prospect especially after the composition of Thus Spake Zarathustra when he believes he 
possesses all the necessary instruments to accomplish the task. With the theory of nature as will to 
power, the eternal recurrence as a means to grasp the problem of becoming, the array of 
psychological insights into human mores, the goal of the übermensch and explorations of nihilism all 
existing side by side, all that remains is to bind these ideas into a harmonious ensemble. 
36 
4 - Nietzsche's World History 
Nietzsche‟s stance in relation to his contemporaries depends entirely on the fact that that he perceives 
world-history as a mortal struggle between the Ideal of Cultivation and all other value systems. It is 
the basis of his remark that great politics provides the best standpoint from which to view the 
present.94 Great politics is the struggle between spiritual and material powers to decide how society 
should be organised. Allusions to "grosse Politik" occur most frequently during the last decade of this 
career, but the outlook is incipient in the early work. Whenever Nietzsche expresses a perception on 
world-historical developments95 it is in nuce a statement of the great political standpoint. There is 
perhaps no better way of illustrating this than by recounting the history of western civilisation through 
Nietzsche‟s eyes. He himself nowhere draws a cohesive world history, but it can be constructed fairly 
easily from examination of his work. 
When Nietzsche equates world history and European history it is not just cultural hubris, simply 
nineteenth century political reality: Europe rules the world. And the legacy of this rule, based on 
military, economic and technological dominance is eternal. 
We hear much about globalisation, as if it is something recent, whereas in fact, globalisation started 
the moment modern humans moved out of Africa, when they populated the continents of Australia 
and North and South America. It went further when Greek, Roman, Chinese and other civilised 
explorers discovered worlds beyond their own and set out to conquer, colonise and trade with them. It 
reached its modern position with the European discovery of the trade routes to Asia and the continents 
of the New World. From there European domination has brought global convergence and uniformity 
so that only the most distant and concealed places are free of any imprint of the western mind. Even 
if, in time, world power shifts to other continents, the globe will never again have the same aspect or 
dimensions. In some sense it will remain forever Europeanised, and for this reason its past might quite 
justifiably be called European. 
What is the point of origin of this event? Nietzsche's answer is unequivocal: world history begins with 
the Greeks, for it was Greek civilisation which begat Europe: “...the Greek was the first great union 
and synthesis of everything near Eastern, and on that account the inception of the European soul, the 
discovery of our "new world".96 By synthesising "everything Near Eastern" the Greeks constitute a 
decisive advance over the other great peoples of the Orient; and a wholly novel principle emerges in 
the self-conscious life of man.  
This advance is not measured by imperial ascendancy or military might in itself, for then the transient 
rule of Parthian, Mongol, or Hun might have a place in this narrative, which it does not; rather by a 
capacity for the highest degree of culture. This is the meaning of "great politics", which in Nietzsche's 
view is intrinsically a politics of culture, the aim of which is to bring forth a harvest of "noble" or 
"great" individuals, that is, geniuses. What is sought in history "are not the happy ages, but those 
which offer a favourable soil for the production of genius."97 In genius the values of culture are 
expressed to a superlative degree; he represents an objective value, an end in itself. The nation or 
epoch which has actively promoted the production of genius is one which has triumphed in the 
domain of great politics. 
Culture and Civilisation 
For Nietzsche Greek civilisation is overwhelmingly fruitful: its success is to produce genius on a 
scale and with a persistence unparalleled in history, not merely by an accidental convergence of 
circumstances, but by understanding this as its most pressing goal and task.  
It is an advance beyond civilisation per se in a way that is different to how civilisation can be claimed 
as an advance over hunter gathering. In the second case civilisation is seen to be superior in its 
technology and productivity. Fields of agriculture and city walls are a better defence against want, the 
elements, and human predators. By distancing us from nature through urban existence we refine our 
manners, discover new forms of social arrangements and live easier lives. 
Nietzsche‟s measure of human progress is not improvements in technology but the greatness of 
personalities attained. He sees the conquest over the past effected only by the highest exemplars of 
humanity. People do not merely have to be civilised; high culture might even contain more 
characteristics of the barbaric. There is more culture in a barbarians thirst for great deeds; were this 
thirst is organised and there is unity between thought and action. If it weakens savage desires by 
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uprooting them, civilisation destroys the human energies that are transformed and sublimated into 
culture.  
On this account both forms of life may fall into opposition: "The high points of culture and 
civilisation do not coincide; one should not be deceived about the abysmal antagonism of culture and 
civilisation. The great moments of culture were always, morally speaking, times of corruption; and 
conversely the periods when the taming of the human animal ("civilisation") was desired and 
enforced were times of intolerance against the boldest and most spiritual natures. Civilisation has 
aims different from those of culture - perhaps they are even opposite."98 
The conflict between Kultur and Zivilisation touted and trumpeted by the intelligentsia of both camps 
during the Great War, was a war waged with zeal exceeding that in the trenches. In defence of a deep 
and serious Kultur the Germans trained their artillery on effete and machine-like Western Zivilisation. 
Western propagandists relived the last days of the Imperium Romanum and saw that they were 
holding off another barbarian invasion. 
Nietzsche's distinction between culture and civilisation, and his implacable anti-nationalism separates 
him from the generation that followed. The idea of 'culture' of the German war propagandists was 
already being prepared in the late eighteenth century and propagated spectacularly by Romantic 
historicism. This emphasised the unique, local, national, and linguistically specific life patterns of a 
people which produce complexes of sentiment and custom significant only to their participants. These 
complexes are not transferable by way of exposition; they can only be understood by active 
participation in them and are hence alien and incomprehensible to the outsider.  
This disposition contributed to the strong interest in hermeneutics shown by German scholars from 
Dilthey to Weber. It also anticipated the ethically neutral investigations of modern anthropology, and 
yet, by way of associating Kultur with the Volk or Volkgeist (Volk often being used to refer 
specifically to the German people) a foundation was laid for German nationalist ideology. Also 
enforcing this view of culture was the tendency of German scholars to equate Civilisation with the 
materiality of human existence. Civilisation is a shell or husk that is the externalisation of spiritual 
activity, being what George Simmel would have called objectified spirit.99 In this way Kultur is 
blatantly in Manichean relation with Zivilisation; as spirit fighting matter within society itself, and the 
progress of civilisation stifling the life of Spirit through mechanical and heartless forces. 
Nietzsche therefore employs the Ideal of Cultivation belonging to the Aufklärung; the Bildung ideal 
elaborated by Goethe's Weimar circle. Here culture is not a localised manifestation of custom and 
sentiment but a potentiality for which all mankind is endowed. It is located in the formation of 
personality, not in the shared habits of a community. It is an activity, not simply the residue of 
activity. It proposes, in the words of Goethe, the harmonic wholeness of the individual by bringing 
“alle Manifestationen des Menschlichen Wesens, Sinnlichkeit und Vernuft, Einbildungskraft and 
Verstand zu einer entschiedenen Einheit."100 
For Nietzsche culture is the personal activity and the social organisation that makes the synthetic 
individual possible. Civilisation needs the individual as a unit in the material processes of state and 
community and therefore diminishes the integrated personality. After Nietzsche, Max Weber 
expresses the same presuppositions in his explorations of bureaucracy. Plainly cherishing the values 
of Bildung, he sees in the enveloping rationalisation of modern life, in the bureaucratic forms of the 
modern state and commercial enterprise, the degeneration of higher spirituality in the synthetic 
individual, and his replacement by an order of specialists. At the final stage of the development of this 
future iron cage it might be said:"Specialists without spirit, sensualists without heart; this nullity 
imagines that it has attained a level of civilisation never before achieved."101 
Elsewhere, Weber alludes to this eventuality as Egyptionism - and equates the etiolation of 
civilisation with life patterns in the late empires of the Orient. By the late nineteenth century it was 
commonplace in German scholarship to distinguish the Orient and Occident as the material examples 
of two antagonistic principles of social organisation. Orientalism indicating serfdom to a despot who, 
shadowed by a ministry of eunuchs, tyrannises an abject population into indolence and semi-
barbarism; Occidentalism signifying principles of robust independence found in archetypes such as 
the republics of Greece and Rome or even the unruly ancient German tribes.  
This stock idea of German scholarship is once again prefigured by a Greek. Aristotle, in a famous 
passage in the Politics, distinguishes between two different types of barbarism: “The races that live in 
the cold regions and those of Europe are full of courage and passion but somewhat lacking in skill 
and brain power; for this reason, while remaining generally independent, they lack political cohesion 
and the ability to rule over others. On the other hand the Asiatic races have both brains and skill but 
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are lacking in courage and will-power; so they have remained enslaved and subject."102 The Greeks, 
on the other hand, combine the best qualities of both the European and the Asiatic barbarians; being 
both high-spirited and intelligent, they are capable of ruling the world.  
To use equivalent terms of German scholarship, we would call the northern Europeans barbaric, the 
Asiatics civilised and the Greeks cultured. These three broad categories - barbarism, civilisation, and 
culture - each connoting a fundamental possibility for human existence, can be perceived in all of 
Nietzsche's works. He adapts and assimilates them into his thought early on, and they change only in 
nomenclature. In his earliest writing the merely civilised existence is called Orientalism or 
Alexandrianism. (Once again, there is a strong tendency to associate the enfeeblement of life with a 
late imperial mores. Ortega Y Gasset, a brilliant student of German literature, also uses the metaphor 
of a late empire when he offers a succinct statement of this opposition: “Uncultured life", he says, "is 
barbarism, devitalised culture is byzantinism".103) Later on Nietzsche equates Christianity with 
Orientalism. Different terms designate the same undesirable qualities in different historical locations 
but the dialectic between these hostile forms produces the tension in his world historical narrative. 
Nietzsche's World-History 
The great political narrative returns us to sixth and fifth century Greece B.C., where for the first time 
in the history of the West and Near-East, culture becomes a possibility for human existence. It is 
conceived almost immediately on the grandest dimensions: so formidably that mankind hitherto or 
since has barely aspired to duplicate it. For Nietzsche its documents are Attic tragedy before and 
shortly after the Persian wars, particularly the works of Aeschylus. The pervasiveness of a tragic view 
of existence reflects the height culture has attained at any moment; therefore Greece is at her cultural 
zenith for the time in which tragic poets and philosopher statesmen are influential. The inescapable 
fact of this duration however, is its brevity. The ideal ensemble of conditions that had permitted the 
culture-forming elements to dominate crumbles quickly against intractable historical forces.  
First symptom of decline is the extinction of the tragic outlook, being supplanted in drama by the 
dialectics of Euripides and in philosophy by the optimistic rationalism of Socrates. The Persian threat 
places intense stress on the Hellenic city-states and this is followed by the devastation and waste of 
the Peloponnesian wars, fought not against a common foe but by Athens and Sparta for dominion of 
the Greeks. The internal strife of the poleis that accompanies this is no less destructive.104 By the 
close of the fourth century a return to the original equilibrium is increasingly remote; reformation of 
Greek culture no longer conceivable. Nietzsche laments that "this reformation of Hellenes would, as I 
envision it, have become a wonderful soil for the production of geniuses, a soil such as there had 
never been before. That would be something to describe! We lost something expressible then."105 
The next stage in the world historical narrative is the Macedonian kingdom's conquest of the city 
states to form an Hellenic empire under Macedonian hegemony that extends to India. Alexander‟s 
empire spreads Greek literature and manners over much of the East, North Africa and the peoples of 
the Mediterranean. But just as Hellenic culture is dispersed and extended to non-Greeks, Greece itself 
- the heartland of the independent republican polis and single most important fact for production of 
that culture - is now incorporated into an amorphous power bloc and is divested of its active spirit: the 
politics of Greece becomes orientalised. “The Hellenising of the world and to make this possible, the 
Orientalising of Hellenism - that double mission of Alexander the Great, still remains the most 
important event... The rhythmic play of those two factors against each other is the force that has 
determined the course of history heretofore."106 
In the world-historical war between culture and civilisation, between Hellenism and Orientalism, no 
end has been reached. Mankind has dallied, gone forward, strayed, stepped backward; at no point is 
there any evidence of world process at work; no outcome ineluctable, and history without intrinsic 
aim other than that given it by men. Through nature, mankind has evolved from the ape but he might 
just as easily return there.107 Advance toward culture is only the result of the most protracted 
endeavour and is maintained if exceptional circumstances do not intrude. There is no necessity for the 
growth or decline of civilisation as Spengler presents it, other than what a population allows. In this 
war a blow may start a rout, a retreat may prepare a victory. 
With the greatest creative episode of the Greeks at an end, and the Alexandrine empire fragmenting 
almost at the moment of its founder's death, the next metamorphosis of the great politics occurs with 
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the fateful conquest by the Romans of the Mediterranean world. Lacking the intellectual brilliance of 
Greeks but surpassing them in political and military virtue, Latin civilisation rises piecemeal by 
conquest. One city meets every challenge. Politics is conceived on a scale previously unknown.  
With the military success of the Scipio's in Spain, Carthage and Syria something new appears: an 
enduring empire across three continents. The Greek Polybius, enslaved by the Romans and deeply 
impressed by their rapid ascent, announces that he is the first to write history on a world scale. The 
salient feature of Roman conquest is embodied in the great Scipio Africanus. He himself assimilates 
many of the essential elements of Hellenic culture to present a form of Graeco-Roman civilisation. 
This interpenetration of Greek and Latin culture makes Hellenism or the classical style a possibility 
even for the barbarians of Europe, which moreover, is conceived as a political entity for the first time 
once Rome expands into France and Britain. 
Early in his life Nietzsche is unimpressed by the Roman achievement: where the energies of Hellas 
went into creating genius, Latium expended itself in world domination and the perfection of its state. 
He complains that "the world-wide empire of the Romans is nothing sublime compared to Athens. The 
strength that really should go into the flower here remains in the leaves and stem, which flourish."108 
Rome did not make the decisive step toward the deliberate cultivation of genius, and whenever it did 
so it was only derivative of the patterns set by the Greeks.  
When the Romans adopt the aesthetics of the Greeks it remains purely decorative, coarsened and 
inferior. There is no unity between the classical style of the Romans and their mores.109 Later in his 
life, he values Roman virtues and honours their achievement, if not as a flowering of culture, then as a 
base on which a great culture could grow: a base that would hold every promise of enduring. The 
immense conception of the Imperium Romanum with its “grand organisation of society might be the 
supreme condition for the prosperity of life"; a structure that could house a culture capable of 
withstanding every blow of fortune and so evading the fate of Greek culture which was extinguished 
through political disintegration.110 "The Imperium Romanum which we know, which the history of the 
Roman province teaches us to know better and better, this most admirable of all works of art in the 
grand style, was a beginning, its structure was to prove itself by millennia - sub specie aeterni has 
never been so much as dreamed of... the tremendous deed of the Romans in clearing the ground for a 
great culture which could take its time..."111 
But he speaks here in the subjunctive; the long preparation does not produce an equivalent of the 
Hellenic tragic age. The work of the Romans is hardly begun before it is ruined: another inert and 
lifeless empire; backward, effete, unworldly, ripe for pillage by waves of invaders, sinking in intellect 
and invention beneath its own weight. Why, when circumstances promised so much? At times, 
Nietzsche's explanation is brief and unconditional: the entire preceding effort expended by the 
Romans was "undone overnight by Christianity."112 
The values and spirit of Christianity undermine the empire from within. Like a sickness it weakens 
the empire‟s political and military organs leaving it incapable of resisting the external threat. This 
assertion - not without precedent if we consider the assessments of Gibbon and Machiavelli - is 
qualified elsewhere. Christianity, which placed itself in explicit opposition to the classical Ideal of 
Cultivation, would not have conquered antiquity without a fertile soil for its growth; and this may be 
blamed as much on the ruling classes as anyone else."The degeneration of the rulers and the ruling 
classes has been the cause of the greatest mischief in history! Without the Roman Caesars and Roman 
society, the insanity of Christianity would never have come to power."113 
Elsewhere he suggests that Christianity only took up in more rigorous fashion the fight that had 
already begun in antiquity against "the classical ideal and the noble religion “- i.e. Hellenic culture. 
Christianity accommodated itself to the existing antipaganism of the cults and religions of "the lower 
masses, the women, the slaves, the non-noble classes “.114 High culture is explicitly linked with an 
aristocratic milieu; the new religion - the natural heir of Orientalism must, of necessity, find its 
following among the slaves and the disaffected of an empire neglectful of its worldly duties. The 
parallel between Christianity and Orientalism is drawn early in his career in the fourth essay of the 
Untimely Meditations where he writes that “...Christianity appears, for instance, as a product of 
Oriental antiquity, which was thought out and pursued to its ultimate conclusions by men with almost 
intemperate thoroughness."115 The systematisation of Orientalism into a world religion has profound 
implications for mankind and throughout his entire opus we hear the regretful sigh that Goethe once 
expressed in conversation: Had we never come to know the melancholy of the Orient, had Homer 
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remained our Bible, how different a form would mankind have achieved.116 
In his analysis of Christianity's world-historical role Nietzsche carefully distinguishes its organisation 
from the spirit of the teachings of Jesus. The way in which the founder of Christianity lived resembled 
the naive beginnings of a Buddhistic peace movement. The organisation of religion, the church, was 
precisely what Jesus was disposed to preach against.117 If carried through to the letter the effect of his 
teachings would have been to quell resentment against the noble culture even though it would not 
have been capable of invoking the spirit of Hellenism.118 Instead, "...'Christianity' has become 
something fundamentally different from what its founder did and desired. It is the great antipagan 
movement of antiquity, formulated through the employment of the life, teaching and "Words" of the 
founder of Christianity but interpreted in an absolutely arbitrary way after the pattern of 
fundamentally different needs: translated into the language of every already existing subterranean 
religion... Its mortal enemy is the Roman just as much as the Greek."119 
It is Paul who turns Christianity into a purified Orientalism and re-directs its principles to promote 
other-worldliness, a circumstance already made attractive in antiquity by Platonic philosophy and its 
transcendental world of Ideas. Orientalism represents a denial of the life Greek tragedians were 
prepared to affirm even in the face of deepest suffering. Christianity reverses all that had been 
deemed good hitherto and calls it evil. As it advances Hellenism retreats. 
Although its theoretical disposition is to turn from the world, in practice it begins to resume step by 
step everything that it had professed to negate.120 When the Christian becomes soldier, priest, 
merchant, citizen, scholar, and merchant i.e. worldly, the ground is cleared for the seizure of the 
secular apparatus of the imperial state. In both the eastern and western empires Christianity is 
sanctioned as the official state religion and so begins a momentous era in the history of great politics. 
Fashioning itself on the ruins of imperial civilisation after the barbarian invasions and imposing itself 
on the mores of the semi-civilised peoples of Europe, the Church in both imperial hemispheres strives 
to attain as comprehensive a status as its secular predecessor.  
Christianity eliminates rival beliefs or subsumes them into its doctrine, thereby schooling the 
European mind in absolutes. Although its ethical domination is total, its political success is various. 
The Church‟s occasional quest for secular dominion is at odds with the will of secular rulers who 
resent the cloister dictating to the crown. So sometimes doctrine complies with imperial will and 
sometimes it fights doggedly to overcome it. In any event the Christian church serves to centre and 
consolidate an identifiably universal world-view for hundreds of years. Under its tutelage European 
multiplicity is endowed with a potential unity. There are moments when Nietzsche concedes a 
modicum of respect for accomplishment, that is, for the Church as a form of spiritual organisation, 
requiring a degree of refinement above the cruder administrative arrangement of the State.121 
In general however, his antipathy is transparent. There is no Romantic nostalgia for the Middle Ages, 
the high point of Christian civilisation. This, he says, is a period of barbarism and unculture. Not only 
does the Church suppress and check the revival of classicism in Europe but, through the agency of the 
Crusades, it wages a great political war against the superior culture of Islam. 
The Crusades robbed us today of "the harvest of the culture of Islam"122 which had arrived at a 
nobility and enrichment of manners during the Moorish occupation of Spain. In similar fashion the 
church grimly fought the imperial genius of Friedrich the Second (whom Nietzsche identifies as “the 
first European according to my taste".123) who had sought rapprochement with Islam. Only when the 
Church relaxes its grip on the nascent elements of culture in Europe, when it becomes most corrupted 
and the possibility arises of the papacy becoming a purely secular instrument of power in the hands of 
the Borgia,124 does the rebirth of Hellenism in Europe once again become realisable.  
The waning of the Middle Ages (if not of Christianity) is punctuated by an interlude of Hellenism and 
retrieval of the spirit of antiquity known as the Italian Renaissance.125 Thus, “is it at last understood... 
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what the Renaissance was? The revaluation of Christian values, the attempt, undertaken with every 
expedient, with every instinct, with genius of every kind, to bring about the victory of the opposing 
values, the noble values... up till now this has been the only great war... neither has there been a form 
of attack more fundamental, more direct, and more strenuously delivered on the entire front and at 
the enemy's centre!"126 
In the perilous jungle of Renaissance Italy, the Man-plant again grows vigorously and the vision to 
build on a grand scale is everywhere at work, finding expression through the state-craft of the 
condottieri, the brushes and chisels of the artists or the quills of the poets and the learned. Europe 
becomes pregnant with the energy and curiosity of the uomo universale. The individual as an 
autonomous and self formative unit again asserts itself as it had in Greece, not because freedom has 
been legislated on its behalf but because it has learned to survive and flourish in the harshest 
circumstances. It is humanity's loftiest moment since the tragic age of antiquity whose example is 
such that “with all the tensions of the past three hundred years we have not yet reattained the man of 
the Renaissance." But it must be qualified: Nietzsche still considers the man of that era to be, in turn, 
"inferior to the man of antiquity."127 
As occurred in Hellas the bloom of culture is brief; its flowering is quickly checked as Christian 
doctrine strenuously reasserts its hegemony in Europe. In the north of the continent Protestantism 
rises against the corrupted Renaissance church, but this in turn triggers a Counter-Reformation in the 
south; the church falls with a vengeance upon heretics of all types and forces stricter control over 
knowledge, art and every other detail of life. In north and south the advances made by European 
culture are eclipsed by the competing claims of Catholic and Protestant fanaticism, the very existence 
of which bespeaks the waning power of Christianity. The significant Teutonic contribution to the 
Reformation leads the later Nietzsche to one of his most vicious anti-German diatribes.128 His final 
estimate is that "the German Reformation is a recrudescence of Christian barbarism".129) At other 
times Nietzsche employs a physiological metaphor to explain the eclipse of the Renaissance; he sees 
it as an epoch which, after an explosive outburst of long assembled energies, quickly exhausts itself: 
“...the great human being is a terminus, the great epoch, the Renaissance for example, is a terminus... 
The danger which lies in great human beings and great epochs is extraordinary; sterility, exhaustion 
of every kind follow in their footsteps."130 
With the Renaissance at an end the history of European great politics grows darker, more uncertain as 
the war between Orientalism and Hellenism takes new directions. In the aftermath of the 
Reformation, there are brief, localised blooms of Hellenism, such as in the France of Louis XIV, or in 
exceptional individuals such as Goethe, whom Nietzsche describes as a "return to nature, through a 
going up to the naturalness of the Renaissance." Seventeenth century Europe has a hardier and more 
robust culture than the ensuing century which descends into sentimentalism.131 Goethe's greatness lies 
in his attempt to overcome the sentimentalism of his time and show, by the example of his own life, 
the path toward the strong and well constituted human being.132 
At the dawn of the modern era new forces emerge that are as opposed to the old medieval order as 
they are to production of culture. As ardent as Nietzsche's hopes are for German culture in his youth, 
he is bitter and reproachful in maturity. His unshaken conviction is that the rebirth of Hellenism in 
Europe can only be assured by the political unity of the continental powers. The Imperium Romanum, 
the earliest promise of that unity, may have collapsed, but its example is never completely forgotten. 
It is recalled in clumsy fashion in the Carolingian epoch, in the consolidation of a Holy Roman 
Empire, even in the mere fact of Catholic Christendom as a loose confederation of European 
provinces under Papal dominion. 
But with the onset of the modern era that promise is shattered by the accumulating power of the 
centralised, organised nation state. The nation state has its own pressing claims on human life; in this 
respect opposed to Christianity as well as culture, exclusive as well as expansionary, hostile to 
external powers, determined to exert complete control over the populations within its boundaries, it 
dispenses with the idea of a European commonwealth. Hitherto the great European struggle was 
between emperor and church, with the exception of the independent attitude of the recalcitrant Italian 
city states, it was a struggle between two centralising powers. With the advent of the nation-state 
however, the great struggle takes on a new form; that is, a struggle between European unity and 
European regionalism. 
The labours of Charles V, the Holy Roman Emperor, to assert his supremacy over Francis I of France 
and the German Protestants mark the last active attempt by a medieval ruler to reassert the tradition of 
a politically and spiritually united Europe. His abdication, following a futile campaign against Francis 
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I, is symbolic of what is to occur in the centuries to come. By the nineteenth century the dissolution of 
Europe has a perilous momentum. Fragmenting within itself, its parts in perpetual contention, 
Europe's energies, which should be claimed for the greater goal of the leadership of humanity, are 
dissipated in provincial strife and disorder. Nationalist politics, necessarily antithetical to great 
politics obscure its cultural mission: "this nevrose nationale from which Europe is suffering acutely, 
this eternal subdivision of Europe into petty states, with politics on a municipal scale: they have 
robbed Europe itself of its significance, of its reason - and have stuffed it into a cul-de-sac."133 
Every gesture by an individual or people to transcend this particularism is an advance. Goethe is such 
an advance. His life and works are of European rather than purely national significance, and he 
refuses to be stirred by German hatred of occupying Napoleonic armies. But by far the single most 
important datum of the modern era is the political will and vision coalescing in the superhuman and 
inhuman recesses of Napoleon himself. Not a modern, but an atavism, a return to the Renaissance, his 
one abiding aim:"...to consolidate Europe and to convert it into a political and economic unit, with 
the object of ruling the world...” would once again have made good the promise of the Romans and 
founded a grand organisation of society on which a future culture may build.134 
Napoleon‟s failure leads to an uprising of petty nationalism, ironically encouraged by his own 
conquests. The peace achieved by the great powers at the Congress of Vienna after his defeat is 
illusory. For Nietzsche, the virus is already at work: in Germany, in Italy, and among half a dozen 
other European peoples, the siren call of national statehood finds willing ears. Liberal and nationalist 
rebellions are repeatedly repressed by the great imperial powers but Europe inevitably takes on the 
appearance of an armed camp. At the moment at which German and Italian unity is finally realised 
Europe becomes a crucible of national hubris and militarism. 
Secularism and the modern crisis of values 
As the nation state grows more powerful, Christianity or more precisely, the settled order of the 
Middle Ages falls into decay. Older and younger Nietzsche assess the decline differently, but both 
await it with a mixture of hope and dread. The nineteenth century is not lacking in energy or 
potential; enormous forces are simmering below which might explode through the slightest fracture. 
Once free predicting the future is best left to a dice throw. Europe is on the threshold of a new dawn 
or unparalleled barbarism. Its danger is precisely in its uncertain transition: there is no clear image of 
its destiny as it breaks free of the past. In a key passage of the third Untimely Meditation the young 
Nietzsche shows profound alarm as modernity swirls into the vortex of Atomism.  
Barbarism is imminent. "For a century," he says, "we have been ready for a world-shaking 
convulsion; and though we have lately been trying to set the conservative strength of the so-called 
national state against the great modern tendency to volcanic destructiveness, it will only be, for a 
long time yet, an aggravation of the universal unrest that hangs over us. We need not be deceived by 
individuals behaving as if they knew nothing of all this anxiety; their own restlessness shows how well 
they know it. They think more exclusively of themselves than men ever thought before; they plant and 
build for their little day, and the chase for happiness is never greater than when the quarry must be 
caught today or tomorrow; the next day perhaps there is no hunting. We live in the Atomic Age, or 
rather in the Atomic Chaos. The opposing forces were practically held together in Medieval times by 
the church, and in some measure assimilated by the strong pressure which she exerted. When the 
common tie broke and the pressure relaxed, they arose once more against each other. The 
Reformation taught that many things were 'adiaphora' - departments that needed no guidance from 
religion: this was the price paid for its own existence. Christianity paid a similar one to guard itself 
against the far more religious antiquity and laid the seeds of discord at once. Everything nowadays is 
directed by the fools and the knaves, the selfishness of the moneymaker and the brute forces of 
militarism. The state in their hands makes a good show of re-organising everything and of becoming 
the bond that unites the warring elements, in other words, it wishes for the same idolatry from 
mankind as they showed to the church. And we shall yet feel the consequences. We are even now on 
the ice floes in the stream of the Middle Ages; they are thawing fast, and their movement is ominous; 
the banks are flooded, and giving way. "135 
Young Nietzsche is circumspect about the decay of the Christian civilisation of the Middle Ages. 
Europe has been swept around in the whirlpool of Christianity for two millennia, but has now 
launched itself away into new hazards. To avert the dangers posed by anti-religious elements over-
reacting he commends considerate abstention: “I thereby honour religion, though it is dying."136 We 
must not disfigure the corpse but treat it gently so that the transition is not too painful to the mourners. 
The task of one concerned with the health of culture is to soothe those who suffer at religion's 
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passing.  
The young philosopher bears great hopes for religion's unlucky hour. Orientalism has ruled long 
enough and must now make way for rejuvenated Hellenism."The earth which, up to the present, has 
been more than adequately Orientalised, begins to yearn once more for Hellenism."137 His optimism 
hinges on the congruence between the circumstances that produced Attic tragedy in antiquity and that 
existing in modern Germany. Nietzsche considers Richard Wagner to be the greatest herald of this 
rejuvenation. He is German‟s Aeschylus, and will lead Europe to restore the spirit of antiquity.138 
As Wagner‟s acolyte, Nietzsche expresses exuberant hopes, but part of him resists the great artist's 
personality as he contemplates the disproportion between ancient and modern achievement. There is 
potential for genius to be sure, but its emergence is broken on contact with modernity. Cultural 
leadership falls daily into the hands of Philistines, who profess concern for culture but are actually its 
deadliest enemies as they prefer mediocrity to genius, flatter inferiority and stifle seriousness. 
Later he is less inclined to display disappointment and therewith idealism and introduces new 
elements into his analysis of the modern malaise. Christianity has transfigured itself into secular 
forms of its original impulse. Though it can no longer exert the same claims as religion, its principles 
remain and, pruned of eschatology, push the growth of modern ideas - the most recent metamorphosis 
and mask of Orientalism.  
During the sentimentalist eighteenth century modernity rejects Christian doctrine but unconsciously 
engorges its values. The fanatic Rousseau inspires an incipient revolutionary doctrine consisting of 
the democratic spirit and distaste for aristocratic values. It is a recrudescence of the primitive spirit of 
that religion, arising once again out of the disaffected lower orders, fired by the concept “equality of 
souls before God", which finally becomes "...revolution, modern ideas and the principle of the 
decline of the entire social order."139 The French revolution with all its implications for the modern 
world is simply the "continuation of Christianity".140 
The modern decadence movement lives off the corpse of religion, even though it is explicitly anti-
church, so by its nature it is antagonistic to every advance of culture. Because essentially religious 
values still affect this-worldly politics, political creeds as disparate as socialism or conservatism look 
backward to an idyllic Christian society, primitive or medieval. It is for this reason that Nietzsche 
abandons his hitherto polite abstention and waves vigorously the banner of Anti-Christ. He dwells, in 
later analysis of Christianity, on how long it has influenced European values. The displacement of 
religion from the centre of individual existence and social organisation seems to reveal a cavernous 
vacuum in each."The time has come when we have to pay for having been Christians for two 
thousand years, we are losing the centre of gravity by virtue of which we lived; we are lost for a 
while. Abruptly we plunge into the opposite valuations, with all the energy that such extreme 
overvaluation of man has generated in man."141 The spectacular advance of modern science has 
promoted the nihilistic consequences of this loss of the centre of gravity: "Since Copernicus man has 
been rolling from the centre toward X."142 
In what does nihilism consist? European man has been instructed to value himself and estimate his 
own significance in the house of Christianity. This protracted tutelage has led him to suppose only 
these beliefs to be true, and when finally they no longer seem true it is assumed that existence itself is 
without worth. Rigorous logic pushes awakening doubt toward radical nihilism and draws Nietzsche 
to assert the antimony: "Insofar as we believe in morality we pass sentence on existence".143 Nihilism 
is an altogether necessary phenomenon, an inevitable manifestation of a period in transition, which 
will bestow on Europe the character of its next two centuries.144 
The most intelligent recourse is not to avoid or ignore nihilism, as if this were possible, before new 
values can be determined it must be experienced openly and plumbed to its depths. A radical 
scepticism is the first stage of a grand revaluation of all values. "For why has the advent of Nihilism 
become necessary? Because the values we have had hitherto thus draw their final consequence, 
because nihilism represents the ultimate logical conclusion of our great values and ideas - because 
we must experience nihilism before we can find out what value these "values" really had. We require, 
sometime, new values."145 
The decay of Christianity, like rotting fruit, spreads to everything around it. The degeneration of one 
set of values endangers all others, even belief in the Ideal of Cultivation. The radical secularising of 
the world in the nineteenth century means the great competitor to high culture is no longer other-
                                                                
137 TOS II, IV, p.122. 
138 loc. cit. 
139 AC, a62. 
140 WP, a94. 
141 WP, a30. 
142 WP, a1. 
143 WP, a6. 
144 WP, Pref 2. 
145 WP, Pref 4. 
44 
worldly religion, but empty and vulgar secularism that promises to uproot the foundations on that 
culture. Changing political structures, in which democracy is everywhere victorious, are bringing 
about a decline in taste and l'esprit that had once distinguished the ancien régime. The aristocratic 
remnants, grown decadent and lacking all former robustness, cannot stall this development. 
Accordingly Europe has grown gloomier and more vulgar, but also more natural and realistic.  
Nietzsche now sees decay as the necessary counterpoint to every forward movement of culture. Using 
physiological metaphors, he suggests that decadence in social organisation might simply be the 
consequence of great tensions that some elements are less able to endure. The decline and even 
extinction of these elements represent a natural wastage. The violent tensions in which the century 
abounds may provoke the happiest effects."There is an element of decay in everything that 
characterises modern man, but close beside this sickness stand signs of an untested force and 
powerfulness of the soul. The same reasons that produce the increasing smallness of man drive the 
stronger and rarer individuals up to greatness."146 
That democracy is wiping away the vestiges of aristocracy is the integral fact on which he bases his 
visions of a politics of cultivation. It also impedes the possibility of Hellenism, based on the 
proposition that "every elevation of the type 'man' has hitherto been the work of an aristocratic 
society."147 Only in a society that "believes in a long scale of orders of rank and difference of worth 
between man and man" can the higher type of man become recognisable and appreciated. The 
equalising trend of democracy can only result in the very opposite to culture - mediocrity and hostility 
towards excellence. This is not a demand for a return to the ancien régime. The old aristocracy of 
Europe has outlived its worth: "the rotted ruling classes have ruined the image of the ruler “.148 If 
Nietzsche despises the idea of democracy, eventually he greets its reality with ironic approval. 
Democracy may provide the groundwork for a favourable development. The trend to homogeneity 
creates a large, intelligent, but essentially pliant, mass of people, happily disposed to slavery.  
It is not meant that we will put on chains and submit to live in coal pits. He supposes rather, that 
democracy will make us easier to lead, readier to bend to a more powerful will. It deepens the gulf 
between rulers and the ruled. To this end the homogenisation of Europe might even be hastened, for it 
will stimulate an experimentation of precisely the opposite kind; one that will make use of the herd 
for its own purposes. Democratic Europe could become an instrument for a new class of Caesarian 
spirits. “A question constantly keeps coming back to us, a seductive and wicked question perhaps, 
may it be whispered into the ears of those who have a right to such questionable questions... is it not 
time, now that the type "herd animal" is being evolved more and more in Europe, to make the 
experiment of a fundamental, artificial and conscious breeding of the opposite type and its virtues? 
And would it not be a kind of goal, redemption, and justification for the democratic movement itself if 
someone arrived who could make use of it - by finally producing beside its new and sublime 
development of slavery (that is what European democracy must become ultimately) a higher kind of 
dominating and Caesarian spirits who would stand upon it, maintain themselves by it and elevate 
themselves through it?”149 
Nietzsche sees qualities in the nineteenth century which may make breeding of genius a political 
reality. The temper of his reflections is experimental. The economic unification of Europe he says is 
coming of necessity.150 Once unified, or in process of unification, he envisages Europe in monumental 
struggle with other continental powers for the lordship of the Earth. He does not only mean by this 
political rule which exists for its own sake, but the ethos which a certain type of political rule will 
bring. The form of culture which must come to dominate humanity and through which humanity as a 
whole must realise itself will, in the final instance, very likely be decided by political and military 
conquest. He indicates clearly the possibilities he finds distasteful:"Keine amerikanische Zukunft," 
and "England's Klein-Geisterei ist die grosse Gefahr jetzt auf der Erde."151 
Europe must oppose the dominance of the Anglo-Saxon world with its high capitalism and 
democratic politics. On occasions he sees alliance with Russia to combat its dominance."Wir 
brauchen ein unbedingtes Zusammengehen mit Russland und mit einem neuen gemeinsamen 
Programm welches in Russland keine englischen Scheinwesen zur Herrschaft kommen lässt."152 In 
Russia there is a greatness of spirit and a promise of durability; "the only power today which has 
durability in it... which can still promise something - Russia, the antithesis of that pitiable European 
petty state politics..."153 At other times he sees Russia as a formidable foe and welcomes an increase 
in the Russian threat "that Europe would have to resolve to become equally threatening, namely to 
acquire a single will by means of a new caste dominating all Europe, a protracted terrible will of its 
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own which could set its objectives thousands of years ahead..."154 
The politics of Europe may be subject to a variety of outcomes, but all in some sense are founded on 
the certain advent of war. He speaks of a party of peace arising "without sentimentality, that forbids 
itself and its children to wage war; forbids recourse to the courts, that provokes struggle, 
contradiction, persecution against itself: a party of the oppressed, at least for a time; soon the big 
party. Opposed to feelings of revenge and resentment." Then he sees, developing in the opposite 
direction, a “war party, equally principled and severe toward itself.”155 
The most persistent of these fantasies is that a new day of Hellenism is dawning when politics 
becomes an art form practiced by a few over the masses, which are their plastic medium. Democratic 
humanity will provide expression for the boldest visions of artist philosophers and statesmen. The 
time is at hand when “...a new, tremendous aristocracy, based on the severest self-legislation, in 
which the will of the philosophical men of power and artist tyrants will be made to endure for 
millennia - a higher kind of man who, thanks to their superiority in will, knowledge, riches, and 
influence, employ democratic Europe as their most pliant and supple instrument for getting hold of 
the destinies of the earth, so as to work as artists upon man himself. Enough: the time is coming when 
politics will have a different meaning.”156 
Nietzsche evaluates on the basis of attachment to a specific type of the Ideal of Cultivation. Much of 
his work is an attempt to justify this standpoint from first principles. 
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5 - The Problem of Value 
Nietzsche‟s world was suffering a crisis of indecision about the values we should live by. This doubt 
resulted in a tendency, known as nihilism, to deny the possibility of all values. He too suffered from 
this tendency, and thought through its implications, but could not help valuing everything from the 
standpoint we call the Ideal of Cultivation. 
So although Nietzsche wanted to clear the ground of all values and start anew, it was only in order to 
affirm and justify from first principles the values he already held. The fact of nihilism remained and 
could not be thought away. But that doesn‟t matter. Life goes on all the same. 
Value and Becoming 
Nietzsche's crisis of value may have been attributable to two modern trends: the decline of 
Christianity, and the decline of Bildung. Such a crisis may be triggered by events in a specific place 
and time, but there are also eternally valid reflections, that apply in any place and time in which the 
order of things is considered. Anyone, anywhere might suppose that the universe is in eternal 
purposeless coming-to-be and passing-away. This cosmic indifference to our well-being would not be 
a problem in itself, were it not for the fact that we actually need values and need to evaluate; that is, 
we humans want to "impress upon becoming the eternal character of being."157 
To this end we classify all the objects in the world as significant and insignificant. In value we see 
redemption of our past and a justification for our future. Value salvages everything lost and reaches 
for everything not yet attained. It pushes everything extraneous aside and away from itself. It wants to 
stand alone. That which is valuable: an object, an action, a thought has to be immutable, fixed in one 
place forever. It compels our closest attention, not by its mere utility but by its capacity to resist 
nothingness, to resist the banality of the many things that appear and drift away in the waters of 
becoming. 
When value is conferred on something it is raised above all else that is common. When the Greeks 
spoke of their most valuable men, their heroes, they called them andres epiphaneis; which is to say, 
men who are conspicuous or outstanding. The same sense of resistance and reinforcement appears in 
the word "value" derived from the Latin Valere, meaning to be strong. The valuable thing holds fast 
and won't be eclipsed. By its prominence and depth it represents the negation of nothingness. 
Value and wisdom 
Nietzsche sees the task of discovering, recognising and communicating knowledge about value as 
belonging to philosophy, which in Greek means the "love of wisdom". 
Wisdom is the art of distinguishing what is valuable. He notes that the word in both Greek and Latin 
(sophia and sapientia respectively) relate to a root verb meaning “to taste".158 A keen sense of taste 
enables you to separate, distinguish, discriminate. A wise man or philosopher is one gifted in 
assessing the things that have value. In its primitive form philosophy is the love of value in itself. It is 
not, as sometimes believed, concerned with knowing a great deal or finding some universal truth. In a 
later aphorism, Nietzsche declares: "Wisdom sets bounds even to knowledge" clearly marking, in his 
opinion, the more essential activity.159 
Wisdom looks to what is essential for living. Knowledge for its own sake must be subordinate. Other 
ways of evaluating, such as morality, are unconscious and based on tradition or custom. Morality is a 
way of evaluating based on the constraints a group places on its members. It regulates behaviour 
without questioning but wisdom is self-conscious and exploratory. Morality is received by fiat; 
wisdom seeks self-reliance and obeys no authority other than nature, whom nobody can disobey. It is 
therefore our duty to transform ourselves from "a moral to a wise mankind".160 
In his youth Nietzsche tries to imagine the original impulses of philosophy in Greek antiquity. He 
traces the development of Pre-Socratic thought, and hopes to reclaim what was lost with those early 
philosophers. In its zealous lust for knowledge the modern world has lost that original capacity to 
distinguish what is essential and valuable. Early Greek philosophy too, he believes, was troubled by a 
tremendous struggle between wisdom and scientific knowledge; in effect, between the perception of 
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value and a limitless omniscience that obliterates distinctions of significance; between a knowing that 
desires to regulate and shape a life, and a knowing that is prostrate before boundless data.  
This antagonism afflicted the inner life of the young philosopher who also suffered a considerable 
drive for knowledge. It spills over in the critique of historical knowledge that he delivers in the 
second essay of the Untimely Meditations, the attack on Socrates in the Birth of Tragedy, and various 
unfinished works from the same period. What is significant is that this friction between his need for 
knowledge and his belief in its ultimate futility sets him on a process of doubt that culminates in a 
radical nihilism with few precedents in western philosophy. 
Nietzsche's experience of nihilism 
Nihilism, in this instance an extreme epistemological scepticism that places the enterprise of knowing 
in jeopardy, is characteristic of Nietzsche's philosophy throughout his life. It holds that endless and 
aimless change in nature makes futile any attempt to find a master "truth".161 His keen awareness of 
the anthropomorphic origins of perception and action leads him to conclude that all attempts to 
understand the world betray our limited and provincial needs.  
Whenever we look at nature we see there only another reflection of our own needs and not the actual 
formless character of nature itself."The total character of the world, however, is in all eternity chaos - 
in the sense not of a lack of necessity but of lack of order, arrangement, form, beauty, wisdom and 
whatever names there are for our aesthetic anthropomorphisms... None of our aesthetic and moral 
judgements apply to it. Nor does it have any instinct for self preservation or any other instinct; and it 
does not observe any laws either. Let us beware of saying there are laws in nature. There are only 
necessities: there is nobody who commands, nobody who obeys, nobody who trespasses. Once you 
know that there are no purposes, you also know there is no accident; for it is only beside a world of 
purposes that the word "accident" has meaning... There are no eternally enduring substances; matter 
is as much of an error as the God of the Eleatics..."162 
This scepticism is already apparent when he was studying at Leipzig, when in a letter of August 
1866163 to Von Gersdorff, he mentions his great esteem for Lange's Geschichte des Materialismus,164 
and compares its effect on him with that of Schopenhauer's works. He says that Lange, whom he 
describes as "einen höchst aufgeklärten Kantianer und Naturforscher," arrived at three conclusions 
concerning truth and our perception of it: first, he says, the world of the senses has been demonstrated 
to be the product of our organisation; second, our visible organs are, like all other parts of the world 
of appearances, only pictures of unknown objects; third our actual inner nature remains unknown to 
us like the actuality of the exterior world and we have always only the product of both before us. The 
actual nature of the thing-in-itself is not only unknown, but is also nothing less than the idea produced 
by our organisation and we can never know if this had some meaning outside of our experience. 
Lange is led to declare that the domains of philosophy, art and ideas are free of obligation to truth. 
Who, he says, will refute a piece of Beethoven or demonstrate a painting of Raphael to be an error? 
This "Truth" is the absolute sense the word still had in the nineteenth century. Today we concur with 
his comment that "the entire domain of "true-false" applies only to relations, not to an 'in-itself'", or 
even take this for granted.165 The nineteenth century still cleaved to the Platonic distinction between a 
world of appearance and an eternal immutable realm of essence existing behind phenomena.  
On reading Schopenhauer, young Nietzsche grew aware of the Kantian presentation of this 
distinction: of an apparent world and a concealed, inaccessible Ding an sich. The "real" character of 
the world is in the nature of the thing-in-itself; the search for truth is a cutting through the veil of 
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phenomena to the source, which is for all time, truth. The inaccessible quality that Kant assigns the 
Ding an sich contributes to his early doubts about the value of knowledge. How the older philosopher 
deals with this distinction is a familiar aspect of his thought, most cogently presented in the Twilight 
of the Idols where he states that if no "true" world can be located then it becomes meaningless to posit 
the existence of an "apparent" one. Both categories are thereby abolished: "We have abolished the 
real world: what world is left? the apparent world perhaps... But no! with the real world we have also 
abolished the apparent world!"166 
Early on Nietzsche sees knowledge as something from human mediation with universal chaos, where 
necessities at work in chaos define the forms that knowledge can take. Every human perception, from 
primitive sensations to the most abstract thought structures, result from the need to struggle with and 
master the environment. In the process certain species of perception are continually more successful 
because they recognise, directly or indirectly, a pattern of necessity. Out of reverence for these 
successful perceptions we call them truth and take them to be universal, even though they are no more 
than life preserving errors. Because living things inevitably mediate with their environment, 
knowledge always carries the imprint of its transference and transferability: that is, it is always 
metaphorical: a carrying across, which is shaped by the living thing‟s receptive capacities and 
requirements. When a "knowing" being tries to apprehend the whole universe, it becomes the 
"infinitely fractured echo" of one sound; the "infinitely multiplied copy of one original picture" - 
man; who "proceeds from the error or believing that he has these things (with he intends to measure) 
immediately before him as mere objects. He forgets that the original perceptual metaphors are 
metaphors and takes them to be the things themselves.”167 
We cannot speak, think, listen, see or act, without betraying this universal mendacity. It is essential to 
our makeup. Mendacity has formed in us because of its life-preserving power, and similarly the 
presupposition that we always reckoning the truth."Thus knowledge became a piece of life itself, and 
hence a continually growing power - until eventually knowledge collided with those primeval basic 
errors: two lives, two powers, both in the same human being. A thinker is now that being in whom the 
impulse for truth and those life-preserving errors clash for their first fight, after the impulse for truth 
has proved to be also a life preserving power. Compared to the significance of this fight, everything 
else is a matter of indifference..."168 
At times Nietzsche calls this conflict tragic, because it occurs to the thinker that the "noble and 
heroic" quest for truth in a mendacious natural order is "possible only in a very relative sense".169 
When that quest is undertaken without tragic irony, as a "theoretical optimism" confident that it can 
fathom the universe and unveil an eternally valid order apart from man, he describes it as naive. The 
scientific optimist's hope of discovering an extra-human certainty by unravelling immense 
concatenations of causality and logic, is not only utopian it is dangerous. And ultimately, science 
itself shows how delusion and error are the condition of intelligent and sentient existence.170 
Ironically science excavates beneath its own foundations, and demonstrates the futility of its goal. 
Knowledge, a primitive type of human creativity, keeps good faith with itself only so long as it is 
innocent of it troubled origins and believes it can find a world free of human taint. But when science 
examines itself, as inevitably it must, it sees itself founded on error and, losing all hope of truth, 
despairs of life itself. The man of knowledge loses his reason to exist and gives himself up to disgust. 
What begins as good faith toward knowledge ends as bad faith toward life. In this way, as both the 
younger and older philosopher agree, "it has proven impossible to build a culture upon knowledge" 
(meaning the exclusive pursuit of knowledge).171 
In the Birth of Tragedy the younger Nietzsche muses that the only remedy to such discords is that art 
become the primary activity of man, since it is "only as an aesthetic phenomenon" that existence and 
the world are eternally justified.172 Only through art, which is a conscious creativity, an unabashed 
type of fabrication, with no claims for truth and therefore well-disposed toward itself, can value and 
wisdom be reinstated to their central position in culture."But science, spurred by its powerful illusion, 
speeds irresistibly towards its limits where its optimism, concealed in the essence of logic, suffers 
shipwreck. For the periphery of the circle of science has an infinite number of points: and while there 
is no telling how this circle could ever be surveyed completely, noble and gifted men nevertheless 
reach, e'er half their time and inevitably, such boundary points on the periphery from which one 
gazes into what defies illumination. When they see to their horror how logic coils up at these 
boundaries and finally bites its own tail - suddenly the new form of insight breaks through, Tragic 
insight which, merely to be endured, needs art as a protection and remedy."173 
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The remedy of art substitutes for an impossible metaphysics: it consoles, heals, weaves a mythic 
atmosphere and protective veil of illusion around us, and without which culture is exposed to the most 
destructive tensions. The innocence of illusion allows us to believe in what we do.  
In the work that appears after Human all too Human he deals harshly with these earlier sentiments. 
He appends to later editions of the Birth of Tragedy an Attempt at Self Criticism where he describes 
the "aesthetic of consolation" as an example of the worst Romantic narcotic. He also adds that he had 
since dispatched the metaphysical comforts of art "to the devil". 
Toward the revaluation of values 
In the middle period Nietzsche's enters a positivist phase intending to investigate methodically how 
the basis of how we evaluate. In The Antichrist he calls this project the revaluation of all values, a 
slogan that he also intended as the title of a systematic work he was planning to write.174 
The slogan belongs to his later years, but the demand for a scientific assessment of morality and value 
makes up most of the material in the books from Human all too Human to the Genealogy of Morals. 
A now benign disposition toward science, disposes him to praise its utility in extending our awareness 
of necessity. Science helps us know what can or cannot be changed. Understanding of nature, no 
matter how fictively presented, gives us dominion over our environment and, more importantly, our 
own nature. With this knowledge we are empowered to create.  
Science offers a more discriminating sense for what is more actual, more probable and in so doing 
allows us to humanise the world more effectively."This compulsion to form concepts, general forms, 
ends and laws (one world of identical cases) should not be understood as though we were capable 
through them of ascertaining the true world, but rather as a compulsion to adapt to ourselves to a 
world in which our existence is made possible. Thereby we create a world that is calculable, 
simplified, understandable etc. for us"175 Science organises and humanises the world and gives us 
tools for our artistic-creative faculties."We, however, want to become those who we are - human 
beings who are new, unique, incomparable, who give themselves laws, who create themselves. To that 
end we must become the best learners and discoverers of everything that is lawful and necessary in 
the world: we must become physicists in order to be able to be creators in this sense - while hitherto 
all valuations and ideals had been based on ignorance of physics or were constructed so as to 
contradict it. Therefore; long live physics! And even more to that which compels us to turn to physics 
- our honesty!"176 
Nietzsche's begins this task with scientific investigation of the origins of morals, ideals, and 
judgements concerning life. Science enables us to understand the conditions that produce certain 
types of evaluation and assists the philosopher whose task it is to judge these evaluations and rank 
their worth. "All the sciences have from now on to prepare the way for the future task of the 
philosopher, this task understood as the solution to the problem of value, the determination of the 
rank among values."177 
Judgements of worth reflect the conditions of life or expressions of the powers of an individual, a 
class, or an entire people. Values are self-reflections of how we live. When we reflect on how we 
behave or what we do, we see the outlines of what we value. Good is any activity that enhances our 
self-esteem, power, or keeps social bonds firmly in place; this self-realisation purifies and intensifies 
the form of life from which it derives. No "should" or "ought" exists prior to behaviour: the "ought" is 
simply an afterthought. "When we talk of values we are speaking under the inspiration or optics of 
life: life itself compels us to set up values; life itself values through us whenever we posit values..."178 
As existence shapes itself in many ways, a multitude of value judgements arise, each bearing the 
stamp of its class, caste, or national origins. An aristocratic class for instance, which is materially 
dominant, has radically different self-estimations and expectations of life than its servants. This is the 
basis of Nietzsche's dichotomy of master and slave morality. Even so, moral codes are not just strict 
oppositions, but gradations along a spectrum; morals can be graded like fruit or wine, according to 
quality and an order of rank.  
Although natural human drives are responsible for producing systems of value, oftentimes "anti-
natural" moralities can occur, which arise out of fear of human drives and whose explicit intention is 
to subdue them. Nietzsche also seeks to understand the processes of "sublimation" by which primitive 
urges are transformed into complex forms of moral behaviour. 
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Stratagems for justifying value 
The project of revaluating values requires more than preliminary surveillance. In an 1886 preface to 
Human all too Human, he states that it also involves the "problem of the order of rank".179 Values 
have to be judged by some criterion and this does not involve absolute or immutable statements about 
truth, since "judgements, value judgements concerning life, for or against, can in the last resort never 
be true."180 
Science may refine our thinking about values or ideals, and can even help us prepare the grounds for 
them. It cannot tell us what they are or should be. Value does not inhere in nature and therefore 
cannot simply be discovered by research. Values do not exist on their own anywhere, except in beings 
with hypertrophied cerebra. The plain fact is that mankind creates value ex nihilo, as it were, by his 
own thought and actions."Whatever has value in our world now does not have value in itself, 
according to its nature - nature is always valueless but has been given value at some time; as a 
present - and it is we who gave it and bestowed it."181 It is mankind who "first implanted value into 
things in order to maintain himself - he created the meaning of things, a human meaning! Therefore 
he calls himself "Man" that is; the evaluator".182 
By stripping nature of meaning, he puts the weight of creating value on man. The activities of 
science, wisdom, and art are, in the later period, entirely complementary if is understood that our 
"salvation lies not in knowing but in creating".183 In each of these activities mankind is giving form to 
the chaos or raising prominences from the universal flatness of nature; from stone, sound, pigment; 
from the life of an individual, a group, or an entire people. 
Just as he disqualifies truth as a basis for ethical judgements, he demands that we not see a 
judgement's falseness as a reason for objecting to it. Knowing that all values are inescapably 
anthropogenic it would be absurd to say that one is "truer" than another. Values are made by us in 
response to our circumstances. What has survival to do with truth? "The falseness of a judgement is 
for us not necessarily an objection to a judgement; in this respect our new language may sound 
strangest...we are fundamentally inclined to claim that the falsest judgements... are the most in 
dispensable for us; that without accepting the fictions of logic, without measuring reality against the 
purely invented world of the unconditional and self identical, without a constant falsification of the 
world by means of numbers, man could not live - that renouncing false judgements would mean 
renouncing life and a denial of life. To recognise untruth as a condition of life - that certainly means 
resisting accustomed value feelings in a dangerous way; and a philosophy that masks this would by 
that token alone place itself beyond good and evil.”184 
Since all values, in their falseness and variety, sustain many ways and types of life they still cannot 
tell us anything about the value of life in itself. Thus, "...the value of life cannot be estimated. Not by 
a living man, because he is a party to the dispute, indeed its object, and not by the judge of it; not by a 
dead one, for another reason."185 Even though the later Nietzsche is happy that values are entirely 
anthropogenic, he still wishes for a way to hold them in higher regard. But if the value of values 
cannot be estimated in any honest way the intellectual impasse is formidable.  
So rather than ignoring the problem or wishing it away, he simply thinks around it. In response to the 
nihilist impasse he employs simultaneously throughout his life two separate intellectual stratagems 
that are in explicit contradiction. The first of these more honestly accommodates the facts of nihilism, 
but is no more than an intellectual showpiece, neither deeply felt nor considered a basis for his values; 
the second is less honest, furtively sidesteps the sinkhole of total scepticism and creeps to a solution 
that is classical in its outline and procedure. For these same reasons, it can be said to arise from his 
deepest intellectual instincts and needs. 
The first stratagem paradoxically uses the reality of nihilism, the destroyer of all values, as a positive 
foundation of value in itself. Since there is no way reason can penetrate this impasse, might not 
nihilism itself, the problem in question, be the criterion? This occurs to him in his youth in his famous 
depiction of the Greeks "Tragic" or "Dionysian" attitude to life in The Birth of Tragedy. and in the 
later period he associates the tragic view with ideas about eternal recurrence and amor fati. The 
tragic view begins by recognising that it is futile to refute nihilism. Not only must we live with the 
reality that nothing is true or truly valuable, we must accept the most unbearable and paradoxical 
aspects of existence. We must not attempt to conceal from ourselves life's meaninglessness or the 
arbitrary sufferings imposed on us, but should meet them in a state of extreme wakefulness. 
Because we must live by endowing all things with significance, nihilism is a difficult thought to bear. 
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That we suffer misfortune for no apparent reason even more so and, in such circumstances, we might 
wish to comfort ourselves with dreams of after-life or other redemptions. So what sternness of spirit 
we must need to live without consolation and suffer in clarity the fact that no hope is given? Would 
this not be a way to measure a person's strength and therefore their worth? That the Greeks could do 
so was their supreme achievement and a model for high culture itself. Uncompromising endurance of 
nihilism makes you wholly worthy of existence, for you accept life with all its blemishes. Like value 
itself, you resist nothingness. Your very being is a gift to existence. This is the Dionysian affirmation 
of life, characterised by Nietzsche as "strong" or "overflowing". Those who seek comforts and 
conceal from themselves ugly necessities he dubs "weak," "parasitic", "unproductive". Those who 
need excuses in order to live take value from life and give nothing back to it. 
Later, when toying with the idea of eternal recurrence, he decides that it might be prove a perfect and 
terrible nihilistic utterance: what more futile than a universe revolving without aim or end in identical 
cycles? Would not the idea breed a stronger human being? Would it not compel us to be benignly 
disposed toward existence if we are to suffer every indignity, misery, and mendacity for eternity? 
Would it not demand amor fati, the acceptance that nothing should be otherwise? Would it not require 
an exultant acceptance of creation and destruction? Would it not subsume the fact of nothingness 
without being itself consumed by the spirit of negation? The secondary Nietzsche literature abounds 
in effusions about the "dionysian affirmation" or "tragic" attitude, particularly in view of its quasi-
religious tensions. 
But we cannot assume that the problem of value is thereby settled. The Dionysian attitude may be a 
"laudable" response to nihilism, but it does not provide the foundation he needs. The paradox of 
Dionysian acceptance is that you must be a nihilist who cannot accept intellectually the validity of 
any value, before you realise you have to utter an unconditional "yes" to existence. And even then, to 
joyfully embrace nothingness rather than howl about it, is very well, but what need has the cosmos of 
our cuddliness? The acceptance by a living thing of an indifferent universe is not mutually engaging. 
One multiplied by zero still equals zero. You can stand on mountain tops and scream your affection, 
but the cosmos will not listen, and when you have screamed enough and go back to work what is 
different? To say yes to nothingness does not tell us how to live, or what to value. It does not aid 
Nietzsche's task as a philosopher, which is to discover value and exhort others to honour it.  
The chasm between value and nothingness is one that philosophy, springing as it does from a 
powerful need for solidity, has always found intolerable and always sought to bridge. The philosopher 
abhors all that is arbitrary, fleeting, or relative, and feels he must secure his judgements by chaining 
them to some immovable or eternal rock that exists behind the curtain of appearance. The rock 
provides a reason or explanation for, or a justification for a belief and whether he calls it God, 
Reason, Happiness, Nature, History, or, Society, is immaterial, so long as it serves his purpose. In 
justifying a belief he wishes to put something behind it so that it cannot be knocked over, since he has 
a powerful attachment to it and wished to defend it from attack.186 He puts outworks around it and 
calls these "first principles": ideas all of us might agree are solid and dependable and cannot be 
reduced. He might also call first principles a "groundwork" or "foundation", to hold a mighty edifice 
that remains to be built. 
The words differ but the metaphorical structure is the same: that of a solid immovable mass 
supporting a set of vulnerable or intricate constructions. Nietzsche's Pyrhhonism, does not preserve 
him from the same habits: "...life is a unique case; one must justify all existence and not only life - the 
justifying principle is one that explains life too."187 The principle for justification must be large, as big 
as the universe, and must lie within the heart of all being. If you grasp what this is, then you can 
explain value, albeit that you have to assume the universe to be somehow explicable and not entirely 
chaotic. Nature has to have some definable characteristic, some immutable foundation to which you 
can attach judgements. Your values can then accord with the cosmos itself. By holding valuable the 
principle of movement of nature, you can consciously work to perfect that movement.  
This of course is the idea of physis: the stratagem for justifying value that Nietzsche utilised 
throughout his life, as it has always had in western thought. Consistent nihilism would make such a 
construction invalid. But instead, in the later stages of his life, he plans to develop a philosophical 
system based on a new understanding of nature that he calls will to power. Our next task is to show 
how he uses this idea of physis to justify an Ideal of Cultivation in his earlier and in his later work. 
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6 - The idea of physis and the younger Nietzsche 
The Idea of Physis 
As we have seen, the idea of physis varies in Greek antiquity and after but is always instantly 
recognisable. Its first assumption is that the world is inherently lawful and that nature operates under 
a regulated and predictable regime. All things have inner laws of development and the phenomenal 
world is attributable to natural rather than divine causation. Its second assumption is that mankind 
belongs to that lawful order, and that his consuming interest should be to go with nature and enhance 
its inner character. In antiquity the earliest and most consistent metaphor to describe this relationship 
with nature was agriculture, which makes nature more productive and causes useful plants to grow 
better. Its final assumption is that the same process can be applied to humanity, and that individuals 
can improve themselves through bodily exercise, perfecting their speech, and by elevating and 
broadening their mind. 
For the Greeks the word physis denotes the sum total of reality in the way the English word "nature" 
does today, or the sense of process, in which nature was considered to have a certain way of 
growing.188 But by the time of the Greek "enlightenment" the word is used increasingly in ethical 
debate to refer not just to the universe, but to humankind, to human nature and the nature of 
individuals. It accompanies the belief that perfecting human nature does not simply improve bodily or 
mental efficiency, but also our behaviour and the principles by which we live. By acting in 
conformity with universal principles each individual perfects their own nature, and endows their 
actions and motivations with a higher authority.  
In this sense Physis does not mean that you are subject to nature, but that you are liberated from 
arbitrary social and political institutions. Physis was used in ethical and political debate explicitly to 
oppose the idea of nomos, meaning behaviour sanctioned by the authority of divinities, of custom or 
widely held beliefs. The idea of nomos could not withstand critical reason that undermined belief in 
the divinities and denied mythology as a justification for social organisation and law. So philosophers 
and poets who argued against nomos hoped that physis would better support morality. This parallels 
every other enlightenment in the west (enlightenment as Kant defines it “an exodus from a self-
imposed tutelage") where critical reason has placed traditional structures under scrutiny.189 
Philosophes of every time are attracted to the capacity of physis to pose an internal origin for right 
action, whereas mythologically-based ethics always imply external compulsion and that "we must act 
in this way because we are told that we must." 
Physis gives you a certain guide for behaviour which is gained by examining and comprehending 
your own inner laws of growth, and studying the laws of nature that exist throughout the world. By 
acquiring self-knowledge you discover a basis for independence from the tyranny of tradition without 
forsaking the claims of right conduct. Another advantage of physis is its promise to unite thought and 
action and theory and practice. Knowledge of the laws of growth reveals what can improve or retard 
our development. Investigating human and universal nature yields results we can use in shaping our 
behaviour. Finally, if it is supposed that reason exists within nature, given the apparent lawfulness 
which it exhibits, then to obey nature would be to behave rationally too. 
Thucydides, writing in the period of Athenian imperialism, when the polis is in full vigour, and 
confident and candid about its designs, illustrates strikingly how the idea is put into practice. In the 
famous Melian Dialogue he records how an Athenian delegation justifies their subjugation of the 
Melians, descendents of a Spartan colony, by appealing to laws of nature that apply to both men and 
gods. The Athenians state that their "opinion of the gods and knowledge of men" lead them "to 
conclude that it is a general and necessary law of nature to rule whatever one can. This is not a law 
that we made ourselves, nor were we the first to act upon it when it was made. We found it already in 
existence, and we shall leave it to exist for ever among those who come after us. We are merely acting 
in accordance with it, and we know that you or anybody else with the same power as ours would be 
acting in precisely the same way."190 
In the new Hellenistic world, when Athens is itself defeated and subjugated, the stoic philosopher 
Zeno frames the idea of physis rather differently. Himself a former slave, he introduces a negative 
twist, declaring that the reason existing in nature forbids, rather than encourages certain actions."The 
end may be defined" he says, "as life in accordance with nature, or in other words, in accordance 
with our own human nature as well as that of the universe, a life in which we refrain from every 
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action forbidden by the law common to all things, that is to say, the right reason which pervades all 
things and is identical with Zeus, lord and ruler of all that is."191 
Zeno still calls on the authority of Zeus, but the god evidently obeys the same laws. Both Thucydides 
and Zeno show how human action, though formally inviting divine imprimatur, actually finds it 
unnecessary. The gods themselves are embedded in the matrix of nature and also abide by its laws. 
The German Idea of Physis 
For post-Socratic Hellenistic philosophies like the Stoics, Cynics and Academicians, it is the sage 
who shows the highest level of independence, because all he does and thinks is based on universal 
principles and informed by constant search for self-knowledge. This idea of physis resembles that of 
the eighteenth century German philosophers, who introduced some significant novelties to the idea.  
One of these novelties was to see mankind as a brilliant event in the history of living things, in which 
Nature could, through human reason, begin for the first time to think. Human consciousness allows 
Nature to accomplish in deliberate fashion what it has for too long gained by blind travail. Mankind 
thereby elevates and justifies himself as Nature's tool for understanding itself.  
This is the mighty abiding theme of German philosophy. In Hegelian terms, it is the process of Being 
attaining its perfection in the form of Absolute Consciousness. The theme can be heard most clearly 
in all major philosophical successors to Kant: Fichte, Schelling, Hegel and Schopenhauer and even, in 
the final outcome, Nietzsche himself. After Kant, and particularly in the speculations of theoretical 
artists like Schiller, there is also an ancillary theme, namely that it is not merely consciousness itself 
but the conscious guidance of the artistic formation of nature by mankind that represents his true 
justification. Man is a new creator, who consciously imposes form upon becoming. 
The second novelty of the German philosophers, and one to play a part in Nietzsche's speculations, 
was their belief in the perfecting of the species, even in extending beyond the species, and in the 
leadership to this outcome being the prerogative of extraordinary individuals or geniuses. At first, the 
German Ideal of Cultivation wavered between harmonic and open-ended ideas of perfection, but there 
was a decisive shift from the first view to the second towards the end of the Aufklärung. It was during 
the eighteenth century that the principles of evolution of species were being worked out, at least 
philosophically if not scientifically as Darwin was to do. Speculations of the sort Goethe entertained, 
that nature was in process of development, naturally led to suppositions that, just as mankind was 
currently at the apex of lower species, it would be possible to extend beyond his present limitations to 
the status of seraphim. It was possible that mankind, as a species, could continually perfect itself to 
the point of divinity.  
The habit of the later Aufklärers to see perfectibility as something open-ended was handed on to the 
Romantic generation who, with their adoration of the infinite, were not hesitant in entertaining 
blasphemies. If it is man's duty to perfect himself, he can do so both as an individual and as a member 
of a species and become far more than what he actually is. It is against this view that Herder reacts, 
when he insists that it should only be the laws of nature as it is that one should obey."Alle Ihre Fragen 
über den Fortgang unsres Geschlechts; die eigentlich ein Buch erforderten, beantwortet, wie mich 
dünk, ein einziges Wort: Humanität, Menschheit. Wäre die Frage, ob der Mensch mehr als Mensch, 
ein Über-, ein Außer- mensch werden könne und solle, so wäre jede Zeile zuviel, die man deshalb 
schriebe. Nun aber, da nur von den Gesetzen seiner Natur, vom unauslöschlichen Charakter seiner 
Art und Gattung die Rede ist, so erlauben Sie, daß ich sogar einige Paragraphen 
schriebe...Vollkommenheit einer Sache kann nichts sein, als daß das Ding sei, was es sein soll und 
kann.Vollkommenheit eines einzelnen Menschen ist also, daß er im Kontinuum seiner Existenz er 
selbst sei und werde, daß er die Kräfte brauche, die die Natur ihm als stammgut gegeben hat, daß er 
damit für sich und andre wuchere..."192 
Perfection would only complete the potential that is already within mankind, and realise in practice 
the idealised image that is immanent within him; it would not go beyond what mankind is and create 
something extra-human, an über- or außer-mensch. An outright romantic like Schlegel however has 
no qualms in demanding that humanity extend beyond itself; a need that he believes can be found 
inside human nature: "It is characteristic of humanity," he advises, "that it must raise itself above 
humanity"193 
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The German Idea of Nature as Will 
A third novelty of the German understanding of physis also figured in Nietzsche‟s work. This was the 
idea of an active principle called "Will" (Wille) that underlies all being. Heidegger usefully observed 
how the idea of Will was integral to German Idealism from Leibniz to Hegel, Schelling and of course, 
Schopenhauer. German Idealists, seeking like all idealists a permanent transcendental world behind 
this one, always situated Will, the impulse to activity, the being of all beings, behind appearances. 
Thus Will always throws up "ideas", "representations", or "reason" appropriate to its character. 
Leibniz's concept of activity (agere) is a paradigm for the dynamic philosophies that follow, and for 
which energy or force are the basic substance, rather than matter as res extensa in the Cartesian and 
later, the Newtonian sense. "Activity" is therefore "the characteristic of all substances; extension, on 
the other hand, is nothing but a continuation or diffusion of a substance already presupposed, which 
thrives, withstands, that is resists, and can therefore never of itself constitute substance."194 The 
indivisible substance of spirit which he calls the monad is itself the unity of perceptio, that is, idea or 
representation, and appetitus - an inner compulsion and striving. 
Kant stands outside this tradition to some extent, but places will at the centre of ethical philosophy 
and this has consequences in Nietzsche's thought. If Will does not represent for Kant a universal 
dynamism, it is a special type of causality that is active in man. It is something natural but distinct 
from inclinations or desires. Will always operates through man's "practical reason" (in the ethical 
sphere sovereign over speculative reason). Kant separates morality from ontological first principles; 
that is, he does not believe statements about nature can support ethical judgements, nonetheless he 
believes in the rational order of nature in which man can participate through his faculty of reason. 
Kant's ethics remain to a large extent tied to the idea of physis."Everything in nature works according 
to laws. Rational beings alone have the faculty of acting according to the conception of laws ...i.e. 
have a will. Since the deduction of actions from principles requires reason, the will is nothing but 
practical reason."195 
Kant, attempting to work his way between rationalism and empiricism and to establish the limits of 
human perception, reflected on the active or creative elements of subjectivity and left behind him a 
dualism between willing and perceiving. Many successors sought to overcome this problem by using 
the principle of physis as will.  
Fichte's Higher Morality sees an eternal supersensuous Being behind all appearances, which is 
actually an "Eternal Will" that manifests itself in everything and in each of us. Those who will what 
they actually are in this supersensuous sense attain the summum bonum.196 
Hegel, in the Phenomenology of Mind, also fuses ontology and ethics by making the immanence of 
Spirit the active agent behind phenomena. Individuals as subjective, self-interested beings are 
necessarily set in otherness to the process of Spirit. They do not see it acting behind them and are thus 
alienated from it. In Hegel's ethics the highest act an individual can perform, is to apprehend this 
spirit and transcend his limiting subjectivity through self reflection. This in itself is an act of willing. 
Merely to think with the world-spirit is to act with it. Schelling also uses the idea of evolving Geist or 
spirit and sees perception and consciousness existing in primitive organisms; nature itself is 
unconscious spirit, and spirit is a conscious form of nature. But what is the motor for all this activity? 
At the conclusion Of Human Freedom, he adduces that in "the final and ultimate instance there is no 
other Being at all than Willing. Will is the Primal Being.”197 
Here will, understood as either a rational human act, or as the ground of being, supplies the causation 
between a subject and its effects. The gap between the first and final state of an action or object - how 
X arrives at A from B, is filled by an agent of activity. Change may simply be a spatial displacement, 
or a transmutation of quality, but Will makes it happen! Will allows us to suggest that activity is an 
internal inclination of all things, living or dead, which makes becoming comprehensible. More than 
this, all things are this internal inclination and nothing else. Hence whenever will is made the 
ontological ground i.e. as the "thing-in-itself", the idea of matter as an impermeable and durable 
substance extended - according to the medieval formula - into space, is repudiated. Instead, 
movement, force, activity, is the actual quality of being and the appearance of solidity is merely a 
momentary equilibrium or representation of will. 
Although there are clearly enough precedents in German philosophy it is Schopenhauer and his 
variant of the idea of Will that influences young Nietzsche profoundly. From Schopenhauer he 
receives his first forceful introduction to philosophy itself after picking up Die Welt als Wille und 
Vorstellung in a bookstore. He is immediately impressed by the concept of Will as an oceanic force 
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underlying and producing all phenomena.198 This Will is blind striving, fluid and inchoate, without 
end or purpose, yet constantly objectifying itself in infinite forms, pressing itself into shapes that 
appear to us as phenomena. 
Once again the idea of formation is tied to a concept of representation. Each form into which Will 
presses itself is preserved as an Idea in the Platonic sense: as a mold into which the forming substance 
solidifies itself. An idea is the crystallisation of Will, which at its simplest, is merely a play of natural 
forces like gravitation and electricity. Thereafter it develops in complexity through the elements of 
matter, to chemicals, to lower organisms, plant life, the various animal species and finally to the apex 
of the hierarchy which is mankind. "Everything presses and strives toward existence, if possible 
organised existence i.e. life, and after that to the highest possible grade of it."199 
Schopenhauer's depiction of Will depends upon a concept of nature - the "great chain of being" that 
was disintegrating even as he was writing. According to Lovejoy, who gave it this name, this idea was 
succumbing to the emerging historicism of the late eighteenth and early nineteenth centuries. 
Schopenhauer's will is more a "will to live" than elemental force and is more organised. 
Schopenhauer grades the forms and "ideas" of the will to live by the degree of consciousness they 
exhibit. Less complex animals have sufficient and immediate perception for their mere existence. 
Living things capable of intellect have a still higher degree of organisation. Man, however, has an 
intellect that enables him to see that he himself is a product of Will and an objectification of it. To see 
this is to see the secret of existence. The increase in intellect means a wider separation between the 
reflective being and the striving will that underpins it. 
Intellect is a liberation from Will but between individuals there are vast differences in intellect. The 
highest creature in Schopenhauer's chain of being is, not man as such but the genius, in whom the 
powers of intellect are concentrated to such intensity that they actually exist almost in opposition to 
Will. Hence, “...the ever wider separation of the will and the intellect, which can be traced in the 
whole series of existences. This reaches its highest grade in genius, where it extends to the entire 
liberation of the intellect from its root the will, so that here the intellect becomes perfectly free, 
whereby the world as idea first attains to complete objectification."200 Although genius develops 
"unnaturally" by severing itself from direct service to will, as intellect "which has become untrue to 
its destination"201 it affords us in a way never before possible a glance "into the interior of nature, in 
as much as this is nothing else than our own inner being, which is precisely where nature, arrived at 
the highest grade to which it is striving could work itself up; is now by the light of knowledge found 
directly in self-consciousness."202 
In Schopenhauer's work the idea that there is a goal in nature constantly breaks through with the 
implication that it is the genius who justifies the processes of nature, and if not redeeming the world's 
suffering, at least makes the cause of that suffering explicable. Thinking, which is the purest human 
activity, establishes a bond between humanity and nature, so that "when I think, it is the spirit of the 
world which is striving to express its thought: it is nature which is trying to know and fathom 
itself.”203 This enables Schopenhauer to place an Ideal of Cultivation as the base of value, since it is 
only through the serenity of thought - through the vita contemplativa - that the blindness implicit in 
the Will's objectifications and in the need to survive are surmounted, and the suffering of the world 
clearly apprehended. Only the thinking being, the philosopher, the saint, the artist (who gazes upon 
and reproduces the eternal ideas through art) can achieve this salvation by denying the will to live. 
Nature and Consciousness in the younger Nietzsche 
Schopenhauer impresses the younger Nietzsche by the way he can show that an Ideal of Cultivation is 
rooted in nature's essence. Von Stein reports that in conversation, Nietzsche told him that 
"Schopenhauer lehrt mich, der mensch kommt von diesem saugenden Polypenwesen der Natur los, 
über sich hinausgelangend.”204 In short, it was Schopenhauer's idea of physis that was most 
instructive. In the period leading to publication of the Untimely Meditations, he alludes to this idea 
repeatedly, sometimes barely transposing it from the metaphors in which it was originally expressed. 
In the essay Schopenhauer as Educator, for example, he declares that "if universal nature leads up to 
man, it is to show us that he is necessary to redeem her from the curse of the beasts of life, and that in 
him existence can find a mirror of itself wherein life appears, no longer blind, but in its real 
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metaphysical significance.”205 
This paraphrase of Schopenhauer shows his belief that humanity's purpose is to justify nature by 
making her conscious, and that this task is clearly the true aim and province of culture. Cultivation 
improves and perfects human nature and therefore the whole of nature itself. The actual equation 
between the terms - culture and physis occurs in this essay as well as in the second Untimely 
Meditation, the Use and Abuse of History where he acknowledges it to be a fundamental idea of the 
Greeks. Whoever, he says, strives after a true culture, will discover the Greek idea as opposed to the 
decorative Roman idea of culture, namely, "the idea of culture as a new and finer nature (Physis)"206 
In all of Nietzsche's youthful work the theme of consciousness or wakefulness - the quest to escape 
nature's blindness - is identical with the theme of culture. Wakefulness serves nature to know itself, 
and occurs in pure form in the art of the Greek tragedians. The tragic artist is "the only wakeful one, 
the only being really and truly conscious, among a host of confused and tormented sleepers."207 
Nature therefore, in its quest for self-consciousness, must produce special types of humanity if it is to 
receive the kind of unblinking vision it needs. Not any human being will do. Only culture can justify 
nature but it can only truly exist in its highest practitioners, the geniuses who as artists, saints, or 
philosophers bring it to perfection.  
Only geniuses can accomplish these ends because their activities are grounded in the foundations of 
being. They, above all, are concerned with what lies behind nature's striving. "The philosopher is a 
self revelation of nature's workshop, the philosopher and the artist tell the trade secrets of nature."208 
In order to perfect nature, culture must look for ways in which to bring forth genius wherever it can: 
"...culture... can put as single task before each of us - to bring the philosopher, the artist, and the 
saint, within and without us to the light and strive thereby for the completion of nature. For Nature 
needs the artist, as she needs the philosopher, for a metaphysical end, the explanation of herself, 
whereby she may have a clear and sharp picture of what she only saw dimly in the troubled period of 
transition - and so may reach self-consciousness."209 
The problem of theory and practice 
Artist, philosopher, saint... thus far Schopenhauer's idiom and trinity of genius is preserved by the 
younger Nietzsche except in one respect: Schopenhauer's ideal is deeply apolitical, passive, and 
literally Buddhistic, whereas Nietzsche's is ferociously activist. For Schopenhauer, culture merely 
involves thinking, for Nietzsche it involves making and doing, or rather, creating.  
That radical self-consciousness, the aim of culture, may also undermine action presents no problem to 
Schopenhauer. After all, it is in full awareness of this that he presents the genius as one who is in 
virtual opposition to will. His axiom is that the more intelligent man is, so is he less active. Nietzsche 
however, is impressed at an early age by the difficulties of matching thought with action. He sees it as 
an irrevocable contradiction lying at the centre of man and nature. Self-consciousness is therefore as 
much the problem as it is the aim of culture. Wakefulness paralyses action, when ideally it should be 
a preliminary and guide to it. Unlike Schopenhauer, he wishes wherever possible to preserve a unity 
between both but is oppressed by what he describes, in a letter of 1866 as the "ungluckliche Differenz 
zwischen Theorie und Praxis".210 
An early response to this dilemma is contained in The Birth of Tragedy where he credits the Greeks 
with having solved the problem of radical self-reflection through conscious illusion. Even while 
knowing that inside all was vacuous, they pretended, or continued to live their life on the surface. 
They consciously spread a veil of illusion over the world. Because “knowledge kills action; action 
requires the veils of illusion; that is the doctrine of Hamlet... Not reflection, no - true knowledge, an 
insight into the horrible truth, outweighs any motive for action, both in Hamlet and the Dionysian 
man...conscious of the truth he has seen, man sees everywhere only the horror or uncertainty of 
existence... now he understands the wisdom of the sylvan god, Silenus: he is nauseated."211 
In a world of aimless change right behaviour is senseless because in the end nothing matters. All who 
see this fact are deprived of hope or motivation to act. The younger Nietzsche states that only illusion 
can veil these comfortless thoughts, and break the evil spell of consciousness. But how do you 
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consciously believe what you know to be false. You must replace belief in the unbelievable 
mythologies with belief in the power of art to give us what divinity or mythology once gave.  
In the last chapter of The Philosophy of As/If Vaihinger happily describes this attempt by Nietzsche to 
unite theory and practice as the doctrine of conscious-illusion.212 The logical consistency of the 
doctrine is irrelevant here. It is simply to show the dilemma Nietzsche faces in employing an idea of 
physis that makes both higher consciousness and action the goal of nature, when the former 
undermines the latter. In spite of this Nietzsche never wishes to abandon consciousness as a 
fundamental criterion of culture, or as a guide to action. 
As much as he may believe that illusion is needed in order to act, he cannot escape the traditional 
faith of those attracted to the principle of physis; that nature harbours creative principles that may be 
apprehended and exploited directly. This faith is seen in Nietzsche's early work and portends an 
eventual break with the influence of Schopenhauer.  
In the same letter to Von Gersdorff, he relates an event that is often recounted in the Nietzsche 
literature. On one of his walks in the country around Naumburg, he observed a storm gathering and 
hurried to find shelter on a nearby hill. On the hill he discovered a hut, where a shepherd and his son 
had recently slaughtered two kids. The experience of the hailstorm breaking and the spectacle of 
bloody sacrifice brings on an overwhelming impression of the spontaneity and "freedom" of natural 
forces which, he notes, are pure expressions of will without the interference of moral or intellectual 
constraints: compared to the dynamism unleashed before him all human problems seem but 
trivia."Was war mir der Mensch und sein unruhiges Wollen! Was war mir das ewige "Du sollst", "Du 
sollst nicht"! Wie anders der Blitz, der Sturm, der Hagel, freie Mächte, ohne Ethik! Wie glücklich, wie 
kräftig sind sie, reiner Wille, ohne Trübungen durch den Intellekt!"213 
Nietzsche envies nature's expressions of pure willing. The highest happiness, it seems to him, stems 
from the spontaneity of action. The lightning strike is happy because it obeys its own inner necessity 
and no external law is imposed upon it. Likewise, when an individual acts from internally necessary 
circumstances and not external moral imperatives, there is a perfect sequence between his internal 
nature and the deed that unfolds from it. In every individual there is a layer not accessible to moral 
precepts or training. If he is to impart integrity to his actions, he must think through to the essential 
part of himself where lurk all his drives and proclivities.  
The seamlessness of intention and deed cannot be implanted by moral tutelage: individual natures 
vary considerably in needs or capacity. When you are told Thou shalt, or Thou shalt not you are asked 
to obey a standard that is outside your nature and which does not recognise your individuality. It 
forces you to turn against your nature and perhaps damage it. Actions springing from solely moral 
imperatives therefore remain halting, superficial, and sometimes completely "false".  
This is especially so if the outer-man, the social man, is coerced to act in ways that deny his inner 
nature. He really wishes to do one thing, but is compelled to do another that he only half-heartedly 
defers to. True action recognises this primal nature, and is therefore spontaneous and effective, like 
lightning. Goethe, in conversation, once prefigured this idea with a remark concerning "extraordinary 
men" like Napoleon who, "place themselves outside morality. They act, after all, like physical causes 
such as fire and water. Indeed anyone who steps out of the position of subordination - for that is what 
morality is - becomes to that extent immoral."214 
Nietzsche's idea of Physis 
In the tradition of physis in Germany, Nietzsche holds that the basis of cultivation is to consciously 
act in accordance with the innermost recesses of one's being. This idea is the substance of the slogan 
he borrows from the Greek poet Pindar: "You must become the being you are" which he alludes to 
persistently from early youth until, in the final instance, he uses it to subtitle his autobiography: Ecce 
Homo or, How one becomes what one is. 
Pindar's injunction complements that of Solon to: "Know thyself" and taken together they perfectly 
represent the form of enlightenment ethics that demands self-knowledge of inner necessity. This 
differs from the brooding introspection of Christians like Augustine or romantic poets because it is at 
once fatalistic and optimistic. Its character can be seen in Montaigne who, standing at the gate of the 
modern enlightenment, says:"I study myself more than any other subject. That is my metaphysics, that 
is my physics... In this universe of things I ignorantly and negligently let myself be guided by the 
general law of the world. I shall know it well enough when I feel it. My knowledge could not make it 
change its path; it will not modify itself for me."215 
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Nietzsche assumes that human nature cannot be infinitely moulded by education or drill. Some things 
in us cannot be altered, and the key to enlightenment is to understand what can be changed. It is 
useless to wish for that which cannot be. However, we can defeat gratuitous becoming by 
consciously holding onto what is deepest and most immutable within us. This is an essential task of 
philosophy. As he indicates in the essay Richard Wagner in Bayreuth:"For my part, the most 
important question philosophy has to decide seems to be, how far things have acquired an unalterable 
stamp and form, and, once this question has been answered, I think it is the duty of philosophy 
unhesitatingly and courageously to proceed with the task of improving that part of the world which 
has been recognised as still susceptible to change."216 
To disavow nature, to supplant the unpalatable consciousness of necessity with "agreeable thoughts" 
abases culture. Agreeable thoughts imprison us in arbitrary convention. Their effect is all around us in 
the social world; in the affectation of idealism that is never acted on, in the cant of diplomats, the 
euphemisms of politics and public life, in the predominance of pleasant images over harsh realities. In 
public statements that never coincide with private convictions and the preference for things to seem 
well rather than honest recognition of necessary evils. Pretending that the world is nicer than it is 
creates a cancer of lies that corrodes the unity of theory and practice. A culture of agreeableness can 
only ever be decorative, a facade overlaying a building of inferior material and construction. Integrity 
however produces style, which is the harmonising of natural drives with consciousness.  
Style is the unity of the inner and outer man in every aspect of his existence. It is the formative 
activity of culture. Barbarism shows itself by incapacity to create a style appropriate to itself. In the 
absence of self mastery and organisation of life in accordance with principles of physis, barbarism 
borrows other forms to give itself the appearance of organisation, Modernity, for example, is 
disfigured by the prevalence of sham styles and sham appearance, it is a "complex of inharmonious 
bombast"."Wherever form is still in demand in society, conversation, literary style, or the relations 
between governments, men have unconsciously grown to believe that it is adequately met by a kind of 
agreeable dissimulation, quite the reverse of genuine form conceived as the necessary relations 
between the proportions of a figure, having no concern whatever with the notions "agreeable" or 
"disagreeable" simply because it is necessary and not optional."217 
The young Nietzsche describes the contemporary malaise as an incapacity to "feel correctly". The 
tyranny of conventions estranges us from our real nature. You need to feel correctly before you can 
think correctly; this is the only way to attain autonomy. Freedom consists in being as honest in doing 
evil as in doing good, in directness, in frankness before distasteful facts of existence. The freest man 
is the genius who, inwardly and outwardly, shapes his own life from the materials of his own nature.  
The genius displays sublime self-sufficiency which he discovers by living, as the Greeks would have 
had it, according to physis and not by nomos. This is also the source of his productivity or creativity. 
Thus all of the elements that traditionally figure in the justification of an Ideal of Cultivation by 
means of physis also figure in the philosophy of the young Nietzsche. 
In the later period, the same ethical structures, the logical links between value and nature, freedom 
and consciousness remain. What differs is the understanding of what nature is. In this period in the 
notebooks he makes ever more frequent references to physics, and starts to read books and papers by 
contemporary scientists and mathematicians. He wishes to study chemistry and physics to improve his 
knowledge of the natural world218 with the aim of building a new ethical system on eternal natural 
principles. The immutable character of nature must be represented in the immutable character of 
value. Knowledge of nature is needed to revalue all values. The principle of physis requires an 
explication of what nature does in order to show how the highest value emerges out of it.  
Physis can cover and contain the most contrary conclusions, because it establishes a logical relation 
between concepts but does not prescribe their content. It is one thing to say we obtain ethical 
justification by perfecting nature, but to decide what nature is or does, or what its perfected form 
would look like is altogether separate. To justify one virtue or another nature must describe the 
specific qualities of nature. 
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7 - The Will to Power in Nature 
The principle of physis justifies young Nietzsche's Ideal of Cultivation. In the later work the logical 
relationship between categories like nature, consciousness, individual, will and genius remain but the 
content of those categories is redefined in a way that defines a unique philosophical moment.  
The key change is the concept of nature as Will. In notes from Human all too Human he breaks 
completely from the philosophy of Schopenhauer by referring to his idea of nature‟s substrate as Will 
to Power. From this new understanding of nature he starts to build an entire ethical system in a way 
he had not done previously and which changes the character of his the Ideal of Cultivation.  
Physis understood as will to power offers new explanations for the nature of morality, value, 
aesthetics, and genius. It is the key idea of his mature philosophy; the pillar upon which his projected 
philosophical edifice would stand. 
The intellectual need for the doctrine of Will to Power 
In the first place will to power is a means to overcome the limitations of mechanistic or materialistic 
interpretation of the universe offered by classical physics. Nietzsche's antipathy toward materialism 
follows a long-standing vitalist prejudice in German philosophy and it is one that enjoys intelligent 
instruction and profound guidance by Friedrich Albert Lange's Geschichte des Materialismus.219 
The mechanistic viewpoint accounts for events and phenomena by tracing their origin to external 
compulsions such as force, pressure, or stress. It does not account for these effects in themselves. 
Two bodies exert a force on each other across empty space, but it is not known what this force 
actually is. When these bodies interact, the interaction remains, for all purposes, an occult actio in 
distans. If the concept of force worked out by classical physics cannot explain masses acting on each 
other at a distance, it would be no less occult to assume that there is a dynamism working within 
matter, or what is perceived to be matter. This inner dynamism would be the author of every event 
and every material structure. With this idea we could dispense with "atoms" as the primary units of 
being and speak instead of "points of force"  
The idea of points of force does not dispense with atomism, it merely changes what atoms are; i.e. 
finite centres of activity, instead of units of "extension". But Nietzsche regards this as a complete 
break with classical physics. Points of force behave as atoms; they organise in increasingly complex 
forms to produce the varieties of matter and life itself. The problem that mechanistic systems have of 
distinguishing between matter and force, which is to say, between a subject and its actions, is 
overcome by abolishing the category of the subject. Matter does not really exist at all; what we call 
matter is our own foreground construction. There is no discontinuity between dead material and live 
material. In some sense all things in the universe are alive. When everything can be reduced to the 
action of "points of force", the one pervasive quality of the universe is will to power: "Physicists 
cannot eradicate "action at a distance" from their principles; nor can they eradicate a repellent force 
(or an attracting one). There is nothing for it; one is obliged to understand all motion, all 
"appearances", all "laws" only as symptoms of an inner event and to employ man as an analogy to 
this end. In the case of an animal, it is possible to trace all of its drives to the will to power, likewise 
all the functions of organic life to this one source. "220 
The idea of will to power is also a strategy to explain the totality of becoming: as it permits universal 
chaos to exist within a comprehensible framework. Unlike Schopenhauer‟s, Nietzsche's new concept 
of Will is not unitary, it is not a monism. Schopenhauer's Will is an ocean, upon which flicker waves 
and shadows we call "reality". The seagull we see skimming the waves is as much of this essence as 
the fish beneath its surface. The seagull devours the fish, but the separateness of their existence from 
one another is merely a phantasm resulting from their "individuation" from the great oceanic Will. 
Their substance is actually one. Tat twam asi or This thou art is the Vedas teaching that Schopenhauer 
often cites. 
Species of animals such as birds or fish, are merely molds, into which the same substance is poured. 
As individual entities, this fish, and this seagull are an estrangement from the oneness. By the fact of 
their individuation both creatures carry primordial guilt in their being, a guilt extinguished only in 
their death and decomposition to the primordial substance from which they were expelled at birth. For 
Schopenhauer, merely to come into the world means to take on a burden of guilt. This is the meaning 
he places on the lines of Calderon, which he again cites more than once."Pues el delito mayor del 
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hombre es haber nacido" (for the greatest crime of man is that he ever was born).221 
One of the profoundest desires of thinkers is to demonstrate that multiplicity can stem from 
simplicity, or at least, as Leibniz perceives this relation, that unity may exist in multiplicity: similitudo 
in varietate. A world of plural essences without an underlying unity is anathema to a thinker‟s 
organising and reductive proclivities. Truth cannot be if it is not simple. For this reason, monistic 
systems that assume a single essence underlying all phenomena are favoured by philosophers in all 
ages. Their psychological appeal is that they provide a common foundation for multiplicity. At the 
same time they are also dogged by a problem that lies in the advantage that monism is seen to 
provide: namely, how can the diversity of the world arise out of one thing. How can a uniform 
substance precipitate the chaos of eternal becoming? How can it be that there is so much havoc in the 
very nature of things? Is it possible for a unitary substance to come into conflict with itself? 
A vexing problem historically. It has oppressed the monism of theologians, whose burden is to 
explain how perfect divinity permits imperfection in the world. The burden they call the "problem of 
evil" is not unknown to atheistic monisms either. Whatever its nature, ingenuous solutions have been 
devised to lift monist systems out of contradiction, invariably by using an alienating principle of some 
kind; some tendency to disunity resting in the bosom of being. Somehow, the creativity of the original 
unitary substance is impaired by an inner short-coming or flaw within its nature.  
In Schopenhauer's system, primal Will is a blindly active agency whose creations are condemned to 
exist blindly because they have no awareness of their origin. The very moment an individual being or 
thing comes into existence, it is alienated from Will. The principle of individuation, of separate beings 
forming and losing all sense of their unity with other beings provides the ground for otherness and 
multiplicity. What deepens the alienating principle is the distinction between the activity of Will, and 
Will's consciousness of this activity. The simpler a being in form and composition, which is to say, 
the closer it is to pure Will, the more individuated it is and the more violently and blindly it strives. It 
is only when the being attains consciousness - most potently in the mind of the genius - that the 
intensity of blind Will is diluted and at least an intellectual return affected toward the original unity.  
Schopenhauer's older contemporary, Hegel, gave an evolutionary dimension to his monism, by posing 
that "geist", though initially alienated from itself, was moving by distinct phases toward its 
completion in absolute knowledge or consciousness. The early Christians, in more primitive fashion, 
employed a corporeal alienating principle. Rather than seeing "evil" as a limpid abstraction, they 
personified it, and call it Satan, a spoiler, a being in complete contradiction to God, though permitted 
to exist by him. The imperfections of the universe are accounted as a rebellion against perfection. 
Nietzsche's contemplations on unity and diversity appear early in his work, not truly thought through 
but as a set of assumptions. It is likely he had already grasped the problem of monism before the will 
to power had been conceived. We are alerted to this possibility in his early study of Pre-Socratic 
philosophy. In the unfinished Philosophy in the Tragic Age of the Greeks he states the principle 
behind the later idea of will to power while discoursing on Heraclitus: “if the world which we see only 
knows becoming and passing but no permanence, should perhaps those qualities constitute a 
differently fashioned metaphysical world, true, not a world of unity as Anaximander sought behind 
the fluttering veil of plurality, but a world of eternal and essential pluralities.”222 
The phrase "a world of eternal and essential pluralities" is echoed in Nietzsche's later statements 
against monism, and in his explication of the will to power. During the middle period he criticises 
Schopenhauer for having so twisted the word "Wille" that it merely denotes several human conditions 
and serves merely to fill a gap in the language. Wille, through the philosophical mania for 
generalisation turned out to be an intellectual liability, merely a poetic metaphor."Finally, that it 
might be applied to all kinds of disordered mysticism, the, word, by a fraudulent convention was 
misused. So now all our fashionable philosophers repeat it and seem to be perfectly certain that all 
things have a will and are in fact One Will. According to the description generally given of this All-
One-Will, this is much as if one should positively try to have the stupid Devil for one's God."223 In 
some later notes he implies that the tendency of philosophers to posit unity behind the world is a 
symptom of their inertia, of a psychological need for peacableness and a desire for reconciliation. A 
plurality of interpretations however is a sign of strength. We should not, he says, "deprive the world 
of its disturbing and enigmatic character.”224 
Nietzsche's preference is for a universe in which multiplicity is already its primal character. His 
philosophy has the opposite problem to one that begins with unity, being a universe of points of force 
with each centre acting independently; no point of force is united in being with any other one. 
 In this state of multiplicity how is form and organisation conceivable? The simplest being, let alone 
life itself, is unthinkable without there being some form of commonality. Some things at least must 
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act in the same way if a complex structure is to exist. For Nietzsche the answer lies in a principle of 
likeness exhibited by every point of force. This is not divulged in its substance for it does not have 
substance, but rather in its motion; in the way it acts. The principle of motion is highlighted by 
designating each point of force a unit of "will to power" (Wille zur Macht). 
What Will to Power is 
A unit of will to power is a point of force in a location in space that wills, and insofar as willing 
implies intention, it intends what is immediately itself, which is power.  
Power has no thingness or quiddity, for it is no more than an eternal grasping outward - an exertion 
that seeks only to exert more forcefully. The action of units of will to power is like the action of an 
alpine avalanche hurling itself down a mountain slope. Irresistible, it cannot prevent itself, or hold 
itself back. Moreover these units of force are quantifiable; they come in smaller and larger packages. 
Nietzsche uses the term quanta of power225 to give the sense of magnitudes. That quantity is not of 
substance, but of the degree of effect each willing unit can exert on its surroundings.  
We must not think of points of force as atoms i.e. as subjects, for this is precisely what the idea of will 
to power does away with. Abolishing the subject abolishes the mysterious lacuna between a subject 
and its deed - the essence of the problem of causality. A unit of will to power annuls the separation 
between cause and effect; it is not an atom, not a substance possessing - in the parlance of the 
Cartesians - "extension", but a happening, an occasion, an event entire within itself. In Nietzsche's 
words, will to power is "not a being, not a becoming, but a pathos".226 Indeed the concepts of being, 
subject, and cause and effect, are simply fictions invented by the living organism in order to deal with 
its environment. These points are prior to being, for being suggests that there is a thing that exists. 
Points of force do not exist. They do no more than provoke the phantasm of existence.  
Thus, the entire phenomenal world, interpreted through the diverse perspectives of diverse beings, 
results from the manifestation of points of will to power."The following are therefore phenomenal; 
the injection of the concept of number, the concept of the thing (concept of the subject) the concept of 
activity (separation of cause from effect) the concept of motion (sight and taste) our eye and our 
psychology are still part of it. If we eliminate these additions, no things remain but only dynamic 
quanta: their essence lies in their relation to other quanta, in their "effect" upon the same. The will to 
power not a being, not a becoming but a pathos- the most elementary fact from which a becoming and 
effecting first emerge.”227 
A world of essential pluralities necessarily excludes an absolute type of perception or knowledge. A 
unit of will to power cannot apprehend, or be apprehended, or have any existence at all until it can 
interact with another of the same. The universe is a magnitude of relationships (for Nietzsche this 
magnitude is finite) between isolated power points, therefore the character of being must be 
perspectival. As each point of force strives outward from its own centre it is destined to encounter and 
perceive its surroundings as a simple displacement from this centre. "...a necessary perspectivism by 
virtue of which every centre of force - and not only man - construes all the rest of the world from its 
own viewpoint, i.e. measures, feels, forms, according to its own force..."228 The perspectival character 
of human knowledge and consciousness is determined at the most rudimentary levels of being.  
By pronouncing a unity between representation and will, between perceptio and appetitus, Nietzsche 
is a true heir of German Idealism, and particularly of its primogenitor - Leibniz. Although there are 
key differences between these "vitalist" philosophies the similiarities between Monadology and the 
will to power are profound.  
Leibniz and Nietzsche think a universe of dynamic pluralities, and each in his own way wishes to 
grasp the creative potency behind everything. Like Nietzsche, Leibniz is sceptical about mechanist 
causality. The idea of the monad - Leibniz's simplest substance – assumes that every action originates 
in the inward impulse of a body. But in place of the eternal grasping outward that Nietzsche calls 
"power", Leibniz assumes that every created thing, or monad is subject to change, "indeed that this 
change is continual in each one..." and that "the changes of monads come from an internal principle". 
This disposition to change moreover, which he calls appetitio, varies one perception to another and 
while it "cannot attain completely the whole of the perception to which it tends... it always attains 
something of it, and arrives at new perceptions.”229 In Nietzsche's system a body perceives according 
to the magnitude of force it can exert. As its capacity to exert force lessens or increases so its own 
representation of the world will change. 
The will to power is something that builds. This building can only occur when binding relationships 
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are formed between centres of force. But if each point of force wants to promote itself at the expense 
of all others, no complex building can occur. There has to be a way of forming binding relationships 
and therefore complex forms of organisation. Nietzsche's answer is that units of power build 
relationships based on command, or, obedience, which is a necessary consequence of the former.  
Every encounter between two centres of force is determined by which of them is the greater and can 
subsume and control the lesser. The command and obedience relationship makes higher levels of 
organisation possible, but it means that everything in the natural world is in permanent contest, since 
no point of force wishes to be subservient to any other. It is held in check by the more compelling 
force but it continues to offer resistance. Therefore every complex body is in danger of disintegration 
if the dominating centre loses hold. "Obedience" and "commanding" are forms of struggle.”230 
Every complex thing is a political entity haunted by factions within itself that strive for control. Every 
aspect of existence, every forgotten corner of being, is a complex web of power relationships. The 
entire universe a monumental series of 'political' arrangements. Nothing is excluded from this order, 
living or dead. Chemical reactions, "laws" of physics, all amount to concatenations of dominations."I 
beware of speaking of chemical "laws:" that savours of morality. It is far rather a question of the 
absolute establishment of power relationships; the stronger becomes master of the weaker, insofar as 
the latter cannot assert its degree of independence - here there is no mercy, no forbearance, even less 
a respect for "laws.”231 
And again:"The unalterable sequence of certain phenomena demonstrates no "law" but a power 
relationship between two or more forces. To say "But this relationship itself remains constant" is to 
say no more than "One and the same force cannot also be another force" It is a question, not of 
succession, but of interpenetration, a process in which the individual successive movements are not 
related to one another by cause and effect.”232 As he explains, the "two successive states, the one 
'cause', the other 'effect" is false because "the first has nothing to effect, the second has been effected 
by nothing." It is in actuality" a question of a struggle between two elements of unequal power, a new 
arrangement of forces of achieved according to the measure of power in each of them. The second 
condition is something fundamentally different from the first (not its effect); the essential thing is that 
factions in a struggle emerge with different quanta of power."233 
Will to Power as life 
When points of force array about a commanding centre, the group presents unity in action, all 
components exhibiting the same impulses, but having a greater magnitude of power. A molecular 
polity of this type will interact with like bodies until more intricate, highly organised, even specialised 
arrangements occur, indeed until they become organic, and yield the prospect of the most uncanny 
and effective transformation of will to power, which is life.  
Simple or complex, living things carry the character of the universe in all of their actions; a never 
ceasing questing after power. But, unlike non-organic beings, their organisation requires favourable 
circumstances for them to exist. Living things can reproduce (within the strictures of defined species 
and types), but are limited by their need to assimilate foreign materials as nourishment, for which they 
are provided various senses, organs and appendages. If will to power is the foundation of life then 
each of its special characteristics must also be explicable in terms of command and obedience. 
Nietzsche did not neglect to offer such explanations, but they are rarely seen in his published books, 
and for obvious reasons. Much of the exegetical material on the will to power as life occurs in the 
notebooks from the year (1888-1889) before his collapse, and was being prepared for his proposed 
systematic work. Some notes state his ideas comprehensively, but others leave us a germ, whose 
implications are evident. This aspect of his work remains in a state of incompletion, and is afflicted 
with logical lacunae and omissions. But the notes do show the working principles of his system. 
The characteristics of living things; nutrition, procreation, responding to stimuli, are usually thought 
of as fundamentally different drives, but Nietzsche represents them as special cases of will to power. 
On the origins of nutrition, he cites the example of uni-cellular organisms to describe how the 
simplest forms of nourishment can exist as modifications of the necessity to exert force: “...the 
protoplasm extends its pseudopodia in search of something that resists it - not from hunger but from 
will to power. Thereupon it attempts to overcome, appropriate, assimilate what it encounters; what 
one calls "nourishment" is merely a derivative phenomenon, an application of the original will to 
become stronger."234 
To eat means to assimilate other being into an organism's areas of control, and to subsume and 
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disperse its contents throughout its body. But what pertains to simple life-forms such as amoeba does 
not easily apply to organisms with complex organisations and specialised adaptations. Nourishment in 
this case would seem a necessity, something required for mere survival, rather than conquest of the 
organism's environment. He suggests that hunger is a primitive form of will to power, which in higher 
animals, becomes a residual function, a secondary need incorporated into an animal now able to find 
new directions to exercise powers to command. "It is not possible to take hunger as the primum 
mobile, any more than self preservation. To understand hunger as a consequence of 
undernourishment means; hunger as the consequence of a will to power that no longer achieves 
mastery. It is by no means a question of replacing a loss - only later as a result of the division of 
labour, after the will to power has learned to take other roads to its satisfaction, is an organism's 
need to appropriate reduced to hunger, to the need to replace what has been lost."235 
Another result of the organism's assimilation of other bodies into its own is the fact of procreation. 
When the protozoon assimilates more than it can control it breaks into separate entities, each with its 
own distinct will to power. "Appropriation and assimilation are above all a desire to overwhelm, a 
forming, shaping and reshaping, until at length that which has been overwhelmed has entirely gone 
over into the power domain of the aggressor and has increased the same. If this incorporation is not 
successful then the form probably falls to pieces, and the duality appears as a consequence of the will 
to power, in order not to let go what has been conquered, the will to power divides itself into two wills 
(in some cases without completely surrendering the connection between its two parts)."236 Protoplasm 
divides in two "when its power is no longer adequate to control what it has appropriated, procreation 
is the consequence of an impotency.”237 
Division of power centres may explain procreation in unicellular life, but we are not advised how the 
reproduction in complex life forms arise. In the absence of genetic theory an answer is merely 
suggested. Procreation ensures that the identity of the complex organism is closely duplicated, and 
thereby prepares its own continued duration. Even if its own organisation crumbles away, it at least 
leaves a template of its form behind which might be further duplicated. Without this succession it 
would itself perish and exert no further force. Thus the obsessive interest of the individual in the 
sexual instinct is not due to its value to the species, but "arises because procreation is the real 
achievement of the individual and consequently his highest interest, his highest expression of power... 
judged from the centre of the whole individuation."238 Sexual reproduction is therefore a further 
"spiritualising" of the will to power, a refinement arising from its increasing complexity.  
Just as nutrition is one way in which will to power is satisfied, procreation is another. Both develop in 
parallel and, becoming integral to life, allow new and more astonishing ways for force to exert itself. 
The capacity of living things to respond to stimuli is dealt with in greater detail. Organisms 
"discourse" with their environment through the primitive language of the nervous system, and their 
discrimination between pleasurable and painful experiences arises from an exaggeration in the 
capacity of a power centre to act against whatever resists it. A point of force manifests itself only 
when it interacts with another entity; it only truly 'exists' through encountering and overcoming 
resistance. The only experiences it truly knows are when a weaker force yields before it, or when a 
stronger one exerts overwhelming pressure upon it. If even the raw unit of power 'experiences' stimuli 
as a purely physical event, it will seem inevitable that a more highly organised structure of power 
heightens or deepens these experiences. The multitude of sensory affects available to organisms - 
sight, touch, hearing or scent - can all be reduced to these fundamental interpretations. 
If, however, the senses make use of variations of the sense of resistance, involving either its 
"pleasurable" or "painful" aspects, this is not to say we can call such interpretations of experience the 
primary drives of living beings. Pleasure and pain are secondary affects, the first is not a goal to be 
pursued, and the second is not a fate to be avoided, both are feelings that ensue from the normal 
pursuit of power. Hence, Nietzsche's elaboration of the question of pleasure and pain is consciously 
directed against the utilitarian ethic."Man does not seek pleasure and does not avoid displeasure, one 
will realise which famous prejudice I am contradicting. Pleasure and displeasure are mere 
consequences, mere epiphenomena - what man wants, what every smallest part of a living organism 
wants, is an increase of power. Pleasure or displeasure follow from the striving after that; driven by 
what will it seeks resistance, it needs something that opposes it. - Displeasure as an obstacle to its 
will to power, is therefore a normal fact, the normal ingredient of every organic event; man does not 
avoid it, he is rather in continual need of it, every victory, every feeling of pleasure, every event, 
presupposes a resistance overcome."239 
Feelings of pleasure and pain are evaluative reactions by the intellectual centre in response to changes 
affecting the whole organism. The evaluation called "pleasure" stems from every increase of power 
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acquired and is registered as such in its nervous system. If degrees of power are maintained, a 
reference point is established, against which the degree of pleasure or displeasure an organism 
experiences can be assessed. To grow in power means to experience pleasure, to have that power 
diminished results in displeasure."The will to grow is of the essence of pleasure, that power increases, 
that the difference enters consciousness. From a certain point onwards, in decadence, the opposite 
difference enters consciousness, the decrease, the memory of former moments of strength depresses 
present feelings of pleasure - comparison now weakens pleasure."240 
Elsewhere Nietzsche refers to more than one type of pleasure and displeasure and implies that 
pleasure itself is only a momentary condition that briefly swamps the more abiding feeling of 
displeasure. This is so because it is not the satisfaction of the will that causes pleasure: something 
which is always driving outward of necessity cannot, after all, be satisfied or sated. An organism 
would immediately and continually wish to acquire more power to overcome and master still more of 
its domain. There would be no respite; the will to power is an eternal dissatisfaction, therefore, "the 
feeling of pleasure lies precisely in the dissatisfaction of the will, in the fact that the will is never 
satisfied unless it has opponents and resistance.”241 
This agitation is not a depressant but a stimulant and we see that pleasure, far from being something 
opposite to pain, is actually a product of it. Pleasure may result from a close sequence of unpleasant 
stimuli or resistances, which are overcome in swift succession and so engender the feeling of 
exaltation in power."There are even cases in which a kind of pleasure is conditioned by a certain 
rhythmic sequence of little unpleasurable stimuli; in this way a very rapid increase of the feeling of 
power, the feeling of pleasure, is achieved. This is the case, e.g. in tickling, also the sexual tickling in 
the act of coitus: here we see displeasure at work as an ingredient of pleasure. It seems a little 
hindrance that is overcome and immediately followed by another little hindrance that is again 
overcome - this game of resistance and victory arouses most strongly that general feeling of 
superabundant, excessive power that constitutes the essence of pleasure.”242 
Nietzsche extends this analysis to suggest the existence of two varieties of displeasure and therefore 
of pleasure. The displeasure that is a type of irritation provokes an organism to resist and overcome its 
source. When the irritation is small enough to be resisted successfully, the organism experiences a 
feeling of victory. The other type of displeasure occurs when an organism over-expends itself and 
suffers excessive stimulation from an inability to resist an imposing force. Nietzsche calls this 
condition exhaustion and it figures significantly in his discussions of contemporary morals. 
Exhaustion is a feeling that afflicts declining or decadent life. The type of pleasure with which it is 
associated, is not realised in victory, but in rest, in sleep, in avoidance of conflict. The exhausted 
organism looks inward because its organisation is not in repair for external conquest. For the decadent 
life form it is enough to monitor its own boundaries and avoid upheavals that may over extend its 
modest economy of force and resistance. In short, "the exhausted want rest, relaxation, peace, calm - 
the happiness of the nihilistic religions and philosophies; the rich and living want victory, opponents 
overcome, the overflow of the feeling of power across wider domains than hitherto."243 
Will to Power and the evolution of species 
In the eighteenth century the suggestion that the diversity of life forms arose through evolving 
speciation could only be uttered by a Diderot; that is, someone with a sense for the outrageous. But 
the activity of philosophes like Maupertuis, Robinet, and most famously Lamarck, acquainted biology 
with the historicising consciousness that was everywhere taking hold in Europe.  
In physical or social science, and in philosophy itself, the new historical consciousness began to see 
everything as the result of pervasive, protracted and cumulative processes of change. Thus, by 1859 
when Darwin unleashed his exposition of the "origin of species by the means of natural selection" 
upon the world, the fact of biological evolution was already well established. It merely required an 
adequate explanation for the process, which the theory of natural selection was able to supply. 
Darwin's theory captured Europe so successfully that by the 1880's, when Nietzsche was working out 
his system of nature as will to power, serious intellectual opposition was scarcely audible and an 
entire intellectual movement was constructing elaborate political and ethical doctrine out of the 
principle of "survival of the fittest". When we examine Nietzsche's remarks on the evolution of 
species, we must take into account the pre-eminence of Darwinist doctrine, since he is doggedly 
opposed to it; not of course, because he doesn't accept the principle that species evolve but because of 
the manner in which it explains this fact. 
There are two reasons for this: the first is that he thinks the Darwinian theory of natural selection 
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cannot account for as many facts of nature as the will to power; the second, is that he sees the ethical 
implications of Darwinian theory to be incompatible with his own Ideal of Cultivation. It requires 
remarkable stolidity, as many have exhibited, to associate Nietzsche's doctrine of will to power with 
Darwinism, especially in view of his explicit attempts to separate the two. 
Nietzsche's criticism of Darwinian evolution appears to follow the pattern of other "vitalists", most 
familiarly in the silliness of Bernard Shaw's Back to Methuselah or Bergson's more ponderous 
Creative Evolution. In one sense it is just another episode in the ancient feud between those with a 
hylozoic view of nature, and those attached to the metaphor of nature as machine. Mechanists 
condemn vitalists for their irrationalism and vitalists scorn mechanists for their superficiality. Nature, 
for the vitalists, has always had a more fundamental reason within it than the rationality of function. 
But the mechanist's accusations against them have not always been unjustified as the vitalist 
programme in many ways represents a belated and desperate bid to put the "soul" back into nature. 
It was this type of sentimentalism that informed secular opposition to Darwin from the beginning. 
And even though Nietzsche, in the Twilight of the Idols and the Nachlass, ridicules Darwin and his 
theory as vintage naisserie Anglaise: a typically English resort to mechanistic stultifications and 
simplistic conceptions of causality, he is particularly careful to disassociate himself from similar 
sentimentalism. As a representative vitalist doctrine the will to power is perhaps one of the most 
deliberate and thorough-going of anti-sentimentalist of meditations, in comparison to which the 
sternest Darwinian would affect a heaving bosom and moistening eye. 
The doctrine of will to power differs from those of Life-force or Elan vital in that all natural 
phenomena, including apparently dead physical reactions are seen to be activated by the same 
principle of movement. Assuming that only living things are moved by a force, alien to that applying 
to physical nature, produces logical difficulties. It could not be explained otherwise how the same 
dead matter - atoms, molecules, electromagnetic and gravitational forces et cetera - should, when 
occurring in living forms, suddenly self-generate and self-motivate.  
By claiming that organisms only are infused with life force we create a logically unsustainable and 
empirically justified dualism. We merely discover yet another way to resurrect the Manichean 
division between a world of "matter" and a world of "spirit". The dualism is surmounted by asserting 
that living and non-living things are determined by the same necessity. Either we assume that what we 
refer to as dead matter is somehow alive, and living beings merely an accentuation of the animating 
force; or, that living things are simply mechanisms lacking capacity for self-will.244 Nietzsche 
chooses the first option, but not in order to put the soul back into nature. Along with the most ardent 
mechanists he wishes to see the soul abolished once and for all. Rather, he sees it as a way of 
explaining an inordinate restlessness in nature, for which he believes Darwinism cannot account. 
Another complaint is that Darwinism attributes teleology to becoming. Nietzsche dismisses ideas of 
universal progress. And even though most vitalists, being inveterate teleologists, accuse Darwinism of 
precisely the opposite, he believes perfectionism is implicit in Darwin's theory because it assumes that 
nature, when left to its devices, ensures that the unfit perish while the strong survive.  
Although Darwin was reluctant to believe that absolute perfection of species would be possible, he 
did muse on the happier ethical implications of natural selection. In the chapter on the "struggle for 
existence" in the Origin of Species, he consoles us that "the war of nature is not incessant, that no 
fear is felt, and that the vigorous, the healthy, and the happy survive and multiply".245 
For Darwinians, our path to biological eudemonia is hedged with thorns, our ascent is slow and 
laborious, but our destiny certain. Humankind leads the progress of the species; and behind lies a 
chain of development from the simplest creatures to the most complex. Higher species crawl upward 
over the backs of the primitive. There are grades of being - "links" between one species and another. 
Whenever individuals survive and adapt they assure the evolution and improvement of their species.  
Nietzsche thinks it is otherwise. Species do not develop toward perfection. Their occurrence is 
marked by profusion and disorder, obscuring the distinctions between grades of being. Evolution does 
not cause a progression from lower to higher species; instead, species occur all at the same time, the 
ancient types mixed with the modern. Even man as a species "does not represent any progress 
compared with any other animal. The whole animal and vegetable kingdom does not evolve from the 
lower to the higher - but all at the same time, in utter disorder, over and against each 
other.”246"Primitive creatures are said to be the ancestors of those now existing", he argues, "but a 
look at the flora and fauna of the Tertiary merely permits us to think of an as yet unexplored country 
that harbours types that do not exist elsewhere, while those existing elsewhere are missing. “247 That 
species represent any progress "is the most unreasonable assertion in the world so far they represent 
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one level. That the higher organisms have evolved from the lower has not been demonstrated in a 
single case."248 
The evolution of a species always reaches a limit, beyond which nothing further develops. "There are 
no transitional forms... one asserts the increasing evolution of creatures. All grounds are lacking. 
Every type has its limits, beyond these there is no evolution. "249 The appearance of new species is not 
determined by protracted and gradual transitions. These movements are much more sudden than are 
generally supposed and occur with a minimum of linking types between one form and another.  
How can new species arise, and what causes their evolution? Darwin says that this happens because 
species adapt to circumstances. Certain individuals are always more successful than others by 
qualities they are given at birth. If these are successful in dealing with new circumstances the 
individuals having them will be more likely to breed and pass on their traits. This is how the process 
works, but the actual driving force behind is the fact that every individual organism from the moment 
of its genesis must struggle to survive. New species could not emerge if it were not in the interest of 
living things to prevail in any environment or against whatever competition they may encounter. This 
one abiding interest is the foundation of evolution. 
What Darwin calls natural selection presupposes that nature is greatly impoverished, whereas there is 
great extravagance in the production and destruction of living forms. Nietzsche concedes that 
struggle, exploitation, and death are inextricable elements of nature's processes, but these do not result 
from mere striving for existence, but from an indomitable will to power. Competition is not for scarce 
resources; it arises from every organism's intention to master whatever it encounters.  
If it were only the desire for self preservation that animated organisms there would not be insufficient 
grounds for change and evolution to occur."One cannot ascribe the most basic and primeval qualities 
of protoplasm to a will to preservation, for it takes into itself absurdly more than would be required to 
preserve it..."250 It is simply a matter of experience "that change never ceases, we have not the 
slightest inherent reason for assuming that one change must follow upon another. On the contrary, a 
condition once achieved would seem to be obliged to preserve itself if there were not in it a capacity 
for desiring not to preserve itself - Spinoza's law of "self preservation" ought really to put a stop to 
change, but this law is false, the opposition is true. It can be shown most clearly that every living 
thing does everything it can not to preserve itself but to become more - "251 
For Darwin, a thing wishing merely to preserve itself alters its characteristics only under external 
compulsion; that is, the environment must change and then the organism is forced to do the same. 
Nietzsche condemns this emphasis on "external" causal factors in the evolution of life. That an 
organism adapts to environmental change is but a minor matter considered against the impact of will 
to power, which disposes all being to restlessness and change from within itself. "Life is not the 
adaption of inner circumstances to outer ones, but will to power, which, working from within, 
incorporates and subdues more and more of that which is "Outside".252 According to Nietzsche, "the 
influence of "external circumstances" is overestimated by Darwin to a ridiculous extent, the essential 
thing in the life process is precisely the tremendous shaping, form creating force working from within 
which utilises and exploits "external circumstances" The new forms molded from within are not 
formed with an end in view but in the struggle of the parts a new form is not left long without being 
related to a partial usefulness and then, according to its use, develops itself more and more 
completely."253 
Natural selection cannot explain how animals acquire new organs, since the utility of these is not 
evident when their properties are still forming, and in that state cannot play any part in preserving the 
individual or the species. Indeed one must ask to what ends this utility manifests itself, what is 
favourable to an organism in one respect may be disadvantageous in others."...that which preserves 
the individual might at the same time arrest and halt its evolution. On the other hand, a deficiency, a 
degeneration, can be of the highest utility in so far as it acts as a stimulant to other organs. In the 
same way, a state of need can be a condition of existence, insofar as it reduces an individual to that 
measure of expenditure which holds it together but prevents it from squandering itself."254 
Darwin cannot explain how an organ can be used to achieve something: "In these matters, the 
assumption of causae finales explains as little as the assumption of causae efficientes. The concept of 
"causa" is only a means of expression, nothing more, a means of description."255 Nietzsche believes 
there is purposiveness and inventiveness in nature that need not for that reason be considered 
"conscious". We exaggerate the gulf between the activity of conscious beings and those that lack this 
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faculty. The creative forces of will to power show an "inventiveness in the application of tools to new 
ends analogous to our inventiveness and experimentation"256 But the problem of heredity remains 
inexplicable, particularly the persistence of traits carried down from generation to generation. Writing 
in ignorance of the discoveries of Mendel, Nietzsche can only suppose that there is in organisms a 
"memory analogous to our memory that reveals itself in heredity and evolution and forms.”257 
Species and individuals 
A further problem with Darwinism is its emphasis on the species as the vehicle of evolution. The idea 
of will to power shifts the source of movement from homogenous laws, essences, or monism, to the 
particular, the individual, the unique points of force. Nietzsche hates the fact that Darwin accentuates 
the role of species over individuals. The universal for Nietzsche is always a collection of roughly 
similar particulars as is evident in how he sees animal and plant species existing. The concepts of 
"individual" and "species", he says, are false and misleading distinctions. "'Species' expresses only the 
fact that an abundance of similar creatures appear at the same time and that the tempo of their 
further growth and change is for a long time slowed down, so actual small continuations and 
increases are not very much noticed (a phase of evolution in which the evolution is not visible, so an 
equilibrium seems to have been attained, making possible the false notion that a goal has been 
attained - and that evolution has a goal)."258 
A species is recognisable whenever a preponderance of similar or "average" types exist at a location. 
The species is nothing more than a mean based upon partial similarities. It does not play the 
evolutionary role ascribed to it by Darwinists, that is, as a tightly meshed chain of members. 
Individuals do not live on behalf of the species, but for themselves. The destiny of the species does 
not represent a higher destiny than that of the individual "ego". "In natural science, the moral 
depreciation of the ego goes hand in hand with an overestimation of the species. But the species is 
something just as illusory as the ego, one had made a false distinction. The ego is a hundred times 
more than merely a unit in the chain of members; it is the chain itself, entirely; and the species is a 
mere abstraction from the multiplicity of these chains and their partial similarity. That the individual 
is sacrificed to the species, as has so often been asserted, is certainly not a fact; rather only an 
example of false interpretation."259 
Species are experiments: narrower or broader perspectives and interpretations of will to power. They 
take organisms along a particular line of development. That these organisms endure as a species 
implies only that their system of interpretation remains constant. Each new species occurs whenever a 
group of organisms incorporates an additional and similar piece of information into their structures of 
power. This concept of speciation is reminiscent of Schopenhauer's, insofar as he too describes 
species as "ideas" of Will; abstract but sometimes enduring patterns in which Will shapes itself. 
For Nietzsche there is a fundamental tension between the success of the individual and the survival of 
the collective average known as the species. Darwinian theory errs, he believes, in asserting that the 
progress of a species is determined by its best endowed exemplars, who by their health and strength, 
survive and prosper, whereas the less developed, the undistinguished specimens languish and exert no 
significant influence over heredity. He believes that, in nature, precisely the opposite happens; the 
fortunately endowed - the highly developed individuals - become superfluous, due to their 
incompatibility with the larger breeding population, and so perish more easily. Their relative 
complexity in relation to the species adds to their needs and makes them more vulnerable.  
If anything, it is the average and uncomplicated who guarantee survival of the species: “...growth in 
the power of a species is perhaps guaranteed less by a preponderance of its children of fortune, of 
strong members, than by a preponderance of average and lower types - The latter possess great 
fruitfulness and duration; with the former comes an increase in danger, rapid wastage, speedy 
reduction in numbers."260 He sees that "the lower preponderate through their numbers, their 
shrewdness, their cunning..." and "the 'cruelty of nature' of which so much has been said, in another 
place: she is cruel toward her children of fortune, she spares and protects and loves les humbles..."261 
So grouping a multitude of power-centres creates a compelling force. Every weaker individual 
understands how it is in its highest interest, indeed the very expression of its own will to power, to 
congregate with others of its own type and exert a greater communal power. The species that allows a 
majority of weaker individuals to prevail at the expense of the stronger few (whose self sufficiency 
disposes them to exert power away from the communal centre and pursue an independent course) has 
acquired what Nietzsche designates the "herd instinct". With this idea we reach the point in 
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Nietzsche's presentation of will to power where description of nature also describes human culture 
and values. 
Given that Will to power exists as individual points of activity, and individual organisms are the 
source of change and evolution, the exceptional is posed as the real source of all that is productive 
and interesting in nature. Despite Nietzsche's refutation of teleology, his belief that will to power 
exists in grades of simplicity or complexity, suggests that the more complex formations of will to 
power have greater value, as states of enhanced power they more perfectly manifest the universal 
principle. So, even if nature is not moved by necessity toward a final state of completion, it has within 
it a principle of formation that makes development possible. It has a beginning and a way of going 
that can be consciously enhanced.  
The fact that Nietzsche attributes a kind of consciousness to the primal points of power (here the 
similarity with Leibniz is most noticeable) promotes this possibility. Nature that is will to power is 
ideal to cultivate. It is fertile, flourishing, creative, and endlessly plastic. An individual convinced of 
the reality of such a nature could see his highest justification abiding in the extent to which he 
perfects or enhances it in his own being.  
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8 - Will to power as value 
The later Nietzsche's idea of nature is based on a principle he calls "will to power".  
Nature is not a unity, but a multitude of centres of force dispensing and acquiring potency. These 
centres of force are what create and dissolve forms and cause what we call "change". Since "matter" 
and "living matter" also partake of the character of this dynamism, each evolution of organic life 
results from the relentless grasping after power; and each innovation in the organisation of life 
represents a platform from which this will embarks upon newer and stranger excursions.  
Evolution of the idea of will to power as physis 
With this idea Nietzsche hopes to explain the diversity of natural phenomena using a single principle. 
More accurately, he hopes that a single metaphor can represent the many different facets of the 
physical world. But not being a natural scientist, his delving into biology and physics to argue the 
case for will to power as a scientific idea are the conjectures of an imaginative dilettante.  
The purpose was to provide him with a tool to analyse and measure value objectively rather than to 
prepare a theory of nature. This is laid bare in his earliest statements about will to power and in the 
drafts for the systematic work which he was to refer to by that title. Two sketches from the year 1888 
propose chapter headings for this systematic work and show how he wants to describe the will to 
power both as nature and in its cultural forms. 
These occur as follows: 
1. "Wille zur Macht als 'Naturgesetz' 
Wille zur Macht als Leben 
Wille zur Macht als Kunst 
Wille zur Macht als Moral 
Wille zur Macht als Politik 
Wille zur Macht als Wissenschaft 
Wille zur Macht als Religion"262 
 
2. "Wille zur Macht Morphologie 
Wille zur Macht als 'Natur' 
Wille zur Macht als Leben 
Wille zur Macht als Gesellschaft 
Wille zur Macht als Wille zur Wahrheit 
Wille zur Macht als Religion 
Wille zur Macht als Kunst 
Wille zur Macht als Moral 
Wille zur Macht als Menschheit"263 
In both of these sketches a chapter heading dealing with will to power as "nature" and "life" appears, 
whereas the rest of the topics show an intention to examine some aspect of human culture: art, 
morality, politics, science, religion. Attention is focused less on the quality of nature itself, than on 
the "morphologies" of power occurring as culture. Importantly he introduces his analysis of culture 
with a preamble concerning the will to power as nature, in keeping with the principle of physis. In the 
Nachgelassene Fragmente between the years 1885, when this title was first conceived, and the last 
months of 1888, there are many other sketches for a book with the title The Will to Power. Though 
the format varies from sketch to sketch, the content appears to remain roughly as that posed above. 
Unlike the idea of eternal recurrence, which occurred to Nietzsche with great moment and suddenness 
when he was composing Die Froliche Wissenschaft, will to power evolved in his philosophy, growing 
from more basic concepts into a fully developed ontological system.  
To begin with, these concepts had no ontological status whatsoever, for he originally uses the idea of 
power only in reference to the psychological drives. In the books of the middle period he employs 
terms like "Gefühle der Macht" or "Wolluste der Macht" to designate primary human motivations, but 
does not link these to a wider theory of nature and being. Such terms are apt to occur in a 
psychological apercu like the following, of which there are many other examples: "People who prefer 
to attract attention, and thereby to displease., desire the same thing as those who neither wish to 
please nor to attract attention, only they seek it more ardently and indirectly by means of a step by 
which they apparently move away from their goal. They desire influence and power, and therefore 
show their superiority, even to such an extent that it becomes disagreeable; for they know that he who 
has finally attained power still seems to please. The free spirit also, and in like manner the believer, 
desire power, in order some day to please thereby; when, on account of their doctrine, evil fate, 
persecution, dungeon, or execution threaten them, they rejoice in the thought that their teaching will 
thus be engraved and branded on the heart of mankind; though its effect is remote they accept their 
fate as a painful but powerful means of still attaining to power."264 
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Here he gives the desire for power a central position in the stellar system of human emotion, an 
estimation uttered consistently by thinkers questing after icy clarity concerning human affairs. 
Whether a Thucydides writing in the turmoil of the Peloponnesian wars, or a Machiavelli in the 
jungle of Renaissance politics, time does not diminish the attractiveness of the hypothesis.265 Hobbes, 
who translated Thucydides, assumed the evidence for mankind's grasping after power to the first 
principle for the justification of an absolute Sovereign266 and the same assumption lurks behind 
Spinoza's systematic treatment of ethics and politics.  
Nietzsche treats this company with respect, for his agreement with them is more profound than his 
kinship with Schopenhauer, often regarded as the parent of Nietzsche's philosophy of power, but 
whose use of the term Wille he refers to as a "mere empty word" ("ein blosses leeres Wort").267 
Though it appears in his thought initially as a reflection about human psychology it is afterwards 
applied to the entire phenomenal world in an attempt to preserve the coherence and integrity of a 
philosophical system. Asserting that man and nature are driven by the same engine he is obeying a 
logical necessity. Any attempt to justify value by linking it to physis needs a comprehensive and 
workable understanding of what nature is.  
For physis and value to mesh logically a consistent explanation must exist for every facet of nature. In 
works between 1876 and 1882 he speaks of mankind being animated by feelings of power, but after 
writing the first four sections of Die Frohlische Wissenschaft he then decides on Der Wille zur Macht 
as a title for his planned systematic work. Doubly significant is that he couples it with the subtitle 
"Versuch einer Umwerthung aller Werthe" (Attempt at a Revaluation of all Values), thus expressing 
his intention to use will to power as physis to redefine and reassess all values.  
To grasp the logic of this process we need to show how Nietzsche believes "spiritual" facts such as 
value, morality, consciousness and reason arise out of animal physiology explained as will to 
power.268 
How an organism perceives 
Value is conferred on nature by mankind in order to maintain himself.269 But among species man 
seems a special case, since all other animals appear to survive and prosper without any such need. 
Nevertheless, the factors that gave rise to its evolution must surely originate in animal physiology 
activated and driven by the will to power. Nietzsche therefore begins his search for the origins of 
value in the capacity by the simplest organisms to form perceptions.  
Because no living thing can perceive or know everything, it constantly takes what it needs from the 
vast sea of data that at every moment envelops and assails it. An organism only perceives what it has 
to and, based on its own power and others surrounding it, circumscribes its own horizon of knowing. 
Looking, hearing, tasting, smelling, are in every case evaluative activities that enable organisms to set 
workable limitations to their experience. The various organs of perception at the disposal of living 
beings actively abstract and simplify the environment. Far from being passive and faithful recorders, 
they are instruments of acquisition, actively taking possession of an organism's surroundings. 
Perception is selective in its schematising of the chaos."It cannot be doubted that all sense 
perceptions are permeated with value judgements (useful and harmful - consequently pleasant or 
unpleasant). Each individual colour is also for us an expression of value (although we seldom admit 
it, or do so only after a protracted impression of exclusively the same colour..."270 
Perception, which is "the awakening of conscious life", begins in the external parts of the organism as 
mere sense impressions that direct it toward food or away from peril - pleasure and pain are simple 
evaluations that aid the process. In complex organisms this process becomes increasingly centralised 
until perception finally attains consciousness: that is, until more and more sense evaluations are made 
and coordinated from the centre of the life form. An ensemble of simple responses becomes 
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comprehensive awareness, a sense of "being alive.""Consciousness - beginning quite externally, as 
coordination and becoming conscious of "impressions" - at first at the furthest distance from the 
biological centre of the individual; but a process that deepens and intensifies itself, and continually 
draws nearer to that centre."271 
How an organism knows 
A developing nervous control centre allows complex organisms to experience new ways of 
"knowing" which are no longer simple reactive responses to sensory stimuli. Now it is sensible of 
logic, and is capable of discriminating, and remembering. The organism sorts the sensory data into 
recognisable, remembered classes and categories, which do not really exist in the world as such, 
except in the coarsest sense. Since no thing is perfectly identical with any other thing, identities and 
similarities must be created by perception itself. To this end the organism has to employ the most 
Procrustean methods. If equalities don't exist in nature, then they must be imposed upon it by the 
organism in the course of its appropriation of things in it.  
The perception by the simplest organism of the outer world as an ensemble of equalities, in the sense 
that it will always reduce broad classes of different stimuli to an identical response, is also the source 
of human intelligence. "All thought, judgement, perception, considered as comparison, has as its 
precondition a "positing of equality," and earlier still a "making equal.” The process of making equal 
is the same as the process of incorporation of appropriated material in the amoeba."272 "The same 
equalising and ordering force that rules in the idioplasma, rules also in the incorporation of the outer 
world: and equalisation in regard to all the past in us; they do not follow directly upon the 
'impression'.”273 The fundamental inclination to posit as equal, is modified, held in check, "by 
consideration of usefulness, by considerations of success: it adapts itself to a milder degree in which 
it can be satisfied without at the same time denying and endangering life. This whole process (which 
is its symbol) by which protoplasm makes what it appropriates equal to itself and fits it into its own 
forms and files."274 
The sophisticated machinations of human intellect originate in a physiological will to equalise, which 
is itself another incarnation of the will to power. Logic could not function without the existence of 
identical cases, and memory requires the appearance of similarity or equalities in nature. The 
organism's imposition upon nature of perceptual equalities creates a realm of fictions, albeit 
exceedingly useful ones. The organism makes experience comprehensible by parcelling and 
categorising it as manageable units and retaining them as memory. Rather than wasting its energies in 
re-orienting itself to each new circumstance, it equips itself with a system for abbreviating and 
systematising its responses. Quickly it knows best when to hide, run, attack, breed, feed or drink.  
The process of acquiring knowledge is not passive. It is a devouring, assimilating and digesting of 
what is of interest to the organism. Perception, from which all higher forms of knowledge derive, is a 
process of physically appropriating, via nerve ends, physical data from the perceived object. One 
cannot, therefore have "truer" perspectives, only more accommodating ones.  
In the epistemology of will to power, we could not have absolute knowledge of an object, say a rat, 
only as much as accords with what we appropriate from it. Our senses would “perceive” more if more 
physical elements carry across to our senses: sounds by air vibrations, form by light particles, smell 
by gaseous molecules, and so forth. In the longer term we would "know" more about the rat, if we 
were able to appropriate and store through memory aspects of its behaviour, its habits, and haunts, 
and make-up. In this way we have physically accommodated aspects of the rat within us more 
effectively, and so provided ourselves with additional power over it. 
The categories we associate with knowing are useful fictions that enable a particular species of animal 
"to prosper only through a certain relative rightness". In this strictly anthropological sense its 
conception of 'reality' must "comprehend enough of the calculable and constant for it to base a 
scheme of behaviour on it". It is the "utility of preservation - not some abstract theoretical need not to 
be deceived - stands as the motive behind the development of the organs of knowledge - they develop 
in such a way that their observations suffice for our preservation. In other words: the measure of the 
desire for knowledge depends upon the measure to which the will to power grows in a species: a 
species grasps a certain amount of reality in order to become master of it, in order to press it into 
service."275 In this way power and knowledge are in a reciprocal relationship; each enhancing the 
other. The quality, quantity, and effectiveness of organism‟s knowledge are directly determined by 
the organisation of its will to power. Increasing this knowledge represents a quantitive increase of will 
to power. In Nietzsche‟s world, Bacon's injunction can be reversed just as validly: Knowledge is 
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power, but also, power is knowledge for "Knowledge works as a tool of power. Hence it is plain that 
it increases with every increase of power -"276 
For Nietzsche, the organism's need for certainty is needed to produce knowledge and value. It must 
feel that the world it inhabits is solid and dependable and that there are regular and recurring events. 
Knowledge must impart the sense of stability and if it too readily recognises the shifting ground of 
becoming and fleeting impressions, it would paralyse the capacity to act.  
Evaluation, whether as simple perception or more complex knowledge, imposes order on chaos and 
filters out the shifting minutiae of experience, for “a world in a state of becoming could not in a strict 
sense be "comprehended" or "known"; only to the extent that the "comprehending" and "knowing" 
intellect encounters a coarse, already - created world, fabricated out of mere appearances but 
become firm to the extent that this kind of appearance has preserved life..."277 
The world of being, of stable and persisting unities, is the work of the body's organs and reflects the 
organism's need to preserve and fortify itself. Because all knowledge is a type of evaluation, being 
itself may be considered a value which is wholly, if unconsciously, believed in. This belief, 
irrespective of its falsity, allows life to persist. This is why" a great deal of belief must be present; 
that judgements may be ventured; that doubt concerning all essential values is lacking - that is the 
precondition of every living thing and its life. Therefore, what is needed is that something be held to 
be true - not that something is true. The real and the apparent world" I have traced this antithesis 
back to value relations. We have projected the conditions of our preservation as predicates of being 
in general. Because we have to be stable in our beliefs if we are to prosper, we have made the "real" 
world a world not of change and becoming, but one of being.”278 
How organisms become conscious 
For Nietzsche, consciousness does not begin with man but is embedded in the nature of will to power. 
Since all willing requires an end or object and consequently, all things, from organisms to physical 
forces, intend what they accomplish. In this universe the character of all intention is of a grasping for 
power. Intention does not require consciousness; it is something inextricably bound up with activity 
of any kind, even that of dead matter. The consciousness of living things however, which is a 
capacity for self-reflection, is a qualitative development beyond intentionality. Consciousness occurs 
in an organism when it is able to direct its organs of perception back upon itself. With the act of self-
reflection the internal life of feelings, moods, desires and the organism's sense of being an acting 
unity i.e. that it is an ego or subject, begins. To be unconscious means that the organism cannot 
perceive its own feelings or desires, with the result that a guiding "ego" cannot take hold. 
The ego is another fiction. Organisms are not unitary entities but a multiplicity of subjects in which a 
few dominate the rest; "whose interaction and struggle is the basis of our thought and our 
consciousness in general. A kind of aristocracy of "cells" in which dominion resides."279 The vast 
communality of cells in the body requires a division of labour and order of rank, with "regents" of a 
kind supervising the structure. What these "regents" know or do is represented in consciousness, for 
these constitute the "ego". Not everything however, which occurs within the body is visible to the 
overseers, the dominating forces of the body. They are not always in touch with the intricate system 
of processes occurring in the various organs and these consequently are not represented in 
consciousness."It is essential that one should not make a mistake over the role of "consciousness": it 
is our relation with the "outer world" that evolved it. On the other hand, the direction or protection 
and care in respect of the coordination of the bodily functions does not enter our consciousness; any 
more than spiritual accumulation: that a higher court rules over these things cannot be doubted - a 
kind of directing committee on which the various chief desires make their votes and power 
felt."Pleasure", "displeasure" are hints from this sphere; also the will; also ideas."280 
As we lack sensitive organs for the inner world, we interpret this communal complex of fluctuating 
nervous impulses and muscular reactions as a type of unity, and call it the ego. We presume that this 
is responsible for all motion and change within the body. But what appear as thoughts or feelings of 
intention and desire are simply the becoming-visible of these bodily changes; they accompany them, 
they do not cause them."In summa: That which becomes conscious is involved in causal relations 
which are entirely withheld from us - the sequence of thoughts, feelings, ideas in consciousness does 
not signify that this sequence is a causal sequence; but apparently it is so, to the highest degree. Upon 
this appearance we have founded our whole idea of spirit, reason, logic, etc. (-none of these exist: 
they are fictitious syntheses and unities), and projected these into things and behind things"281 
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Consciousness could not exist if it did not make use of a type of knowledge that was communicable; 
that was rigorously pared down and simplified for the purpose of interaction between organisms. 
Language, the capacity to express intentions or desires, is used by the organism for interaction with 
the outer world. It is only at a much more refined stage of development that the organs of perception 
were ever turned inward to discover a world of inner events, and even then these can behave only as 
superficial registers of the surfaces of this world, not as sources or guides for actions.  
Consciousness does not direct, but is a tool of self-concealed directing agents; a means to perfect the 
animal functions, which are “ as a matter of principle, a million times more important than all our 
beautiful moods and heights of consciousness: the latter are a surplus, except when they have to serve 
as tools of those animal functions. The entire conscious life, the spirit along with the soul, the heart, 
goodness, and virtue - in whose service do they labour? In the service of the greatest possible 
perfection of the means (means of nourishment, means of enhancement) of the basic animal functions: 
above all, the enhancement of life. What one used to call "body" and "flesh" is of such unspeakably 
greater importance: the remainder is a small accessory. The task of spinning on the chain of life, and 
in such a way that the thread grows ever more powerful - that is the task."282 Nietzsche constantly 
stresses that evaluation does not originate in the consciousness of mankind but in the facts of 
physiology and environment, and all our attempts to estimate the value of existence by what takes 
place in the conscious mind are a wayward deflection of this fact:"To measure whether existence has 
value according to the pleasant or unpleasant feelings aroused in this consciousness: can one think of 
a madder extravagance of vanity"283 
How organisms become moral 
Nietzsche believes that all "valuations are only consequences and narrow perspectives in the service 
of this one will: valuation itself is only this will to power."284 The reason many valuations stem from 
the same drive is because there are many power centres and consequently many representations of 
value according to equivalences in the degree of power that they express. He does not believe that 
values are simply signs humans use to communicate with each other but are estimations about life 
embedded in the very form, construction, habits and instincts of all living beings.  
Even simple organisms display in their means and acquisition of nourishment, in their manner of 
reproduction and so forth, evaluations determined wholly by the magnitude of their will to power. 
This determines and is determined by their physical organisation. Their choices in evaluating are 
constrained by this fact. In complex organisms such as man, many more valuations are possible, all 
the more so because he is very much a creature "whose nature has not been fixed". Man has to seek 
guidance for his actions from a different source than the rigid instincts of simpler organisms. A single 
individual of a complex species "contains within himself a vast confusion of contradictory valuations 
and consequently of contradictory drives. This is the expression of the diseased condition in man, in 
contrast to the animals in which all existing instincts answer to quite definite tasks."285 
For the greater part of history, mankind has countered the degeneration of these instincts by relying 
on a form of guidance called "morality”. Moral judgements do not originate in consciousness but 
remain the product of physiology, albeit in a more attenuated way, and are profoundly subject to the 
environmental influences to which human life is subject.  
In morality the tools and habits of consciousness are used to help us to adjust to the environment. 
Morality therefore bespeaks a degree of consciousness about conditions needed to preserve 
individuals or groups but no more than that. Mostly it is the evolved product of habit, custom and 
prejudice rather than a continual and methodical investigation by people of their circumstances. 
Nietzsche describes morality as "a system of evaluations that partially coincides with the conditions 
of a creature's life"286 He has attempted to "understand moral judgements as symptoms and sign 
languages which betray the processes of physiological prosperity or failure, likewise the 
consciousness of the conditions for preservation and growth - a mode of interpretations of the same 
worth as astrology, prejudices prompted by the instincts (or races, communities, of the various stages 
of life, as youth or decay, etc.)."287 
The herd instinct imposes the greatest influence upon the birth and growth of morality. Long before 
individual consciousness arose, individuals depended for their welfare upon the group. Tribal 
organisation protected them from nature and increased each individual's will to power. The group 
makes individuals stronger in relation to their environment but at the expense of their own autonomy.  
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Individuals desire power at the expense of their fellows and physiological variety in nature give some 
individuals advantages over others. Powerful individuals can distance themselves from the group or 
strive to dominate it. This is seen by the majority of weaker individuals within the group to be against 
their interest, and by protecting themselves, shape a common interest and standard of conduct. 
Awareness of their common needs slowly acquired a spoken and unspoken character, manifesting in 
laws as well as in the daily habitual behaviour of the herd. A standard of conduct based on the 
example of the group's average member was used to police and control dangerous deviations. The 
task of morality was therefore to bring a specific type of being, the herd animal, to prominence, at the 
expense of exceptional individuals. The instinct of the herd is to want “to be master: hence its "thou 
shalt" - it will allow value to the individual only from the point of view of the whole, for the sake of 
the whole, it hates those who detach themselves - it turns the hatred of all individuals against 
them."288 "The herd animal seeks to "preserve one type and defends itself on both sides, against those 
who have degenerated from it (criminals, etc.) and those who tower above it. The tendency of the herd 
is directed toward standstill and preservation, there is nothing creative in it. The pleasant feelings 
with which the good, benevolent, just man inspires in us (in contrast to the tension, fear which the 
great, new man arouses) are our own feelings of personal security and equality: the herd animal thus 
glorifies the herd nature and then it feels comfortable. This judgement of comfort masks itself with 
fair words - thus "morality" arises. - "289 
The herd has not baulked at any means to keep recalcitrant individuals in check, and has used 
morality to justify its cruelties. All the feelings associated with morality originate in the herd's 
systematic repressions: "conscience", "guilt", "debt", "punishment" and so forth. During the early 
stages of the formation of the herd, it could only employ the immediately explosive force of anger and 
physical violence to forestall transgression. Morality is a more sophisticated means for exerting 
control. Morality is a refinement of violence.  
The feelings of remorse stemming from a "guilty conscience" for example, is nothing less than a 
sublimated form of torture invented for erring herd members. The essence of the delight in cruelty, 
"one of the most ancient festive joys of mankind", as Nietzsche refers to it, is the supreme titillation of 
the feeling of power. Cruelty is time and again sublimated and internalised through morality in 
communities where people are most endangered and deprived. It is the means by which people refresh 
themselves:"one supposes that the gods too, feel refreshed and festive when one offers them the sight 
of cruelty; and so the idea creeps into the world that voluntary suffering, torture one has chosen for 
oneself, has value and makes good sense."290 
Gradually all well being is looked upon with mistrust, and hard and painful states with confidence: In 
the Genealogy of Morals, he accounts in this way for the origin of asceticism, a morality of voluntary 
suffering which has bloomed like an exotic flower on the manure bed of herd violence. All spiritual 
leaders or martyrs, he says, undergo voluntary torture to engender great faith, and most of all faith in 
themselves. The entire aim of this grim history of morality in the herd has been to produce a type of 
animal which could remember right conduct and to promise to obey the authority demanding it. In 
doing so morality has set horizons around man and made him calculable. This tremendous labour, 
what Nietzsche calls the "morality of mores": "...the labour performed by man upon himself during 
the greater part of the existence of the human race, his entire prehistoric labour, finds its meaning its 
great justification, notwithstanding the severity, tyranny, stupidity, and idiocy involved in it: with the 
aid of the morality of mores and the social straight jacket, man was actually made calculable."291 
The relation of types of morality to will to power 
Although all herd moralities may seek to repress individuality, they do not necessarily have anything 
else in common and differ from place to place, nation to nation, and between castes, classes, 
professions or orders within the one nation. These differences are most pronounced wherever one 
caste rules another, for it is then that master and slave moralities emerge. The morality of the slave 
derives from a group whose powers and independence have been stripped away, and whose daily 
experience is subordination and humiliation. Accordingly, the slave estimates as "bad" every human 
quality he associates with those responsible for his oppression: martial spirit, pride, an order of rank, 
the cruel punisher of disobedience: and every behaviour he calls "good" - peaceableness, fraternity, 
equality, humility - either opposes the harmful character of the master, or eases the burdens of a 
suffering life. Whereas the group that is master believes everything "good" to be the outcome of a 
conquering pride, martial strength, the sense of superiority and everything "bad" to reflect the 
subordinate slave class: its weaknesses, its resentment. 
Nietzsche does not believe that herd moralities are inherently objectionable. In a physiology founded 
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on will to power, a group may be as well constituted, vigorous, and strong as an individual may be 
badly constituted, exhausted and weak. What matters to the evaluator of morality is that expressions 
of morality reflect either "ascendant" or "decadent" forms of life. Again we encounter physiological 
metaphors: "ascending life" is that which grasps after the will to power with greatest surety. It is 
"healthy", "robust", "life affirming" and its aims are in harmony with its capacity. "Descending" or 
"decadent" forms of life are prey to exhaustion, their energies are easily dissipated, their attack feebly 
applied; they envy what is well constituted, and conspire against it.  
Decadent life is sick and values what is sick; it has no wish to control the world around it or even 
itself, but wishes to be controlled. It takes actions least demanding to its energies and resources. 
Descending life works against life itself; it denies the value of life in itself.  
But if all life is will to power, surely decadent life is a disproof of its very existence? For Nietzsche 
even declining life desires to impose its will on its surroundings. What differs is that this exhausted 
will, due to dissipation of its internal organisation, can only will what is inferior, and closer to its 
meagre capacity, whereas the ascendant life can make greater demands on itself and can will grander 
and finer things. 
Even when its instincts are ascending herd morality is undesirable to some degree because it rejects 
individuals who diverge from the mean. This includes exceptional ability, stature, and character as 
much as exceptional baseness and malice. The bad is rejected with the good. Yet the rare exceptions 
are precisely what express the greatest worth. It is not that the individual in itself is a more valuable 
document of will to power than the group. The morality of the herd is perfectly appropriate if it is 
applied only to those who fit the standard. It is only the indiscriminate application of these standards 
against higher natures, who cannot conform to a debilitating norm, that deprives nature of its means 
for perfecting itself. By rejecting them the herd destroys master works of will to power. 
Nietzsche's philosophy consequently "aims at an ordering of rank: not at an individualistic morality. 
The ideas of the herd should rule in the herd - but not reach out beyond it: the leaders of the herd 
require a fundamentally different valuation for their own actions, as do the independent, or the 
"beasts of prey", etc.”292 The view of various asses and donkey that Nietzsche embodies an 
intellectual doctrine known as "nineteenth century individualism" which preaches a gospel of 
"egoism" is clearly incorrect. His interest is not in the individual per se, but in an elect few whose 
thoughts and actions, he believes, bestow value on all mankind. Most individuals are best to remain 
with the herd: that is their highest value; others must live away from it and in their own right because 
the herd reduces their highest value. 
A deed is no less valuable because it is committed by one and not ten. More important is the type of 
individual who performs it. "Order of rank" implies a wholesale separation and distinction between 
the value of individuals within a herd according to their innermost character. The nature of an 
individual is intrinsic to the value of his deeds, and these must be judged accordingly. A deed has no 
universal value or significance, no abstract value in and for itself; the same action committed by one 
may have a different worth when committed by another. What matters is who undertakes it, and the 
indicators of that person's nature; whether they act from innermost impulses of their nature, or by 
habits and customs imposed upon them from without. "Der Werth einer Handlung hangt davon ab, 
wie sie thut und ob sie aus seinem Grunde oder aus seiner Oberflache stammt: d.h. wie tief sie 
individuell ist. Der Werth einer Handlung ist bestimmbar, wenn der Mensch selber erkennbar ist: was 
im Allegeinen zu leugnen sien wird."293 
That actions should be assessed according to the impulses behind them accords with the idea of 
physis. If the impulses are inferior, then the action is inferior regardless of its outcome or effect. If the 
impulse is deep, and the action shows this character, then it is good. Individuals must be assessed by 
their nature rather than by their actions. If the man is great, he is so regardless of whether he 
demonstrates this greatness in his life or works; and likewise the mean-spirited man will never redress 
his inner worthlessness by a multitude of good works. 
Who is most valuable? 
Nietzsche points to the difference between ascending or descending life as a solution to the question: 
What makes the higher type more valuable than the merely moral man or herd animal? In real life of 
course, the decadent frequently triumph over the healthy so does that make the decadent more 
valuable? A simple naturalist would have to agree, but Nietzsche resorts to paradox: "Strange though 
it may sound," he advises, "one has always to defend the strong against the weak."294 By this he infers 
that "strength" or "ascendant life" does not imply evolutionary success and involves a more complex 
estimation of how power is to be defined.  
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“Ascendant" or "strong" life cannot be characterised as brute vigour or flourishing, nor as 
megalomania. If brute force were the sole criterion of value, the gorilla must rank higher than the 
human. It is not quanta of power that defines value but the superior usage of raw force. The higher 
type possesses more force because he utilises what he has more efficiently and pushes his raw will to 
power to the optimum. The higher type has a superior facility for synthesising data: he is more 
conscious than any other being. He masters the world around him by assimilating data more 
efficiently, therefore he is freer. Freedom is directly related to the amount of power a being acquires. 
The more perfectly he utilises his nature, paradoxically the closer he is to the essential character of all 
nature. He brings to light nature's inner character of will to power in all his actions. This does not 
mean that he is involved in perpetual brutal conquest, but in an immeasurable degree of creativity.  
Whoever consciously perfects will to power also shares its restlessness urge to produce new forms. 
The higher type reflects in his being the character of the universe. In the doctrine of will to power all 
the justifications and stratagems typical of the German idea of physis are utilised: the perfection of 
nature by the individual, his freedom through the development of his consciousness, his capacity for 
self-direction over and above merely moral guidance, and his creativity. Nietzsche even retains the 
term traditionally used by German philosophy to designate the higher type, namely the genius and, 
like his predecessors, holds the genius as one who has learned to live outside morality, who creates 
his own value and therefore bestows value on all mankind. At other times he refers to such types as 
"sovereign individuals", "free spirits", "noble types" or more famously, "übermenschen", but it is the 
term genius that he uses most frequently. For all its renown, the term übermensch is most heavily 
employed only in Thus Spake Zarathustra, and thereafter desultorily.295 
For Nietzsche, as for the Aufklärers, the genius does not need the direction of custom or tradition, and 
does not model himself on the herd animal; but allows his actions to be governed by his nature. 
Nietzsche conception of genius does not differ profoundly from predecessors, however he does 
criticise Schopenhauer, for example, for having regarded genius as one whose higher capacity for 
reflection liberates him from the blind processes of primal will and therefore renders him more moral. 
"Schopenhauer", he says, "interpreted high intellectuality as liberation from the will; he did not want 
to see the freedom from moral prejudice which is part of the emancipation of the great spirit, the 
typical immorality of the genius... I see a fundamentally different valuation cutting across all the 
moral idiosyncrasies: I know nothing of such an absurd distinction between "genius" and the moral 
and immoral world of the will. The moral is a lower species than the immoral, a weaker species; 
indeed - he is a type in regard to morality, but not a type in himself; a copy, a good copy at best -"296 
Nietzsche diverges from Schopenhauer only because he interprets what is valuable in nature 
differently. Schopenhauer, more purely than any of the Germans, retrieves the spirit of the Hellenistic 
Ideal of Cultivation by making the sage, the free contemplative genius, the icon of value. For 
Nietzsche, it is formation and creation that counts, so his idea of genius adds to the image of the sage 
that of the warrior, the hero, or kalos kai agathos. He foregrounds the courtly conception of the Ideal 
of Cultivation in a way never previously accomplished in German literature. Courtiers or warriors are 
accustomed to using and stylising power; they are artists of activism. Nature as will to power most 
appropriately defines and justifies their conduct.  
With this doctrine Nietzsche explicitly equates physiological soundness with "spiritual" health and 
thus lays a theoretical foundation for the idea of harmonious development of body and mind. By 
demonstrating nature to be the product of will to power he believes he can systematically validate his 
Ideal of Cultivation, and the image of highest humanity, the genius.  
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9 - What is a Genius? 
When the older Nietzsche claims that genius is the highest type of humanity who brings value into 
being for all mankind, he justifies it on the basis that genius is the sublime development of will to 
power. To us the equation seems bizarre. We have learned to equate genius with higher intelligence or 
exceptional cleverness or think the idea more appropriate to aesthetic than ethical debate.297 But 
Nietzsche's understanding was within the tradition of German philosophy and German Ideal of 
Cultivation in which the genius was the hero, just as the sage was to the Hellenist model, or the 
warrior to the courtly model.  
Genius as an ethical concept 
That an aesthetic category came to be used by the Germans as an ethical model dates to the eighteenth 
century, when aesthetics implicitly became a vehicle to discuss the greatest questions of human value 
and activity. Aesthetic categories took over thought and became the centre of philosophical activity, 
most extremely in the work of Schelling and Schiller. Art was seen to be the primary human activity, 
though not as Fine Art, but as the mere making and remaking of the world by mankind into eternal 
idealised structures. The medium that was to be formed was not significant: a painter or statesman, for 
example, do basically the same thing, the one with pigment the other with human souls. It was the 
activity of the making and the quality of making in itself that counted. 
The German Ideal of Cultivation transformed the aesthetic idea of genius into a basis for individual 
ethics and finally into a political idea. Once they assumed that the genius, the most creative of 
individuals, justified all humanity, it was a small step to proclaiming him its leader. Perhaps too the 
idea of genius provided the Aufklärers, who lived with censorship, a way of masking questions 
relating to matters such as education, freedom, law, and necessity. Such debates could be 
encompassed in seemingly innocent discussions of aesthetic thought.  
Origins and elements of the idea of genius 
In transforming the aesthetic idea of genius into an ethical concept the Aufklärers employed habits of 
thought that have been intrinsic to aesthetic discussions since antiquity. 
The stem of the word genius, gen or gens has a common origin in all Indo-European languages. It is 
always associated with the concept of begetting or producing. The modern word derives specifically 
from the Latin variant of this stem, whence genere the verb, and finally genius. The genius of 
antiquity was a spirit, who inhabited persons or places (genius loci), which they protected and guided. 
In this usage the Latin genius would have been synonymous with the Greek daemon that guided 
Socrates in all his actions and gave them a fundamental rightness.  
The word genius did not then arise in aesthetic argument. It is rather to the cognate Latin word 
ingenium meaning inborn natural ability that it owes its present place in English vocabulary and in 
most European languages. The nearest equivalent in antiquity what we would today call genius, a 
creative or extraordinary productive personality, would have been the Poet. The words for poet and 
poetry in Greek (and therefore in Latin), deriving from the verb "to make" generally described 
constructive activity such as that of an artist.  
The poet is the supreme maker or producer, and poetry the supreme production (an estimation 
disputed by post-Socratic philosophers, who believed philosophers superior). When Greeks debated 
the nature of the Poet's activity or that of his prosaic companion the Orator, three basic ideas were 
always manifest. The first may be referred to as naturalness, integrity, or by the Greek word, 
mimesis; the second by a number of terms, techne in Greek, ars, iudicium, even studium in Latin, or 
what we might refer to today as style; and the third might be called furor poeticus, poetic furor, 
implying anything from spontaneous human passion to rapture, or possession by divinities. 
Underlying this is the supposition that the poet could have imagination, and even originality; that is, 
some special human quality that cannot be found in nature. 
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Mimesis and genius 
Mimesis, generally translated or interpreted to mean imitation of nature, has been discussed in 
aesthetic debate in all periods and ages since antiquity, which is not to say it has ever meant one 
thing. At one extreme mimesis has been understood as merely copying of nature, as in a realistic 
painting; at the other, as an ability to impart naturalness or integrity to a work of art, as though the 
work showed no sign of artifice or mannerism.  
Most often it has been felt that artists imitate nature's works in that their skill might achieve a 
perfection little greater than nature's own. They are not entitled to believe that they make freely or 
inventively. As in the idea of physis their endeavours are perfected simply following the laws by 
which nature itself works.  
Even the gods abide by this rule: the maker of the universe in Plato's cosmology, the Demi-urge or 
divine Artificer, could only fashion the world from pre-existing materials in accordance with existing 
laws. This rational Greek god could never have created ex nihilo like the Judeo-Christian one. Thus 
the poet, the freest artist, could never invent freely but had to consider Nature's laws whenever he 
fabricated a poem. At best he could discover, finding what is concealed in nature, but never 
originating something entirely novel. There are close associations between this idea of mimesis and 
the more recent idea of realism which holds that art must seek to reveal and communicate great truths 
about the nature of man and his circumstances. 
Style and genius 
The idea of a relation between nature and art was extended from the thing produced, the poem, to the 
producer himself, the poet. If the best poetry reflected nature in some way, what of the character of 
the one who made poems and whence came his capacity for it? In debates it was popularly answered 
that the poet was born with a native gift for poetry, with ingenium. The counter charge most 
frequently levelled at this assertion held the native ability to be secondary to the poet's capacity for 
obeying the laws (iudicium) of art or style. Cicero for example followed Aristotle in believing 
ingenium had to be tempered by iudicium. Horace, in De Arte Poetica298 cites Democritus as having 
esteemed the native gift as something happier than the poor rules of art, but he himself insisted that 
Nature (ingenium) could not do without study (studium) and study could not do without Nature.299 
This opposition featured eternally in the aesthetic debate of antiquity. The emphasis on the capacity of 
individuals to follow laws of art or style also closely paralleled ethical tendencies then prevalent. The 
admirers of unparalleled achievement, of heroes, statesmen or poets, often emphatically extolled, to 
the neglect of great individual‟s native endowments, the influence of acquired virtue upon his success. 
This was frequently done in post-Socratic epochs when warring philosophical schools sought prestige 
and influence by lauding the ameliorating powers of philosophy to the skies. Virtue, equates in ethics 
to techne, ars, or iudicium in aesthetics. 
Poetic Furor and genius 
Against those who argued that ingenium was the key to the poet‟s makeup were those who argued 
that it was divine guidance or inspiration. The idea of furor poeticus, like that of mimesis, poses many 
possibilities. One of these is contained in the early meaning of the word genius wherein gods were 
thought to give guidance to the poet without his conscious volition.  
This idea separates personality from personal responsibility for achievement. An individual‟s 
accomplishment is not due to his personality but to the daemonic urge working within and through 
him. This prefigures the modern idea of the unconscious; of a psychic force within the individual for 
which he does not himself feel responsible. However you name it, the thought implies a feeling of 
overflowing or spilling over, an excess or evanescence of the soul. With the advent of Christianity, 
personal gods were displaced by the omniscient creator, so it was natural to attribute poetic insight to 
his intervention. The actor changes, the act remains the same.  
In antiquity the enraptured poet was more mocked than admired, but this surely indicates widespread 
endorsement of the idea.300 Sometimes it was promoted to attack the influence of poets. Plato 
famously and cunningly made inspiration, a faculty having nothing to do with reason or truth, the 
main force behind poetry. He did this not out of admiration, but of envy, because the poet undermined 
the authority of philosophical truth. And it is why Plato barred poets from the antiseptic streets of his 
Republic. 
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The aesthetic idea of imagination is also a variant of the idea of poetic furor, mainly in the middle 
ages when Aristotelian opinion dominated. Aristotle described the poet's use of imagination or 
phantasia (fantasia) as a faculty with the character of perception and thought insofar as it revived and 
threw up images of previous primary experience in the manner of dreams, while not being itself 
unconscious. In Aristotle's view, imagination only visualised what already existed in the world: what 
was already in nature. The good poet simply used this faculty to recreate more vivid images than 
others. This idea of imagination, which lingered for as long as Aristotle's influence, belongs more 
properly to the mimetic strain of aesthetic argument.  
Since the Renaissance, imagination was related to poetic furor once it was deemed that poets could 
combine and synthesise images into new and startling forms; invent completely novel histories or 
situations, conjure up other worlds and put themselves sympathetically into the circumstances of 
others. 
One final variant of poetic furor, not especially manifest in antiquity is that of creativity. The terms 
"create", or "creator" have always implied freedom of action, of bringing into being some new thing, 
or, of bringing forth something new from nothing as in creatio ex nihilo. In antiquity human activity 
could rarely be equated with such a concept, except for poets perhaps, the one who made.  
In Latin there were two roughly synonymous words that convey the idea of forming or making: facere 
or creare. The verb creare, from which derives creatio, and creator, had more explicitly rustic 
origins; it meant to produce or cause to grow, and also gathered connotations of fatherhood such as in 
the term creator urbis - founder of the city. The words facere and creare remained synonymous 
throughout most of antiquity, but creare was adopted by the Christians to describe God's bringing 
forth of the world from nothing. In this case, creatio, or more precisely, creatio ex nihilo could never 
define human activity, since only the divinity could truly originate things especially because, from 
late antiquity to the Middle Ages, art was generally thought to be imitative.  
During the Renaissance however expressions of the idea of man creating in the manner of a divinity 
abound. But the word creativity or its similes in the European languages was not used to describe this 
or indeed to indicate artistic freedom or originality until the eighteenth century. The idea of creativity 
in art again makes explicit reference to magical or deistic elements provoking artistic productions. 
That the Christian understanding of the divinity creating ex nihilo precedes the aesthetic usage of the 
term is also significant. Making a work of art is subsequently deemed a magical act, partaking of 
some grander moment in the universe than mere craftsmanship or fabrication. 
The controversy over the three elements of genius 
These three ideas, having gone by various names and subject to many variations have formed the 
basis for aesthetic debates in the west ever since.  
In debates between Baroque, Rococo, Classical, or Romantic styles, arguments have pitted Reason 
against sentiment, rules against spontaneity, imitation against originality (those advocating in art the 
pre-eminence of imagination over reason, self-creating genius over aesthetic laws, and beauty as 
elevated feeling over beauty as a form of objective knowledge) using the vocabulary of the epoch. 
There have always been revolts for and against mimesis and laws, even though the idea of nature and 
laws may change. During the Middle Ages and well into the Renaissance the rule of Aristotle 
provided one tyranny and thereafter Descartes who, having never written explicitly on aesthetics, 
became the despot of French and of European ideas.  
There is little or no progress in the history of ideas. The aesthetic debate we today call Romanticism 
contra Classicism (involving a gross simplification of all the complexities which these terms betray) 
has never really been absent from civilised reflection on art and, due to its general nature, being a 
collision between two forms of sensibility rather than condensed and clarified world-views, is 
unlikely ever to conclude. On one extremity an arid classicism and rationalism that would make art 
and artists conform to a tyrannous legislature, has always been arrayed against an errant rush of 
sentiment and sickliness that would dispense with reason for enthusiasm and with laws for 
recklessness. Somehow reason always picks its way between the camps, but as always extremism 
provides us with something to talk about, and therefore to define the temper and taste of a period. 
Developments in the idea of genius 
Christianity arrives in Europe and the definition of what a poet or genius is becomes a backwater 
issue. Outstanding worldly achievement is not a proper subject for intellectual discussion until the 
Italians of the Renaissance decide to remember pre-Christian antiquity, and restore various categories 
and talking points, in the first instance with little variation other than a stronger metaphysical and 
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demonological sense; Scaliger, for example in his Poetics (1561)301 regards the genius literally as a 
spirit who visits the writer or poet in his moments of inspiration.302 Metaphysical interpretations were 
soon enough displaced and by the passing of the seventeenth century many different definitions of 
genius are to be found; indeed it was then that the word genius properly entered aesthetic debate. 
From the severe classicism of the early Italian Renaissance to the Baroque, familiar ideas of artistic 
style and genius were conceived and reconceived. The Italian poetic movement of marinismo, after 
the influential poet Giambattista Marino (1569 - 1625), widens the idea of poetic furor to encompass 
imagination, passion and sensuality. Through the miracol de l'Arte Marino tried to stimulate, not 
understanding, but sensual delight. A craze for his poetry, paralleling Mannerism in painting though 
not necessarily identical with it, swept Italy and, according to its critics, glorified moral laxity, 
unbounded individualism, callous selfishness, irresponsibility, aristocratic snobbery and other vices.  
In marinismo, the poet, and the artist's whims and fancies, his personality in short, baulked larger than 
the work itself. The genius of the poet was primary. If the meaning of the word ingegno ranged from 
or ingenuity, to capacity for invention, the modern understanding (i.e. the Romantic one) of genius 
was already well developed. Writers of the movement referred to the need for novitá in poetry, which 
is to say freshness, novelty, innovation, originality, something verging on the extraordinary or 
marvellous. With Marinismo we are embrace the idea of creativity. 
Marinismo is typical of a decline in manners and style in the secentismo of Italian history. The excess 
and indulgence of the Italians was snottily reproved by the French. Critics such as Boileau, Rapin, 
and Bouhours, whose fund of reason and taste preserved them from folly, condemned Marinismo as a 
literary disease, and the assessment stuck for almost two hundred years. Even the Romantics, who 
might have shown some sympathy with Baroque poets, accepted the judgement and derisively cited 
Marino as an example of bad style.  
The French style of the Grande Siecle was explicitly opposed the Italian Baroque; being impersonal, 
ceremonial, static and, where literary productions were concerned, oratorical. Descartes' philosophy 
invaded French aesthetics. Linking the idea of beauty with the quest for certain knowledge, French 
aesthetic writings of the classical period dwell on the idea of the genius as one with the consummate 
ability to speak truth. In the Art Poetique Boileau declares “Nature is truth" and "only the true is 
beautiful." The Genius is considered to have a gift of nature active from the earliest stages of his life 
which consists in an unparalleled capacity for discrimination and assessment; he is able to grasp the 
essential character of things, that is, of the deepest reason embedded in nature:"Genius," according to 
Boileau, “is sublime reason" .303 
The art of the early eighteenth century swung toward the other extremity until about 1760, when 
another tendency to return to the classical style occurred; in this period it was dynamic rather than 
stately, focussed on feeling, seeking fantasy rather than truth, and given to intimacy rather than 
impersonal declamation. In England, where these ideas were first promulgated, John Dennis defined 
genius as a capacity to exhibit passion in a poem: "For passion in a Poem is Genius, and the power of 
exciting Passion is Genius in a Poet."304 Poetic furor again gets the upper hand over iudicium. A 
fundamental reappraisal of the value and character of genius occurred in the writings of Shaftesbury. 
With the first reference appearing in 1710, he pressed forward the idea of genius as an extraordinary, 
instinctive, and creative spirituality, as a mortal imitating the divine. The inventive character of 
genius was closely associated with the personality of the individual, rather than his daemon.  
The quality and quantity of literature discussing these matters increased during the course of the 
century. In England, there was Sharpe's Dissertation on Genius (1755), Warton's Essay on the 
Writings and Genius of Pope (1756-82). E. Young's Conjecture's On Original Composition (1759), 
and R Woods' An Essay on the Original Genius of Homer (1765). Alexander Gerard, in An Essay on 
Genius (1774), declared that only the vulgar confounded genius with mere capacity, genius was rather 
"the faculty for invention; by means of which a man is qualified by making new discoveries in science 
or for producing original works of art."305 What had been anticipated by Shaftesbury took form all 
over Europe, but nowhere more thoroughly than in Germany where, through Aufklärers, like Lessing, 
Kant, Hamann and Herder, through Sturm und Drang poets like Goethe and Schiller, and later by the 
fulminations of Romantics like Tieck, the Schlegels, and Novalis, and the later Idealist philosophers - 
Fichte, the younger Schelling, Schopenhauer, it advanced toward its logical completion. 
The German idea of genius 
When Lessing (1729 -1781), a man of balance and measured taste, wrote, "genius transcends all 
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rules! Rules suppress genius" he was reacting to the fact that German poetry was then gripped in the 
stranglehold of Gothshed's shrivelled aesthetics, itself inspired of Boileau. But if Lessing's voice was 
singularly reasonable among the earlier Aufklärers it was soon drowned out by an opposite bout of 
extremism. From about 1760 onward the Sturm und Drang movement in German letters, sometimes 
called the geniezeit, thrust the idea of genius into the living heart of poetry and aesthetics. Goethe, the 
movement's favoured son, wrote of this period later in his life with manifest distaste, declaring that in 
his youth, “the word genius became a universal watchword... It was long before the time when it 
could be said that genius is that power of man which gives laws and rules through acting and doing. 
In those days it manifested itself only when it broke existing laws, overthrew established rules, and 
declared itself untrammelled."306 
What was being experienced was yet another bout of Marinismo, but this time with a more theoretical 
edge. Sturm und Drang was essentially a youth movement and each of its principles grew up and 
moved on, but their example was noted and soon systematised by intellectuals who deemed it man's 
highest duty to develop all his powers to the full. The genius was the type of man who set out on this 
quest in earnest and lived by fulfilling the dictates of Bildung. The equation was historic, for it 
explicitly tied the idea of genius to the Ideal of Cultivation. Thereafter, it became a commonplace in 
German intellectual life to make the genius exemplify cultivation of the highest kind. The Romantic 
generation which succeeded not only endorsed the idea but pushed it to its ultimate limits by 
regarding the genius, as Nietzsche was later to do, as the justifier of life itself. 
As an aesthetic sensibility, Romanticism, or rather the varieties of romanticism, emphasises personal 
experience, emotion and spontaneity, eclecticism in taste and style, beauty for its own sake, and 
estimates highly the significance of art. In short, it is an untrammelled embrace of the idea of poetic 
furor. For the German Romantics artistic activity was the sublime achievement of the universe. 
During Schelling's Romantic phase he regarded the work of art so highly that he believed it reflected 
the unity of existence behind all the grades of self-evolving life. The process of self-divisions and 
unifications experienced by nature and history could be united by the activity of the artist.  
The artist unifies being, because his work is both conscious and unconscious."It is as though in rare 
persons who are, above all others, artists in the highest sense of the word, the immutable identity, on 
which all existence rests, has put off the raiment with which it clothes itself in others... Consequently 
it can only be the contradiction between the conscious and the unconscious in free action that sets the 
artistic impulse into motion, just as, once more, it can only be given to art to satisfy our infinite 
striving as well as to resolve the ultimate and most extreme contradiction in us."307 
The artistic genius closes the contradiction in nature. We are now not too far from the younger 
Nietzsche's radical aestheticism. Schelling comes closest among the German Idealists to putting art 
equal to or higher than philosophy for systematic reasons. Similar sentiments are found among the 
Romantic poets and literati. Novalis, an active and significant poet associated with the Schlegels, 
believed that "nur der Künstler kann den Sinn des Lebens erraten".308 Friedrich Schlegel, writing to 
his brother in 1793 while still a young man, declared "Die Seele meiner Lehre ist, daß die Menschheit 
das Höchste ist und die Kunst nur um ihretwillen vorhanden sei."309 From there poetry or the feeling 
for art and style in general was felt to be needed in all areas of life: ethics, politics, and social 
institutions. And above it all was to stand the greatest type of poet, the genius. 
The sceptical rationalism of the Aufklärers made them determined to explore all areas of human life 
critically, methodically, and unencumbered by ancient prejudices. The juvenile poets of the Sturm und 
Drang never sought to impede the Aufklärers' progress, or react against rationalism in any sense. 
They were seen as a reaction of feeling against reason, but this feeling was itself highly reasoned and 
came out of a higher order of thought. It was not Reason itself but a particularly limiting it stultifying 
brand of it that the intellectuals of the geniezeit wished to complain with familiar green enthusiasm. 
Likewise the Romantics who followed were not, as generally assumed, merely revolting against 
reason even if they explicitly claimed to be doing so; they continued the programme of the Aufklärers, 
but pushed aspects of it to ludicrous lengths. The dictum that “rules suppress genius" can be and was 
extended to ethical and political life, with the effect that great criminals and demagogues could be and 
were elevated to hero status, and monstrous irresponsibility justified as the privilege of "great" men. 
This excess also afflicts Nietzsche, whose sobriety in other matters melts to sentimentality before 
mug shots of unshaven criminality.  
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German idealist philosophers were obsessed with awakening inner consciousness, and equated this 
consciousness with the progress and freedom of the human spirit; this is true not only of the greatest 
of them, Leibniz, Kant, Hegel, Schelling, Fichte, Schopenhauer, but countless others. With respect to 
this unifying aim Romanticism and Rationalism were never at cross-purposes. In Germany, the 
Romantics built upon concepts already prepared for them by the Aufklärers. The aesthetic discussions 
of the Enlightenment and Romantic period widened and deepened the idea of genius and provided 
most of the formulae for Nietzsche's understanding of its character. The pages of the Birth of Tragedy 
or the Untimely Meditations for example contain much that is Schiller, as presented in the Letters 
upon the Aesthetical Education of Man, which Nietzsche's would have read in his youth, even if he 
affected to scorn the poet in his maturity. 
The Aufklärers built the bridge to greener pastures and the Romantics walked across it. Nietzsche, 
working at least two generations later, started to build a philosophy there. 
The elements of genius in Nietzsche's works 
The three primary qualities of genius or poetry that historically have constituted aesthetic discourse 
are also essential to Nietzsche's understanding of genius and ethical behaviour. For Nietzsche any 
person who truly embraces an Ideal of Cultivation will always embody what we have termed here 
mimesis, iudicium or poetic furor. In Nietzsche's nomenclature, mimesis is integrity, iudicium is style 
and furor poeticus is plenitude. 
Integrity 
Integrity as an element of genius, or the highest levels of culture, appears consistently in all 
Nietzsche's works. It is sign-posted by words or phrases such as "freedom and sincerity"310, "correct 
feeling"311 the "unity of inner and outer",312 "honesty",313 and "you shall become the person you 
are."314 
Integrity has close logical affinity with the idea of physis, insofar as it is seen as the means to reach 
down to and touch what is fundamental in nature. This is the first principle of culture, as we see when 
we construct the logic of idea of physis: 
A Human beings are involuntary productions of nature.315 
B There are two aspects to human nature; one is individual, inborn; the other is social and given 
to us through relations with the group or tribe. 
C That which is inborn is deep-rooted, persistent, and too essential to be changed; that which is 
formed in us by the group is superficial and ephemeral. 
D In every group there are manners or customs that may prevent what is in-born in individuals 
from emerging. This may or may not benefit the group, but it places individual in a state of 
contradiction; they must decide whether to follow the group, at the cost of giving up what is 
their own; or, follow their deeper nature, though it may lose them the goodwill of the group. 
Living by customs of the group gains goodwill; living by the dictates of one's nature is more difficult 
or dangerous, but it is the nobler course. We are more honest when we live in harmony with our 
primal character: Integrity may be defined therefore as being true to our primal self. 
We have seen how two injunctions of Greek antiquity informed Nietzsche's Ideal of Cultivation; one, 
from the Pythian odes of Pindar: "You must become the being which you are"; the other, attributed to 
Solon: "Know thyself". Both statements announce a concern for the development of the individual, 
indicate that self-development is a desirable end in itself and are sign-posts in the history of the Ideal 
of Cultivation in the west.  
Pindar‟s statement has an uncanny hold on Nietzsche throughout his life316. To emphasise its 
importance to him he uses it as the subtitle of his autobiography - Ecce Homo, or "wie man wird, was 
man ist". "To become what one is"; is paradoxical. If one is then one cannot become what one is. 
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Becoming bespeaks incompletion, or a series of stages toward a state of completion; to say that one is, 
indicates this state has already been attained and that further change would be unnecessary.  
It is not a paradox if we consider how human nature is represented here. The view of humanity 
expressed implicitly in Pinder's injunction and explicitly in Nietzsche's is that two natures dwell in us; 
the primary nature or "daemon" underlies the secondary one that is imposed on us by upbringing. By 
becoming the "being we are" we allow the primary nature, the genius or daemon within us, to ripen 
under the shell of the social nature. The younger Nietzsche believes that few can shed this shell once 
their primary nature comes to maturity and in most cases "the germ of it withers away."317 
If we are honest we must liberate ourselves from the constraining shell and permit inner genius its full 
expression. Only by becoming what we truly are can we produce something of enduring value and 
avoid a life of mimicry and servitude to others; wherein we produce only things of fleeting value. We 
can attain things of truly abiding worth by discovering our own laws of movement, not by aping 
others. Those who seek to become what they are -"human beings who are new, unique, incomparable, 
who give themselves laws, who create themselves... must become the best learners and discoverers of 
everything that is lawful and necessary in the world: we must become physicists in order to be able to 
be creators in this sense - while hitherto all valuations and ideals have been based on ignorance of 
physics or were constructed so as to contradict it. Therefore: long live physics! And even more so that 
which compels us to learn physics - our honesty!"318 
"Physics" means the study of human nature, of one‟s own individual nature so as to bring it to 
perfection. We may not create or accomplish anything great unless we turn our honesty inward and 
assess what is there. Those who act on false beliefs about themselves acts less effectively than those 
who study themselves carefully. Thus we see the affinity which draws together the concept of Pindar 
and that of Solon, and later Socrates: "Know thyself". For Socrates the discovery of internal laws 
substituted for the abasement of feeling for the laws of the Athenian polis; if guidance could not be 
found externally, then a more abiding system of law lies in our interior, which can be obeyed if its 
existence is discerned. For Nietzsche there is no universally valid law, but degrees of necessity, 
elements of human character and instincts that cannot be altered but which may hinder or enhance 
creativity. By knowing these are there we can at least see how necessity can be turned to best effect. 
Integrity and the younger Nietzsche 
The younger Nietzsche deals with the theme of integrity extensively in the first of the series of 
Untimely Meditations, - David Strauss, the Confessor and the Writer. In this essay he distinguishes 
between those who have "honesty" who are "true men of culture" and possess or follow their 
"genius", and those who are philistines (Bildungsphilister): a term of student coinage brought into 
wider usage by Goethe and Schiller in the previous century. Those with true culture have 
uncompromising integrity concerning the ends and means of their existence, whereas philistines have 
sham culture, which Nietzsche exposes in the popular writer and critic David Strauss. The philistine, 
he muses, is one who affects a degree of civility and learning and parades an aesthetic sensibility, 
though none of his actions or interests are informed by sincere sentiments.  
Easily blown in the winds of convention, the philistine cannot guide himself because he is unwilling 
to know himself. Partly this is due to a cowardice and reluctance to acknowledge the disturbing 
enigmas of existence. Mostly however, it is due to sloth:"Each knows they are a "unique being" but 
hides this knowledge from himself, preferring to look to his neighbour "to think and act with his herd, 
and not seek his own joy. The reason for this behaviour is, apart from rare cases of shyness - sloth. 
Men are more slothful than timid, and their greatest fear is of the burdens that an uncompromising 
honesty and nakedness of speech would lay on them... The man who will not belong to the general 
mass has only to stop "taking himself easily", to follow his conscience which cries out to him, "Be 
thyself! All that thou doest and thinkest and desirest, is not thyself!... There is no more desolate 
creature in nature than the man who has broken away from his true genius.”319 
The man of true culture is not distracted by the demands of the zeitgeist. Current events do not drown 
out his own thought. He obeys an inner compulsion that presses him to ask the most fundamental 
questions:"Why am I alive? What lesson have I to learn from life? How have I become what I am, and 
why do I suffer in this existence?"320 Finally he asks: "What is the real worth of life?"321 In attending 
to these concerns he is unwilling to satisfy himself with facile conclusions like the philistine, who 
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wishes only to expend himself in a career, and "become a good citizen or professor or statesman"322 
The questions are so great they need to be answered with deeds as well as words; by living out his 
response to these enigmas he commits an act of "heroism" and so ceases to be the plaything of time 
and circumstances. Now he aspires to an imperative that goes beyond his time and circumstance and 
so declares: "I will remain my own"323 The man of culture cannot compromise with truth, so his 
actions betray what he truly believes; there is no disharmony between his inner and outer life. 
For young Nietzsche the unity between inner and outer life is the key to integrity. The culture-
philistine lacks this unity so whatever culture he possesses is no better than a veneer on an ineffectual 
centre. His indifference toward truth contrasts markedly with the cultured man whose innermost 
longing and deepest need if for certainty. Reflecting on the influence exerted by Kant's sceptical 
philosophy on his generation, he claims that it is "only a very few men that Kant has so vitally 
affected as to change the current of their blood:"324 On the popular mind the only affect has been 
"corrosive scepticism and relativity", whereas noble and active men, who cannot remain in a 
condition of tepid doubt, the despair of truth is a shattering experience.  
Doubt makes it impossible for noble men to act with passion. If the task they undertake is not 
significant, if it cannot seize their imagination and invest every moment with meaning, then they 
would rather not bother. The extremities, total conviction or utter nihilism, are more satisfactory than 
the incompletion of uncertainty. To believe unquestioningly spurs you to action but also to 
foolishness; to despair of all truth condemns you to unredeeming idleness. Honesty tells you that all 
knowledge is a fabrication of order imposed upon the world by the need to live. Falsehood is 
advantageous to life, but only so long as it is believed. Men of true culture meet every truth directly, 
whether it is to their advantage or not, and understand the illusory and provisional character of 
knowledge. The contradiction between urgent desire for truth and the realisation that this is not 
possible in any absolute sense provokes a tension that tests their creative powers.  
Philistines experience no contradiction as they do not really care whether what they believe is true, or 
whether what everyone calls truth is false. They pursue the path of least resistance and abstain from 
thoughts that lead to inner commotion. They do not even recognise the challenge that affronts every 
man of culture: “How much truth can a spirit endure, how much truth does a spirit dare?"325 
There is an important distinction between what Nietzsche calls "honesty" and what he later refers to 
as the "will to truth". At an early stage in his intellectual development he is uneasy about the value of 
an untrammelled pursuit of knowledge. He experiences the disquiet eternalised by Goethe in his 
treatment of the Faust legend; of a polymath hungering for a richer, more passionate existence. 
Nietzsche the culture-physician, drawing from the examples of this German affliction concludes that 
the libido sciendi may not be a spur to culture at all and may in fact lead away from that goal. 
"Scarcely anybody," he notes in the essay on David Strauss, "seems to ask what the result of such a 
cultivation of the sciences will mean to culture in general, even supposing that everywhere the highest 
abilities and the most earnest will be available for the promotion of culture."326  
Further on he cites Pascal's observation that men work hard at "business and sciences" in order to 
escape questions of greatest import that every moment of loneliness or leisure might press upon them: 
those relating to the "wherefore, the whence and the whither of life".327 In this he follows Socrates 
who disparaged the work of the natural philosophers because it dwelt on what he thought were less 
essential questions. In the case of unbounded will to truth the degree of self-reflection and self-
consciousness demanded by the cultural imperative "know thyself!" is dissipated in the investigation 
of objects outside of the self. True culture involves deeper self-consciousness than this. 
In later works Nietzsche treats the will to truth as a special form of the will to power. Scholars or 
scientists, types who exhibit this trait most forcefully, have a boundless appetite for knowledge for its 
own sake. Scholars unconsciously imagine their investigations into history or nature bring them ersatz 
control over reality. By bringing themselves intellectually into the presence of things, they experience 
an abstracted sensation of will to power. When scholars gain understanding of an object or process 
they obtain a victory; a satisfaction in itself, after which they desire nothing further. Their happiness 
is in knowing what is. In Nietzsche's estimation this action is incomplete and does not satisfy the 
criteria of true culture. Men of higher culture do not merely desire to know that something "is thus 
and thus" but wish to act so that something becomes thus and thus. The scholarly type consequently 
stands in lesser relation to the philosopher or artist who fixes things as they "ought to be". Instead of 
merely knowing, they create, and by creating they bring value into being. 
In Richard Wagner in Bayreuth, Nietzsche uses the term correct feeling to describe integrity. In 
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matters of life and culture, he observes, you must feel correctly before you can think correctly. It is 
the spontaneous in you that should determine how you evaluate, not second-hand conventions, which 
he likens to an "artificial estrangement" that distances one from another, and gives birth to countless 
misunderstandings. For the sake of an agreeable dissimulation we create an "inharmonious bombast" 
within and between ourselves. By convention and "incorrect feeling" the forms of life are emptied of 
content, their significance is lost, and true value which can only be forged out of sincerity is effaced. 
Thus, "wherever form is still in demand in society, conversation, literary style, or the relations 
between governments, men have unconsciously grown to believe that it is adequately met by a kind of 
agreeable dissimulation, quite the reverse of genuine form conceived as a necessary relation between 
the proportions of a figure, having no concern whatever with the notions "agreeable" or 
"disagreeable" simply because it is necessary and not optional"328 "...incorrect feeling governs and 
drills them unremittingly, and does not even give them time to speak, convention whispers their cue to 
them, and this makes them forget what they originally intended to say: should they desire to 
understand one another their comprehension is maimed as though by a spell: they declare that to be 
their joy which in reality is but their doom,... they have become transformed into perfectly and 
absolutely different creatures, and reduced to abject slaves of incorrect feeling."329 
Man's best and worst qualities depend on the depth of nature within and "those of his abilities which 
are terrifying and considered inhuman may even be fertile soil out of which alone all humanity can 
grow in impulse, deed and work."330 To suppress that nature for the sake of peace and civility makes 
the highest human endeavour impossible. The genius of culture requires depth of passion and 
spontaneity as much as he eschews excessive refinement or mistrust of the appetites. The later 
Nietzsche gleefully observes how periods of highest culture are volcanic in their passions. The same 
energy applied to constructing and adorning a city is as easily adapted to destroying another: noble 
Athenians were as ready for war as for philosophy, and the tyrants of Italy scourged their enemies as 
energetically as they paid geniuses to adorn their courts. Too much "nature" may indeed be a 
dangerous surplus but when nature is denied life is undermined. 
In a culture of correct feeling passions are played out in innocence of bad form or bad conscience. 
You understand that your passions are necessary and that it is hypocritical or superfluous to disavow 
them. This integrity is difficult to sustain in a milieu of rigid morality – such as Christian morality – 
which equates nature with sin or evil, and conceals countless passions behind pious ritual. To leave 
passion hiding, but undiminished behind masks of respectability ferments poison. Morality reflects 
low levels of culture, whereas high culture is dominated by "admitted immorality".331 
The Greeks and pagans of antiquity displayed an "innocence" before the natural,332 likewise the 
Renaissance Italians, and in modern times individuals like Napoleon and Goethe, who is a "return to 
nature" after the superficiality of the eighteenth century; not in the sense of "going-back" or 
regressing to something lower, but a "going-up" to a freer kind of being. Naturalness to the Greeks 
meant affirming life through contest and struggle and openly admitting ambition, their will to 
dominate, envy and hatred of rivals. This is what stimulates the energies that produce genius.  
No disgust or guilt was felt for desiring victory or employing cruelty to attain it. Struggle was 
necessary to culture, and to ensure that struggle never ceased no one victor was permitted to over-
tower his opponents; many geniuses excite competition and constrain the excesses of absolute 
domination. The Greeks understood that one victor dominating for too long results in tyranny and the 
hereby the diminishment of culture:"That is the core of the Hellenic notion of the contest: it desires, 
as a protection against genius, another genius."333 
Integrity, freedom and necessity 
If value is that which resists becoming; the sincere man of culture, who produces and contains value, 
also resists becoming. This does not imply unwillingness or lack of desire to change in his life or his 
milieu, but that he makes what is essential to himself the foundation of his actions. The personality he 
creates for himself is more enduring than that of the man of his time: "who only regards his life as a 
moment in the evolution of a race or state or a science, and will belong merely to a history of 
"becoming" has not understood the lesson of existence and must learn it over again. This eternal 
"becoming something" is a lying puppet-show, in which man has forgotten himself; it is the force that 
scatters individuality to the four winds, the eternal childish game that the big baby time is playing in 
front of us... The heroism of sincerity lies in ceasing to be the plaything of time. Everything in the 
process of "becoming" is a hollow sham... man can only find the solution of his riddle in "being" 
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something definite and unchangeable."334 
The inner life of the cultivated man addresses immutable needs. He asks questions about his life that 
can be posed in every epoch, and the energy with which he responds to these questions indicates the 
extent of his freedom. In the essay, Richard Wagner In Bayreuth, the younger Nietzsche expresses 
this conception of freedom with a precision which is not bettered in later writings: "passion is better 
than Stoicism and hypocrisy, that being honest in evil is still better than losing oneself to the morality 
of tradition, that a free human being can be good as well as evil, but that an unfree human being is a 
blemish upon nature and has no share in any heavenly or earthly comfort; finally, that everyone who 
wishes to become free must become free through his own endeavour, and that freedom does not fall 
into any man's lap as a miraculous gift."335 
This is not the freedom of a citizen in a republic but of the Hellenistic sage and the German 
philosopher. It is personal not public freedom that you seek in a civilisation without political liberty. 
Physical and material freedom is deemed lower or easily obtained, whereas spiritual autonomy, 
something gained by inwardly directed exertions and discipline, is viewed as higher. Like the 
Hellenistic sage Nietzsche is unmoved by exhortations for liberty by the liberal movements of his 
time. His freedom is wholly appropriate to traditional Germany where the inner life of spirit is the one 
area of life not controlled by the political ruler, and therefore easiest to demand as one's own. Real 
freedom does not arise by opposing secular authority, it comes from thinking in accordance with truth 
that is independently acquired.  
Real tyranny is not imposed by a ruler, but by the opinions of others. These considerations inform 
Kant's masterly definition of "enlightenment" as an "exodus from a self-imposed tutelage" and his 
observation that "immaturity is the inability to use one's understanding without guidance from 
another." Immaturity, he notes, is “self-imposed when its cause lies not in lack of understanding, but 
in lack of resolve and courage to use it without guidance from another. Sapere Aude! 'Have courage 
to use your understanding!' that is the motto of enlightenment."336 Kant demands we act in 
accordance with our independent understanding, arrived at as an individual rather than as a party to a 
social or political order. Freedom requires strength of resolve and self-consciousness to resist the 
arbitrary customs and superstitions that prevent us knowing what is essential. 
The same paradigm causes Nietzsche to oppose the idea of free will favoured by moralists opposed to 
the idea of physis. The „freedom‟ given to us by acting with integrity does not free us from one single 
link of the chains of necessity, for we remain wholly and solely determined, like everything else in the 
universe, by physical forces.337 We cannot under any circumstances be liberated from our nature or 
seek to exert a will in contradiction to it. Our inner nature cannot be recast. It is only that by honestly 
appraising our circumstances we may calculate the scale and extent of necessity which gathers in and 
around us, and can thereby assess what it is we are able to change and what we must learn to endure. 
Freedom consists, paradoxically, in the consciousness of necessity.338 
Traditional morality legislates for a multiplicity of human natures without considering what it has 
license to control, an action no less absurd than trying to rule that the sun should rise. In every moral 
epoch we see the ironic consequence of this naivety: moralists set down codes that force us to act 
against our inner nature and then rail and thunder because they are disobeyed. Irony completes itself 
as moralists energetically theorise an illusory freedom for mankind merely so that it can be believed 
that it is possible to act against nature. Because moral categories are the basis of the power of officers 
of morality - of priests, shamans, journalists, or state functionaries - they cannot be allowed to be 
undermined by an idea that shows it is impossible to act in contradiction to natural forces. Mankind 
must be seen to possess free will, for without it how could anyone follow traditional morality. The 
moralist insists that we are free from nature only in order to secure his own power. "if you are free 
from nature" he argues, "then you can choose between what I call 'good' and what I call 'evil'." These 
categories good and evil have no meaning in a purely determined world. 
For early and later Nietzsche, freedom is a narrow zone of possibility between the overwhelming 
power nature exerts over humanity and the slender power humanity exerts over nature. It is a small 
freedom but one that makes possible the multiplicity and drama of human value, since our capacity to 
evaluate is its direct result. Increase of power, freedom and value are closely related. We extend our 
freedom by increasing our knowledge of ourselves, recognising the nature in us. Power is knowledge, 
knowledge is power. One who has the power to assimilate and control more of nature, is freer than he 
who acquires less of nature. Freedom is power, power is freedom.339 Or, as Nietzsche expresses it:"if 
power has been attained over nature, one can employ this power in the further free development of 
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oneself: will to power as self elevation and strengthening."340 Once this relationship is established you 
embark on the next step in the process toward genius; you now have to learn how to organise power. 
Thus, if the aesthetic conception of mimesis resembles the ethical notion of physis, the aesthetic idea 
of style, resembles the ethical notion of perfecting. 
Style 
Schiller, in the Letters on the Aesthetic Education of Man declares that "One of the most important 
tasks of culture, then, is to submit man to form, even in a purely physical life, and to render it 
aesthetic as far as the domain of the beautiful can be extended..."341 This remark could be taken as the 
cue for Nietzsche's reflections on, the second element of genius: style (Stil). If integrity is the process 
of becoming conscious of nature, style is the next step in the process of cultivating genius, that is, of 
giving form to nature. This understanding of style is shared by the early and the later Nietzsche.  
Its significance may be defined as follows: 
A. Nature is chaotic, without being, and therefore without value. To be made valuable it must be 
given a fixed and immutable form i.e. it must be organised. 
B. All living things are fragments of value insofar as they are attempts, inwardly and outwardly, 
to organise nature.  
We give form to nature by learning to master ourselves and resist the tendency toward decay. We do 
this by integrating the many impulses of which we are constituted, and sublimating them to a more 
perfect level of development. Together these processes bring forth style.  
For the later Nietzsche, style was reformulated in sympathy with the doctrine of will to power, and 
defined as the practice by which the life most effectively embodies power. 
Style through integration 
Nietzsche's earliest discussions of style occur in the Untimely Meditations, particularly in the third 
essay Schopenhauer as Educator. Not unexpectedly, the question of education is discussed in the 
same context as style. Education attends to the aspects of a person that are subject to change. It helps 
produce integrity by encouraging people to see “what in man is immutable and what is accessible to 
change." Education, according to Nietzsche, should not hope to alter the fundamental character of a 
man, but seek to reveal the deepest layers and significance of his being. It should not try to change but 
to complete nature. It can do this by helping someone see the arbitrary restrictions that impair their 
development.  
Education should liberate as all "true educators and moulders reveal... the real groundwork and 
import of thy being, something that in itself cannot be moulded or educated, but is anyhow difficult of 
approach, bound and crippled: thy educators can be nothing but thy deliverers. And that is the secret 
of all culture: it does not give artificial limbs, wax noses, or spectacles for the eyes - a thing that 
could buy such gifts is but the base coin of education. But it is rather the delicate shoots, the 
streaming forth of light and warmth, the tender dropping of the night rain; it is the following and the 
adoring of Nature when she is pitifully minded as a mother; the completion, when it bends before her 
fierce and ruthless blasts and turns them to good, and draws a veil over all expression of her tragic 
unreason - for she is a step-mother too sometimes."342 
Like the guru, the ideal educator brings enlightenment, aiming not just to impart information but to 
help each pupil discover and develop their individual genius. This philosophic teacher has two 
maxims: that he seeks out his pupil‟s one strong point, and strive to bring this to maturity and that he 
raise all of that pupils's qualities to a higher level and have them exist together harmoniously.  
Again Nietzsche echoes ancient wisdom, and like Plutarch, believes it is in the nature of certain 
pursuits that they cannot exist side by side. You must occupy yourself as nature intended and not try 
to master her by compulsive emulation of one mode of life or another.343 He approves the example of 
Benvenuto Cellini who, having a decided talent for gold smithing, refused his father's pleas to learn to 
play the cornet. The demand for harmonious development hardly applies to a talent as strongly 
manifest in one direction as Cellini's. It may well be, he argues, that "the maxim of harmonious 
development applies only to weaker natures, in which there is a whole swarm of desires and 
inclinations, though they may not amount to very much, singly or together... Where do we find such a 
blending of harmonious voices... as we see in natures like Cellini's, where everything - knowledge, 
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desire, love and hate - tends towards a single point, the root of all, and a harmonious system, the 
resultant of the various forces, is built up through the irresistible domination of this vital centre?"344 
Years later, Nietzsche returns to this concern when he gives voice to Zarathustra. This ideal 
pedagogue warns that too many virtues may afflict an individual and " if you are lucky you will have 
one virtue and no more... To have many virtues is to be distinguished, but it is a hard fate; and many 
a man has gone into the desert and killed himself because he was tired of being a battle and battle-
ground of virtues."345 Inner chaos arises as much from surfeit as lack of ability. It undermines 
effectiveness and thwarts the process of cultivating your nature. Rather than face an unmanageable 
ensemble of possibilities you can integrate your resources by directing these at a single purpose. 
Better an internal tyranny arises that dominates all action and sweeps aside vacillation and weakness.  
The benign effect that a single goal or task has on your character and culture is self-evident: "Formula 
of my happiness: a Yes, a No, a straight line, a goal..."346 But once you identify your supreme virtue 
you can allow lesser ones to grow and adorn without impairing it. Harmonious development begins 
by seeking a centre; thereafter the two pedagogical maxims complement each other, since the ideal 
philosophic teacher would know how to encourage the lesser virtues without impairing the centre. 
"And so perhaps", Nietzsche concludes, "the two maxims are not contrary at all; the one merely 
saying that man must have a centre, the other, a circumference as well. The philosophic teacher of my 
dream would not only discover the central force, but would know how to prevent its being destructive 
of the other powers: his task, I thought would be the welding of the whole man into a solar system 
with life and movement, and the discovery of its paraphysical laws."347 
Attaining unity or integrating your actions is the first principle of style, which follows from honest 
appraisal of your natural faculties and capacities.348 By identifying that which is most essential, and 
dispensing with that which is unnecessary you achieve unity of purpose. By clearly setting goals that 
are within scope of your virtues or capacities you achieve effectiveness and cultivate your genius. 
Nietzsche attaches so much significance to integration that he even uses the concept to define genius: 
"What is genius?" he asks, and in answer replies that it is " to aspire to a lofty aim and to will the 
means to that aim." 349 
Style through sublimation 
Those who can live in word and deed according to a cohering principle may make considerable 
progress in the cultivating their personality, but the task does not end there. Gaining power over your 
many inclinations is not fully justified until you can extend and refine that power. This is the basis of 
the idea of sublimation, which Nietzsche refers to elsewhere, most famously in Thus Spake 
Zarathustra, as self-overcoming. 
The idea that nature longs for her perfection through sublimation is always implicit.350 For the 
younger Nietzsche mankind will justify nature by bringing the raw materials that she provides to a 
higher purpose: " ...if only we will take her yarn and spin a fine cloth out of it we will be redeemed. 
Not only will we ourselves be redeemed but we will redeem nature itself. We, the cultivated men, are 
the deliverers and the delivered."351 
Innocence and directness toward Nature‟s most terrifying aspects is needed in order to sublimate her. 
Nietzsche believes that where instincts are deeper and more violent, there is greater capacity for 
culture. Finer productions need finer materials and greatness is impossible in civilisations that have 
lost the ferocity of passion. Every "higher culture on earth" has begun when men "of a still natural 
nature, barbarians in every fearful sense of the word, men of prey still in possession of an unbroken 
strength of will and lust for power, threw themselves upon weaker, more civilised, more peaceful... 
old mellow cultures."352 Whenever barbaric passions are assimilated by a civilisation that has been 
conquered, its etiolated forms are refreshed and revivified. Speech and conduct is stripped of its 
affectations and everywhere there is an innocent joy in contest and struggle. All of this is achieved by 
holding fast to many of the feared remnants of barbarism. You cannot expect to have it otherwise. If 
culture must lead nature from its myopia, it must also share in its abominable cruelties. 
All our human refinements and all we honour, have been purchased at magnificent cost or bred into 
us by either cruel necessity or the tyranny of society: "...reason, seriousness, mastery over the affects, 
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the whole sombre thing called reflection, all these prerogatives and showpieces of man: how dearly 
they have been bought: how much blood and cruelty lie at the bottom of all "good things!"353 
Blood drips from everything that elevates us over beasts. The special power and duration of our 
memory for example, owes its existence to the enforcement of obedience within the tribal group. 
“Man could never do without blood, torture, and sacrifices when he felt the need to create a memory 
for himself; the most dreadful sacrifices and pledges (sacrifices of the first-born among them), the 
most repulsive mutilations (castration, for example), the cruellest rites of all the religious cults (and 
all religions are at the deepest level systems of cruelties) - all this has its origins in the instinct that 
realised that pain is the most powerful aid to mnemonics."354 Prolonged and often awful moral 
schooling gives us the refined instrument of reason, for it is out of our capacity to remember: to fix 
one thing in the mind for eternity, and make promises that we learned to reason.  
He bludgeons home the point by referring the "nation of thinkers", the Germans, to their tribal past: 
"We Germans certainly do not regard ourselves as a particularly cruel and hardhearted people, still 
less as a particularly frivolous one... but one has only to look at our former codes of punishments to 
understand what effort it costs on this earth to breed a "nation of thinkers.”.. Consider the old 
German punishments; for example, stoning (the sagas already have millstones drop on the heads of 
the guilty), breaking on the wheel... piercing with stakes, tearing apart or trampling with horses... 
boiling the criminal in oil or wine... the popular flaying alive... cutting flesh from the chest, and also 
the practice of smearing the wrongdoer with honey and leaving him blazing in the sun for the flies. 
With the aid of such images and procedures one finally remembers five or six "I will not's", in regard 
to which one had given one's promise so as to participate in the advantages of society - and it was 
indeed with this aid of this kind of memory that one at last came "to reason"!"355 Thus the genealogy 
of "reason": a pedigree of public lynchings! 
Culture teaches manners to the brute, but it cannot change physiology. We may adore finer feelings, 
yet we must not forget their vexing origins. If we want to cultivate style we must accept the unruly 
character of the raw materials. Sublimation requires nature to be drawn out of itself and presented 
with opportunities it could not itself contrive. Art, the most essential expression of stylisation, is 
nothing less than a spiritualised sexuality."Making music", declares Nietzsche, "is another way of 
making children"356 
Art is not an overcoming of sensuality. They exist side by side, the former as a transfiguration of the 
original desire so that aesthetic feelings no longer enter consciousness as sexual excitement. Thus 
from one urge a thousand volatilisations are brought forth to beautify and adorn civilisation. 
Christianity‟s ignorance of this principle and its hostility to the passions has diminished culture:"The 
Church combats the passions with excision in every sense of the word: its practice, its "cure" is 
castration. It never asks: "How can one spiritualise, beautify, deify a desire?"357 Christianity 
reproaches nature with the epithet - "sin", and compels us to become shameful before the "deepest 
and highest desires of life."358 
The freedom that results from knowledge of necessity; and which consists in a facility in "self-
direction” results in style. Style, is not just an aesthetic phenomenon; it is integral to the processes of 
living and is manifest in every aspect of civilisation: in customs, manners, cuisine, technical practices, 
arts, and conduct of war. When a specific way of organising becomes familiar to a people it is as 
though all individuals share the same taste and every task is executed in conformity with this taste. 
Freedom in action results the moment these processes become unconscious.  
Purification of taste is a sign of strength and of the freedom of self-knowledge. In this sense the 
highest style is one that subjects raw nature to a higher will. "To 'give style' to one's character - a 
great and rare art! It is practised by those who survey all the strengths and weaknesses of their 
nature and then fit them into an artistic plan until every one of them appears as art and reason and 
even weaknesses delight the eye. Here a large mass of second nature has been added; there a piece of 
original nature has been removed... Here the ugly that could not be removed is concealed; there it 
has been reinterpreted and made sublime... In the end, when the work is finished, it becomes evident 
how the constraint of a single taste governed and formed everything large and small... It will be the 
strong and domineering natures that enjoy their finest gaiety in such constraint and perfection under 
a law of their own, the passion of their tremendous will relents in the face of all stylised nature, of all 
conquered and serving nature. Even when they have to build palaces and design gardens they demur 
at giving nature freedom"359 
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Style and Will to Power 
When Nietzsche interprets nature as will to power he adds something new to his reflections on style, 
without abandoning his original standpoint. In the new view sheer quantity of force is worth nothing 
unless it is artfully guided and controlled. A being with less brute force but superior organisation is 
more valuable. Power is only worthwhile to the extent that it is sublimated and refined by reason. 
Again Nietzsche directs our attention to the example of the genius, who efficiently exemplifies this 
principle."We still fall on our knees before power... when the degrees of venerability come to be 
determined, only the degree of reason in power will be the deciding factor. We must find out, indeed, 
to how great an extent power has been overcome by something higher, which it now obeys as a tool 
and instrument. ...I refer to the spectacle of that power which a genius does not lay out upon his 
works, that is, his own self-control, the purifying of his own imagination, the order and selection of 
his inspirations and tasks."360 
The degree of guiding intelligence that the genius demonstrates and his ability for organisation is the 
real criterion of value. The principle applies throughout the natural world. Organisms manifest will to 
power in internal administration and in the order they seek to impose on its environment. It is this that 
makes the power of the organism superior to that of physical forces. The degree of command that an 
organism can exert over its own physiology and the fluency with which it executes its effects dictates 
the extent that it can dominate. In the scale of worth the avalanche rushing down a mountain slope is 
infinitely less significant than the ant descending a blade of grass. 
The creation of value is equated with the degree of organisation of power361 and genius is the living 
embodiment of this principle, being able to attain within himself an equilibrium of forces and to focus 
with extraordinary tenacity on a single objective. The genius is a creature of intricate engineering. 
Pushing this metaphor further he declares the genius to be the "sublimest machine that there is" but 
also adds that he is therefore the most fragile.362 Because he is a being of complex coordinations he is 
all the more disposed to disintegrate. For this reason simpler and more stupid forms of life are often 
more successful in purely Darwinian terms. 
With will to power, perfection for Nietzsche becomes open-ended, creative and dynamic. It is in Thus 
Spake Zarathustra, where he entertains this notion for the first time, that he calls the genius an 
übermensch; which is to say, someone who extends the practice of self-stylisation beyond the self and 
therefore becomes more than human. The younger Nietzsche's preference for an enclosed, harmonic 
view of genius is dispensed with. The übermensch lives by the dynamic principles of physis as will to 
power; he is constantly re-inventing himself and achieving new formations of power within himself. 
The process of sublimating this kind of nature is termed by Nietzsche "self-overcoming" and the 
injunction which flows from it is that man must never form himself to remain at one state. He must 
always be moving on, for life itself is that "which must overcome itself again and again.”363 
The difference between this and the harmonic idea of perfection is that man redeems himself, not by 
perfecting his individual nature, but that of the entire cosmos. That is why he can exhort that "Man is 
something that should be overcome" as merely an ethical possibility rather than a thing in itself: an 
intermediate stage between ape and a new species he calls the Superman.364 This is not an exhortation 
to deny or turn against human nature. Self-overcoming simply extends what cosmic nature already 
does, except consciously at a higher degree of complexity. So even the open-ended idea of perfection 
of his later period does not abjure the classical features of the principle of physis or of stylisation. 
Classical style 
When the older Nietzsche's speaks of will to power he also speaks of what he calls "grosse stile", that 
is, grand or great style, or sometimes "classical style". Grosse stile is the most masterly form of 
coordination and sublimation, the "highest consciousness of power" that typifies genius.365 
Most references to grosse stile occur in the notes of 1888 shortly before the onset of insanity. Certain 
ideas recur: the man of classical style is synthetic, purged of all chaotic elements; he is calm, and 
reacts slowly to antagonism. He is not alarmed by contest or struggle; in all matters he hardens and 
strengthens himself; nothing he accomplishes appears complex since his thoughts and actions aim at 
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simplicity; he is not preoccupied by moral questions, all decisions are based on considerations that are 
"beyond good and evil".366 "The most powerful men have always inspired the architects; the architect 
has always been influenced by power. Pride, victory over weight and gravity, the will to power, seek 
to render themselves visible in a building; ...The highest feeling of power and security finds 
expression in that which possesses grand style. Power which no longer requires proving; which 
disdains to please; which is slow to answer; which is conscious of no witnesses around it; which lives 
oblivious of the existence of any opposition; which reposes in itself, fatalistic, a law among laws: that 
is what speaks of itself in the form of grand style."367 “The feeling of intoxication, in fact 
corresponding to an increase in strength; ...becoming more beautiful as the expression of a victorious 
will, of increased coordination, of a harmonising of all the desires, of an infallibly perpendicular 
stress. Logical and geometrical simplification is such a simplification again enhances the feeling of 
strength - High point of the development: the grand style."368 
Classical taste simplifies and unifies. Its aims and goals are grand and its conceptions expansive; what 
is manifest is its nobility. In those who exhibit classical style: the Greeks, the Romans, the condottieri 
of the Italian Renaissance, Napoleon, the best instincts of nature have ripened and the human machine 
approaches its optimum. Natures of this sort impress their mark on the clay of millennia. They are the 
end to which the human experiment has been striving."They are the "highest type: the classical ideal - 
as the expression of the well-constitutedness of all the chief instincts. Therein the highest style: the 
grand style. Expression of the 'will to power' itself."369 
Grand or classical style results when consciousness accords with will to power; the means of 
organisation that is closest to nature and which attains the highest feeling and consciousness of power. 
In this the genius reaches a perfection that can finally bear fruit. When this state is reached a natural 
and inevitable evanescence occurs that brings forth new being and new values; a feeling of plenitude 
that is the manifest joy in begetting or creating. 
Plenitude 
Plenitude describes two aspects of Nietzsche's idea of genius, related to what we have called poetic 
furor. The first may be called creativity, the second, the tragic or Dionysian outlook. The idea of 
plenitude or overflowing of powers has always been associated with the idea of creativity and has 
been a natural, even essential way of explaining how gods might bring the world into being; as if 
from nothing.  
This is as true of religious speculation as of philosophy; Plato used the idea to represent the actions of 
his Divine Artificer, and thereafter it was used by pagan and also by Christian thinkers. A late pagan 
like Plotinus, for example, in speaking of the "One", the transcendent being of beings, says: “The 0ne 
is perfect because it seeks for nothing, and possesses nothing, and has need of nothing; and being 
perfect, it overflows, and thus its superabundance produces an Other..."370 "Whenever anything 
reaches its own perfection, we see that it cannot endure to remain in itself, but generates and 
produces some other thing..." "To [the One]...we cannot impute any halt, any limit of jealous 
grudging; it must move forever outward, until the ultimate confines of the possible are reached..."371 
For Plotinus the generation of the world is the spontaneous result of the perfection of the divinity. 
Perfection stimulates outwardness: a being desires to overflow because inwardness or even self-
containment would not be conceivable to something that needed nothing. In secular periods, when we 
are not so frightened to compare ourselves favourably with gods it is natural to apply the same 
principle to human endeavour, even to explain why humans have to be be more than what they are. 
Men, like gods, create because they have a surplus of energies that expels itself in great works or 
deeds. As the Aufkärer Schiller says, man is "not satisfied with the needs of nature, he demands the 
superfluous. First, only the superfluous of matter, to secure his enjoyment beyond the present 
necessity; but afterward he wishes a superabundance in matter, an aesthetical supplement to satisfy 
the impulse for the formal, to extend enjoyment beyond necessity."372 
In the Letters on the Aesthetical Education of Man, he calls this surplus energy play (Spiel) and man's 
proclivity for it the play instinct or play drive (Spieltrieb).373 Play is a sensuous impulse that flows 
from his innermost nature and presses him to change and renewal, toward creativity in short. It is 
counterbalanced by the formal impulse in man that wishes to define and press a specific shape on the 
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character of that change. In defining this relation between the formal impulse (what we have hitherto 
called style) and that of play (what we call plenitude), Schiller lays bare the same metaphysical kernel 
at the centre of Nietzsche's philosophy. “The sensuous impulsion", Schiller says, "requires that there 
should be change, that time should have contents; the formal impulsion requires that time should be 
suppressed, that there should be no change. Consequently, the impulsion in which both of the others 
act in concert - allow me to call it the instinct of play... would have as its object to suppress time in 
time, to conciliate the transition or becoming with the absolute being, change with identity.374 
The conciliation of being and becoming is the object of human activity and embodied in man's 
attempt to bring value into existence; it is, in the words of Nietzsche, the attempt to impress upon 
becoming the eternal character of being. Style is the human activity that attends to being and is 
therefore the static aspect of genius; plenitude parallels becoming and is therefore a dynamic quantity, 
being the motor that drives genius and culture. 
Though loathe to admit it Nietzsche undoubtedly received significant guidance from Schiller. In his 
early work it is reflected in his distinction between Apollonian and Dionysian art; the former 
representing the form-drive and the latter the play-instinct. Apollonian art draws on the visual and 
plastic faculties and its affects stem from the world of phenomenal appearance; it manifests itself as 
the calm and ordered contemplation of a dream. Delighting in beautiful surfaces, it justifies and 
makes valuable the world of illusion, i.e. of being. Dionysian art is immediately identifiable with 
music, which is dynamic and impetuous; its affects reach beneath the phenomenal world to that of 
blind striving will itself, the endless becoming which is the foundation of all being.  
Even though in the highest culture Dionysian and Apollonian elements are combined, he always 
concedes the primacy of the former:"Thus the Dionysian is seen to be, compared to the Apollonian, 
the eternal and original artistic power that first calls the whole world of phenomena into 
existence."375 The tragic view of life, which Nietzsche equates with Dionysian art and therefore with 
the principle of plenitude, is the highest form of consciousness; it is one which recognises the 
nihilistic order of the cosmos yet which is willing to embrace life uncompromisingly.  
All three formulae are united in a passage of Die Fröhlische Wissenschaft, where Nietzsche sees those 
who seek a Dionysian art as suffering from "the over-fullness of life", they want a "Dionysian art and 
likewise a tragic view of life, a tragic insight.”376 Dionysian insight is tragic because the overflowing 
of those who have it affirms even painful existence. Only the unselfconscious voluptuousness of 
plenitude can sideline the importance of suffering in life. The most questionable and terrifying 
conditions of existence are accepted as inescapable counterpoints to the most joyful. Destruction and 
creation exist as boon companions and creation cannot begin at all without commission of some 
outrage of destruction. The key to tragic wisdom is found in the pagan orgy. The later Nietzsche 
states that "the psychology of the orgy as an overflowing feeling of life and energy within which even 
pain acts as a stimulus" provided him with "the key to the concept of the tragic feeling..."377 
These are ideas Nietzsche never relinquished. In his maturity, when seeking to ground his system of 
value, he selects an idea of nature that is the very character of plenitude: will to power. Will to power 
is predicated on the idea of surplus. At the simplest level of being all things extend outward, not out 
of hunger but out of fullness. At a more complex level every well-constituted living thing, which is 
always a construction of commands and subjugations of will, must also overflow since it has tamed 
its borders and subjugated its internal organisation. It must extend outward because it has nowhere 
else to go. It must discharge itself of necessity, like any natural force whose equilibrium is disturbed. 
Nietzsche relates plenitude as will to power to genius by declaring that the genius is a "being who 
either engenders or produces".378 Plenitude occurs in him as an inner vitality that constantly seeks 
work and action. The abundance of the genius is attributable to the splendid coordination of his 
physiology, which produces a surplus of powers; with the internal strife of the organism stilled, it is 
free to look outward. The feeling of outwardness is an urgent tension which preys on him inwardly. 
Surplus energy is tumultuous when suppressed and seeks expulsion. When this occurs the genius is 
heedless of self-preservation. It is not sacrifice, indifference to his own interests, or devotion to an 
idea, cause or fatherland that impels him to act. His imperative is to release his powers:"he flows out, 
he overflows, he uses himself up, he does not spare himself - with inevitability, fatefully, involuntarily, 
as a river bursting its banks is involuntary."379 To describe this state Nietzsche employs terms 
traditionally associated with the idea of plenitude. One might as well be listening to Plotinus as he 
observes that it is "richness in personality, abundance in oneself, overflowing and bestowing, 
instinctive good health and affirmation of oneself, that produce great sacrifice and great love: it is 
strong and godlike selfhood from which these affects grow, the inner certainty of having a right to do 
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everything"380 Not merely talent or productivity but all the greatest virtues arise from this one 
impelling force:"true graciousness, nobility, greatness of soul proceed from abundance..."381 
The concentration of energies given to individuals is also given to nations. A noble nation - here 
Nietzsche mentions Athens - is tormented by a restlessness that leads to bold and sometimes heedless 
undertakings. When abandoned by other Greeks and prostrate before the advancing Persian army, the 
people of Athens put out to sea to save themselves, leaving the city itself to burn. This remarkable 
venture, gains them an invaluable education that they use to check the invaders at Salamis and 
transform themselves into masters of the Aegean. The same energy that spurred every citizen to 
defend their city aspires to empire. Alcibiades dazzles the city with the ambition of conquering Sicily. 
Plutarch describes the fever of young men in the wrestling schools and old men in the shops and 
meeting places who sit tracing maps of Sicily and of the harbours and the coastline facing Africa. 
Defying caution they equip their expedition to Siracuse only to suffer a military catastrophe. But this 
grim reverse is soon shrugged off and the nation presses on to other undertakings. Restlessness of this 
sort awaits neither victory nor defeat, it does not consider outcomes but delights in activity for 
itself."This "boldness" of noble races, mad, absurd, and sudden in its expression, the incalculability, 
even incredibility of their undertakings... their indifference to and contempt for security, body, life, 
comfort, their hair-raising cheerfulness and profound joy in all destruction, in all the voluptuousness 
of victory and cruelty"382 betrays a desire to affirm their existence at any cost. 
In Nietzsche's final estimation, the true mission of genius in individuals and nations, is to create; to 
bring form to becoming, to endlessly generate whole new worlds out of the richness of being. In doing 
so genius completes nature and redeems the suffering of ages. Creation is the sport of those who, 
sundered from blind nature by self-consciousness, can display an unqualified acceptance of every 
good and evil thing that occurs to them.383 Hence this effusion in Thus Spake Zarathustra: " a sacred 
Yes is needed, my brothers, for the sport of creation: the spirit now wills its own will, the spirit 
sundered from the world now wins its own world;"384 or, as he states more composedly, "there is 
nothing better than what is good - and good is having some ability and using that to create..."385 
Conclusion 
Nietzsche's ethical ideal of genius embodies three elements that have been at the foundation of 
aesthetic discourse since antiquity. The qualities of integrity, style and plenitude are reflected not only 
in what the genius does, for he may or may not be an artist in the literal sense - certainly he must be 
an artist in whatever he chooses to do in life - but in what he is. Integrity and style indicate the "how" 
of what a person must do and plenitude the "what". The genius perfects his own personality and 
makes his life and deeds a perfect example of form within becoming, and therefore of the foundation 
and embodiment of value that comes from cultivation. 
Occasionally Nietzsche gives us a more complete and concrete picture of the genius: most often he is 
one who unifies diversity, after the principle of similitudo in varietate of Leibniz. He is a synthetic 
individual who embodies and unifies diverse tendencies in his nature. In one example, often cited 
admiringly by Jaspers, he sees the genius as a "Roman Caesar with Christ's soul", though this 
specimen might be to ethics what a camel is to marine biology.386 At other times he refers to the pre-
Socratic philosophers as ideal synthetic individuals, who embody capacity for self-rule, with that of 
legislating for all mankind. They were commanders of the spirit and political commanders as well. 
But his idealisations of pre-Socratics are as shadowy and incomplete as our actual historical 
knowledge of them.  
Amore convincing picture of ideal genius appears in the Twilight of the Idols when he describes 
Goethe as engaging in all of the operations of genius, integrity, style and plenitude, to form himself as 
a total being. What Goethe aspired to, he tells us "was totality". He "strove against the separation of 
reason, sensuality, feeling, will... he disciplined himself to a whole, he created himself... Goethe 
conceived of a strong, highly cultured human being, skilled in all physical accomplishments, who, 
keeping himself in check and having reverence for himself, dares to allow himself the whole compass 
and wealth of naturalness, who is strong enough for this freedom; a man of tolerance, not out of 
weakness, but out of strength, because he knows how to employ to his advantage what would destroy 
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an average nature; a man to whom nothing is forbidden, except it be weakness, whether that 
weakness be called vice or virtue.... A spirit thus emancipated stands in the midst of the universe with 
a joyful and trusting fatalism, in the faith that only what is separate and individual may be rejected, 
that in the totality everything is redeemed and affirmed."387 
These are the classical elements of the Ideal of Cultivation, but of which model? The Mycanean 
aristocrat, the republican politician, the Hellenistic sage? Like many German intellectuals before him, 
he juxtaposes the first of these with the third. Sharing the natural affinity of the Germans for the 
Hellenistic sage, but also entranced by the idea of action and political effects, Nietzsche imposes on it 
the model of the warrior. The principle of the independent and self-cultivating sage, the Hellenistic 
icon of heroism, is activated by representing him as an aristocrat given to command: the sage as kalos 
kai agathos, as one who has the leisure to cultivate himself and the privilege to command. 
This hybrid is no mere aristocrat of property and tradition, but of "spiritual greatness" and therefore 
more authentic. These reflections accord with the political reality of German civilisation from the 
Middle Ages to the nineteenth century: where power is in the court or bureaucracy and the agents or 
servants of power either courtiers or mandarins or as happened often enough, the mandarin or courtier 
merge indistinguishably into a single entity as happened to Goethe who, as Minister of State in 
Weimar, fulfilled both roles. Intellectuals, desiring power and influence, but who do not deny the 
principle of aristocracy, seek to unmoor it from inherited privilege and redefine it on the basis of 
merit. In short, they spiritualise it. The desire for a meritocracy of spirit based on those who best 
cultivate themselves was prevalent among Greek as among German intellectuals. Perhaps, it will 
always be wherever aristocracy is not itself in dispute. What we examine next, is how this feeling is 
politicised and how, in Nietzsche's hands, the Ideal of Cultivation became a politics of cultivation. 
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10 - Nietzsche's Politics of Cultivation 
Wer soll der Erde Herr sein? Das ist der Refrain meiner praktische Philosophie.388 
Nietzsche's unbridled faith in the Ideal of Cultivation isolates him from his contemporaries and 
underpins his experience of nihilism. This leads him to employ the stratagem of physis to justify this 
ideal even though fully aware that values cannot have rational foundation. The later Nietzsche 
continues to use an idea of physis that understands nature as being nothing but will to power. 
In intellectual history an elective affinity often holds often entirely separate ideas together within a 
pattern of consciousness. If you grasp hold of one of these ideas you may expect to predict the 
existence of others alongside it. There is no rigid necessity here: ideas aggregate for psychological 
and neurological causes rather than logical affinity. It has never pained philosophers to discover 
reasons to 'logically' join together concepts that they merely feel to be related. They love doing it. 
Given Nietzsche's attachment to the Ideal of Cultivation, it was highly likely he should also possess 
an idea of physis and an idea of genius, or rather, some icon of heroism. And, since having the last, it 
was quite probable that he should have employed at least some of the categories we associated with 
the terms integrity, style and plenitude, to define it.  
Intellectual precedence, the dependence on previous thinkers, is not needed to trigger these sequences, 
though of course, a thinker is always likely to reach for examples ready to hand. Intellectual historians 
are prone to treat ideas as though they were a set of rags that once draped over a Greek, and been 
handed on to every thinker ever since.389 For purely historical reasons Nietzsche was drawn to the 
Ideal of Cultivation, but he was to some extent, doomed to rethink it along a preordained trajectory. 
Nietzsche's concern with politics 
Whenever an Ideal of Cultivation has existed, there is also likely to be an attempt to apply to politics. 
Even if seen as purely an ethic for individuals, there is always an understanding of how an Ideal of 
Cultivation relates to the organisation of the group. For Nietzsche the politics of cultivation is the 
major component of his philosophical activity. He politicises the Ideal of Cultivation and make it the 
basis for discussing his contemporary world. He even refers to his concern as 'great politics' since it 
looked beyond the borders of the national state to the reshaping of mankind itself. 
Although, in later years he calls himself an 'antipolitical' or 'unpolitical' German, suggesting that in 
this he falls within a venerable German tradition, this does not imply a lack of interest in worldly 
affairs, but a dissatisfaction with contemporary German politics, which he understands as the 
parliamentary, diplomatic, party and even bureaucratic games and manoeuvres of those working 
through formal institutions of power. By declaring himself to be 'unpolitical' he merely indicates his 
aversion to the power institutions of the second German Reich, in whose establishment he had 
willingly participated during his youth. 
Nineteenth century German intellectuals were happy to see state or public institutions employed as 
vehicles for change, but in the longer tradition of the Aufklärung the book, the stage, the work of art, 
the festival, or the professor's podium was the epicentrum of the political act. It was the ironic fate of 
the Aufklärer, denied opportunities for direct political engagement won by his western counterparts, 
that he should politicise areas of life such as aesthetics. Far less incendiary than their Latin or Anglo-
Saxon cousins, German intellectuals were the prophets of reform and incremental improvement. They 
were, above all, politicians of culture because they believed change could be brought about by 
educators rather than by legislators. Nietzsche, as student and scholar, as professor, as man of letters, 
used his vocation to press for one reform or another. In this he was a tireless participant, and never a 
'mystical separatist' flitting between tourist resorts in Italy, Switzerland and southern France. It was 
actually during this reclusive period that his books became most polemical in the cause of the politics 
of cultivation. He even employed his reclusiveness as a political statement, for he never ceased 
banging on about it. And if someone publically congratulates themselves for being little read or 
misunderstood in their own country does that not indicate how resentful they are that they cannot 
exert any influence there. 
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Eudemonic Versus Culture Politics 
The preceding observations make more sense if we distinguish between culture and eudemonic 
politics. These terms describe different archetypal responses to the question of ends or purpose for 
which a society should be organised.  
Both eudemonic and culture politics are purely secular in character. Against these there are traditional 
other-worldly positions, with which all secular viewpoints compete. Religiously inspired political 
debates are concerned neither with happiness nor culture but with moral standards or with preparing 
souls for the after-world. In Europe the medieval church opposed the emergence of the modern nation 
state, and in the modern western world, the call for theocracy continues in the United States, and in 
the Middle East and South Asia among Moslems, Jews and Hindus.  
Though there are many varieties of political organisation, there are few reasons for justifying any one 
of them. The justification embodied in the terms culture or happiness are two of these. We can 
illustrate this by asking ourselves what we would consider to be the most important task of any 
political system. We may, if we are liberal westerners, decide that it is 'to protect the freedom of all 
individuals in society'. But we would then have to ask ourselves: 'Why is freedom good?' 
Some would say that freedom is good in itself, but most would be able to qualify the claim by stating: 
A.  We are not happy unless we are free. Freedom for all individuals is the best means for 
ensuring the greatest happiness of the greatest number, or, 
B.  Freedom may not make us happy but it is only when we are free that we can develop our full 
potential and contribute to the progress of humanity. 
Statement A is the eudemonic position and Statement B the culture position, though nothing they are 
not mutually exclusive. Culture politics and eudemonic politics aren‟t necessarily opposed though 
quite often they are.  
We could conduct similar experiments on almost any of the following political polarities: 
1. Whether the state's powers should be: 
A. maximised or B. minimised; 
2. Whether the ideal political arrangement would: 
A. preserve hierarchy or B. promote equality; 
3. Whether political systems should strive for: 
A. homogeneity and order, or B. heterogeneity and conflict; 
4.  Whether states should be: 
A. national in character or B. cosmopolitan; 
5. Whether people should or should not be ruled, and if so, whether they be ruled by: 
A. one, (hereditary monarch, tyrant, or great commander), 
B. a few, (an oligarchy, aristocracy, or political party) or, 
C. many, (spontaneous participatory democracy); 
6. Whether the character of rule should be: 
A. authoritarian and censorious, or, B. liberal and tolerant; 
7. Whether the aim of government is to: 
A. redistribute wealth on grounds of justice or welfare, or, 
B. allow the material status of individuals to be determined by their own prowess. 
Each pole could be justified as either a basis for happiness or for cultivation and improvement. It 
could be argued, for example, that dictatorship ensures the happiness of more than liberalism and 
tolerance, or vice versa; and likewise that dictatorship is better for culture than tolerance, or vice 
versa.  
The distinction between culture and eudemonic politics is perhaps alien to modern westerners who 
now believe there are only two alternatives for government namely: welfare or rational economic 
management. Both alternatives are sub-species of the eudemonic standpoint whose current dominance 
assures that if we can never agree about which is the best form of government we are universally 
certain that our common destination is Happy Valley.  
Because universal happiness is accepted unquestioningly as the only legitimate political end, we are 
surprised that anybody could desire anything else. That there have been those who have seen the 
production of high culture alone as the one true goal of nations is thus invisible to us. But in fact this 
has been the political objective of generations of intellectuals prior to the twentieth century. 
97 
Nietzsche's Political Extremism 
Intellectuals have not always thought high culture and happiness to be incompatible. But wherever 
they have, as occurred in the German enlightenment many, as Nietzsche was later to do, conceded 
priority to culture. Culture is a mighty god; on whose alter even the happiness of an entire people can 
be sacrificed. In this sense a politics of Cultivation is the secular equivalent of otherworldy politics 
that serve divinity before humanity. Only, for the culture-politician, gods are in this world and require 
as much solemnity and piety of devotion. For Nietzsche it is not happiness but the production of great 
works that matters in life, and it is this point which he believes constantly eludes his contemporaries. 
“The problem of culture is seldom grasped correctly”, he complains: “The goal of a culture is not the 
greatest possible happiness of a people, nor is it the unhindered development of all their talents; 
instead, culture shows itself in the correct proportion of these developments, its aim points beyond 
earthly happiness: the production of great works is the aim of culture.”390 
Nietzsche‟s extreme attachment to an Ideal of Cultivation brutalises his responses to other values and 
humanity, just as the love of deity brutalises a civilisation's attitude to human life. It is idealism rather 
than pragmatism that most cynically treats flesh and blood as a cipher for its purposes. And it is this 
tendency in Nietzsche that has made 'liberal' sympathisers like Kaufmann or Hollingdale reluctant to 
discuss the political dimension of his work.  
Nietzsche's contemporaries, being innocent of the convulsions Europe was soon to suffer, were not so 
neglectful. By the beginning of the Great War his books had been adopted by right and left wing 
radicals of German and European politics. If the conservative Stefan George circle had worshipped 
him as a saint, the young Marxist Georg Lukacs, who later venomously attacked Nietzsche and his 
legacy, was the keenest of his readers. Those who took what they needed from his work, did not 
always express motives that were strictly 'Nietzschean', but they did recognise his political intentions 
(as did Baeumler in his Nietzsche, der Philosoph und Politiker.)391 Nor was the Nazi reception of his 
ideas aberrant. However crudely Nazi intellects digested works of philosophy, however incapable 
they were of distinguishing reality from fancies, they could see what more sophisticated readers have 
not: that Nietzsche was and wished to be a philosopher for action. 
The key to the later Nietzsche's philosophical activity: “Wer soll der Erde Herr sein? - Who shall rule 
over the earth? This is the refrain of my practical philosophy.” We cannot stress sufficiently the 
candid use of the interrogative pronoun in this declaration. It is Wer? Who? What person? not what 
ideas? or What values? By asking who rather than what values shall rule, he implies that no values, 
no form of being, no way of living will ever dominate until those who embody it also have the 
physical power to bring it into effect. Spiritual power must be actuated by political power. Only 
individuals who can educate and organise can make others enact their ideals.  
This view is a natural outgrowth of understanding the world as will to power. If all Being is itself will 
to power, 'Who shall rule over the earth?' is a metaphysical and a political question. More precisely 
this question is: Which way of expressing will to power will become dominant?, or What form of being 
will be imposed on mankind? Since all living things are simply forms of organised power and each 
organism a polity, then the common aim of nature is to attain a higher level of power that is realised 
in the higher types of individual known as the genius. The will to power is therefore in its essence and 
implications a total political doctrine extending from the forms of human society to the very 
foundations of Being. The politics of cultivation for the later Nietzsche is not only a political 
orientation but also metaphysics, involving a politicising of all Being. 
Since the genius embodies the highest human value, and justifies mankind and all nature, then 
producing genius by means of a culture-state should be our natural objective. So just as the genius is 
the individual who consciously perfects nature, the culture-state is the form of social organisation that 
consciously seeks to bring forth genius.  
Nietzsche‟s idea of the culture-state is one that existed in Germany since the Aufklärung. Although he 
rarely used the term and sometimes explicitly disassociated himself from it (only to react against a 
specific understanding of what a culture-state should be) the idea is implicit in all his statements 
about social and political organisation. He may have claimed not to have been utopian, but his 
criticisms or discussions of contemporary political arrangements clearly display a fund of ideals about 
the way society should be organised. Nietzsche‟s culture-state is loosely conceived and consistent 
with Hellenistic forms of Bildung that looked inward and focussed on the development of the 
individual. Whenever Aufklärers pondered on politics and society, they did so in a way that was 
consistent with their inwardness. If the paradox may be forgiven, they turned inwardness inside out, 
as Nietzsche's was fated to do with a vigour that they never exceeded. 
How Nietzsche's imagined that culture-state, and how he proposed to bring it into existence in modern 
Europe in order to breed genius is the subject of the ensuing chapters.  
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11 - The historical character of the German State 
Nietzsche's contemplated the politics of cultivation in a civilisation whose political structures had not 
changed significantly for some four to five hundred years of which the most important was the 
Prussian state. The state is his one essential experience of how power is used to organise human 
existence. It is with this that his political education begins. He is instructed in Prussian schools and 
serves in Prussia's army. Along with generations of German intellectuals he shares an intense 
preoccupation with the nature and role of the state, with its origins, its development and the 
possibility of its extinction. Even his reactions against it are commonplace in German thought, and 
the revulsion he shows is no more than their extreme expression.  
Certainly, discussions of the state's nature and function occur throughout Europe, due to the 
emergence of new territorial- or nation- states like France, England, Spain, and Holland that were 
replacing city-states and feudal empires. Universal like empires but autonomous like city-states, the 
territorial states expand outward as they grab more territory and inwardly as they intrude into the 
affairs of their citizens. They emerge in the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries as absolutist 
monarchs, interposing themselves between the Empire or Church and the territorial nobility, 
concentrate and centralise their power. More complex and invasive than any state structure hitherto, 
their existence could hardly be ignored in political discourse.  
But unlike the English, French, Dutch and others, the Germans could not match state authority with 
ideas of nationhood. Geography was on the side of the westerners, and their political forms fused 
more easily and naturally with national territories. In Germany the undignified decay of the Holy 
Roman Empire delayed the formation of a nation-state until long after Atlantic nations had 
established worldwide empires. Generations of Germans were compelled to invest it with a 
significance it could never be given elsewhere, as an abstract source of devotion in its own right, even 
outside the claims of the nation. The idea of the state became the very kernel of ethical discourse; an 
obsession that is sounded by Hegel who observes that “the State is the actuality of the ethical 
idea”,392 or for example, by Adam Müller who notes that “Man cannot be thought of outside of the 
state”.393 
The material character of the Prussian State 
The character of the future Prussian state is already observed in the administration of the founders of 
Prussia, the chivalric Order of the Teutonic Knights (the Deutschritterordern). Based at Marienburg 
these bureaucratic priestly warriors colonised and ruled eastern, mainly Slavic, territories until the 
fifteenth century. It was during this conquest that the Prussian political habits developed but when the 
knightly order withered away, they were adopted by the dynasty that succeeded them, the 
Hohenzollern. 
You can already see many features of the corporate state by the thirteenth century: in the Order‟s 
observance of ascetic principles and knightly ethics; its relatively open membership (you only needed 
to be a freeman and of legitimate birth – other orders demanded credentials of nobility); in its election 
of a grand master by the members as opposed to hereditary hierarchy; in its supra-national identity - 
members were related by common principles rather than common nationality and put the interests of 
the order before their own; and in its foundation of administrative arms for finance, trade, and supply. 
This strict and alien regime ruled colonists and subject peoples, such as Slavs and Balts, as an abstract 
corporate power. There was no sense of monarchical inheritance or pursuit of national prestige. In the 
hundred years before Polish forces smashed the military power of the Order at Grunwald in 1410, it 
focussed more on promoting commerce than on military conquest, another habit that would be 
adopted by future Hohenzollern rulers. During the reformation, the last Grand Master of the Teutonic 
Knights, a Hohenzollern, dissolved the order, became a Lutheran and secularised the church 
territories to form a separate princedom. In 1618, this Prussian territory was merged with 
Brandenburg in the west, where a branch of the Hohenzollern family had been ruling since 1417. 
The Hohenzollern adopted military and economic policies used by the Deutschritterordern. By the 
time of the Great Elector, Frederick William, Prussia was a geographically dispersed inheritance, 
consisting of Brandenburg, the duchy of Cleves, the counties of Mark, and Ravensburg and Prussia. 
This inspired successive Hohenzollern princes to consolidate their possessions, for they could not be 
preserved by any other means. They perpetuated the psychology of power initiated by the Teutonic 
Order; and overcompensated for geographical weakness by enlarging state organs. They also 
conducted a vacillating diplomacy to forestall encirclement by predatory powers like Sweden, Poland, 
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Russia, Austria, and France.  
Most importantly, they founded a professional standing army: a measure then uncommon in Europe 
which, due to the burden it imposed on government revenue, led to introduction of uniform financial 
administration over all territories and to efficient methods of taxation. Unlike other courts they 
eschewed extravagance and monitored expenditure carefully. Maintaining such an army was not just 
desirable, it was imperative for the Prussians. The ascetic ghost of the Deutschritterordern tramped 
into the chambers of office: the modesty and frugality of the court was matched by the strict 
discipline in the army and the probity of state officials, a condition ensured by punishments no other 
European country ever sought to emulate.  
Yet there was more to state policy than fiscal restraint. It was foreseen, in the time of the Great 
Elector that a small efficient standing army could prove economically beneficial by stimulating 
manufacturing. So although the basis of the Prussian economy until the 19th century was agriculture, 
the Hohenzollern state actively encouraged industry over centuries. In the 16th and 17th centuries it 
did this instinctively; in the 18th it applied the economic doctrines of Mercantilism, or 'Cameralism' 
as it was known in Germany. Frederick William I went so far as to establish chairs for this science at 
various universities and to stipulate that individuals verse themselves in the subject before applying 
for admission to the Prussian state service. 
In the early 19th century laissez-faire principles invaded German universities and attracted the 
interest of Prussian officials, but their application in public policy never extended beyond aristocratic 
land-tenure, and guild-privileges. An economy so beholden to government, discouraged individuals 
from competing to promote their success in competition with those of other states. 
In other nations industry spawned an independent bourgeoisie with interests above the state, worked 
closely with its supporter and benefactor and initiated a German policy tradition that even the Nazi's 
did not break. Industry was encouraged yet harnessed so that the social order could never be unsettled 
by it. The bourgeoisie had retreated from glory in the 15th and 16th centuries when the Hanseatic 
burghers could not respond to the shift in world economic power from the Mediterranean to the 
Atlantic. It never threatened the commercial power of the noble estate owners, or sought to limit the 
powers of the state until well into the nineteenth century. The power of the Prussian nobility that 
initially resented taxation without consent was also pruned by the monarchy, as happened elsewhere 
in Europe. In Prussia however, their loss of traditional privileges were compensated by receiving 
greater economic and administrative dominance within the state. 
The monarchy tightly reined in the Prussian bureaucrats, who were recruited mainly from nobility and 
from the bourgeoisie, and often played them off against the Junkers, the landed nobility. The 
recalcitrance of the aristocracy was subverted once they found themselves incorporated into the state 
and their interests made identical with it. In the first instance nobles were compelled to serve as 
professional officers in the army and bureaucracy. Officer's academies were founded that fostered 
professional and hereditary elitism, and schools and universities specialised in preparing sons of the 
aristocracy and haupt-bourgeoisie for state service. Unlike the British, the Prussian aristocracy never 
sullied its blood by outbreeding with the parvenu, and unlike the French never allowed itself to be 
accused of idleness. Its place in the traditional hierarchy was preserved, even in the face of absolutist 
monarchy when their interests did occasionally diverge. Although inherently conservative the Junkers 
remained the only class capable of initiating change within Prussia. Until well into the 19th century it 
was the class of action and reaction. 
Before unification, Prussia developed the state further than any other German principality. Sharing 
the same language, economy and political circumstances as other states in the Holy Roman Empire, 
enabled it to exert increasing influence over them, either by conquest, prestigious example, or 
economic domination. 
Spiritual character of the Prussian State 
That a nation of diverse geography, classes and nationalities could be welded into a single state and 
become, within a few centuries, a leading European power was a remarkable achievement. Those who 
lived under the Hohenzollern had no particular pride in being Prussians, at least not until the nation 
was a power in its own right. But no nation could achieve such power without some conviction 
motivating its citizens and justifying their exertions. Religion could not do it, since it suffered the 
same fate in Prussia as all else: being secularised and incorporated into the state structure. 
Prussians were no less religious than other Europeans but they learned to subordinate their faith to 
higher principles. Religion was either ancillary to Prussian spiritual life or it facilitated secular rule. 
Like other German Protestant rulers during the Reformation, the early Hohenzollern believed they 
were entitled to perform spiritual and secular roles. They established the Consistory, a separate state 
body of leading theologians, to govern ecclesiastical affairs, and generally deferred to its counsels. As 
the spiritual momentum of the Reformation expended itself in the 17th and 18th centuries the 
100 
Consistory became yet another bureaucratic department. 
In periods of extreme secular rule, such as under Frederick William I and Frederick II, the Protestant 
clergy, mostly of bourgeois background, laboured under strict state regulations and, as though no 
more than an arm of government, performed duties remote from their spiritual calling. Obedience to 
the ruler and the welfare and consolidation of the state was the priority. Dissident clergy were 
invariably punished, sometimes with imprisonment. 
The Hohenzollern assimilated organised religion into the bureaucracy but also, like every profoundly 
secular state, displayed civil tolerance of various beliefs. This occurred early in Prussia's history even 
though the rulers themselves, discounting exceptions like Frederick II, were deeply pious Calvinists, 
and thus did not share the mainly Lutheran faith of their subjects.  
Huguenots, Jews, Hussites, and Mennonites, and even Catholics in a Europe tired of religious 
dissension found refuge in Prussia. Tolerance had sound practical benefits: it increased the stability of 
the state by protecting it from potential schism and the arrival of persecuted but talented and 
industrious minorities increased the population and strengthened the economy. Early capitalist 
enterprise in Prussia, as in other parts of Germany, owed much to immigrant westerners fleeing 
persecution elsewhere. It was only after 1871, the year the Catholic Church promulgated its dogma of 
papal infallibility, that the state initiated religious persecution in Prussia, when Bismark, fearing a 
usurping of secular authority, notably in South Germany, initiated the Kulturkampf against it. 
Until the 19th century a more perfect doctrinal marriage between faith and secular rule could not have 
been hoped for. Protestant orthodoxy emphasised obedience and diligence and so did the state. Even 
when increasingly 'enlightened' Protestant clergy devalued elements of mysticism and dogma in 
religion, they preserved the idea of fidelity to civil order.  
Religion was secularised to bare principles of 'reasonable' morality, belief in the creator god, and the 
immortality of the soul.394 Even where religion retained strong mystic elements, as in the Pietist 
movement, which was popular among the upper bourgeoisie and nobility, it was of a character not 
antipathetical to state interests, or rationalism itself. Emphasizing private salvation undercut grounds 
for disputes on dogma, and introspection and quiet worship severed it from concern with worldly 
matters with the exception of charitable works, that were appreciated by and at times sponsored by 
the state. Pietist groups maintained highly regarded schools and made the sober and virtuous state 
functionary their educational ideal rather than the cavalier or gentleman. Products of their schools 
frequently entered the bureaucratic and military services. Pietist devotion shared many parallels with 
contemporary secular movements, firstly with the enlightenment and later with the Romantics and 
their reaction against rationalism and the ideas of the French revolution. 
A reforming hierarchy 
Up until the death of Frederick II the Prussian state was the work of rulers who might be described as 
'state artists' in the sense Jakob Burckhardt spoke of when he described the despots of the Italian 
Renaissance. Some like Frederick II had been peerless, and others undeniably mediocre, but slowly 
they had acquired territory and personal power to create a nation that barely had a right to exist, and 
probably would never have emerged for any organic reasons. Hohenzollern rulers thereafter could not 
maintain breadth of command and resorted increasingly to ministerial advice. 
The habit of statehood and participation in the alien abstraction of state corporation was imposed on 
an obedient and pliable mass by the Prince‟s bureaucracy and military. They used violence 
judiciously and legislated to unite the interests of all classes, undermine sources of discontent and 
conflict and extend the tentacles of state institutions. Within the state-system necessary reforms were 
allowed without overturning the established order. Almost every major social reform up until the 
reign of the last Hohenzollern (by which time the German state had implemented social insurance 
schemes ahead of the democracies of Europe) was the result of executive decisions made with or 
without the spur of public agitation. 
Although Prussian ancien régime was liberalised to some degree before the revolution in France and 
although Aufklärer intellectuals had been hawking concepts of liberty for some time, it was only after 
the French invasion that liberal ideas had to be taken seriously by the state in order to forestall the 
prospect of revolution. As early as 1799, Karl Gustav von Struensee, finance minister under Frederick 
William II anticipated the slogan 'revolution from above', later made famous by Hardenberg when he 
told the French chargé d'affaires that “the beneficial revolution which you Frenchmen have conducted 
violently from below, we Prussians will conduct gradually from above. The King is a democrat in his 
way: his constant preoccupation is to restrict the privileges of the aristocracy...”395 However, 
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Frederick II's reactionary and indecisive successors delayed serious attention to this matter until the 
French occupied Berlin in 1806. By then the need for action was self-evident. 
The leaders of reform, Stein, Hardenberg, Scharnhorst, Gneisenau, and Von Humboldt, all highly 
placed bureaucrats or army officers, saw that Prussia could not eject the French without the help of 
patriotic citizens, which they had to create by giving them representation of sorts and some stake in 
preserving the order. Between 1807 and 1813, they enacted laws that abolished serfdom, liberated 
industry, dissolved the guilds, rationalised taxation and the financial system, and conferred wider 
powers of self-government on the townships. Scharnhorst and Gneisenau reconstructed the army, 
forging the instrument that figured so decisively in Napoleon's defeat, while von Humboldt 
implemented a new Prussian educational programme.  
During the high tensions of the War of Liberation the reformers even managed to exact from the king 
a promise to enact a constitution, however he retracted this when the war ended in 1815. Conservative 
reaction in post-Napoleonic Prussia worked against the liberalising of public institutions, so the focus 
of reform was on bureaucracy. The Prussian historian and official, B. G. Niebuhr says in 1815: 
“Freedom depends much more on administration than on constitution”.396 Assimilating liberal ideas 
permitted the monarchy to forestall questions of constitutional representation until 1848 when popular 
uprisings forced them to accede. Even then the monarchy took the initiative and absorbed the newly 
prepared constitution into the old state system, affecting the appearance of popular representation but 
leaving power in the hands of those who always had it. 
Displays of state artistry by absolutist monarchs in the 18th century, by the leaders of the Reform 
movement and later virtuosically by Bismark in the 19th century, were in the political consciousness 
of Germans into the twentieth century.397 The idea of the statesman as artist, the far-sighted genius, 
the philosopher-politician, who could inject advanced elements of European civilisation into a 
backward but pliant society, was invoked repeatedly by German intellectuals whenever they pondered 
on political change. It was a stock notion of the Romantic generation and even found a place in the 
liturgy of the social sciences in the twentieth century when Max Weber soberly and containedly 
posited the ideal type of the charismatic leader. 
It was no accident that the German intelligentsia, until the mid-19th century saw political change in 
terms of state rather than social action. Nor was it an accident, for example, that the great Prussian 
historian, Von Ranke, should found his new historiography in the 1830's on the practice of close 
scrutiny of archived state papers and memoranda. He had seen that it was in the chambers of state that 
Prussian history was made. 
The Aufklärers' sanctioning of enlightened absolutism was inherited by their Romantic successors. 
Some accepted the state apparatus as the destiny and justification of human existence, but many did 
not. Some sought to redeem state power by investing it with cultural mission: to justify the state by 
means of culture, and to formalise culture by means of the lawful state. Nietzsche inescapably adopts 
the categories and assumptions of his predecessors. 
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12 - Power-state and Culture-state in German thought 
The extraordinary role of the state in the nation's political history and of its affect on German political 
and cultural ideas is well known. All the generations of German thinkers - Aufklärers, Romantics, 
Nationalists, Left and Right Hegelians, Liberals, Marxists, and later Nietzsche, based their perception 
of the state and their politics on this reality. We restate the fact in order to recall the context in which 
German intellectuals fashioned and expressed their political theories. 
Machtstaat and Kulturstaat 
German intellectuals had two main ways of characterising the state. Either it was a pillar of power and 
administration, a Machtstaat or as a foundation for culture, a Kulturstaat.398 
The idea of the Machtstaat or Rechtstaat, a power institution that unifies citizens by legitimised force, 
is an example of the eudemonic politics we defined earlier. At the minimum such a state must ensures 
that individuals or society are not discomfited by disorder, but above that it can enact just laws, 
promote commerce, and the welfare of subjects.  
The idea of the Machtstaat is not unique to German thought. At the beginning of the early modern era 
it was implicit in Hobbes writings, which were read by seventeenth century German intellectuals like 
Pufendorf (1632-1694). For Hobbes, the state or commonwealth results when individuals willingly 
and collectively submit to a single greater power or 'sovereign'. Whether the sovereign is one person, 
or some or all people is secondary: without the idea of the sovereign society could not cohere and the 
natural order would be continuous civil strife. Hobbes' power state, based as it is on fear of death and 
the desire for peace, serves as an apology for absolutism in the territorial state, but it is also a practical 
response to the perceived need of every conservative; a geometric principle of power designed to 
create social stasis and stability. It is the standard apology for the existence of any power state.  
Until the mid-17th century German political theory was devoted solely to power-state apologetics. 
Political theory consisted of constitutional jurisprudence employed to entrench and justify the 
authority of the Holy Roman emperors. It is in Pufendorf that, for the first time in Germany, we see 
any attempt to determine precisely how much power invested in the sovereign and how much liberty 
permitted the ruled could be consistent with happiness or 'justice'.  
Afterwards, up until the late 19th century it was not the question of who ruled that worried German 
intellectuals (princely authority was seldom reviled) so much as how they ruled: a ruler must never 
arbitrary or capricious. They must use power in a manner that is regular and consistent. This was 
more important than that power be in the hands of the people or particular classes. Even individuals of 
liberal persuasion could state that “people want to get away from arbitrary rule... Neither republics 
nor absolute monarchies are any use in Germany; what we need is firm and well-ordered power.”399 
This was the core of discussion concerning the Machtstaat in Germany, until a secondary level of 
discourse arose in the early 19th century, often but not exclusively associated with Hegel's influence. 
This viewed the state as an ethical entity, not in the form of contract between ruler and ruled, but as a 
supra-personal identity with a sphere of interests and a separate life of its own. 
Adam Müller (1779-1829), a Prussian by birth who converted to Roman Catholicism and served as an 
Austrian official, exemplifies this development. Condemning those who merely wanted the state to 
concern itself with external security, he argues that it is in organic unity with a people. “Man cannot 
be thought of outside the state”400 he proclaims, “[the state] is the totality of human affairs, their 
union into a living whole.”401 Private and public life cannot be separated and whoever seeks to exist 
outside the state is spiritually desiccated. The state has both cultural and legal authority. The 
sovereign‟s duty is to “stimulate as well as compel people into this great union.”402 All human ends, 
happiness, virtue, culture, is subordinated in the moral hierarchy since, while the state can serve any 
purpose, it is actually greater than any other purpose.403 The state justifies its own existence. 
The purpose of the Kulturstaat is to be an instrument of culture and create a virtuous citizenry. In 
Germany from the mid 17th century two different ideas of the Kulturstaat existed: one organic, one 
cosmopolitan. The organic idea, inherited from the culture politics of antiquity and Renaissance, 
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pictured civic participation and a state constitution, with the state itself a work of culture designed to 
produce individuals of a specific, even uniform, type. The cosmopolitan idea, expressing Hellenistic 
elements, pictured the state as a safe harbour providing freedom for individual culture to emerge of its 
own volition, and therewith a diversity of types. As we have noted, this orientation is characteristic of 
cosmopolitan empires, regulated by bureaucratic forms.  
The difference between these views was one of emphasis rather than kind. Where the cosmopolitan 
Kulturstaat dominated among Aufklärers the idea of the organic culture state was more popular with 
the Romantic generation. In many cases, individuals like Nietzsche, wavered between both 
tendencies. 
The Cosmopolitan Kulturstaat 
The cosmopolitan Kulturstaat is the preoccupation of 18th century German intellectuals, living under 
absolutist rule, with individual freedom and with the especially inward-looking Ideal of Cultivation 
we have called Bildung. This preoccupation is clearly linked to their inability to participate in affairs 
of state other than as bureaucrats, to the weakness of the German bourgeoisie and urban civic life in 
general, and the tension between their urge for free expression and state censorship. 
The inwardness of Bildung parallels strikingly the shift from a civic to a personal Ideal of Cultivation 
that occurred in Hellenistic Greece. The intense civic life of the Greek polis required that individuals 
were cultivated to serve in public office as politicians, soldiers, diplomats and public administrators. 
They were fitted for their role by a universal paideia that fulfilled practical ends. When those city-
states lost their power and were incorporated into baggy multinational empires administered by 
despots or governors, civic virtue waned and the purpose of practical paideia was lost. Now the 
practice of cultivation was directed at private and personal needs. The cosmopolitan faiths of this 
period, those of the Academy, the Stoa, and Epicurus recommended quiet, disciplined, personal 
development. Talented individuals, denied access to fame in the theatre of politics, sought their 
salvation in philosophy, science and scholarship - a fact not lost on observers such as Polybius.404 
Paideia became intrinsically cosmopolitan: it elevated individuals above regional origins, to the 
higher sphere of universal principle, the perfection of human nature purely for itself. Paideia now 
fitted individuals to govern themselves rather than others, and this form of government was regarded 
increasingly as the highest form of freedom. 
A free-born citizen in the polis must participate in affairs of state and suffer intrusions on their time 
and purse. Active civic life discourages introspection. In the cosmopolitan empire, with no obligations 
to public order, you are not too distracted to cultivate your soul. Likewise in an 18th century 
Germany, administered by territorial rulers loosely gathered in a cosmopolitan, albeit moribund, 
imperial system. In underdeveloped towns that lacked the obligations of the republican civic spirit, 
German intellectuals (as the example of Goethe and von Humboldt attests) compensated by 
developing their private lives even when they held official positions.405 Both were ministers of state 
but their public obligations were diluted and relieved by peace and solitude. As in the Hellenist world, 
sons of the bourgeoisie, clergy, academics or bureaucrats, turned to an internalised cosmopolitan 
culture for self-justification. Accordingly, in the fifty years before Napoleon's invasion of Germany, 
Europe reaped one of its most bountiful harvests in the fields of art, science and scholarship. 
In Germany the idea of freedom is spiritualised, and internalised. It is something we must win for 
ourselves by mastering our faculties. That is why German intellectuals jealously guarded private 
spirituality from state control. Deeply implanted principles of stoical self-rule warned against a state 
that sought to regulate private ethics. The right of the state to enforce external constraints, to demand 
obedience in the sphere of economy, defence, or administration was not questioned; the intellectuals, 
even the most radical, were quite satisfied if they merely were allowed to think and speak freely. All 
the state has to ensure is that it does not interfere, as far as reason will allow, with this intellectual 
process. When the firebrand Fichte, his radical zeal awakened by revolution in France, published his 
first political pamphlet in 1793 he titled it: A Demand for Freedom of Thought Presented to the 
Princes of Europe who have hitherto Suppressed it. A gauntlet in the face of the ancien régime to be 
sure, but a 'demand for freedom of thought' seems unduly timid. To his credit, Fichte also expressed 
demands for 'external' freedom. But one suspects that he reflects an intellectual habit whose classical 
expression, echoed with approval by Kant in his essay What is Enlightenment?406 and to some extent 
the foundation of Kantian moral philosophy, can be attributed to that enlightened absolutist, Frederick 
the Great: Argue as much as you like about whatever you like, but obey!' 
A spiritualised idea of freedom that sanctioned ready submission to civil authority began in Germany 
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long before any obsession with Bildung. The same political circumstances affected even the forms of 
Protestant and German Catholic devotion. Luther‟s insistence on freedom of conscience with 
obedience to civil authority is characteristic of the secular Aufklärers. The Protestant form of worship 
correlates remarkably with Bildung: the same inward-looking habit of mind, and emphasis on 
personal salvation. It was not difficult to adapt those responses to a purely secular framework. 
Predictably, when German philosophers defined the relation between Bildung and the state, they 
would, to a man, identify freedom as the pre-requisite of a just constitution, not because freedom is 
good or just in itself, but because culture could not exist without it. The freedom they sought was not 
an untrammelled freedom of deeds, which might lead, they alleged, to a chaos that makes culture 
impossible. Civic harmony, enforced by and guarded by the state, would better constrain the wild 
instincts of men and permit these to be sublimated in pursuit of culture. They wanted to think freely, 
not to be free. 
The state was thought to be a part of nature and therefore compulsion and necessity were intrinsic to 
it, but freedom belonged to the spiritual realm of Reason. All the elements of this idea, which merges 
the principles of the Machtstaat with those of a Kulturstaat, can be found in Germany by at least the 
time of Christian Thomasius (1655-1728).407 They were however, to receive their classic exposition 
during the second half of the 18th century in the writings of Immanuel Kant.  
Kant, perhaps more influential than any other in the area of cosmopolitan culture-politics, prepared a 
groundwork of principle that was to nourish successive generations, particularly those of liberal 
persuasion, into the 20th century. Like all Aufklärers, his political obsession is to demonstrate the 
necessity of spiritual freedom for the promotion of culture and the physical preconditions it requires.  
His political preference is for absolute but enlightened monarchy. It was only in the 1790's that he 
starts to emphasise the role of popular will in establishing constitutional monarchy. In the essay What 
is Enlightenment (1784) he states that enlightened monarchy was superior to a republic in ensuring 
the preservation of spiritual freedom, and noted that culture is compatible with less rather than more 
civic liberty: “A greater degree of civil freedom seems advantageous to a people's spiritual freedom; 
yet the former established impassable boundaries for the latter; conversely, a lesser degree of civil 
freedom provides enough room for all to fully expand their abilities.”408 
Reconciling obedience to civil authority and spiritual freedom was difficult. But submission was 
easier. Kant unheroically submitted to censorship during the one abortive attempt by a Prussian 
monarch (Frederick William II) to impose religious regulation.409 
In the nine theses of the Idea for a Universal History with a Cosmopolitan Intent of 1784, Kant 
outlines a groundwork of principle to establish the cosmopolitan form of Kulturstaat, not too different 
from what Nietzsche used for the same purpose a century later.410 In the first three theses he 
elaborates the notion of the Ideal of Cultivation claiming it is nature's purpose to be consciously 
perfected by man, a perfection conducted by mortal individuals on behalf of the immortal human 
species. In the fourth thesis, he considers how this perfection takes place in human society. For Kant, 
as for successors like Nietzsche, the means that nature employs to develop man's capacities is 
'antagonism' or what we might today call 'competition' among individuals within society: “...their 
tendency to enter into society, combined however, with a thoroughgoing resistance that constantly 
threatens to sunder this society.”411 
The individual's own selfish desires to surpass others, which otherwise gives rise to social evils, also 
leads him to overcome his laziness and to work for his own distinction. This is what blooms into 
enlightenment and culture. The problem is then, as outlined in the fifth thesis, how to constrain vital 
but unsociable instincts within a framework that does not suffocate them: 
'The greatest problem for the human species... is to achieve a universal civil society administered in 
accord with the right. Since it is only in society - and, indeed, only in one that combines the greatest 
freedom, and thus a thoroughgoing antagonism among its members, with a precise determination and 
protection of the boundaries of this freedom, so that it can coexist with the freedom of others - since it 
is only in such a society that nature's highest objective, namely, the highest attainable development of 
mankind's capacities, can be achieved, nature also wills that mankind should itself accomplish this, as 
well as all the other goals that constitute mankind's vocation. Thus must there be a society in which 
one will find the highest possible degree of freedom under external laws combined with irresistible 
power, i.e., a perfectly rightful civil constitution, whose attainment is the supreme task nature has set 
for the human species; for only by solving and completing it can nature fulfil her other objectives 
with our species. Necessity compels men, who are otherwise so deeply enamoured with unrestricted 
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freedom, to enter into this state of coercion; and indeed, they are forced to do by the greatest need of 
all, namely, the one that men themselves bring about, for their propensities do not allow them to 
coexist for very long in wild freedom. But once in a refuge such as civil society furnishes, these same 
propensities have the same salutary effect. It is just as with trees in a forest, which need each other, 
for in seeking to take the air and sunlight from the others, each obtains a beautiful straight shape, 
whilst those that grow in freedom and separate from one another branch out randomly, and are 
stunted, bent and twisted. All the culture and art that adorn mankind, as well as the most beautiful 
social order, are fruits of unsociableness that is forced to discipline itself and thus through an imposed 
art to develop nature's seed more completely.'412 
Man is an animal that needs a master: someone who will break his self-will and force him to obey a 
universally valid will.413 Kant, unlike many of his intellectual descendents, is egalitarian enough to 
observe that a master is better provided by state constitution than by arbitrary rule of aristocracy. 
Once the just constitution is laid down culture emerges as a matter of course and the state need do no 
more. The state is a hard outer shell within which a constrained freedom sublimates the various forms 
of culture. This then is the limited yet essential function of the cosmopolitan Kulturstaat. 
Kant's ideas clarified the thought of the next generation. Wilhelm von Humboldt, a close friend of 
Goethe and Schiller (who had immersed himself in Kant's writings) and a key member of the Prussian 
Reform Group, provides a famous and perhaps more extreme statement of these principles in his 
treatise: Ideas for an Attempt to Determine the Limits of the Power of the State. The first two theses 
he presents are that “the true end of man... is the highest and most harmonious development of his 
powers to a complete and consistent whole...” and that “Freedom is the grand and indispensable 
condition which the possibility of such a development presupposes...”414 His adherence to the values 
of individuality, spontaneity and diversity in culture, and what Meinecke was later to call 
'cosmopolitanism', leads him to regard the best state as one that makes minimal use of its powers415 
and which interferes in the lives of citizens only as far as is needed to promote their welfare.416 
A state that regulates and legislates beyond this threatens its citizens with uniformity, and impedes the 
growth of individuality. Diversity is something that can only be encouraged if the state leaves people 
alone. But just as he wishes to limit state power, Von Humboldt also wants to keep the population as 
unpolitical as possible. Politics invades the quiet pursuit of culture. Like Kant, and most of the 
Aufklärers, he believes that monarchical absolutism is the best way to make the state behave 
responsibly. 417 
If freedom within constraint was accepted by the Aufklärers as the key to the development of culture, 
many like Von Humboldt cautioned that excessive state regulation could suffocate it. Often, in accord 
with the laissez faire doctrines of Adam Smith, which influenced some German intellectuals, they 
denied state involvement was needed anywhere other than to maintain order.  
Kant did not accept that the state had any concern with guiding morality or providing welfare and 
even Hegel remarked on the perturbing modern tendency of the state to overly organise the affairs of 
its citizens. In this context he mentions the new French republic but more significantly, he links 
regulatory extremism in Prussia with its singular inability to produce geniuses, a point made more 
than once by other commentators on that country. “How dull and spiritless a life”, he remarks, “is 
engendered in the modern State of the sort where everything is regulated from the top downwards, 
where nothing which has implications for the community as a whole is left to the management and 
execution of those parts of the people that have an interest in it - in a State such as the French 
Republic has made itself into - this we still have to experience in the future, if indeed mastery can 
maintain itself at this pitch of pedantry. But what life and what sterility reigns in another equally 
regulated state - in Prussia - strikes anyone who sets foot in the first village across the border or 
considers the complete lack of scientific or artistic genius in Prussia, and does not assess its strength 
by the ephemeral level of energy which a single man of genius was able to force it up to for a 
time.”418 
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In his Lectures to the German Nation Fichte goes further than any in rejecting state control at the cost 
of culture: “Freedom in the actions of the external life also, is the fostering soil for higher culture; a 
legislation which has the latter in view will give to the former the fullest scope possible, even at the 
risk that... governing may become somewhat more difficult and laborious.”419 He explicitly 
subordinates the Machtstaat principle to that of individual freedom needed for the practice of culture. 
In the eighth Lecture he goes even further and insists that the early state's use of coercion would 
slowly be superseded by rational educative processes. The state would so elevate individuals that 
eventually it would cease to have any reason to exist, and actually bring about its own extinction.420 
When claiming that the state may eventually 'wither away', Fichte anticipates an idea that both Marx 
and Nietzsche were to consider separately later in the century.  
If the state should concern itself only with providing spiritual freedom for culture, where do the state 
responsibilities end and those of culture begin? Cosmopolitan intellectuals present a theoretical haze 
that grows darker when the French revolution, having failed to enhance diversity of personality or 
increase cultural endeavour, leads many to reconsider the extent to which freedom should be 
permitted. Schiller, an enthusiast of the revolution in its early stages, backs away from its regicidal 
and fratricidal outcome, grows cautious about liberty and is convinced that freedom could not benefit 
culture until the moral substance of men is improved. The course of the revolution, he believes, 
degenerated precisely because the French lacked inner greatness to follow through to noble ends.  
In order for us to be capable of freedom we first have to be educated to moral strength through the 
power of art. We have to acquire a more refined sense of beauty and taste. In The Aesthetic Education 
of Man Schiller expressed the conviction that “to arrive at a solution even in the political problem, 
the road of aesthetics must be pursued, because it is through beauty that we arrive at freedom”.421 
What he means is that perfect freedom for individuals is realisable only in the world of appearance or 
imagination, in other words the world of culture, but not in the material or substantial world of the 
state. Schiller takes as inevitable the coercion and subjection of individuals before the law of the 
Machtstaat. He accepts that perfect freedom in a state system can never be possible and that 
consequently it is only “in the world of aesthetic appearance, [that] the idea of equality is realised, 
which the political zealot would gladly see carried out socially.”422 
The freedom of the ideal world compensates us for the restraints that we experience in the material 
one.423 It is only there that imagination and exuberant energy coexist without forcing a material, and 
therefore ignoble, objective. By learning to constrain this exuberance we realise and apprehend the 
beauty of artistic forms and in so doing instruct ourselves in the practice of freedom constrained by 
self-rule. Schiller appears to believe that if all of us are subjected to the aesthetic experience then 
eventually its ennobling affect will improve us as individuals and also the institutions of the state. 
Yet again Schiller confirms the schism between culture and state, without clarifying their 
relationship.424 Although pessimistic about the inherent 'material' character of the state he agrees with 
Kant, Von Humboldt, Fichte and other cosmopolitan philosophers that the state constitution is a type 
of artistic production, whose goal was to form men artistically. In the works of the Aufklärers and 
their successors political ideas are continually linked metaphorically or conceptually to aesthetic ones. 
Schiller calls the establishment and structure of a true political freedom the “the most perfect of all 
works of art”.425 In the fifth thesis of the Idea for a Universal History with a Cosmopolitan Intent, 
Kant likened the constraint with which the state forced the wild unsociability of individuals to be 
sublimated into culture, to a type of 'imposed art'. Fichte, straightforwardly declares that the “absolute 
state is ...an artistic institution, intended to direct all individual powers towards the life of the Race 
and to transfuse them therein... as an institution of free and self-intelligent art, only after it has 
scientifically penetrated to its complete and perfect purpose in the Age of Reason as Knowledge...”426 
Strange as these metaphors may seem to us, they are consistent with the Ideal of Cultivation of the 
German Enlightenment. In this tradition the progress of Reason, or in other words, human 
consciousness and self-consciousness, liberates us from nature and allows us to view it as an object. 
We no longer experience the natural world unconsciously. And just as Reason frees us from nature's 
tyranny, fashioning our own world of objects allows us to make use of our plastic powers: nature is 
something ready to be formed consciously and methodically as art. The same principle extended to 
the social world implies that we can overcome the arbitrary restraints of tradition and superstition, and 
that society itself is nothing more than an object to be manipulated by conscious artistry. Thus the 
state conceived by a rational agent, a type of artist-statesman, would be a created artefact. This idea is 
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amplified and extended in Nietzsche's politics of cultivation. 
Intellectuals who favoured the cosmopolitan Kulturstaat thought culture was the responsibility of 
individuals in civil society, and thus a realm of 'spiritual freedom' where state intrusion was 
unwelcome. Ideas of collective cultural goals were less developed. The state remained a static 
framework that could at some ideal point in the development of human reason be dismantled. So even 
when collective goals were considered, it was in the widest possible terms, as the goal of humanity 
rather than of the specific nations that comprise it.  
The idea of state seldom converged with that of nationality. It was generally thought that a state could 
appropriate any mass of people of diverse races and customs, yet still remain a Kulturstaat. It was 
inevitable then when the spirit of national feeling awoke in German thought and letters in the early 
part of the 19th century that this model would decline in favour of one that took national culture as 
the proper justification of the state. Despite this advance in the concept of an organic Kulturstaat the 
cosmopolitan model never totally declined. Residues and remnants lived on in German political 
thought and would continue to nourish liberal and conservative intellectuals for another hundred 
years. It was this very model that informed and inspired Nietzsche's politics. 
The Organic Kulturstaat 
If the cosmopolitan Kulturstaat presupposes an ideal of personal cultivation such as prevailed in 
Hellenistic times, the idea of organic Kulturstaat presupposes a form of politics that prevailed in the 
Greek polis. The characteristic Ideal of Cultivation of the age of the polis was republican or civic and 
the focus of cultivation was not the individual but public virtue. The polis, as democracy or oligarchy, 
made heavier demands on its citizens and demanded their participation in all theatres of life: in 
economy, festivity, war, and administration. Little individuality other than what served the state, or 
the party in power was tolerated. The aim of politics, outside of immediate party strife, was to raise 
the city-state above others in power and prestige. Political theory was exclusively a debate over which 
state constitutions produced the most virtuous or cultivated citizens.  
Constitutions, which were seen as means of fixing a certain type of virtue on the citizenry and 
bringing the whole body up to a certain ideal type, were typically the products of sages such as Solon 
in Athens or Lycurgus in Sparta. It was to philosopher-statesmen that the self-conscious polis would 
turn, as did Ephesus when it invited Heraclitus, who uncharitably spurned the offer, to give it laws: 
like sculptors carving living forms out of the marble of humanity, they excited in dreamers like Plato 
the envy and desire to attain similar renown. Even in Hellenistic times, when the polis had lost its 
power, these forms of political discourse were pronounced among the Greeks, as living examples of 
republican virtue could still be found in other nations like Rome. 
Ironically Machiavelli, the influential early modern theorist of the organic culture state is most often 
seen as a theorist of Machtstaat principles, an amoral apologist of state power whose one concern is 
to point out how it can be attained and maintained. What is overlooked is his conviction that the goal 
of statecraft was to awaken virtù (that is to say efficiency, or talent) in the citizenry, and that the 
republican model of government was the best means for achieving this. Machiavelli's politics of Virtù 
as Nietzsche himself correctly designated it427, with its close study of the Roman republic, specifically 
aimed at describing the institutions and constitution needed to create capable citizenry. The state is 
not separate from culture but is a creation of and creator of it, and glory would be bestowed on the 
actions of the collective rather than the individual. This organic unity would not consist of the gloomy 
harmony of say the Platonic republic, but of the balanced tension between parties and factions.428 
Within a free republic party friction was regarded as not only inevitable but could, when wisely 
directed, provide an everlasting spark of energy and action. 
Machiavelli draws on the examples of antiquity but is obsessed with the cultural mission of his own 
city Florence. In the tradition of Humanists like Aretino his studies lead him to equate the rise and 
decline of high culture with the fortunes of the free city state.429 With the extinction of the Italian 
republics that, needless to say, resembled and explicitly modelled themselves on the polis of 
antiquity, civic culture-politics lost its material nourishment, for it was not easily transferable to the 
new forms of territorial state, even when the latter attained 'republican' forms. The 'perfection of 
nature' or 'the development of genius' were not the first hope of the French revolutionaries in 1789, 
and the conjunction of liberté, fraternité and equalité shows explicit devotion to eudemonic political 
ideals, though this was redressed to some extent by a rough attachment to Reason and technical 
progress.  
Germans, other than those in the Hansa ports and other free cities, never breathed the spirit of 
republicanism as others did. By the 18th century, they did so even less. In Italy, at least nostalgia 
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lingered. Nevertheless a variant of the idea of the organic Kulturstaat did in fact catch on, without 
dependence on the models of antiquity or the Italian Renaissance, but relying instead on the progress 
in the 19th century of German nationalism. This is in many respects entirely consistent with the 
organic culture-state, as republicanism can involve diverse political arrangements or constitutions, 
but is never anything other than patriotic; la gloria de la patria is in the nature of the beast.  
The German form of culture-politics in this period most resembles that of the pan-Hellenist Athenian 
rhetorician Isocrates, who pleaded for the union of Greek states in war against a looming enemy: 
Persia. Isocrates argued thus to persuade them from the fratricidal conflicts that had weakened them. 
What Greeks shared more than anything, he declared, was paideia, their attachment to a common 
Ideal of Cultivation. This is what made them different to Persians, and what made them Greek. 
This idea of national kinship closely parallels what was coalescing in nineteenth century Germany 
after Napoleon‟s invasion, when intellectuals, before the threat of a common enemy, sought to 
identify with a unit larger than a single principality. In this context, patriotism came to be related to 
the display of Bildung, or high culture. The Bildung of individual Germans was taken to be the 
quintessence of German nationality and offered as a reason for their superiority over French and other 
Europeans. Even if Germans could not shelter under the umbrella of political unity, they could at least 
recognise themselves as a single people on account of their shared culture. The grand achievements of 
German culture were after all their source of pride and vastly more significant than the political 
jostling of three hundred or so petty princedoms. This is what made it possible to think of culture as 
an ensemble of national customs, language, and artistic productions, and brought about a new 
variation in the idea of an organic culture-state. 
The drift from cosmopolitan to national ideas of culture happened slowly in the twenty years before 
and after 1800, in tandem with similar developments elsewhere in Europe and with similar changes to 
European sensibility. European intellectuals were shifting from a priori and speculative thinking to 
thinking based on historical and empirical example. The idea of humanities expanding self-
consciousness, the core principle of German's Ideal of Cultivation and their greatest endowment to 
European enlightenment was the first victim of the new patriotism. Herder touched on it when he 
stated that every nation had a unique consciousness and genius that contributed to the commonweal of 
all nations. Herder's sentiments were both national and universal: he wanted a cosmopolitanism of 
nationalities rather than of individuals, wherein an individual could contribute most to world culture 
by truly representing the national folk culture. Fichte, Schiller, and the early romantics took this 
further by arguing that, since Germany lay at the centre of the world (namely Europe), it was also the 
cosmopolitan centre of world consciousness. Germany was the nation into which all ideas flowed and 
were synthesised. It was the representative nation of mankind which by its inner diversity, its eclectic 
borrowing from other nations had created a universal synthesis, embodying their separate tendencies 
in higher unity. And yet, despite these opinions not one of these thinkers rejected the older static 
cosmopolitan idea of the state, and or insisted that national culture and the state should grow together. 
It was Hegel who, though not a German nationalist, took the first systematic and decisive step to join 
ideas of culture - Bildung and nationality - and the state. Hegel's Ideal of Cultivation, like that of all 
the great German Idealists, holds that the chief object of human life is to self-consciously perfect 
nature; to become the mind of nature, and liberate it from blind striving. Freedom of mankind and 
nature is directly equated to the extent to which mankind attains understanding of himself. The 
difference is that, where the cosmopolitan strand of idealism from Kant to Schopenhauer tended to 
make the individual the bearer of self-consciousness, Hegel conferred this role on the state. The state, 
in relation to the nation, and therefore to all nature, was its functioning, self-apprehending mind.  
Given the role of Hegel's Kulturstaat, it was necessary for him to perceive it as an organic entity, in 
which the various elements of the polity join in common higher purpose. As he notes in the 
Philosophy of Right: “the state in and by itself is the ethical whole, the actualisation of freedom; and 
it is an absolute end that freedom should be actual. The state is mind on earth and consciously 
realising itself there. In nature, on the other hand, mind actualises itself only as its own other, as 
mind asleep. Only when it is present in consciousness, when it knows itself as a really existent object 
is it the state. In considering freedom the starting point must not be individuality, the single self-
consciousness, but only the essence of self-consciousness... the march of God in the world, that is 
what the state is. The basis of the state is the power of reason actualising itself as will.”430 
Hegel's intellectual tendencies were to harmonise diversity and reconcile oppositions. Where 
predecessors saw value in conflict between individuals, and between individuals and the state he 
sought unity and structure. Atomism repelled him. To achieve an ethical ideal you had to start with 
the essence of actuality, not build on single individuals. For Hegel the state was not a work of art,431 
but an organism subject to universal laws of development. His republican instincts coaxed him to base 
the spiritual progress of man on the civic order rather than the individual and though he constantly 
iterated the significance of subjective freedom for individuals, the right of the state was uppermost. 
                                                                
430 Hegel, The Philosophy of Right, op. cit., p.279. 
431 ibid., p.258. 
109 
Just as Kant best represents the cosmopolitan model; Hegel is the champion of the organic 
Kulturstaat. But while Hegel resembled Fichte and Schiller in sharing a lifelong obsession with the 
Ideal of Cultivation and believing Germany a representative nation of mankind, his habit of 
historicising human consciousness led him elsewhere. Preoccupation with human philosophical 
development convinced him that a single people are always charged with the execution of a great 
moment in the progress of the world spirit toward self-awareness. At any epoch an elected people is 
“for this epoch in world history - and it can make the epoch but once - the ruling one. Against this, its 
absolute right to be the bearer of the current stage of development, the spirits of the other peoples are 
without rights, and they, like those whose epoch is past, no longer count in world history.”432 Hegel 
believed that modern Nordic peoples, including the Germans, were charged with effecting a great 
spiritual turning point similar to that accomplished by Oriental, Greek and Roman civilisations. But 
finally their fate would be as dismal as their predecessors. As temporary instruments of the world 
spirit they would be supplanted by some other great people and their work would remain only as 
distant memories. This was a matter of indifference to him. The German nation had no unique or 
eternal value in itself. 
Such grand perspectives suggest patriotic indifference but in fact Hegel gave patriotism plenty of 
weight in his political theory. Influenced by Rousseau and attached to republican democracy in his 
youth, like so many of his generation, he welcomed the French revolution, and idealised the Athenian 
polis as the perfect Kulturstaat. Even when the revolution drifted from its idealistic moorings he 
favoured its world-historical example. The Greek state embodied a unity of elements that modern 
machine states like Prussia did not. A 'folk-religion' was needed to arrest modern political 
fragmentation and alienation and Germans had to be dragged from their individual private culture into 
one that was civic-based. Later on he conformed to the principle, the foundation of von Savigny's 
school of jurisprudence, that the rational state constitution is inextricably bound to the customs, 
religion, art and philosophy of a nation. The critical difference was that Hegel held the state rather 
than the national spirit to be the true goal of ethical striving. The state, as the mind of a nation, brings 
a people to self-consciousness, which is the substratum of freedom. So the nation, while a valid and 
important ethical phenomenon, was merely a precondition, a stage on the way to a statehood that 
would carry a people to the highest phase of spiritual progress.  
Hegel was to philosophy as Beethoven to music. He successfully synthesised the classical past and 
the romantic future. Whether he neatly fitted into the cosmopolitan or nationalist camp is immaterial. 
Devaluing the individual as the bearer and object of culture in favour of the larger entity provides a 
critical lead to successors who accept his example for their conceptions of an organic Kulturstaat. 
After Hegel the nationalist culture-state dominates, even among those inheriting Weimar‟s 
cosmopolitan legacy. The historian Von Ranke, at first attached to ideas of individual cultivation, 
later gave development of national personality precedence. Support grew among political 
conservatives and liberals for the idea of a Germanic national state, one not patterned on Western 
models but with a character appropriate to the German mind. With civic participation in government 
not really occurring until the latter half of the 19th century, intellectuals happily imagined that they 
participating in the life of the nation. 
Nationalism is not responsible for the waning influence of liberalism later in the century. Empirically 
liberal-republican political ideals have always been associated with robust patriotism. If the liberalism 
waned in Germany while patriotism waxed it has little to do with antagonism of principle. Wherever 
liberalism survived into the twentieth century it remained attached to the national culture-state: as in 
the case of Max Weber, a zealous culture-politician and equally zealous patriot. Weber's goal was to 
keep Germany the leading nation of culture, and even his scientific preoccupations were an offspring 
of this intention, as seen in his concern at the ill-effects on life of rationality and bureaucratisation 
caused by the modern state - traditional German concerns since Schiller's time. Mostly however, the 
idea of nationality continued to drift from the idea of Bildung. As such, the nation state principle 
ceases to be a form of organic Kulturstaat and therefore ceases to be of relevance to us. 
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13 - Nietzsche's Culture State 
Nietzsche had definite if contradictory ideas about how society should be organised. If he never 
outlines his vision of a utopian culture state explicitly, fundamental ideals guide him in everything he 
says about politics and the state. By examining these ideals we can discern how his culture-state 
might look. Of the two models of the Kulturstaat described, the cosmopolitan and the organic, it is 
the former to which he most disposed, while unconsciously incorporating elements of the latter. 
Although so prejudiced against state power, he can deny the very possibility of a culture-state, he can 
elsewhere propose ways of breeding culture that would practicably require rigid state regulation. 
Never able to reconcile these separate tendencies or think them through methodically, Nietzsche 
spontaneously expels contradictions whenever he discusses the ways that genius can be produced. 
Nietzsche's Idea of the State 
Mostly Nietzsche discounts the importance of the organisation or constitution of the state when 
discussing social conditions favourable to culture. Invariably, he sees the culture-state as one in which 
state structures and institutions are weak, and where leadership and guidance of social organisation is 
by individuals of an upper caste, philosophers, artists, educators, who would work through what 
German philosophers called civil society or what Nietzsche himself calls the 'people'.433 The authority 
of these individuals stems from natural local leadership, as a feudal aristocracy might work, rather 
than through rigid constitutions like those proposed by Plato in his Republic. 
The Cosmopolitan Culture-State preferred 
This position is characteristic of cosmopolitan tendency and puts Nietzsche squarely in the camp of 
the early Aufklärers. Like them, he doubts that a regulating state with a fixed, juridical system can 
bring forth higher culture systematically. To support his scepticism he cites Machiavelli's remarks: 
that, with regard to the state, “the form of Government is of very small importance, although half-
educated people think otherwise. The great aim of State-craft should be duration, which outweighs all 
else, inasmuch as it is more valuable than liberty.”434 
He frequently observes that it is in the environment of political stability and duration that culture is 
produced, for it is “only with securely founded duration that continual development and ennobling 
inoculation are at all possible”.435 Hastily and without elaboration he acknowledges that, as a rule 
'authority', which is to say, conservative or arbitrary authority lacking the wisdom of foresight and 
higher human goals, will be the "the dangerous companion of all duration”and “will rise in 
opposition to this.”436 Undervaluing the relation of government forms to high culture, he overlooks 
what has been a key question for republican exponents of the culture-state: whether a monarchical, 
democratic, or oligarchic constitution is likely to produce a higher culture. Nietzsche deems such 
debates irrelevant and constitutions unimportant save when, as he notes in the case of the party 
system of parliamentary democracy, the stability and duration of government is undermined by their 
frequent replacement. 
All of this indicates his closeness to the cosmopolitan tradition of German culture politics; it 
harmonises with his belief that any perfect, regulated form of government would actually weary and 
exhaust the individual, which he sees as the true object and agent of cultivation.437 The state should be 
nothing more than a “wise arrangement for the protection of one individual against another”. That is 
its justification, but whenever it is overly strengthened, the individual will at last “be weakened by it, 
even effaced, - thus the original purpose of the State will be most completely frustrated”.438 
Nietzsche's hope is that the most distant progress of culture diminishes the state's role. Unlike Hegel, 
but like Fichte, and later Marx, he sees that the state may one day disappear and be replaced by some 
other order, in the same way as the social forms of the gens or clan have disappeared from modern 
civilisation. The state's existence, he asserts, is justifiable and beneficial only in the present, where it 
still imposes social cohesion and permits hierarchical social structures to be formed and maintained. 
When less centralised modes of human organisation evolve, dispensing with the need for elaborate 
state structures and hastening the privatising of all areas of civil society, its decay will be assured, 
though hierarchy in some form must always exist. 
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Goal and origin of the State 
Anxious to assure culture's highest rank in the hierarchy of values, Nietzsche is perturbed by the 
growth of state power in contemporary life insofar as it threatens spiritual freedom, and displaces 
cultivation of genius as the proper goal of society. While deeming the state as useful to culture, he is 
concerned that it does not become an end in itself.“The world of culture is almost independent of the 
'good of the state’.”439 The mere growth of state power has no intrinsic value. Happiness, whether of 
the individual or the greatest number, the principle of eudemonic politics, is an inferior corporate 
objective. The state should not concern itself with general welfare, any more than it should be a 
vehicle for private political ambitions. 
The only valid goal for a state is to produce conditions appropriate for the rise of a nobler humanity. 
In a note of 1873 Nietzsche claims that...“in the State the individual's happiness is subordinated to 
the general welfare: what does this mean? Not that the minorities are utilised for the welfare of the 
majorities, but rather that individuals are subordinated to the welfare of the highest individuals, to 
the welfare of the highest specimens. The highest individuals are the creative persons - be they 
morally the best, or else useful in some larger sense. Thus they are the purest models and are the 
improvers of mankind. The goal of the commonwealth is not the existence of the State at any price; 
but rather its goal is for the highest specimens to be able to live and create within it. This is also the 
goal that underlies the foundations of states, except that they often had a false opinion concerning 
who the highest specimens were: often conquerors, dynasties, etc. If the state's existence is no longer 
to be preserved in such a way that great individuals can live within it, what will then arise is the 
terrifying state filled with misery, the pirate state in which the strongest individuals take the place of 
the best. It is not the state's task that the greatest possible number of people live well and ethically 
within it; numbers do not matter. Instead, the task of the State is to make it generally possible for one 
to live well and beautifully therein. Its task is to furnish the basis of a culture. In short, a nobler 
humanity is the goal of the State. Its goal lies outside of itself. The State is a means.”440 
In Thus Spake Zarathustra he calls the state a 'cold monster', an abstract, heartless beast, devouring 
the energies and talents of all who serve and live under it. It is one of many idols in the long history of 
false worship that insists on being appeased by bloody sacrifice. It is a tyrant who consumes the 
highest men for its myopic aims. According to the wisdom of Zarathustra, those who are truly free 
shun state-service and leave it to the superfluous. Only where the state ceases does the man who is 
not superfluous, that is, the necessary man begin.441 More than this it is responsible for the death of 
'peoples' (Völker), the spontaneous communities of custom who represent a more authentic form of 
social organisation. It makes a pretence of maintaining the laws merely to maintain its own power and 
because everything about it, including the culture it promotes is false: values, art, religion, heroism, 
science and philosophy, which are all press-ganged into service, shine dimly behind its corpulent 
figure. The state destroys the authenticity of civil society. 
More dangerously, the modern state prudently recognises culture as being useful, and encourages 
universal education. The Prussian state in particular sees culture as a means to promote its own 
power, and for that reason smugly calls itself a Kulturstaat. In the early Lectures on the Future of Our 
Educational Institutions he sees this presumption sanctioned by the flattery and servility of Hegelian 
philosophy, which treats the state as an absolute ethical organism.442 Philosophy in Prussia, he says, 
actually conspires in the destruction of culture, precisely because it accords greater priority to the 
state rather than itself. In Prussia, as in Sparta, culture of this type would never change or progress, it 
would hold men back from further development. As“the modern state becomes more and more like 
Sparta... It might happen,” he says, “that the greatest and noblest forces will dry up and die away 
owing to atrophy and transfusion. For I observe that the sciences and philosophy itself are preparing 
the way for precisely such an occurrence. They are no longer bulwarks, because they are no longer 
allowed to have their own goal i.e. because no commonwealth embodies their essence in its goal. 
Thus what is needed is the foundation of a cultural state, in opposition to the false ones which now go 
by this name and which would serve as a sort of refugium of culture.”443 
For the younger Nietzsche, the proper relation between culture and state is seen in the Greek polis 
where both were virile companion's, counting each other as equals and supporting each other in the 
face of peril. The latter did not merely supervise or regulate the former. “The ancient state 
emphatically did not share the utilitarian point of view of recognising as culture only what was 
directly useful to the state itself.,. and was far from wishing to destroy those impulses which did not 
seem immediately applicable. ...the profound Greek ... clearly recognised not only that without such 
state protection the germs of his culture could not develop, but also that all his inimitable and 
perennial culture had flourished so luxuriantly under the wise and careful guardianship of the 
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protection afforded by the state...”444 
The metaphor of 'virile friendship' between state and culture occurs in a partially completed essay of 
1871 entitled The Greek State; perhaps Nietzsche's most sustained examination of this relationship. A 
turgid piece, composed during his association with Richard Wagner and enthusiasm for 
Schopenhauer, it proceeds typically as a querelle des anciens et modernes, with the moderns 
comparing unfavourably. The proposes that while the goal of society is the production of culture, 
which can only be achieved by a few remarkable individuals in a layered arrangement of classes and 
castes i.e., in conditions of slavery, it is the state that makes such a society possible; that is to say, if it 
were not for the state's enforcing power, hierarchies would collapse into anarchy. 
The tyrannical cruelty of the state is an unpleasant necessity, the price you pay for organisation and 
order. In the Greek polis which, however naive and barbaric an institution in itself, made possible the 
blooming of Greek society; a society so diverse that it would have splintered without this 'iron clamp' 
that held it together. In all civilised societies the state prevents our return to the small herd, the family 
or tribal group, which inevitably brings a bellum omnium contra omnes. So, "be the sociable instinct 
in individual man as strong as it may, it is only the iron clamp of the State that constrains the large 
masses upon one another in such a fashion that a chemical decomposition of Society, with its 
pyramid-like superstructure, is bound to take place.”445 The state for Kant and the younger Nietzsche 
is a way to curb our native wildness: “Nature, in order to arrive at Society, forges for herself the 
cruel tool of the State - namely, that conqueror with the iron hand...”446 Without it, in the natural 
bellum omnium contra omnes, society on a larger scale cannot strike root beyond the reach of the 
family.447 
Like Hobbes and the Aufklärers, Nietzsche holds that the natural inclination of man is to disorder and 
the need for imposed order, but does not propose, as they did, that the state was formed by social 
contract and noble agreements between ruler and ruled. Dispensing with this unhistorical fantasy he 
sees nothing far-sighted or benevolent in its foundation. The origins of the state are in brutal conquest 
and perfunctory arrangements by dominating powers. It is Hegel's realism he shares when he insists 
that all states arise out of the subjugation of the majority by a powerful few who, knowing nothing of 
'rights' or 'contracts', wish only to impose their will upon all others. Violence not reason founds the 
state; an origin betrayed to us by the Greeks who “even in the ripest fullness of their civilisation and 
humanity never ceased to utter as out of a brazen mouth such words as: 'to the victor belongs the 
vanquished, with wife and child, life and property’. Power gives the first right, and there is no right, 
which at bottom is not presumption, usurpation, violence.”448 Never relinquishing this idea, Nietzsche 
develops it consistently in works like the The Genealogy of Morals, where he describes the state as 
originating when“some pack of blond beasts of prey, a conqueror and master race which, organised 
for war and with the ability to organise” lays its claws upon a numerically superior but still formless 
and nomadic populace. He also proceeds to assure us that the “sentimentalism which would have it 
begin with a 'contract'” can be safely disposed of. 
Nature of the State 
For Nietzsche, there is no organic relation between culture and the state. As independent agents they 
act at best in parallel and at worst in opposition. The ill-effects of the state stem from its tendency to 
promote its power. Every organising power is exclusive and distrustful of the growth of culture. Once 
established it instinctively bulwarks itself against other social institutions. Even in antiquity the state 
paralysed and obstructed culture. It prevented change, and the education it imposed upon people by 
laws kept them either at one level of development or, as occurred in Sparta, in complete stasis. 
Culture, he muses, developed in spite of the polis and calls the Periclean panegyric on Athens, which 
lauds the happy relation between the Athenian state and its Ideal of Cultivation, a "great optimistic 
dream”.449 He denies that there was a necessary connection, as Pericles imagined, between the polis 
and Athenian culture. 
In the Greek State Nietzsche observes that we form an unconscious attachment and need for the state 
in spite of its brutal origins: however much it usurps our freedom, however bloody its history, we who 
are vanquished by it inexplicably grow almost to love it. Hearts go out to the 'magic' of its growing 
power to the point where it is even“contemplated with fervour as the goal and ultimate aim of the 
sacrifices and duties of the individual.”450 As it extends its control and establishes its many arms of 
administration - legislative, juridical, military, bureaucratic, and even religious - we see the possibility 
of extending our own power by being swallowed into the organisation. And while it undoubtedly 
sometimes needs talented and able individuals the state depends most of all on mediocrity. 
                                                                
444 FEI, p.88. 
445 TGS, EGP, p.9. 
446 TGS, EGP, p.10. 
447 TGS, EGP, p.12. 
448 TGS, EGP, pp.9-10. 
449 GM II-17. 
450 HAH I, a474. 
113 
In earlier work Nietzsche complains of the levelling effect of the state on culture, and the 
fragmentation of personality it causes. In later work he actively desires a class of herd animal in 
Europe, and is more sympathetic to this development. The division of labour upon which the state is 
founded allows individuals to find a role and function and grow strong. They can do in state service 
what they could never contemplate as private persons. In a note of 1887-1888 he ponders how it is 
“that the State will do a host of things that the individual would never countenance?'451 The answer, 
he allows, is its "division of responsibility, of command, and of execution. Through the interposition 
of the virtues of obedience, duty, patriotism and loyalty.”452 “None of you” he says, “has the courage 
to kill a man, or even to whip him... but the tremendous machine of the State overpowers the 
individual, so he repudiates responsibility for what he does... Everything a man does in the service of 
the State is contrary to his nature...”453 The state, he concludes is therefore a form of organised 
immorality which, by upholding the qualities of pride, severity, strength, hatred, and revenge actually 
promotes characteristics which contradict the herd type.454 
The other danger posed by the state arises from strong individuals who 'pirate' the state for their own 
use. If most obey a blind instinct to follow the state and fulfil all its demands, there are always a few 
who look beyond the machinery and see how it might serve their ends. In scarcely veiled criticism of 
Bismark, Nietzsche notes how such men gain influence in the state precisely because they see it as a 
means, whereas others only see it as their fulfilment. As men with partial vision they triumph easily 
over those who are completely blinded.455 Perceiving the immense resources and powers within their 
reach, they jealously eliminate rivals, centralise power, free the State from the internal convulsions, 
enlarge their influence by deploying the state for war and conquest, enfeeble the political factions and 
“endeavour to wrest the question of war and peace from the decision of the individual lords, in order 
to be able rather to appeal to the egoism of the masses or their representatives; for which purpose 
they again need slowly to dissolve the monarchic instincts of the nations.”456 
Those who use the state for to enjoy brute power give no meaning to what they do and no meaning to 
those who labour for them. In language uncharacteristic of his early period and clearly inspired by 
Wagner, he accuses such men of furthering their ends by using liberal optimism, an“un-Germanic, 
genuinely neo-Latin, shallow and unmetaphysical philosophy”. Again the reference is to Bismark 
who had just introduced universal suffrage to Prussia. He even makes an anti-Semitic sally against “a 
selfish State-less money aristocracy” who employs the state-instinct for commercial purposes.457 
Having dwelled on the diverse afflictions of the modern state he considers the ways in which it can be 
purified and regenerated. He believes an authentic union between culture and state can be attained 
only by returning to the original idea of the Greek polis founded on a military form of organisation. 
Here he is thinking of Sparta, a rare and absurd phenomenon among the Greeks, and as he himself 
had elsewhere noted, an example of fossilised culture. As much as a cultivated society needs slavery, 
so is the state in need of war.458 The original military state with its “immediate decomposition and 
division of the chaotic mass into military castes, out of which rises, pyramid-shaped, on an 
exceedingly broad base of slaves, the edifice of the 'martial society'”, took as its unswerving goal the 
methodical creation of military genius.459 
This arrangement did not necessarily benefit culture, but it did school individuals to see and justify 
themselves as tools of military genius. It creates a class able to command and another able to obey. 
The broader conception arises of all humanity, consciously or unconsciously, existing merely for the 
service of cultural genius in itself. He returns to this idea later in life. In the Will to Power for 
example, he observes that“the maintenance of the military state is the last means of all of acquiring 
or maintaining the great tradition with regard to the supreme type of man, the strong type.”460 We do 
not have to labour this point to see how this would fulfil his worst apprehensions about the state. For 
all his cosmopolitan tendencies, Nietzsche still pines after the regulated state with which he is most 
familiar, that of Prussia. In this sense he comes closest in sympathy to the organic culture-state; lying 
uneasily and irreconcilably beside his own cosmopolitan feelings. 
Oblivious of this contradiction, the young Nietzsche in the Greek State fragment eulogises Plato's 
metaphysical culture-state, The Republic, as a formula for the“ever-renewed procreation and 
preparation of the genius... discovered with a poetic intuition and painted with firmness.”461 
Crediting Plato as the first to see in a truly magnified way the ideal relation between state and culture, 
he passes lightly over the fact that this gloomy conservative' had dismissed the inspired artist from his 
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polis. He even apologises for Plato whom, he says, really didn't mean it. The ban on artists in The 
Republic reflected Socrates' influence and no more. This small indiscretion should not prevent us 
from “recognising in the total conception of the Platonic State the wonderfully great hieroglyph of a 
profound and eternally to be interpreted esoteric doctrine of the connection between State and 
Genius.”462 The eulogy is repeated elsewhere in Nietzsche's early work and in 1873 he remarks that 
“Plato's state is not impossible. Here philosophy attains its summit as the founder of a metaphysically 
organised state.”463 Later in life his attitude to Plato is openly contemptuous, but he still sees the 
philosopher as a legislator of a superior form of social organisation and does not consolidate his 
thoughts on these matters. So although The Greek State may be regarded as an embarrassing sample 
of juvenilia, all its weaknesses and contradictions are preserved in the work of the older philosopher, 
sometimes within the same document. 
Labour and Property 
In relation to the first facts of human life and organisation: labour and the means of production 
Nietzsche displays a number of prejudices and opinions that are not always entirely consistent, and 
for the most part, out of character even with educated opinion of his own time. 
Leisured and the slave classes 
The younger Nietzsche‟s views about labour are pockmarked by aestheticism and Hellenophilia, and 
do not change much thereafter. Then, as later, he sees a profound difference between the value of 
labour for the purpose of subsistence and that serving the aesthetic instincts. He sees nothing 
ennobling in men working to feed and clothe themselves, just as there is nothing ennobling in the 
processes of breathing, sleeping, or shitting. Work that merely supports existence does not justify 
existence. If anything, it is antagonistic to existence because it consumes our time.  
Those devoted to cultivating their nature cannot labour merely to live. The rest however are not 
absolved. In The Greek State, he notes that culture“which is chiefly a real need for art, rests upon a 
terrible basis: ...in order that there may be a broad, deep and fruitful soil for the development of art, 
the enormous majority must, in the service of a minority, be slavishly subjected to life's struggle, to a 
greater degree than their own wants necessitate. At their cost, through the surplus of their labour, 
that privileged class is to be relieved from the struggle for existence, in order to create and to satisfy 
a new world of want.”464 “Accordingly”, he notes, “we must accept this cruel sounding truth, that 
slavery is of the essence of Culture; a truth of course, which leaves no doubt as to the absolute value 
of Existence... The misery of toiling men must still increase in order to make production of the world 
of art possible to a small number of Olympian men.”465 Again, in the middle period he confirms the 
opinion, observing that “a higher culture can only originate where there are two distinct castes of 
society: that of the working class, and that of the leisured class who are capable of true leisure; or, 
more strongly expressed, the caste of compulsory labour and the caste of free labour.”466 
A culture state cannot dispense with compulsory labour; or slavery. So that the few can justify the 
existence of all, the many must toil in bondage and two distinct classes must always exist: noble types 
at the top with refined sensibilities suited to the business of administration and cultivation, and slower 
and duller types at the bottom with sensibilities suited to drudgery. In this society “the heavy work 
and trouble of life will be assigned to those who suffer least through it, to the most obtuse, therefore; 
and so step by step up to those who most sensitive to the highest and sublimest kinds of suffering, and 
who therefore still suffer notwithstanding the greatest alleviations of life.”467 
The foundation is clear: the labour of the cultivated man is free, that of the uncultivated is obligatory, 
but both must exist side by side in the culture-state. This grim credo of Nietzsche's political 
philosophy sets him apart from other utopians. Others imagine that a perfect order has no slavery, but 
Nietzsche insists that it is necessary for a cultivated society. We gasp at the provocation this poses 
and suspect he may be taunting or exaggerating for effect. But in fact he is deadly earnest, for 
although his statements on slavery are often cast metaphorically, they are often enough quite literal.  
In later works he sometimes describes those who, while not enslaved in a physical sense, do the 
bidding of others under the delusion of their own volition as a 'slave class'. He invokes the example of 
Greek philosophers, who felt secretly that they alone were free and that even the most powerful 
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individuals were their slaves.468 Sometimes his advocacy of slavery is laid bare and scorns the 
nineteenth century condemnation of slavery as hypocrisy. Everybody, he says, must acknowledge that 
slaves lived more securely and happily than modern labourers, and that slave labour is easy compared 
with that of modern workers.'469 Today, he says, we do not understand the meaning of slavery. The 
pride that separated the slave and those of noble descent is incomprehensible to us, for such a gulf 
existed between them that the slave could not even be seen clearly. We are accustomed to the doctrine 
of equality though not to equality itself. “One who is not at his own disposal and who lacks leisure 
does not by any means seem contemptible to us for that reason.”470 
Slaves more desirable than workers 
Nietzsche favourably compares the fate of the slave with that of the modern hired worker, whose 
exploitation, he regards as 'a piece of folly'. He does not condemn their mistreatment because it is 
unjust but because it is an unwise. It limits the effectiveness of those who lead and creates 
revolutionary prejudices in workers: inspiring class war when no such thing should ever occur. If the 
exploitation of workers is immediately and self-evidently unjust, he says, justice must also look to the 
future “and thus keep in view the well being of the worker, his physical and spiritual contentment: in 
order that he and his posterity may work well for our posterity and become trustworthy for longer 
periods than the individual span of human life. The exploitation of the worker was... a piece of folly, a 
robbery at the expense of the future, a jeopardisation of society. We almost have the war now, and in 
case the expense of maintaining peace, of concluding treaties and maintaining confidence, will 
henceforth be very great, because the folly of the exploiters was very great and long-lasting.”471 
Nietzsche contrasts the labour of slaves with that of workers and expels a familiar Romantic sigh over 
the effect of mechanisation on modern work. Machinery, he complains, humiliates work, robs it of its 
pride, and causes workers to live in impersonal serfdom; handicraft allowed a mark of distinction for 
personality and inspired them to draw consolation from labour. Modern industrial efficiency has been 
bought too dearly472 and industrial culture has become“the most vulgar form of existence that has 
ever existed”.473 In civilised countries we look for work in order to be paid: it is a means and not an 
end in itself. We are not refined in our choice and will work without pleasure if only it pays well. As a 
result the level of vulgarity rises, since we ward off boredom at any cost. For higher men, however, 
boredom and idleness is necessary, and they will not work unless it is associated with pleasure.474 
Paid labour changes the nature of the relations between those with power and those without it. At the 
mercy of brute need, workers work and sell themselves, but despise those who exploit their need and 
buy their labour. Submission to tyrants and generals could not be any more painful than submission to 
unknown and uninteresting captains of industry. To workers, the industrialist is a bloodsucking dog 
because he cannot prove that he is a higher type. If he could show that he possessed the nobility of 
spirit that distinguishes the aristocrat there would be no socialism, no class war, no spirit of rebellion. 
Workers do not mind labouring for those they respect, but the elevation of industrialists seems 
accidental and they cannot willingly defer to those who merely seem to be luckier. “At bottom, the 
masses are willing to submit to slavery of any kind, if only the higher-ups constantly legitimise 
themselves as higher, as born to command - by having noble manners.”475 
Modern workers suffer distress only because they are seduced by modern ideas. In medieval times 
their natural modesty and self-sufficiency allowed them to exist happily in their place, but modern 
ruling classes have divested them of innocence by offering universal education, making them liable 
for military service, and permitting them to form unions and to vote.476 The degeneration of the upper 
classes has allowed this to happen: “if one wants slaves, one is a fool if one educates them to be 
masters.“477 When workers discover that they are as capable as the ruling caste, is it any wonder they 
see their lowly status as injustice? Rebellion and revolution is the natural consequence of this 
discovery and perhaps, since the ruling classes are so rotted and feeble, it might not be such a bad 
thing: “It is all over with us if the working classes ever discover that they now can easily surpass us 
by means of education and virtue. But if this does not happen then all the more is it all over with 
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us.“478 
Nietzsche hopes that duty and contentment and even pride in occupation might once again be 
achieved for the worker: “Workers should learn to feel like soldiers. An honorarium, an income, but 
no pay!”479 Elsewhere he suggests that they might become a wealthier self-sufficient caste ruled over 
by those with no need for material possessions, only power: “the workers shall live one day as the 
bourgeois do now - but above them, distinguished by their freedom from wants, the higher caste: that 
is to say, poorer and simpler, but in possession of power.”480 
The sham life of modern democracies 
In Die Fröhlische Wissenschaft, Nietzsche complains that the freedom of modern workers to choose 
their employment or 'vocation' undermines cultural integrity. The need to make a living forces them 
to adopt certain roles. As they get older, they confuse their existence with their role and, becoming 
habituated to the same performance, imagine that they were always destined to be what they do. They 
imagine their occupation to be a natural development and forget how much caprice and accident 
disposed them to it, or how many other roles they might have played had they taken another path. 
This sham can only occur in a democratic period like the present. In the Middle Ages, men believed 
their vocation to be predestined and refused to acknowledge the role of accident, heredity, or caprice. 
This faith allowed durable social pyramids such as guilds, classes and hereditary trade privileges to 
emerge. But in democratic states the capacity to build for the long term is overcome by a new faith 
that holds that the individual can do anything or manage any role. This faith requires us to become 
actors, with the result that "everybody experiments with himself, improvises, makes new experiments, 
enjoys his experiments; and all nature ceases and becomes art.” 
Actors could never have become the real masters in the solid and limited Medieval period as they 
have done today and did in Greece, with the consequence that no long term plans are made; the 
strength to build is undermined and the courage to make encompassing plans for the distant future 
dissipated. Due to pervasive 'role-playing' the 'great architects' of societies, those who have a genius 
for organisation, and who require solidity and long-sightedness, no longer have materials with which 
to work. Great social edifices are built not on actors but on men who firmly believe that their value 
lies in being a stone in the wall. Today we are no longer material for a society481 and lack the 
properties for composing great structures because of our modern means for selecting an occupation. 
Again and again Nietzsche lauds the medieval ethic of labour over modern industriousness. Today, 
the means for producing leisure, which is the true object of industry, supplants the goal, and ensnares 
men in empty routine. Blind industriousness may create wealth and honours but deprives our 
sensibility of its subtlety, which alone make possible the enjoyment of wealth and honours. Work, or 
work for commerce, becomes the chief antidote to boredom and surplus passions, just as the great 
propagandists of the industrial age had foreseen. The sum total of this most industrious of ages only 
makes more industriousness and money and little else besides.482 Naturally the most important labour 
of the culture-state, the labour for art, is neglected. Art is merely consecrated the residue of our time 
and strength when it should be our most serious activity. It is now a province for the idle and 
conscienceless, who are not capable of great art and consider its claims arrogant. Artistic endeavour 
reflects its status as recreation and becomes petty: a pleasant distraction for the exhausted. It were 
better that art should vanish altogether, for an age that valued leisure would think little of the 'great' 
art of our industrial age. 
The question of property 
Industrialists are not bad because they are rich, but because their riches are not employed for the 
benefit of culture. Higher culture needs property and wealth, but more pointedly inherited wealth, 
which creates an aristocracy of race by permitting men to choose beautiful women as partners and 
engage the best teachers; it allows cleanliness, time for physical exercise and immunity from dulling 
physical labour. It encourages freedom of character, independence, absence of niggardliness and of 
self-abasement before bread-givers: in short it can permit happy nobility. Poverty is not a desirable 
condition for a noble man. A man who is poor comes to grief through a noble disposition: he does not 
get on, acquires nothing and his race is extinguished. For those aspiring to serve higher masters 
however, poverty is the best starting place. It teaches men to abase themselves early on.483 
Nietzsche praises wealth but advises that its unequal distribution should be checked in order, he says, 
“that property may henceforth inspire more confidence and become more moral, we should keep 
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open all the paths of work for small fortunes, but should prevent the effortless and sudden acquisition 
of wealth”. He advises that strategic industries like transport and trade, which favour accumulation of 
large fortunes, should be taken 'out of the hands of private persons or private companies', since those 
who own too much are as dangerous to the community as those who own nothing - a surprisingly 
socialist prescription from one mostly perturbed by excessive state influence.484 
Elsewhere he notes that when the injustice of property is felt in the extreme it can be relieved by 
either equal distribution of wealth or abolition of private possession and a return to state ownership. 
The latter, he observes, is the method of the socialists whereas the former was tried in antiquity, 
always on a small scale and with little success. Whenever an equalising adjustment was made in 
antiquity, the same old inequality would arise again after a few generations through inheritance, and 
there would be 'needy malcontents' longing for political upheaval. When the second method, that of 
socialism, is tried and ownership given to the community, the individual becomes a temporary tenant 
(here he refers specifically to ownership of land) and, as men do not care for transitory possessions, 
behaves in 'freebooter' fashion with the tenure, to the detriment of agriculture. 
Nietzsche's ideas about wealth and property, which sound like prescriptions for a modern 'mixed' 
economy, do not necessarily illustrate his economic preferences for the culture-state.485 There is only 
one clear indication of what should not occur there. Though material inequality is inevitable and even 
desirable, it should never be extreme. Likewise, private ownership of property is always preferable to 
state ownership, except where strategic facilities and industries are concerned. Though not 
condemning the possession of property, or the propertied class in itself, he insists that the wealthy 
should justify their privileges, rather than enjoy them without sacrifice or service. If, in its conduct of 
life, its manners and cultivation, the propertied class fails to reflect a higher order of being, then its 
existence is gratuitous and it is deservedly despised by those beneath suffering to serve it. 
Writing in the turmoil of Germany's industrial revolution, Nietzsche sounds like a patrician 
conservative, bewailing wont of virtue in the propertied classes: they are short-sighted, greedy; have 
all the vices of the parvenu. “If a Luther were to appear now”, he notes in 1873, “he would rebel 
against the disgusting mentality of the propertied classes, against their stupidity and 
thoughtlessness..."486 He sees no hope of reforming them or their vulgarity; they are mostly lost to 
culture and to its future. Sometimes he expresses feeble hopes: their redemption is conceivable, he 
thinks, if they started behaving like a real aristocracy and salvage some dignity from the past: “I do 
not expect an awakening of goodness among any substantial portion of the propertied classes, but one 
might be able to instil in them a custom, a duty toward tradition.”487 
An Ideal of Cultivation cannot be practised unless some are liberated from the cares of daily 
subsistence and have leisure to pursue self-perfection. This is why it has mostly been embraced only 
by aristocratic or propertied classes. In any culture-state many must be burdened to produce the 
surpluses that support the cultivated few. Nietzsche does not even want the Ideal of Cultivation to be 
embraced by the majority, believing it would coarsen and dilute the practice of culture. Those 
permitted leisure must be noble, which is to say, worthy of their privilege, and not merely the vulgar 
who use their advantages without sacrificing themselves to the discipline of cultivation. In the 
culture-state there must be no idle rich, no jet-set, for they are not worthy of their wealth. Likewise, 
those committed to labour should be treated fairly, and should be encouraged in their station. It should 
be impressed upon them that this aristocracy rules, not by the good fortune of inheritance, but by the 
right of superior virtue and merit. There should be no semblance of equality between the higher caste 
and the lower, although there must be means for lowering those in the upper caste who are not worthy 
and elevating those in the lower caste who are. 
In the long history of the politics of cultivation, these ideas are quite familiar. While recognising the 
aristocratic nature of the ideal, Nietzsche's prejudices are manifestly bourgeois. The son of a 
clergyman in a state owned by a landed aristocracy but administered by preachers and bureaucrats, 
who at least demonstrate their virtue and talent palpably, he disdains those whose privileges are 
merely inherited. In Nietzsche, we discover the ancient and powerful desire of the professional 
administrative class in civilisation - the scribes or soldiers who constitute the 'rule of merit' - for an 
aristocracy of the spirit, rather than one founded on the ownership of property. 
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Heterogeneity, Homogeneity, Hierarchy 
Like any utopian Nietzsche needs to show how relations between groups and individuals should be 
organised in his ideal state. If he does not seek a classless society, does he count as a collectivist or as 
an individualist? Does he favour the group or the individual? Those who read only Zarathustra, and 
profess to explain Nietzsche always describe him as an arch-individualist, and dwell on his professed 
contempt for herd morality. However, Nietzsche expressly distanced himself from this nice caricature, 
which is more complex than cartoon commentary would suggest. 
There are two separate voices in his work. One is the strident voice of conviction, pronouncing that an 
order of rank is the best form of social organisation for higher culture. The other speaks amorally, 
with the accents of the technocrat, the engineer seeking a 'scientific' basis for higher culture. This 
voice assures us that both heterogeneity or individualism and homogeneity have uses in a social 
structure, with the difficulty being to establish the right balance.488 
The wise culture-politician would place both principles behind the goal of producing genius. Intimate 
knowledge of the social and physiological conditions of a nation would allow him to see that where 
society is too decayed and chaotic, universal moralities would be necessary, while where conditions 
are too stifling, the moral chains should be loosened to let individuals find their way. In this 
precarious way, Nietzsche's culture-state embodies all three principles of social organisation: 
heterogeneity, homogeneity and hierarchy. 
Heterogeneity - Individuals in Contest 
Modern individualism fails to recognise the enormous disparities between the capacities of 
individuals. In a fragment dated between 1883 and 1888, Nietzsche declares that even individualism 
does not recognise the order of rank that elevates some over others and which would grant the same 
freedom to all. "The modern European is characterised by two apparently opposite traits: 
individualism and a demand for equal rights; that I have at last come to understand... All moralities 
know nothing of an 'order of rank' among men...”489 Accordingly the modern principle of 
individualism is an extremely vulnerable piece of vanity.490 
What is referred to as the 'freedom of the individual', is actually a modest and still unconscious form 
of will to power, in which it seems merely sufficient to individuals to free themselves from the 
overpowering domination of society. They oppose society not as their own person, only as 
representatives of all individuals... what they gain in this struggle they gain for themselves not as 
persons but as representative of individuals against the totality.'491 
The problem is that modern individualism actually rejects very great human beings and demands, 
which is why it expects equal rights for all,492 and the doctrines of the socialists, though apparently 
collectivist, are a vehicle for individualism based on universal equality: Socialism is merely a means 
of agitation employed by individualism.493 True individuality is not a right but a privilege earned by a 
few. True freedom is something gained by personal struggle and contest rather than by endowment 
from above. Only those who fight and conquer their afflictions can be considered sovereign to 
themselves, and display the pride of self-reliance. All others have only the right to be slaves. 
If it is the degree of will to power you have that determines the extent of your freedom, it is unlikely 
that a humane society will produce more individuals than one fractured by tyranny and violence. It 
may be that the latter is a more favourable for breeding genius. It is "the degree of resistance that 
must be continually overcome in order to remain on top' that is 'the measure of freedom, whether for 
individuals or for societies - freedom understood, that is, as positive power, as will to power. 
According to this concept, the highest form of individual freedom, of sovereignty, would in all 
probability emerge not five steps from its opposite, where the danger of slavery hangs over existence 
like a hundred swords of Damocles. Look at history from this viewpoint: the ages in which the 
'individual' achieves such ripe perfection, i.e., freedom, and the classic type of the sovereign man is 
attained - oh no! they have never been humane ages!”494 
It is contest, inspired by all the best and worst elements of the human passions - jealousy, ambition, 
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the will to dominate, the desire for blood – that spurs us to great tasks. In the unpublished fragment 
Homer's Contest young Nietzsche reminds us that 'humanity' and 'nature' cannot be separated; that the 
same soil produces the most dreadful and inhuman actions and also the highest and noblest works. He 
recounts how in war the Greeks showed the depths of their hatred and cruelty. The whole Greek 
world revelled not only in blood-letting but in its depiction in poetry or sculpture. Their genius 
"admitted the existing fearful impulse and deemed it justified, strife and the pleasure of victory were 
acknowledged”.495 They found no offence in jealousy, spite, and envy like the Christianised moderns, 
but found both good and bad results from the same: spite and envy could lead men to conduct hostile 
wars of extermination, but could also spur them not to the 'action of contest.'496 
In this manner envy could serve as an antidote to tyranny, for the impulse of every Greek to dominate 
all others, is neutralised by the equally determined efforts of his peers to thwart him. To ensure that 
the too powerful did not behave with inordinate hubris, others entered the field against them. The 
Greeks went further to prevent their domination by one and employed the expedient of Ostracism to 
preserve the state. They acted on the principle that 'none among us shall be the best' not, according to 
Nietzsche, because they were peevish egalitarians but because they wanted the stimulus of contest, so 
necessary for the well-being of the state, which would have been extinguished if one person proved 
greater than the rest. Thus it was in the contest rather than in the victory that culture prospered. 
Realising this, agonistic education was actively fostered by the Greek state for the good of all its 
citizens. "The all-excelling individual was to be removed in order that the contest of forces might 
reawaken, a thought which is hostile to the 'exclusiveness' of genius in the modern sense but which 
assumes that in the natural order of things there are always several geniuses which incite one another 
to action, as much also as they hold one another within the bounds of moderation. That is the kernel 
of the Hellenic contest-conception: it abominates autocracy, and fears its dangers; it desires as a 
preventative against the genius - a second genius.”497 
The measure of a sophisticated, heterogeneous culture is how many individuals can flourish, without 
one becoming too powerful. Many tyrants can rise, but none will dominate the rest. A civilisation of 
individuals cannot allow itself to submit to a single tyrant, party, faith, or morality. The heterogeneity 
of the Greeks caused many attempts to found new religions to fail: the Orphic cults, Pythagoras, 
Plato, and also Empedocles managed, despite superlative gifts, only to found sects. Their higher 
civilisation, with its diversity of individuals and diverse needs, could not be consoled by a single 
prescription of faith and hope. Thus, "whenever the reformation of a whole people fails and it is only 
sects that elevate their leader, we may conclude that the people has become relatively heterogeneous 
and has begun to move away from rude herd instincts and the morality of mores: they are hovering in 
an interesting intermediate position that is usually dismissed as a mere decay of morals and 
corruption, although in fact it proclaims that the eggshell is about to be broken.”498 
Luther's Reformation succeeded in northern Europe precisely because it was retarded compared to the 
south and knew only homogenous and monotonous needs. Nietzsche takes it as axiomatic that the 
more general and unconditional the influence of an idea or individual, then the more homogenous the 
mass that is influenced. Counter-movements and fragmentation in a civilisation, normally described 
as its 'corruption', suggest other needs that have to be satisfied. "Conversely, we may always infer that 
a civilisation is really high when powerful and domineering natures have little influence and create 
only sects. This applies also to the various arts and the field of knowledge. Where someone rules, 
there are masses; and where we find masses we find also a need to be enslaved. Where men are 
enslaved, there are few individuals, and these are opposed by herd instincts and conscience.”499 
Individuals and their Relation to Social Decay 
The later Nietzsche equates corruption with proliferating individualism. This is not undesirable, as 
corruption implies that the strictures of the herd are dissolving.500 The first sign of corruption in a 
nation is the emergence of superstition, which opposes itself to common religious faith. This 
development suggests individuals are independent enough to go their own way, and the presence of 
many 'false' beliefs signals the glimmering of enlightenment. At the same time occurs the malady of 
'exhaustion', enjoyed by those who prefer pleasure to war and discipline. Nietzsche sees this as a sign 
that the nation's energies are no longer corporate but have been transformed into countless private 
passions. These are no less powerful than the martial passions but because they are private they seem 
less visible. Thus it is precisely in times of 'exhaustion' that "tragedy runs through houses and streets, 
that great love and great hatred are born, and that the flame of knowledge flares up into the sky." 
Further down the path to corruption the nation is no longer as cruel as it was when it was stronger and 
stuck to its religious faith. The cruelty it practices does not decline in quantity but in form. It becomes 
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more refined, to the point where words and gestures achieve what was once managed by a branding 
iron. When 'moral decay' begins and public virtues disappear tyrants emerge and seize control of the 
state. Discord then follows until, in the autumnal reign of a Caesar, public factionalism is crushed and 
order is imposed. It is only then that individuals have peace to manage the unrest inside themselves. 
In such times bribery and treason are triumphant since the love of the ego is greater than love of the 
nation; individuals live for themselves and make laws for themselves, with the result that "the times of 
corruption are those when the apples fall from the tree: I mean the individuals, for they carry the 
seeds of the future and are the authors of the spiritual colonisation and origin of new states and 
communities. Corruption is merely a nasty word for the autumn of a people."501 
Nietzsche's approval of heterogeneity exceeds the conservative and popular love of order and probity. 
If individuality increases culture then let it flourish, whatever the cost. Amen if the dismemberment of 
the herd means that there should be more evil in the world. This leads Nietzsche to inordinate 
fascination and even admiration for common criminality. In romantic moods he pictures himself a 
criminal, like anyone who defies the herd. All who do not obey herd ethics are criminals; it is merely 
a question of how they go about this: there are great criminals and petty ones, depending on the nature 
of their crime. "In our civilised world, he advises, we learn to know almost only the wretched 
criminal, crushed by the curse and the contempt of society, mistrustful of himself, often belittling and 
slandering his deed, a miscarried type of criminal; and we resist the idea that all great human beings 
have been criminals (only in the grand and not in a miserable style), that crime belongs to 
greatness...To be 'free as a bird' from tradition, the conscience of duty...”502 
Unlike the grand criminal, the petty or 'pale criminal', as he is referred to in Zarathustra, is really not 
worthy of his crime; bad manners and low intelligence deforms his sensibility, and as he surrenders to 
an uncomprehended drive, mostly a lust for blood, he draws back and becomes abashed at his action; 
out of a bad conscience he proceeds to justify his deed with some other motive such as the robbery: 
he "ascribes a false motive to his deed (perhaps by robbery when what he wanted was blood)...”503 It 
is the 'joy of the knife' that really moves the criminal. Naively taking the special case of the violent 
thief to describe 'low' criminality in general Nietzsche's image of the murderer is undoubtedly 
inspired by literature, perhaps Dostoevsky's Crime and Punishment, rather than life experience. To be 
fair, his intentions here are more polemical than scientific: while declaring the low criminal to be 
confessedly 'sick', he wants to ascribe to him a strength that 'good' people do not possess. In 
Zarathustra the point is clarified: "Much about your good people moves me to disgust, and it is not 
their evil I mean. How I wish they possessed a madness through which they could perish, like this 
pale criminal."504 
In the right circumstances it would be easy for many men to commit a crime; therefore we should be 
wary of assessing the value of a man according to a single deed. "Napoleon”, he says, “warned 
against this... If men like us have no crime, e.g. murder, on our conscience - why is it? Because a few 
opportune circumstances were lacking. And if we did it, what would that indicate about our value? In 
a way one would despise us if one thought we had not the strength to kill a man under certain 
circumstances... If with us the criminal is an ill-nourished and stunted plant, this is to the dishonour 
of our social relationships; in the age of the Renaissance the criminal throve and acquired for himself 
his own kind of virtue - virtue in the Renaissance style, to be sure, virtù, moraline-free virtue.”505 
His romance with criminality fathers unusual opinions on the nature of and treatment of criminals. He 
resents the idea of penal institutions, and condemns punishment as a form of contempt or revenge 
against the criminal. He even entertains Christian sentiments without offering 'love' for one's foe. 
Crime, he says, belongs to the concept 'revolt against the social order', and requires suppression rather 
than punishment: one does not punish a rebel.506 Indeed, the act of rebellion may serve to draw our 
attention to some flaw in the social body, and thereby serves a useful function: "...there is nothing 
contemptible in revolt as such... there are even cases in which one might have to honour a rebel, 
because he finds something in our society against which war ought to be waged - he awakens us from 
our slumber...”507 At another point he concedes that, the noble criminal aside, there may be such a 
things as criminal types, a race (rather than a class) of humanity predisposed to crime by birth and 
breeding. So if, in general, one should not deprive the criminal of the possibility of making his peace 
with society, one may make an exception with the type who belongs to the race of criminals. In this 
case "one should make war on him even before he has committed any hostile act (first operation as 
soon as one has him in one's power: his castration).”508 
The later Nietzsche tolerates the cultural decadence he once condemned and accepts decay as the 
natural counterpart to growth. Don‟t argue with decadence; just look for the shoots sprouting through 
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the detritus, which are indeed being fertilised by decay. Decadence may even reflect strength rather 
than weakness, with individuals willing to experiment and lose themselves if they must. Where firm 
order is kept neither individuals nor great culture can be found. Where rulers are too successful, there 
is no cause for change. Only dissatisfaction ensures innovation.509 Likewise, where politics and the 
distractions of public service dominate, permitting neither privacy nor leisure, they too become anti-
cultural. It is more likely that great works are produced when a polity is in decay than in its youthful 
flourishing. "A nation”, he observes, "usually renews its youth on a political sickbed, and there finds 
again the spirit which it had gradually lost in seeking and maintaining power. Culture is indebted 
most of all to politically weakened periods.”510 
War or Peace 
If culture needs conflict and contest between individuals does it need the same between nations? 
Agon, as Greek civilisation shows, was the greatest stimulant of genius, so would not the struggle of 
one nation to surpass another work the same effect? Should not the culture-state itself be warlike in its 
relation to other states? Is high culture better conducted amid arms and manoeuvres than in a cloister, 
or better in the turmoil rather than the harmony of nations? 
Nietzsche admitted that although the Greeks were among the most humane peoples of antiquity, they 
also fought the bloodiest and most unforgiving wars. He himself was eager to go to war and took 
personal pride in his military training as 'an old artilleryman', but despite these inclinations was not 
committed to the idea of war being of value to culture. It is one thing for individuals to struggle with 
each other, even violently, and quite clearly the state may gain from this as much as it may lose. But 
who can profit from the extremity of wars in which many may perish? 
Advantages and Disadvantages of War 
A great war between nations can be likened to a 'period of sleep or winter' for culture, sometimes 
squandering the finest men and women. Nietzsche observes that the Persian wars exhausted the spirit 
of the Greeks and prevented them from enjoying the full blossoming of culture.511 On the threshold of 
discovering ever newer possibilities for human existence, the dire peril presented by Persian invaders 
clamped a ball and chain on Greek progress which afterwards failed to reach so far or so high. The 
Peloponnesian wars that followed soaked up what remained of Greek energies, and they were left as 
prey for predatory nations like Macedon and Rome. 
In modern Europe, culture will only suffer if nations engage in total wars. The pride that surged 
through Germany after the defeat of the French in 1871 has only bred hubris and an over-estimation 
of cultural superiority. The Germans may trounce the French on the battlefield, but the culture of the 
victors is lower than that of the vanquished. Pride of victory has blinded the Germans to the 
superiority of French culture, and has convinced them that they have nothing to learn from it.512 
Apprehensive at the extent to which modern Europe is arming itself, Nietzsche fears that the total war 
which these preparations portend will weaken and engulf the continent in self-destruction. In the 
middle period, he even considers what steps might avert a European conflagration, noting that all 
European governments currently claim to be maintaining arms and armies only for purely for 
defensive reasons due to the attitude that "reserves morality for the defender and immorality for the 
aggressor”. The doctrine that only your own self-defence is moral, and that others who claim this are 
hypocrites, is as inhuman as war itself. "The notion of the army as a means of self-defence must be 
abjured as completely as the lust of conquest." 
At the present time in Europe the only way in which peace might be found is if a mighty nation 
voluntarily dismantles its army, a hint perhaps for the new German Reich. What is required is a nation 
"renowned in wars and victories, distinguished by the highest development of military order and 
intelligence...will voluntarily exclaim, 'We will break our swords,' and will destroy its whole military 
system, lock, stock, and barrel. Making ourselves defenceless (after having been the most strongly 
defended) from a loftiness of sentiment - that is the means towards genuine peace, which must rest 
upon a pacific disposition. The so-called armed peace that prevails at present in all countries is a 
sign of a bellicose disposition, of a disposition that trusts neither itself nor its neighbour, and, partly 
from hate, partly from fear, refuses to lay down its weapons. Better to perish than to hate and fear, 
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and twice as far better to perish than to make one-self hated and feared - this must some day become 
the maxim of every political community!"513 
Again, when insanity was closing on him, Nietzsche condemned the contemporary arms race in 
Europe. In a fragment entitled Declaration of War to be placed at the conclusion of Ecce Homo, but 
which has been otherwise lost, he writes: "If we could dispense with wars, so much the better. I can 
imagine more profitable uses for the twelve billion now paid annually for the armed peace we have in 
Europe; there are other means of winning respect for physiology than field hospitals..."514 
Nietzsche's pacific sentiments are directed at an historical moment, and against contemporary 
Germany. They are provocative in the prevailing climate of opinion. His pæans to war were not so 
singular in his time, and he would not have been condemned for them. It was easier then to be a 
hawk. To condemn German participation in the European arms race, put him out of step when, after a 
century of peace, whole nations were spoiling for war. The prospect of total European war seemed 
possible even between 1870 and 1890 and would have undermined his hopes for a unified Europe. 
That the nations of the continent would exhaust their energies needlessly in mutual contest was the 
height of folly when powers like Russia and the United States were lurching to world-domination. 
Given that his martial statements outnumber his pacific ones must take Nietzsche at his word when he 
says that the worst thing that can be said against war is that it makes the victor stupid and the 
vanquished revengeful. Overwhelmingly in its favour is its power to barbarise to the extent of making 
men natural again: “man emerges from it with greater strength for good or evil'”.515 If it is not always 
expedient or wise to conduct war it is essential we never lose the capacity to wage it. Nothing much 
could ever be expected from a humanity that could not bring itself to the battlefield. Only fanatics or 
those afflicted by the beautiful soul mentality could wish it to be otherwise. Unwarlike nations 
become enervated and weary. Too much delicacy saps the power which is indispensible to great 
culture which "...can by no means dispense with passions, vices, and malignities.”516 
Nietzsche offers the consolation that if the rough energy needed for war cannot always be satisfied in 
battle, it can be simulated in other ways. The Greek state saw the desire for pre-eminence and victory 
in humans as ineradicable and promoted gymnastic and artistic competitions contests to satisfy 
bellicosity without endangering the political order. Once these contests fell out of fashion the Greek 
state foundered in unrest and dissolution.517 In a cruder way the Imperial Romans, having grown tired 
of war, tried to refresh themselves by beast-baitings, gladiatorial combats, and by persecuting 
Christians. The modern English, who 'appear to have renounced war', have found ways to generate 
strength and vigour by undertaking dangerous explorations, sea voyages, mountaineering, and so on. 
But substitutes are not always enough; Nietzsche also believes that there must be some engagement in 
real war if Europe is to survive its enfeeblement through over-refinement. "Many other such 
substitutes for war', he assures us, 'will be discovered, but perhaps precisely thereby it will become 
more and more obvious that such a highly cultivated and therefore necessarily enfeebled humanity as 
that of modern Europe not only needs wars, but the greatest and most terrible wars, - consequently 
occasional relapses into barbarism - lest, by means of culture, it should lose its culture and its very 
existence.”518 The primitive indulgence of war in contemporary Europe is not merely an inevitability 
but a necessary palliative. This a view which increasingly diverts him in his later works: “The 
maintenance of the military state, is the last means of all of acquiring or maintaining the great 
tradition with regard to the supreme type of man, the strong type. And all concepts that perpetuate 
enmity and difference in rank between states (e.g., nationalism, protective tariffs) may appear 
sanctioned in this light.”519 Thus even nationalism, which Nietzsche customarily abhors, can be 
justified to some extent if it provide peoples with an excuse to fight each other. 
In his last years Nietzsche is sure that the collisions of armies will shake Europe from its effeminacy 
and make the continent more virile, so that the man, the sturdy warrior, always more aesthetically 
appealing than the grasping merchant, will dominate businessmen and philistines. Without irony he 
claims that "the future of German culture rests with the sons of the Prussian officers”520 And, listing 
as one of the remedies for modernity, “universal military service in which the time for joking is past”, 
declares that he is glad about the military development of Europe: “the time of repose and Chinese 
ossification... is over.”521 
Owing to the influence of Napoleon earlier in the century "...we now confront a succession of a few 
warlike centuries that have no parallel in history; in short we have entered the classical age of war, 
of scientific and at the same time popular war on the largest scale (in weapons, talents, and 
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discipline). All coming centuries will look back on it with envy and awe for its perfection.”522 
Napoleon's campaigns had shattered the pleasant succession of feints, sieges, and manoeuvres typical 
of the wars of the eighteenth century. War had been a refinement, a recreation for gentlemen generals, 
now it was a struggle waged in earnest, engulfing the lives and feelings of entire peoples. Descending 
into this abyss of barbarism they will emerge more brutalised but also more passionate, and therefore 
more fruitful subjects for culture when the principles of refinement are rediscovered. 
In these remarks Nietzsche adheres to the Ideal of Cultivation that owes more to the warrior than to 
the scribe. War has been the companion of culture; and the classes devoted to its conduct, idle and 
eager to praise their own merits, externalising their excellences in codes of courtly conduct, poetry, 
and music, figure prominently in the history of civilisations. Nietzsche's is the last of the generations 
of Europe for whom the conduct of war is the preserve of a specific class, rather than a profession due 
to the reformation of warfare brought about by Napoleon. That is why he regrets the passing of noble 
manners, and maintains that "culture that rests on a military basis still towers above the so-called 
industrial culture.”523 The question remains however as to whether this kind of class-based militarism 
is in any way reflective of heterogeneity, for surely it would have the very opposite effect. A military 
order of any kind must make homogeneity the basis of its organisation and leads us to wonder 
whether Nietzsche is not unsympathetic to its existence within the culture-state. 
Homogeneity - The Importance of Mediocrity 
If heterogeneity is needed for a culture-state, so is some level of homogeneity. Nietzsche abhors the 
'mediocrity' of the masses or mass institutions like the state, mainly in his youthful period. After the 
middle period he regards such idealism with abhorrence. "Hatred for mediocrity” he then maintains, 
“is unworthy of a philosopher” and “is almost a question mark against his 'right to philosophy'.” It is 
precisely because the philosopher is exceptional that he has to “keep the mediocre in good heart.”524 
Far from making war on the rule the exceptional individual should grasp that the continued existence 
of the rule is what makes the exception possible.525 So, just as the economic and material foundation 
of culture demands that the broad mass of men must work to supply cultivated leisure to the few, the 
same principle can be applied even in a more spiritualised sense, to the conduct of science and art for 
example. “A high culture can stand only upon a broad base, upon a healthy and consolidated 
mediocrity. Science - and even art work in its service and are served by it.”526 
It is not commonplace ability or talent that makes you mediocre; even gifted mediocrities are possible. 
The criterion is the degree of 'greatness' of your 'spirit'. The mediocre, he believes, do not have tragic 
vision; they have not the power to confront the irreconcilable polarities of existence and behold them 
beyond moral categories. Unable to accommodate or understand these oppositions, they seek to 
define only a small corner of being as the whole, and reject the remainder as some form of aberration 
or 'evil'. Unable to live with what they call evil and without appreciating its necessary role in 
existence they seek to destroy it entirely. “Commonplace men can represent only a tiny nook and 
corner of this natural character: they perish when the multiplicity of elements and the tension of 
opposites: i.e. the preconditions for greatness in man, increases. That man must grow better and more 
evil is my formula for this inevitability-“527 Such men have not composite natures, they are 
individually only bits and fragments of human nature, needing to be added together to amount to 
something. It is only when they are taken en masse that they make possible a base or foundation of 
civilisation from which synthetic individuals may work to perfect nature. 
Nature needs homogeneity because all life is intrinsically hierarchical, and the greater part of it 
always plays an invisible and subordinate role. Living structures are pyramids of subordinations: that 
a few rule over many is a law of efficient functioning inherent in the design of the animalcule as the 
arrangement of human society. What makes life possible makes society possible. Nothing could exist 
without unconditional rule by a small part of the body over the greater part, so long as the greater part 
keeps to narrowly defined tasks and purposes, and performs these for the grander edifice of which it 
has no notion. 
The willingness of mediocrity to subordinate itself is what makes it serviceable to artist-statesmen. 
Great individuals are rare and unpredictable, but homogeneous groups are malleable and calculable. 
They are agents of stability and are needed to construct mighty and enduring social edifices. But if the 
mediocre are unwilling to submit to knavery and slavery then building becomes more difficult. 
Nietzsche laments the decline in the modern world of a willingness he believed existed in antiquity 
and in medieval times. Because of this he expects that an entire world of possibility will disappear. 
The modern fragmentation of the Holy Roman Empire and the diminution of Church powers have 
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given way to freer circumstances in which people are only prepared to subordinate themselves on 
conditions, 'i.e. contractually, with proviso's of self-interest.' Now, there will be no pyramid building, 
no grand political architecture. "When this subordination is no longer possible, he says, a multitude of 
astonishing results will no longer be attained, and the world will be all the poorer.”528 
Not entirely despondent, Nietzsche recalls that homogeneity can be encouraged by means of universal 
moralities and eugenics. Artist statesman can educate a population by encouraging it to behave in 
accordance with certain laws and applying principles of eugenics allows him to breed a calculable 
type. Morality, which "emphasises the power-instinct of the herd” disparages individuals and stifles 
the instinct for tyranny.529 Laws, as codified forms of morality, channel the behaviour of the masses 
to favoured outcomes, so that when an artist statesman, a Solon or a Lycurgus, has an image of the 
best type of citizen, he turns to legislation as the first means for producing him. Laws, backed up by 
the physical force of the state, constrain and direct behaviour, and because they reduce every living 
action to an abstract principle, they are perfect vehicles for encouraging homogeneity. 
Eugenics, practised in many societies since antiquity, must also play its part. The question of marriage 
is a concern of the community not just individuals and in the interest of producing a calculable 
humanity we must be responsible for ensuring that unsound partnerships do not take place. Nietzsche 
himself recommends "...a medical certificate preceding every marriage and endorsed by the 
communal authorities... every marriage warranted and sanctioned by a certain number of trusted men 
of the community, as a matter of concern to the community.”530 Marriage has a far more serious 
purpose than the happiness of individual couples; it is, when properly considered, the grand vehicle 
for breeding a race to rule and one which can be ruled: "In marriage in the aristocratic, old 
aristocratic sense of the word it was the question of the breeding of a race ... - thus of the 
maintenance of a fixed, definite type of ruling man: man and woman were sacrificed to this point of 
view."531 The control of breeding must be invested with a central authority, not merely to enforce a 
rule but to prevent all forms of miscarried life. Strict breeding practices would ensure that those who 
exhibit declining or decadent tendencies should not be allowed to procreate: "Society, as the great 
trustee of life, is responsible to life itself for every miscarried life - it also has to pay for such lives: 
consequently it ought to prevent them. In numerous cases, society ought to prevent procreation: to 
this end, it may hold in readiness, without regard to descent, rank, or spirit, the most rigorous means 
of constraint, deprivation of freedom, in certain circumstances castration.”532 
Doctrines of Homogeneity: the Rise of Socialism 
Nietzsche is certain of the need for homogeneity as a principle of social organisation, but is not 
always sympathetic to doctrines that hail it as virtue. Hence his response to socialism, whose rise in 
modern Europe he regards as significant, paralleling the growing power of the state and of democratic 
movements, is unambiguously hostile. Recalling that, prior to his collapse in 1889, no socialist party 
on earth had ever held power, or had given palpable demonstration of its capacity for good or the evil, 
his attitude is based entirely on encounters with socialist doctrine. Recall too that Nietzsche was 
familiar only with revolutionary and international socialism rather than social-democratic parties that 
were to become a reality only after the turn of the century. 
There are two main reasons for this hostility. One is socialism's intention to increase and centralise 
state powers, and the other to consider the welfare of the community at the expense of the individual. 
Socialism, he says, would make the state an even greater despot than what it already is; its efforts are 
reactionary for it "desires as much state power as despotism has possessed, and surpasses the 
despotism of the past insofar as it aims at the complete annihilation of the individual who must be 
integrated as an organ within the general community.”533 It wishes to make use of the despotism 
already existing as a survival of the reign of kings, but would press this to lengths never before 
conceived. It would demand the total submission of the citizenry before the state. In its efforts to hold 
power socialism will have to conduct reigns of terror, for it has dispensed with myths and the 
principles of piety toward religion and the state which the old despotisms employed to keep their 
subjects in order. The dependence upon terror would indicate that socialist systems could only ever 
exist for relatively short periods. The application of terror would be a reflection of its political 
despair. Hence, socialism, "...as it can no longer count upon the old religious piety towards the State, 
but must rather strive involuntarily and continuously for the abolition thereof - because it strives for 
the abolition of all existing states - it can only hope for existence occasionally, here and there for 
short periods, by means of the extremest terrorism.”534 
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There is a badly concealed 'will to negate life' in socialism that will always bring it to negate itself.535 
Nietzsche is confident that it will never be more than an experiment, nor will it dominate the hearts 
and minds of people for great durations. It is an aberration that may provide a few instructive lessons 
for the history of political forms. In many places in Europe it may bring off 'occasional coups' and 
"there will be deep 'rumblings' in the stomach of the next century... the Paris commune... was perhaps 
no more than a minor indigestion compared to what is coming.”536 
Socialism as an instructive experiment 
In some degree experiments with socialism should be welcomed as a practical demonstration of the 
harm such a system will do. "The earth is large enough and man still sufficiently unexhausted; hence 
such a practical instruction and demonstratio ad absurdum would not strike me as undesirable, even 
if it were gained and paid for with a tremendous expenditure of human lives.”537 But the death knell 
of socialism is already sounded by the rising power of the masses. Indeed socialism is paradoxically 
preparing its own impossibility through its influence among them. The present political powers, 
fearful of this, attempt to gain the sympathy of the masses by promising them welfare and freedoms 
and make it unnecessary for them to recourse to the more extreme measures advised by Socialist 
doctrine. Nietzsche has in mind here the generous social welfare system introduced by Bismark in the 
early years of the German Reich. The combination of fear and counterthrust only hastens the onset of 
democracy and enlarges the size and power of a middle-class that has no need of socialism. 
Nietzsche anticipates the reforming social-democratic parties of the West that will attack the 
accumulations of wealth and privilege through parliamentary majorities and thereby decrease the 
distance between those with property and those without. These parties will make terror unnecessary. 
The outcome is that "all political powers nowadays attempt to exploit the fear of socialism for their 
own strengthening, yet in the long run democracy alone gains the advantage, for all parties are now 
compelled to flatter 'the masses' and grant them facilites and liberties of all kinds, with the result that 
the masses finally become omnipotent. The masses are as far as possible removed from socialism as a 
doctrine of altering the acquisition of property. If once they get the steering-wheel into their hands, 
through great majorities in their parliaments, they will attack with progressive taxation the whole 
dominant system of capitalists, merchants, and financiers, and will in fact slowly create a middle 
class which may forget socialism like a disease which has been overcome.”538 
As socialism undermines itself while struggling to gain the sympathy of the masses, it also generates 
opposition by making the state absolute in human affairs. Should socialism ever successfully attain its 
end it will demonstrate to all witnesses what the consequences of unbounded state power might be 
and will thereby stimulate, in reaction to it, a party advocating the reduction of the same. Socialism 
may therefore “serve to teach, very brutally and impressively, the danger of all accumulations of 
State power, and may serve so far to inspire distrust of the State itself. When its rough voice strikes up 
the war-cry 'as much state as possible', the shout at first becomes louder than ever, - but soon the 
opposition cry also breaks forth, with so much greater force: 'as little State as possible'. "539 
Although varieties of nationalist socialist doctrine already existed in Nietzsche's day, his knowledge 
of European socialists was that they were opposed by the nationalist parties. This was then largely the 
case in Germany where liberals and conservatives had strongly aligned themselves with the 
nationalist cause, while socialists remained internationalists. Each side, he thought, deserved the 
other. "In the one camp (socialist) they desire to work as little as possible with their hands, in the 
other (nationalist) as little as possible with their heads; in the latter they hate and envy prominent, 
self-evolving individuals, who do not willingly allow themselves to be drawn up in rank and file for 
the purpose of a collective effort; in the former they hate and envy the better social caste, which is 
more favourably circumstanced outwardly, whose peculiar mission, the production of the highest 
blessings of culture, makes life inwardly all the harder and more painful."540 This is no anticipation of 
the fusion of both doctrines in the Fascist world-view, but a rejection of each for its own failings. 
The threat of socialism has therapeutic value however, if only to a Europe grown sickly and 
effeminate. "...it delays 'peace on earth' and the total mollification of the democratic herd animal; it 
forces the Europeans to retain spirit, namely cunning and cautious care, not to abjure manly and 
warlike virtues altogether, and to retain some remnant of spirit, of clarity, sobriety, and coldness of 
the spirit - it protects Europe for the time being from the marasmus feminismus that threatens it.”541 
But in essence, socialist doctrine promises nothing for culture, and must never be adopted by a 
politics of cultivation. 
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Pro and contra democracy 
Socialism is merely one manifestation of the modern democratic movement and its equalising 
individualism and homogenising collectivism. Although hostile to socialism he is sometimes 
ambivalent about democracy, or at least about its effects. There is no doubt about his distaste for 
democratic principles and politics. The genteel scholar abhors the vulgarity of the demos and those 
who seek its rule; his attacks on democratic politics are as vehement in his youth as in his maturity. 
His epithets are familiar and unremarkable, at least not for someone urging an uncompromising and 
unforgiving elitism. Democracy is 'barbarism'; it flatters and gives free reign to the instincts of the 
'herd animal'; it is a type of rule which features all the vices of the masses: myopia, vulgar 
enthusiasms, a proclivity for idolatry, arbitrary violence, the manifesting of bad taste and ugliness in 
private and public places, generally lower powers of discrimination... 
At times he concedes virtue to democratic forms, or at least criticises them in more generous spirit. Of 
universal suffrage, still no more than an idea in mid-nineteenth century Europe, he complains that it is 
impractical because it is not supported in practice by the majority of people; this is demonstrated by 
the fact that whenever a vote is actually held most people do not even go to the polls.542 He scornfully 
dismisses parliamentarianism since it merely provides the public with permission to choose between 
five basic political opinions and flatters those who like to seem independent, as though they had won 
their opinions for themselves. Ultimately it really doesn't matter whether the herd is commanded to 
have one opinion or permitted to have five, since whoever really deviates from the five opinions and 
stands apart will always have the herd against him.543 
In his most liberal phase, in Human All Too Human, he allows that democracy does strive to create 
and guarantee independence for the majority. For this reason, he believes political suffrage must be 
withheld from both the very rich and the very poor, as these are the two most intolerant classes. 
Democracy must always ensure that these classes are disenfranchised, because they will always strive 
to undermine it. Similarly democracy must prevent all measures that aim at party organisation. For 
the three great foes of independence, in that sense, are the “have-nots, the rich, and the parties. - I 
speak of democracy as of a thing to come. What at present goes by that name is distinguished from 
older forms of government only by the fact that it drives with new horses; the roads and the wheels 
are the same as yore. - Has the danger really become less with these conveyances of the 
commonwealth.”544 In the same mood he concedes that democratic institutions usefully quarantine 
against tyrannical desires, although they inspire a society with little else than enervating tedium.545 
Regarding human 'rights' he merely notes that, quite clearly there is no such thing; no inner principle 
of rights in nature or society, simply one's power to assert oneself. We only have rights when we have 
enough power to force a treaty with an opposing power. That someone should demand 'rights' without 
a foundation of power supporting them makes no sense. If socialists demand equal rights for the 
subject caste it simply reflects their covetousness. The demand comes from below, and is made by 
those who are no position to bargain. It is only when representatives of the governing class say "We 
will treat men equally and grant them equal rights”that socialism can ever be based on justice.546 
The argument of socialists that the unequal division of property is the consequence of injustice and 
violence committed by one class over another is correct, but they see only a special case, and this is 
not permissible. The entire history of civilisation is built upon violence, slavery, deception... and all 
of us inherit a past that cannot be altered. To demand immediate forcible redistribution of wealth, as 
many socialists do, commits an injustice as great as that of which the propertied classes are accused. 
To achieve a fairer distribution of property gradual transformations of opinion are necessary; by this 
means justice can be strengthened and the instinct for violence weakened. 
The inevitability of democracy 
As he grows more convinced of the irreversible nature of the democratic trend Nietzsche tries to 
understand its implications. A new world is at hand that barely comprehends the principles of the 
ancien régime. Like the decline of Christianity, the rise of science, technical progress, and the 
breakup of the old empires, modern democracy is yet another aspect of Europe's rejection of the 
middle ages. The old orders of rank are being effaced steadily and with little violence, and no longer 
hold uncanny power over men's feelings.  
To be sure, for some time the agents of the ancien regime will launch occasional counter-attacks. The 
monarchs and emperors of Europe, for example, imagine that they can restrain democracy by putting 
their nations on a war footing: the perception of national peril excuses their tighter grip on the state. 
These agents actually seek war for they realise that their existence in times of peace is tenuous. 'The 
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steady progress of democracy slowly nullifies, without violent means, the power of monarchy and 
emperor, so that these remain only as an ornament on the dress of democracy. A superfluity which 
democracy allows itself as a venerable tradition, a relic etc. In order to avoid the danger of this 
nullification, kings hold by their teeth to their dignity as war-lords. To this end they need wars, or in 
other words exceptional circumstances, in which that slow, lawful pressure of the democratic forces 
is relaxed.'547 But these actions are futile; the entire process is so inexorable that even those who 
oppose it encourage its ascendency by using the means that democratic thought has developed. 
Nietzsche's certainty of a democratic future affects his vision of a culture state. In the middle and later 
period he accepts that democracy unintentionally forms the basis of great culture. Although the 
democratic work of the present generations will bring ever more distressing degeneration of intellect 
and taste in public affairs, it will build an edifice able to endure all manner of crises and to support the 
future of culture. It seems "that the democratisation of Europe is a link in the chain of those mighty 
prophylactic principles which are the thought of the modern era, and whereby we rise up in revolt 
against the Middle Ages. Now... is the age of Cyclopean building! A final security in the foundations, 
that the future may build on them without danger! Henceforth, an impossibility of the orchards of 
culture being once more destroyed overnight by wild, senseless mountain torrents! Dams and walls 
against barbarians, against plagues, against physical and spiritual serfdom!”548 
This will involve the immense labour of centuries, and if democrats merely see democracy as an end 
in itself it should not offend those engaged in the politics of cultivation. The former cannot yet see 
"the gardener and the fruit, for whose sake the fence exists.” The practical results of increasing 
democratisation will be monumental. A European league of nations will arise, in which "each 
individual nation, delimited by the proper geographical frontiers, has the position of a canton with its 
separate rights."549 Democratic Europe will negotiate new administrative boundaries - cantons rather 
than nations - according to rational criteria which pay no heed to tradition or precedent. "The 
corrections of frontiers that will prove necessary will be so carried out as to serve the interests of the 
great cantons and at the same time those of the whole federation... To find the standpoints for these 
corrections will be the task of future diplomats, who will have to be at the same time students of 
civilisation, agriculturalists, and commercial experts, with no armies but motives and utilities at their 
back.”550 The peoples of new Europe will take small account of previously existing nations. Even 
memories of these will fade because the democratic régime, with all its craze for novelty and 
experiment, will obliterate any feelings for the past. 
The democratic movement, following the spreading tentacles of capitalist economy and revolutionary 
transport and communications networks, forces the integration of Europe. If democracy can bring this 
result its existence will have been justified, but that does not mean it is destined or desirable to be 
maintained. For the tasks of the next century, Nietzsche declares, the methods of popular 
representation and parliaments are the most inappropriate imaginable',551 but it would certainly be a 
kind of goal, redemption, and justification for the democratic movement itself if someone arrived who 
could make use of it.'552 Democratic Europe awaits new Caesars and new Napoleons; statesmen with 
the formative powers of artists who will use the democratic mass, this intelligent slave class, to 
produce social structures of awesome grandeur, dedicated solely to the pursuit of culture. 
Hierarchy - Order of rank 
Nietzsche's desire for a high culture of duration, of grand social structures able to resist time, must 
surely exclude social heterogeneity. If the lumbering structures created by mediocrity are needed by 
culture, would they not also obliterate the agonistic anarchy on which culture depends? How can 
individuality exist over and above the homogenous mass? Nietzsche tries to reconcile this confusion 
using a stratagem he calls the 'order of rank'. It would, he imagines, be possible to incorporate both 
heterogeneous and homogenous social structures by creating entirely separate higher and lower 
castes. 
Within the order of rank lower castes serve culture by permitting their herd instincts to flourish. Over 
and above them another caste renounces such instincts and occupies itself with individualist 
experiments. It is not so much material differences but vast gulfs of consciousness that separate them: 
your position in a caste would be determined by 'the quantum of power' you embody.553 No 
graduation or scale of ranks but a simple unbridgeable division between two great classes; one 
governed by the laws of homogeneity the other pursuing a careless heterogeneity. The distance 
between them would be so great that there could never be any interaction, or vertical movement of 
individuals from one to the other. They would represent wholly distinct races of mankind with their 
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own physiology and character; one, the slave class, being weak, obedient, intelligent and diligent and 
the other, the master class, stronger, more experimental, and richer in spirit and energy. Where 
homogeneity would be enforced by the former, heterogeneity would be favoured by the latter. 
He believes the potential for this development is growing in Europe. This caste system is already 
being prepared. Hoping that modern decadence and decay portend an experimental individuality, he is 
convinced that Europe is growing more homogenous. Both developments, desirable and 
complementing each other, will tear the continent into halves that will constitute his beloved order of 
rank. "The homogenising of European man is the great process that cannot be obstructed: one should 
even hasten it. The necessity to create a gulf, distance, order of rank, is given eo ipso - not the 
necessity to retard this process.' 'As soon as it is established, this homogenising species requires a 
justification: it lies in serving a higher sovereign species that stands upon the former and can raise 
itself to its task only by doing this. Not merely a master race whose sole task is to rule, but a race with 
its own sphere of life, with an excess of strength for beauty, bravery, culture, manners to the highest 
peak of the spirit; an affirming race that may grant itself every great luxury - strong enough to have 
no need of the tyranny of the virtue-imperative, rich enough to have no need of thrift and pedantry, 
beyond good and evil; a hot house for strange and choice plants."554 
The later Nietzsche's principles of social organisation contradict those that dominate the modern 
world. Like Hegel, he sees justice in the preservation of estates and castes and the equilibrium of 
classes, though only in order to serve the higher end of creating genius. Notions of justice or right for 
each individual have no place in a system which looks even beyond the commonwealth or national 
good and beyond mankind itself. In order to consolidate a social organisation to breed genius we may 
even need, in the shorter term, to suppress genius itself; there must be periods in which homogeneity, 
the values of the herd, must dominate the drives of powerful individuals: thus, the "most fearful and 
fundamental desire in man, his drive for power - this drive is called 'freedom' - must be held in check 
the longest. This is why ethic, with its unconscious instinct for education and breeding, has hitherto 
aimed at holding the desire for power in check: it disparages the tyrannical individuals and with its 
glorification of social welfare and patriotism emphasises the power-instinct of the herd.”555 
Furthermore, order of rank involves the question of "the degree of power that the one or the other 
should exercise over others or over all, and to what extent a sacrifice of freedom, even enslavement, 
provides the basis for the emergence of a higher type. Put in the crudest form: how could one 
sacrifice the development of mankind to help a higher species than man come into existence.”556 
Nietzsche's desires an enduring social organisation to produce great individuals, but recognises that 
periods of high culture are brief and do not recur for generations. A society organised to conserve the 
results of these brief episodes of genius does not necessarily create genius. In any system a long stasis 
must be endured until punctuated by brief interludes of brilliance; as a spring flowering after a long 
winter. The long periods of seeming inertia are as necessary as the brief but spectacular bloom. This 
is why Nietzsche still hankers after a utopia of durable organisation that can breed genius continually. 
It is also why he sees the idea of order of rank, typical of bureaucratic, priestly and military 
organisation, as most fruitful, and why he can assert that "the maintenance of the military state is the 
last means of all of acquiring or maintaining the great tradition with regard to the supreme type of 
man, the strong type. And all concepts that perpetuate enmity and difference in rank between states 
(e.g. nationalism, protective tariffs) may appear sanctioned in this light."557 
Conclusions 
It is hard to see how such a perceptive observer of the past could arrive at conclusions at odds with 
historical example. Wherever and whenever cultural awakenings have occurred in the west, there 
have been higher and lower classes, but not more than what is usually found. If anything, in the 
civilisations of Greek antiquity and the Italian Renaissance, based as they were on the organisation of 
the city-state, class boundaries were inclined to blur and social mobility prevailed. The fragility of the 
city-state's independence and power, even at its most oligarchic and aristocratic (as in Venice), led it 
to seek and employ talent of any provenance. Their dynamism was predicated the rivalry between 
parties in the state, and between states themselves due to the need of aristocratic classes to defend 
their privileges and power against the demos. This occurred, but never to the degree it did within 
medieval Europe's caste-like feudal structures, and certainly never in the caste systems of Asia. Even 
when slavery was practiced in city-states, which presented a rigid caste structure, it was not unusual 
for slaves to rise and shake off the infamy of their origin. 
An outstanding exception to this pattern in antiquity was Sparta, where an awesome divide, almost an 
intractable class war, separated Spartans and their subjects the helots. This city-state had notable 
successes in war but in almost no other department and produced few extraordinary individuals. 
                                                                
554 WP, a898. 
555 WP, a720. 
556 WP, a859. 
557 WP, a729. 
129 
Sparta was a fossil, and in the long run was punished for its inflexibility. In the less rigid institutions 
of Sparta's rival, Athens, diverse talents flourished and, despite military defeats at the hands of Sparta 
and later Macedon, remained a centre of cultural achievement for centuries to come. 
In early modern Europe it was in the towns, with their comparatively liberal institutions (even the 
medieval city was a place of elaborate hierarchies) that employment for talent was found. Ability 
strutted and postured in the townhouses of the bourgeoisie and embourgeoified aristocracy, not on the 
dismal estates of the feudal aristocracy. The celebrated sovereign individuals of the Italian 
Renaissance deported in the most urbanised country in Europe where the feudal impositions of the 
Holy Roman Empire barely existed as a concept. Class divisions and social hierarchies flourished, 
and nowhere more methodically than in Venice (which for all its commercial and martial vigour, did 
not produce the abundance of genius of smaller Italian cities), but talent could always rise, not 
because it had to struggle more, but because it was not thwarted. The middle classes are by nature 
more ambitious than those lower to them, for the riches and grandeur of inherited privilege are within 
sight. The lowest classes observe their lords across a gulf that neither diligence nor capacity can 
bridge. Aristocracy in the city-states were essential as instigators, preservers and consumers of talent, 
but in no way proved that there was a need for rigid caste structures that Nietzsche imagines. 
Remarkably Nietzsche did not foresee the flaws of a rigid caste system. By his own principles, it is 
contest that separates the excellent from the mediocre, so the culture-state would have to ensure a 
modicum of equality at the outset that many do not become disheartened at the advantages of a few. 
This state would have to be supremely heterogeneous and permit those from the lowest orders to rise 
to prominence by virtue of their abilities. Fluidity of rather than rigidity caste would be the key to 
success, and families must ascend or descend rapidly in the social scale according to their proficiency. 
Friction and factionalism, disharmony between classes and individuals is a minor discomfort 
measured against the aggregate of virtù a nation of self-sufficient individuals would possess. 
However, agonistic instinct is quickly undermined in a polity based on caste, which would have to 
enforce strict moral codes to promote uniformity among members, and to keep others in their place. 
Such a heavy overlay of morality would, according to Nietzsche's own observations, snuff out the 
development of conscious, self-willed individuals. As he is prone to asserting, the strongest will 
always get away. But could there be a more discouraging way of encouraging the production of 
sovereign individuals? 
Do we expect that the strongest and best are always from the upper caste, despite their education and 
breeding? A durable system of social hierarchies would stifle individuality in every caste, even the 
most privileged, and inheritance would triumph over talent, heaping honours on the undeserving. Did 
not the caste system of Germany and Europe, though not as extreme as that recommended by 
Nietzsche, produce social ossification? For all his posturing before blue-bloodedness Nietzsche is no 
lover of privileged bone-heads. He resents their power like any capable and ambitious burgher.558 
In his deepest instincts as scribe and intellectual, Nietzsche is a meritocrat. His aristocracy is not that 
of property and privilege, but of the 'spirit'. It is the utopia of merit he seeks: a place where only the 
best rule, the perfect utterance of which occurring in Plato's Republic, has been an eternal wet dream 
of the scribes, or what we today call intellectuals. Nietzsche shares the ancient prejudice to admire 
power and prestige gained by virtue and ability and to despise merely inherited privilege. Scribal 
civilisation, based on the principles of professionalism and therefore invariably bureaucratic in 
character, is much attached to 'orders of rank' and the establishment of stages of merit, along which an 
individual passes to higher grades of power and status. Being nurtured in such a civilisation (and 
nowhere more advanced in nineteenth century Europe than Prussia) he shares the disposition of 
professional classes, like soldiers, officials, or priests to see the world across legions of serried ranks. 
Although not oblivious of the problem of accommodating the contradictory forms of caste and merit, 
Nietzsche never deals with it thoughtfully or methodically. Plato, when considering the same in the 
Republic, believed individuals from a higher class should sink to a lower one if they were found to be 
unfit, and that others could be elevated. Nietzsche accepts this idea in principle, but does not point to 
a mechanism for accomplishing it. Like a thousand other scribal utopians before and after, he never 
indicates how genius can rule without being usurped or corrupted, or how the movement of merited 
privilege could be prevented from ossifying into mere inherited privilege. 
He can say at last, albeit feebly, that there "should be an interchange between the two castes, so that 
on the one hand the duller and less intelligent families and individuals are lowered from the higher 
caste into the lower... and the freer men of the lower class obtain access to the higher...”559 He also 
recognises that superior 'blood' and breeding is not always the preserve of aristocracy and that "the 
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peasant is the commonest type of noblesse, for he is dependent upon himself most of all. Peasant 
blood is still the best blood in Germany - for example, Luther, Niebuhr, Bismark."560 From the same 
standpoint he can even go so far as to say that "the lower classes of unlearned men are now our only 
hope. The learned and cultivated classes must be abandoned, and along with them, the priests, who 
understand only these classes and who are themselves members of them.”561 
Thus it is the bureaucratic and not the republican forms of meritocracy that dominate his perception of 
ideal social organisation, and make him interpret even the high achievements of republican 
civilisations as merely species of the former. He sees the virtues of the early Greeks, as a superior and 
purified version of those historically characteristic of German civilisation since the Middle Ages and 
which were still so even in his own his lifetime despite it undergoing the most radical transitions. It is 
the deep-rooted vestiges of the Holy Roman Empire within modern German institutions and political 
culture that Nietzsche recalls when he envisages an order of rank. The Holy Roman Empire, like 
Prussia on a national level and like, for example, eighteenth century Russia after the reforms of Peter 
the Great, was administered by a bureaucratised aristocracy. This peculiar form of aristocracy is not 
uncommon in cosmopolitan empires, where a centralised ruler presses an existing propertied class, an 
aristocracy of inheritance, into the service of administration and imposes on it stratifications typical of 
bureaucratic organisation: ranks, divisions, grades, such that it also shares the form of a meritocracy. 
The natural egalitarianism among aristocrats in simpler social organisations (as pares cum paribus ) is 
supplanted by forms of precedence and rank. This type of aristocracy represents a separate caste 
within the civilisation, but within itself is stratified by grades of merit and distinction. 
The demand for an aristocratic caste ruling over a vast mass of clever slaves recalls the medieval 
system of Germany, the spirit of which breathes still in nineteenth century Prussia. Bureaucratised 
aristocracy provides both the class of reaction and reform: the Junkers, the only class able to institute 
political change: a class of administrative artists working on a sullen mass which, resisting in spirit, 
finally yields to its capable control. Although he reinterprets the patterns of German medievalism in 
modernity he also embraces political developments like democracy in the short to middle term as 
necessary stages on the road to a newer and higher species of feudalism. 
 If Nietzsche can never resolve his contradictory reflections on the need for heterogeneity, 
homogeneity and hierarchy, he is not alone in German political thought.  
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14. Religion, Myth and the State 
Religion and Enlightenment 
In his youth Nietzsche gave much thought to the relation between religion, myth and community and 
the dilemma that rational search for truth undermines our need for comforting illusion. The concern 
that rational thought can undermine widely held beliefs that bind a civilisation, is one natural to all 
enlightenments. When old myths are no longer believed, the first result is metaphysical discomfort. 
Everything else about the world then seems questionable, and old injustices that the myths may have 
justified now seem outrageous. When intellect is liberated from tradition it questions the old 
constellations of power and hierarchy and its political offspring are revolution and rebellion.562 
Writing after a century of European revolutions and 'irrationalist' reaction to Enlightenment, and 
himself pricked by metaphysical anxieties, Nietzsche is sensitive to the political implications of 
declining belief. If not endorsing unconscious embrace of superstition, he insists we need some 
degree of illusion in order to live and work. His explorations of this theme in the sphere of private 
conscience are novel but in the public sphere of politics, the policy of 'conscious-illusion' has an 
ancient and illustrious ancestry best known, after Plato, as the 'holy-lie'. Most of Nietzsche's thoughts 
on the relation of politics and religion are governed by this principle. 
Nietzsche's Attitude to Religion 
Nietzsche's is famous as the author of one of the most vociferous diatribes against Christianity ever 
penned, The Antichrist. None of the Humanists, none of the philosophes or Aufklärers, indeed few 
European intellectuals have ever attacked so viciously a belief that has always been, if not 
intellectually significant, then certainly politically powerful. The attack, all the more startling insofar 
as it did not, as was usual, belabour easily disposed of dogmas or episodes of Church corruption, 
impugned the very character of Jesus and Christian ethics. But if its intemperance was novel, its 
direction was ancient, and in the vein of Classical moralists like Tacitus or the Emperor Julian, and 
indeed all afterwards who, like the Humanists of the Italian Renaissance, tenaciously preserved 
antiquity against Christian goodness. Even at Christian civilisation's zenith in the Middle Ages, 
surreptitious unbelievers were sensible not to commit their private misgivings to print. As the ages 
slackened the chains, unbelief strayed to greater audacities. Where the humanist Boccaccio, in the tale 
of the three rings,563 could intimate that one religion was as good as another, Goethe centuries later is 
less reticent and openly declares cultivation superior to religion: 
Wer Wissenschaft und Kunst besitzt 
Hat auch Religion; 
Wer jene beiden nicht besitzt, 
Der habe Religion.564 
There is only a short distance in feeling from Goethe's lofty disdain to Nietzsche's eruption, which 
disposes of Christianity as the "one great curse, the one great intrinsic depravity... the one immortal 
blemish of mankind.”565 
Many argue that Nietzsche's pious upbringing (his father, who died when he was young, was a 
Lutheran pastor), means he remained a Protestant; that his overt antipathy to religion overlay a 
profoundly Lutheran spirituality. This is a moot point. Indifference to religion was common among 
Aufklärers, many of whom had studied in seminaries or whose fathers had been clergymen. Nietzsche 
was entirely typical in this regard, and that indefinable sense of reverence, piety, greatness, immensity 
or eternity, is not always a religious impulse, even if theologians seem to think it is. 
Nietzsche's 'spirituality' is secular and parallels rather than originates in his religious background. The 
secular spirituality of the Ideal of Cultivation has always existed alongside religious impulses, and the 
ever-recurring antagonisms, recriminations, and even reconciliations between these rivals determine 
the intellectual character of the west. Both share origins in a ground of psychological need more 
fundamental than exposure to the Ideal of Cultivation or Protestantism, or any other body of belief. 
Early in his life, his indifference to Christianity could still remain partisan, and in this he was a 
creature of his milieu. Undoubtedly he preferred Protestantism, or perhaps it would be fairer to say 
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that he despised Catholicism with the ferocity of a provincial pastor. Writing to his friend Rohde in 
1875, he steams with indignation after having heard that a mutual friend was contemplating the 
Roman path and even of becoming a priest. "...I should blush for shame', he says, 'if I were suspected 
of having had anything to do with Catholicism, for there is nothing I hate with a more deadly hatred... 
Oh, our excellent pure Protestant air! I have never in my life felt my dependence upon the spirit of 
Luther so strongly as I do now...”566 
Four years later, in his 'middle period' and his prejudices softened, he writes to Gast, saying of Luther 
"that it is a long time since I have been able with honesty to say anything to his credit”. He attributes 
his change in part to material which Jacob Burckhardt had drawn to his attention and notes that "at 
present, the fact that we prefer Luther as a man to Ignatius Loyola strikes me as being no more than 
our national taste in north and south!”567 
The volte face rotates cleanly: in his final phase he declares Catholicism superior to Protestantism.568 
In his most charitable assessment he advises that Protestantism arose waywardly out of the same 
vitality that produced the Renaissance, but because it occurred in the backward north of Europe, it 
could only express itself as religion rather than as high culture. "In the Reformation we possess a wild 
and vulgar counterpart to the Italian Renaissance, born of related impulse; only in the retarded 
north, which had remained coarse, they had to don a religious disguise; for there the concept of the 
higher life had not yet detached itself from that of the religious life.”569 But by this time Nietzsche 
was more bitterly anti-German and this over-towered, but did not undermine his anti-papism. 
The sympathy he later extends to Catholicism doesn't hold when he reflects on the relation between 
religion and the State. In this he condemns the church‟s hypocrisy for destroying the character of 
original Christianity, and transforming unworldly doctrine into a powerful worldly institution. Yet he 
can admire it for the same reasons and, at times, actually compares the institution of the church 
favourably against that of the state. In comparison "a church... is above all a structure for ruling that 
secures the highest rank for the more spiritual human beings and that believes in the power of 
spirituality to the extent of forbidding itself the use of all the cruder instruments of force; and on this 
score alone the church is under all circumstances a nobler institution than the State.”570 
It is a common nostalgia among European Romantics that the institution of the church is deemed 
nobler than the State. The memory of the order the medieval church supposedly imposed on Europe 
has always charmed Europeans weary of national wars. Unlike the secular provincialism of states and 
nations the Church offers a universal aim in the highest interests of humanity. The 'spiritualised' form 
of the united Europe yearned for by intellectuals since the eclipse of the Imperium Romanum, seduces 
Nietzsche's sensibilities as it does early nineteenth century converts to Catholicism like Friedrich 
Schlegel or Chateaubriand. But these sensibilities do not overcome his certainty that the vision and 
institution of the Church are based on false and fictitious needs. Belief in the necessity of salvation, 
demands a form of distress that has to be fostered, and ruins the health and intellect of Europe. If it 
were possible to replace false premises with genuine ones, new institutions could arise, mimicking the 
medieval institution, but casting it into the shade.571 It is the shell and structure of the church that is 
admirable, not the feelings that nourish it. It is only in this respect that it surpasses the nation state. 
The Need for the 'Holy-Lie' 
The dilemma of 'conscious-illusion' is that 'illusion is a necessity of life for a sensate being' just as it 
is 'necessary for the advance of culture'. Every civilisation must be held together, not merely by state 
power and allegiance to the state but by commonly held falsehoods or 'myths'. Between 1871 and 
1873 Nietzsche examined these questions in depth, seeing parallels between contemporary events and 
antiquity. Just as the European Enlightenment had undermined the basis for a universal Christian 
order and set the continent in turmoil, secular forces also undermined the old mythic foundations of 
the Greek state. 
Governance of the early Greek state was aided by myths or religion: injustices, customs good and 
bad, were set down by divine agency and not to be questioned. In early Greece, to the detriment of 
culture, myth served each individual state, and thus separated rather than unified the Greeks. By 
eroding these myths the Greek enlightenment brought on crises of civil strife and national wars. 
In this hour of danger, when the polis could no longer hold itself together, it was then that the pre-
Socratic philosophers, acting as cultural statesmen urged a pan-Hellenic and tragic outlook. They saw 
that a new type of spiritual cohesion, which could not be corroded by scepticism like the old myths, 
was needed to draw the disparate elements of culture to harmony. 
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The philosophers perform this task in different ways.  
Thales is the first to struggle against myth in the name of science and wisdom, and in doing so 
struggles against the polis, which is founded on myth.572 “How was it possible for Thales to renounce 
myth? ...If the polis was the focal point of the Hellenic will and if the polis was based upon myth, then 
abandoning myth meant abandoning the old concept of the polis. Now we know that Thales proposed, 
though he did not accomplish, the foundation of a league of cities: he ran aground on the old 
mythical concept of the polis. At the same time he had a foreboding of the enormous danger to Greece 
if this isolating power of myth continued to keep the cities divided. In fact, had Thales brought his 
league of cities into being, the Greeks would have been spared the Persian wars and therewith the 
victory and predominance of Athens. All of the early philosophers took pains to alter the concept of 
the polis and to create a Pan-Hellenic way of thinking.”573 
Heraclitus wants to rip "down the barrier separating the barbaric and the Hellenic in order to create 
greater freedom and to broaden narrow points of view.”574 He opposes pliancy and excessive 
sociability by pride and solitude.575 He struggles against myth insofar as it insulates the Greeks from 
the barbarians and he even ponders a superhellenic world order.576 
Democritus opposes science against myths that had become idle or cold abstractions, and the strict 
ascetic views of Pythagoras, Empedocles and Anaximander oppose the overly cosy577 myths that had 
coddled the people and made them superficial, and thus led the Greeks into danger.578 
The relation of post-Socratic philosophers like Plato to myth is more ambiguous. At one point 
Nietzsche acknowledges that Plato “requires the lie for his state”,579 as we know from references to 
the 'noble lie' in The Republic, but at another he declares that Plato “denied the culture of the 
beautiful lie”580 and desired instead “a state governed by dialectic”, a view more readily applicable 
to Socrates, and which after all comprises a major part of the discussions in the Birth of Tragedy. 
Plato's exposition of the 'noble lie' is the earliest confession that rulers exploit belief in myths to 
control the masses. Another is provided by Polybius who, in his analysis of Roman government tells 
us that deliberate promotion of religious belief and ritual among the masses by the aristocracy, clearly 
shows the superiority of the Roman commonwealth. “...the very phenomenon ( i.e. religion)” he says, 
“which among other peoples is regarded as a subject for reproach, namely superstition, is actually 
the element which holds the Roman state together. ...Many people find this astonishing, but my own 
view is that the Romans have adopted these practices for the sake of the common people. This 
approach might not have been necessary had it ever been possible to form a state composed entirely 
of wise men. But as the masses are always fickle, filled with lawless desires, unreasoning anger and 
violent passions, they can only be restrained by mysterious terrors or other dramatisations of the 
subject. For this reason I believe that the ancients were by no means acting foolishly or haphazardly 
when they introduced to the people various notions concerning the gods and belief in the punishment 
of Hades, but rather that the moderns are foolish and take great risks in rejecting them.”581 
The same principle is repeated over the ages. That modern Caesar, Napoleon, observed that no power 
could become “legitimate without the assistance of the priests”, and filed the Bible and Koran in the 
Politics section of his library. When a satisfactory religion hasn't been to hand, as the history of 
totalitarianism attests, politicians will simply invent them. 
Nietzsche claims, along with pragmatists and utilitarians and those of conservative or paternalist 
politics that religion is handmaid to good government. A paternal ruler ensures that superstition 
among the masses crystallises as a single religion in which all believe excluding, of course, the rulers 
themselves. Paternal government needs to preserve religion: “Absolutely paternal government and the 
careful preservation of religion necessarily go hand in hand. In this connection it must be taken for 
granted that the rulers and governing classes are enlightened concerning the advantages which 
religion affords, and consequently feel themselves to a certain extent superior to it, inasmuch as they 
use it as a means; thus freedom of spirit has its origin here.”582 
Nietzsche endorses using the holy lie to contain the lower orders. Rulers must consciously encourage 
illusions from which they themselves would resile. Masters will adopt the tragic view of life and urge 
slaves to enjoy the consolations of faith. Secular government will always promote preserve religion in 
times of loss, destitution, terror, and distrust. These are the times when the consolations of religion are 
most needed. Because the state itself is unable to mitigate spiritual afflictions, it leaves this role to 
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faith which checks and soothes the sources of discontent, like an ice-pack an inflammation. 
Religion in the Modern State 
But Nietzsche is confronting a new idea of government. Paternalistic forms of government are 
waning, to be displaced by forms of democracy, where the placidity of people is not guaranteed. 
When no upper class guides the lower, and government is merely the instrument of popular will, what 
we think of religion will be reflected by government. As faith diminishes the exploitation of religious 
impulses and consolations for political purposes becomes more difficult. When the state cannot derive 
further advantage from religion, or when too many religious denominations prevent the state from 
adopt uniform measures toward them, it must begin to treat religion as a matter of private conscience 
and leave it to individuals to decide their position. 
The tendency of the state to privatise religion and to allow religious toleration may cause further 
sectarianism and hostility. In Human All Too Human he observes that the advance of democracy and 
the religious sectarianism that follows it is responsible for state-worship in modern Europe, and most 
particularly, in Germany. This is because, in the democratic milieu, the governing classes in Europe 
continue to make religion a private affair: a sentiment which, almost against their will, gives an anti-
religious character to their policy. Witnessing the indulgence shown by rulers toward the many sects 
and seeing how the State washes its hands of religious controversy, religious people who formerly 
adored the State as a thing half sacred - being in partnership with church - grow hostile toward it. 
They rail against the secular turn and oppose the State wherever they can in the name of religion. 
Their intransigence before new developments and their opposition to secular ordnances drives the 
irreligious parties further into the arms of the State, which is their one protection against the 
organisation of the church. State-worship in consequence, becomes almost a surrogate faith. 
There is danger in this. Nietzsche warns that if secular parties eventually check the influence of the 
religious ones their enthusiasm for the State will also abate. The pious and reverent attitude toward 
the State will fall away. Individuals will see only how the State can serve their self-interest and will 
use all means to obtain influence over it. An intense rivalry between parties will arise that will 
undermine the permanence of any significant undertaking. Projects that “require the silent growth of 
future decades or centuries to produce ripe fruit” will be tossed aside since nobody believes that their 
party will remain hold power for more than a few years and do not wish to undertake anything that 
will not reap immediate profits or prestige. Likewise, nobody will feel any obligation to a law other 
than to submit for the moment to the power that introduced it.  
For every law established, there will be those who will immediately set to work to undermine it by 
forming a new majority. The secularising of democratic politics will end in the distrust of all 
government, and make way for the decay of the state itself. “...the interests of the tutelary government 
and the interests of religion go hand-in-hand, so that when the latter begins to decay the foundations 
of the State are also shaken. The belief in the divine regulation of political affairs, in a mystery in the 
existence in the existence of the State, is of religious origin: if religion disappears, the State will lose 
its old veil of Isis, and will no longer arouse veneration. The sovereignty of the people, looked at 
closely, serves only to dispel the final fascination and superstition in the realm of these sentiments; 
modern democracy is the historical form of the decay of the State.”583 
That the state should decay is not to say that chaos would prevail: “the wisdom and selfishness of men 
are the best developed of all their qualities; when the State no longer meets the demands of these 
impulses, chaos will least of all result, but a still more appropriate expedient will gain mastery over 
the State.”584 Most probably there would be a turn from public to private forms of office. The new 
varieties of rule would work to drag all responsibilities away from the State and back into the theatre 
of private endeavour. Hence, in a remarkable passage, Nietzsche predicts the death of the State, 
through the privatisation (if we may lapse a` la mode for a moment) of all public institutions. It is 
“the insight into the useless and harassing nature of these short-winded struggles”which will “drive 
men to an absolutely new resolution: to the abolition of the contrast of 'private and public'. Private 
concerns eventually absorb the business of the State; even the toughest residue which is left over from 
the old work of governing (the business, for instance, which is meant to protect private persons from 
private persons) will at last some day be managed by private enterprise. The neglect, decline, and 
death of the State, the liberation of the private person (I am careful not to say the individual), are the 
consequences of the democratic conception of the State; that is its mission.”585 
When private enterprise, as business and welfare, eventually assumes all the old duties of government 
a new leaf in the story of humanity will be turned. Many organising forces in human history have died 
out, and the state would not be singular in that regard. The gens or clan was mightier than the power 
of the family and ruled and regulated before the latter existed. Today the idea of the right and might 
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of the family, supreme in Roman times is enfeebled by the advance of the state. In a similar way a 
later generation will see the state become meaningless. But this eventuality would take place over the 
longest durations and we should not begin pushing for its realisation too quickly: a long train of 
developments are yet to be encountered. Therefore let the state continue on until its usefulness and 
power is spent and the seeds of the new order have already sprouted. “Let us, therefore, trust to the 
'wisdom and selfishness of men' that the State may yet exist a good while longer, and that the 
destructive attempts of over-zealous, too hasty sciolists may be in vain.”586 
Conclusions 
For the rulers of a culture-state to maintain an order of rank and commit lower castes to drudgery for 
generations without resort to violence, they must convince these castes that their drudgery is justified. 
They need to employ myths and perhaps even folk-religion consciously to support their rule. 
It is an axiom of government that “there can be neither society nor culture without untruth.”587 The 
modern problem, according to Nietzsche, is that it is neither possible nor desirable to use Christianity 
for this purpose due to a general weariness in regard to religion. “People”, he maintains,“have finally 
grown tired of and exhausted by the weighty symbols. All possible forms of Christian life have been 
tried: the strictest and the most lax, the most harmless and thoughtless and the most reflective. It is 
time to discover something new, or else one must fall back into the same old cycle over and over 
again. Of course it is difficult to emerge from the whirlpool after it has spun us around for a few 
thousand years. Even mockery, cynicism, and hostility toward Christianity have run their course.”588 
Therefore new lies have to be invented to console the weak and empower the strong. The lie that, as a 
would-be politician of culture, Nietzsche devises and hopes to serve the latter purpose he calls the 
eternal return. The new secular folk religion that must be clearly avoided is that of nationalism, 
which is rapidly filling the interstices of faith once occupied by Christianity. 
 
                                                                
586 loc. cit. 
587 TLES, PAT, p.92. 
588 PHT, PAT, p.103. 
136 
15 - Nations, Races and the Mission of Europe 
'And, between ourselves, I did not hate the French, although I thanked God that we were free from 
them. How could I, to whom culture and barbarism alone are of importance, hate a nation that is 
among the most cultivated of the earth, to which I owe so great a part of my own cultivation? 
Altogether ... national hatred is something peculiar. You will always find it strongest and most violent 
where there is the lowest degree of culture. But there is a degree where it vanishes altogether, and 
where a person stands to a certain extent above nations, and feels the weal or woe of a neighbouring 
people as if it had happened to his own.'589 
The emergence of German nationalism 
Goethe's remarks concerning the occupation of Germany by Napoleonic armies prefigure and inform 
Nietzsche's own reflections on nationality; a matter of fateful interest to nineteenth century 
Europeans. They show clearly that Goethe, though sensitive to the contempt compatriots showed him 
for his inertia during the German wars of liberation, observed nationality through the prism of the 
cosmopolitan Ideal of Cultivation, and this inhibited his support for national liberation. Love of 
higher culture got in the way of his patriotism. He resented the French for depriving Germans of their 
liberty, but could not hate them on account of their taste and accomplishment. Cosmopolitanism of 
this sort was alien to the Romantic generations, and it isolated Goethe in his later years. As described 
in Meinecke's work590 German nationalism developed along lines dictated by Romantic sentiment; so 
that from the fulminations of Fichte in his Addresses to the German Nation, to Thomas Mann's 
diatribes in the Meditations of an Unpolitical Man, spitting like a cat at the superficialities of western 
zivilisation, the cosmopolitan Ideal of Cultivation continued to lose ground in Germany. 
German nationalism involved much more than a growing sense of national pride or commensurate 
contempt for nations of lesser accomplishments. Simple chauvinism is a historical constant that ebbs 
and flows over centuries. What was so remarkable about it was that it had existed as a cultural form 
long before it acquired a political nature. 
To compensate for their backwardness of their empire the Aufklärer took immense consolation in the 
cultural success of the Germans, who, it was felt, expressed their greatness through culture and did 
not need a Reich, did not need to have colonies, or to conquer the world. They were a 'nation of 
culture' not a political nation. Schiller encapsulates this haughtiness when he observes that “the 
German Reich and the German nation are two different things. The majesty of the Germans never 
rested on the heads of their princes. The German has founded his specific value elsewhere than in the 
political sphere; and even if the imperium collapsed, the dignity of the Germans would remain 
unassailed. Theirs is a moral greatness; it dwells in the culture and character of the nation, which are 
independent of its political fortunes. This Reich flourishes in Germany, it is in full growth, and in the 
midst of the Gothic ruins of an ancient barbaric constitution the forces are taking shape.”591 
Schiller's apolitical appeal to the cultural greatness of the Germans was amplified and altered by the 
Romantics through their obsession with history and hermeneutics. As German nationalism acquired 
political ends, a doctrine, a principle of life was encoded, which initially had only a few parallels but 
afterwards became the intellectual justification for every variety of irredentism.592 
The determination by intellectuals to experience the Ideal of Cultivation as the feeling of 'Germanity' 
and ultimately to demand the political unity of German nations, was replicated to some extent by pan-
Hellenist intellectuals in antiquity. Unlike the Germans the Greeks did not maintain that there was 
anything so subtle about Greek culture that it could not be transferred to others. There was no 
hermeneutic impasse, preventing foreigners from understanding or acquiring it. For German 
Romantics, German culture was accessible only to German peoples, because nationality was the key 
to the creation of all aspects of culture, even law and politics.  
If modes of cultivation are organic to the nation, as opposed to something universal to all mankind, 
only national culture can be deeply felt whereas everything cosmopolitan is eclectic, sham and 
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themselves together around the great Muscovite aggregation which already comprises so many diverse elements... What will you say if one day the 
Slavs come and vindicate Prussia proper, Pomerania, Silesia, Berlin, because their names are Slavic; if they do on the banks of the Oder what you 
are doing on the banks of the Moselle; if they point out, on the map, villages which once were inhabited by Slavic tribes?' E. Renan, September 1871, 
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superficial. If this was not exactly its intention the idea was destined to undermine tolerance and 
promote bigotry. To peevish minds it became an excuse for believing that only your own culture 
mattered, whereas more generous minds, such as Herder's, allowed that the great variety of national 
cultures, taken to their individually highest level, adorned and enriched humanity as a whole. 
Nietzsche's Response to German Nationalism 
If the conjunction of cosmopolitan ideals of cultivation and national assertiveness caused discomfort 
to Goethe, who did not live to witness German political unity, how divisive was it in one growing up 
when nationalist sentiment and imperial destiny and the drama of national unification was playing to 
packed houses? Nietzsche was witness to the reversal of the events of Goethe's time: now Germans 
were trampling the French underfoot, and Germans claiming to have the higher culture. In these 
times, how much a cosmopolitan and how much a national mystic was Nietzsche? Did his Ideal of 
Cultivation draw from principles accessible to all peoples, or did he feel that there existed a nationally 
private higher culture that could be apprehended only by those participating in it?  
For Nietzsche, higher culture is not the preserve of a few races or nations, yet not all nations are 
equally equipped. However different national cultures may be, 'higher culture' is more universal, 
simply because it requires universal preconditions like class differences. It would be inconceivable it 
could exist without a ruling class able to create an ethos of nobility and noble valuations. Language 
and custom can little alter fundamental human divisions of power and the values they generate, 
however unique or ineffable they may be. Thus aristocracies of different nationality, sharing as they 
do similar values, aspirations and manners, are less foreign to each other than they are to the lower 
classes with whom they share a nation and language. Nietzsche's culture-state does not have to be a 
nation state. This idea would have been incomprehensible to his contemporaries, as it would be today. 
Investing energy and sentiment in the service of a national ideal, threatens the universal Ideal of 
Cultivation. Nietzsche‟s fondness for Germany never deforms his feelings for the greater Ideal. The 
weight of these values stifles his youthful intentions to work for the betterment of world culture as a 
German, and his hopes that Germans can lead Europe to the highest attainments, an obsession that 
dogs him from childhood. Everything he does, from the founding of the cultural society 'Germania' as 
a teenager, to the composition of the Untimely Meditations reflects this obsession until his loyalties 
are betrayed. Afterwards, he feels he can only work for culture as a European, as someone belonging 
to a miscegenating Europe where nationality counts for nothing. The rupture occurs dramatically after 
France's defeat by Prussia in 1871. In the early months of the war his contempt for the French is 
equals to that of any countryman. After the German‟s embarrassingly swift victory, introspection 
leads him to question its value. He shares the disquiet that plagued Goethe during the wars of 
liberation: that the Germans, having allegedly demonstrated superiority in no other place than the 
battlefield, and with still much to learn from one of Europe's most cultivated peoples, are arrogantly 
stomping them down. Encouraged no doubt by the unsatisfactory reception accorded his books in his 
own dear Germany, he eschews the hybris swelling in the breasts of his countrymen. 
Exiling himself from Germany, firstly in Switzerland and thereafter in France and Italy, his 
disposition toward other nations warms, but being neither completely at home as a Swiss, an Italian or 
Frenchman, he contrives a greater homeland that accommodates his love for other European nations, 
such that he could eventually declare that he was “... not nearly 'German' enough, in the sense in 
which the word 'German' is constantly being used nowadays to advocate nationalism and race hatred 
and to be able to take pleasure in the national scabies of the heart and blood poisoning that now 
leads the nations of Europe to delimit and barricade themselves against each other as if it were a 
matter of quarantine.”593 
This new European homeland synthesises the spirit of its north and south, of its profound seriousness 
and its artistic vivacity, of its power to know and its capacity to give form. The idea of the concert of 
European nations, according to Nietzsche, has never been alien in the realm of culture, for there 
Europe has always been one. All of the greatest intellects in its troubled history have worked towards 
the idea of a united Europe and have actively borrowed from and given to each other. Thus, “to make 
Europe a centre of culture, national stupidities should not make us blind to the fact that in the higher 
regions there is already a continuous reciprocal dependence. France and German philosophy. 
Richard Wagner and Paris (1830-50). Goethe and Greece. All things are impelled towards a 
synthesis of the European past in the highest types of mind.”594 
This traffic has existed between individuals and nations. So much have national styles cross-
pollinated in Europe that it is impossible to imagine how great individuals from any nation could have 
existed without this liaison. Europe, Nietzsche believes, is greater than all the petty states that 
compose it, just as the best men are individually worth more than the nations from which they spring. 
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Nationalism is therefore doubly insidious: it makes you blind to all the good outside your country, 
poisons your feelings to what is foreign or alien, and devours the energy and talent for a petty cause.  
Nations, or national states do not matter other than in the role they play in Great Politics. The goal of 
greater power for a single nation is myopia unless it has regard to the fate of all mankind. Nietzsche 
asks of the German nationalists whether “any one can interest himself in this German Empire? Where 
is the new thought? Is it only a new combination of power? All the worse if it does not know its own 
mind. Peace and laisser aller are not types of politics for which I have any respect. Ruling, and 
helping the highest thoughts to victory - the only things that can make me interested in Germany. 
What is it to me if the Hohenzollern are there or not?”595 
Nietzsche complains of Germany's entrance into European politics. The new nation's eager grasping 
after empire has deprived it of the abilities of its best young men, which might otherwise be diverted 
to culture. Cultural nationalism had been supplanted by political nationalism and education, the 
foundation of culture, has been placed in the service of the German Reich, to produce clever 
bureaucrats and functionaries. The nation‟s finest are being used up in the service of the state. All this 
would not matter if human energies were boundless, but if you use them to accumulate military 
power, play politics or engage in economic activity, you will certainly lose it for other things. “...a 
nation that sets about practicing high politics and securing a decisive voice amongst the great 
Powers... constantly sacrifices a number of its most conspicuous talents upon the 'Alter of the 
Fatherland' or of national ambition, whilst formerly other spheres of activity were open to those 
talents which are now swallowed up by politics...the political growth of a nation almost necessarily 
entails an intellectual impoverishment and lassitude, a diminished capacity for the performance of 
works that require great concentration and specialisation ...”596 
The evidence was plain. Germany, a nation possessing unparalled potential for culture was 
deliberately making itself stupid. Where in the new Germany were the great men of culture of the old 
duchies and principalities? By becoming a great power a nation of great thinkers had, so to speak, 
decapitated itself. “Deutschland, Deutschland, über alles” signalled “the end of German 
philosophy...”597 As ironic proof of the fact Nietzsche points to the example of France which, though 
in political and military decline, was reaching new levels of importance as a cultural power. 
If this seems fairly straightforward, Nietzsche always says something that seems to cast clarity into 
confusion. European nationalism and its arms race is unhealthy, but he also sees merit in the illness. A 
barricaded Europe, with many hostile camps may make Europeans more warlike, and therefore more 
virile. It will help Europe shake off the effeminacy of modern ideas, democracy, equal rights, and 
permit “the manliest men”to rule: this being “the natural order of things.”598 Wars caused for the 
most myopic of reasons, national enthusiasm, will be justified by serving higher ends. Out of its 
experience of the terrible dangers of war Europe will inherit stronger individuals who can produce a 
robust culture. “The condition of Europe in the next century will once again lead to the breeding of 
manly virtues, because men will live in continual danger. Universal military service is already the 
curious antidote which we possess for the effeminacy of democratic ideas, and it has grown up out of 
the struggle between nations.”599 Such remarks do not however subvert his anti-nationalist views. He 
still regards nationalism with contempt, but occasionally sees a higher utility for it. 
Nations and Culture 
This is not to suppose that Nietzsche's politics of cultivation was concerned only with dangers posed 
to cultural progress by nationalist doctrines; he was closely concerned with the question of nationality 
in its own right and more than usually interested in how nations figure in the formation of culture, 
much in the way individual personalities do. This interest is attested by the inclusion in Beyond Good 
and Evil of an entire chapter entitled Peoples and Fatherlands. An inveterate analyst of national 
psychology, he indulges that hobby of all intellectuals: the distinction and definition of national 
character and types. With all the attendant dangers it poses even to the subtlest intellect - though 
assuredly there is not a soul alive who has not engaged in it – it was an obsession in Nietzsche's case, 
and his works are littered with related observations and reflections like the following: 
“As Frenchmen reflect the politeness and esprit of French society, so do Germans reflect something 
of the deep, pensive earnestness of their mystics and musicians, and also of their silly childishness. 
The Italian exhibits a great deal of republican distinction and art, and can show himself to be noble 
and proud without vanity.”600 Or: “Toward a characterisation of national genius in relation to what 
is foreign and borrowed: the English genius coarsens and makes natural everything it takes up; the 
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French makes thin, simplifies, logicizes, adorns; the German confuses, compromises, confounds and 
moralises; the Italian has made by far the freest and subtlest use of what it has borrowed, and 
introduced a hundred times more into it than it took out of it: as the richest genius which had the most 
to bestow.”601 
These otherwise unremarkable observations show how discussion of nationality orbits about the Ideal 
of Cultivation. Previously unremarkable performance by nations to produce genius does not 
disqualify them from future greatness. But of one thing he is sure: that the endeavours of a few have 
surpassed all others, and it is on these that his studies concentrate, with the intention of investigating 
their customs, morals, politics, history, and what he generally referred to as blood or breeding. 
Nations of genius concern Nietzsche as much as individuals of genius; and probably more so since a 
single great individual may always be accounted an accident, but a nation of many great individuals 
must be doing something that can be learned. 
Nietzsche never explicitly states what a nation is, so we have to examine his assumptions. The 'nation 
state' is definitely not his starting point. In fact, he derides those who define nationality in this way 
and seek to discover for each modern nation a pure source and lineage. “Nation - men who speak one 
language and read the same newspapers. These men now call themselves 'nations', and would far too 
readily trace their descent from the same source and through the same history; which, however, even 
with the assistance of the most malignant lying in the past, they have not succeeded in doing.”602 
It is not geography, or political frontiers or even a single language that makes a nation. Only the 
modern trend toward monolingual nation states encourages such an idea. If anything, Nietzsche's 
understanding of nation is best expressed by the term volk, or people, which suggests something less 
structured and more fundamental than 'nation state'. A 'people' is what he regards as the unit of human 
association succeeding, in order, the family, the clan and the tribe. It is the larger, looser and more 
complex association that permits many tribes and settlements to recognise each other as similars, as 
having some equivalence through language, race, customs, or common experience, which 
distinguishes them from other stranger groups.  
A volk need not have a formalised state system, and may be no more than an aggregate of tribes or 
clans. Its area of habitation may be vast or minute, its population dispersed, concentrated, or scattered 
among the populations of foreigners. Germans or Italians, may be spoken of a single people, without 
ever having constituted a nation state before the nineteenth century, and Jews of the Diaspora may be 
considered one even though no original Jewish state existed. A people represents a calculable 
'breeding' milieu, a source for certain types of valuation and therefore of culture. 
The relation of races to culture 
Like the vast majority of nineteenth century intellectuals Nietzsche believes that race has a role in 
forming national character and therefore culture and that the indefinable spirit of a nation is somehow 
related to its 'blood', which is the assumed medium for biological inheritance before genetic theory. 
Just as individuals inherit their character from progenitors, the same must apply to a nation. There is 
an inner core to a nation‟s character that cannot be changed by environment. In the absence of any 
other cause we go to this immutable substrate to account for the mysteries of national traits. It must be 
why, for example, taller and fairer north Europeans are allegedly more phlegmatic while shorter and 
darker southerners display more vivacity. It must be the blood, it must be inherited nature. It is the 
explanation you find when you have no other. 
Nietzsche accepts this paradigm and reworks it with his own nomenclature, suggesting that history is 
crowded with examples of master or noble races, and attendant slave races. The separation is 
fundamentally the outcome of success or defeat in war. Master races are bold, adventurous, 
accustomed to conquering and ruling others; slave races are habitually conquered and subject. Their 
respective success causes them to attach different values to life and living, which – as he suggests is 
virtually bred into them. Master races consequently maintain a culture of noble manners and higher 
èlan while slave races harbour eternal rancour against their oppressors and against life itself.  
The separation is eternalised by the master/slave class relationship formed when one people conquer 
another. Most aristocratic and serf relationships in history are the result of a warlike, possibly barbaric 
people, conquering and enslaving a weaker, perhaps more civilised one. Soon the externals of culture 
merge, and conqueror or conquered start to borrow each other‟s language and customs. A distinct 
nationality is formed which owes its existence to the synthesis of cultural elements from both peoples. 
Race is therefore forgotten, yet is somehow built into the nature of social stratification. In one piece 
of provocation Nietzsche speculates that the racial inheritance of the lower classes of Europe is 
evident in the development of modern ideas, the democratic movement and the call for equality. 
These lower classes, he suggest, are descendents of the pre-Aryan peoples of Europe, who were 
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subsequently conquered and suppressed by the war-like and fairer Aryan peoples sweeping into the 
continent from the East. Today, they are fighting back through the medium of modern ideas, 
therefore: “the same is true of virtually all of Europe: the suppressed race has gradually recovered 
the upper hand again, in colouring, shortness of skull, perhaps even in the intellectual and social 
instincts: who can say whether modern democracy, even more modern anarchism and especially that 
inclination for 'commune' for the most primitive form of society, which is now shared by all the 
socialists of Europe, does not signify in the main a tremendous counterattack - and that the conqueror 
and master race, the Aryan, is not succumbing physiologically, too?”603 
Here we might shudder and cross ourselves. The terminology employed here: Master race, Aryan and 
so on, seems to portend and possibly shape twentieth century National Socialist doctrine. However 
contemporaries would neither have been shocked nor inspired. The Aryan was already enshrined in 
nineteenth century scholarship, and Nietzsche's speculations contribute nothing. Undoubtedly, 
Nietzsche accepted that the imperialism of the Europeans, a brutal yet 'noble' racial quality, may be 
attributable to the predatory instincts of Aryan ancestors. "The Europeans", he says, "imagine 
themselves as representing, in the main, the highest types of men on earth... How the European has 
established colonies is explained by his nature, which resembles that of a beast of prey.”604 But he is 
far from suggesting that this beast of prey, die blonde bestie, is necessarily only an Aryan possession.  
In The Genealogy of Morals he observes that at the 'bottom of all these noble races the beast of prey, 
the splendid blond beast prowling about avidly in search of spoil and victory; this hidden core needs 
to erupt from time to time, the animal has to get out again and go back to the wilderness: the Roman, 
Arabian, Germanic, Japanese nobility, the Homeric heroes, the Scandinavian Vikings - they all shared 
this need.'605 Naming diverse races makes it clear that the master-slave dichotomy is not merely an 
outcome of Aryan supremacy over others. He is no Nordic supremacist, nor 'race' theorist like de 
Gobineau or H. S. Chamberlain. As is well known, he actively opposed race theories by solemnly 
vowing “...to associate with no man who takes any part in the mendacious race swindle.”606 He 
makes this vow for two reasons: to correct the simplifications and falsifications of history committed 
by race theorists, and to oppose an apology for mischievous bigotry. 
Race theories cannot adequately explain the development of modern Europe. The Europeans are 
neither one pure race, nor comprised of groupings of pure races. Throughout the continent 'bloodlines' 
are overlaid and intermingled after centuries of migrations and conquests, therefore: “what quagmires 
and mendacity must there be about if it is possible, in the modern European hotch-potch, to raise 
questions of 'race'!”607 Nietzsche allows race a part in the production of culture but opposes extremist 
claims of its importance and while indulging eugenic fantasies and acknowledging the need for good 
'breeding' to produce genius, he reviles simplistic reduction of culture to racial causes. 
Perturbed by the bigotry of racist theorists, most of whom are from the north of Europe, he notes that 
they are so intent on proving the heights of civilisation were reached in their own patch that they 
achieve nothing more than intellectual peevishness, smug indolence, and the retardation of high 
culture and European unity. Blind to the enduring greatness of the south or to the Jews, both 
pathfinders of European civilisation, their pursuit of racial purity is the most pathological form of 
eugenics. Europe was made great by the mixing of its 'races'. There is no place on the continent 
settled by a single people, untainted by invasion or contact with others. Any attempt to preserve the 
separateness and 'purity' of peoples would, of necessity, produce the unsatisfactory human specimens. 
The quality of a race is never constant, it improves or degenerates as conditions allow. A race of 
strong individuals can become effeminate, not by having the inferior 'blood' of other races mixed with 
its own, but by stagnating if it has nowhere to expend its powers.  
The mixing and blending of different races is proven to be the more successful breeding policy. 
Nietzsche cites the Greeks as an example of successful miscegenation that blended many races, 
including Aryan and Semitic elements to invigorate their biological inheritance. Occasionally, his 
endorsement of miscegenation is a taunt to German racial purists. In contempt of the Germans' 
ancient sense of superiority over the Slavs, he suggests at one point that Bismark, the icon of Teutonic 
virtue, is one,608 and asserts that German 'blood', generally inferior on account of the loss of the best 
individuals over centuries of völkerwanderung, may actually have been improved by interbreeding 
with Slavs. “Let anyone look upon the face of Germans. Everything that had manly, exuberant blood 
in it went abroad. Over the smug populace remaining, the slave-souled people, there came an 
improvement from abroad, especially by a mixture of Slavonic blood.”609 
His most consistent concern is the increasing volubility of anti-Semites in modern Europe, for the 
level of their rancour is a gauge of cultural decadence. Their primary motivation is envy and 
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ressentiment of a race that has distinguished itself in intellect and will accumulated over centuries of 
suffering. It manifests itself as a form of 'literary misconduct' that treats Jews as universal scapegoats 
for all possible public and private abuses. True culture, which rests on a substratum of spiritual 
generosity, has no need for racial hatred. Its very prevalence, particularly in Germany, is a sure sign 
that the level of culture has been abased. 
These are noble sentiments, but we suspect that they are occasioned more out of distaste for the 
oppressors than out of love for the oppressed. In his youth, particularly when he was in the orbit of 
Richard Wagner, a ferocious anti-Semite, his disposition toward Jews was cold, although this never 
fell to outright bigotry. With the provincial European's perennial distaste for the Jew, the younger 
Nietzsche allows this to become, in his youth, more overt under Wagner's influence.610 But in the 
great bloom of reasonableness of his middle period he opposes Wagner on the Jewish question. More 
than this, anti-Semitism seemed to him to be intrinsic to a certain mentality that irritated and enraged 
him: absurdities like reflex conservatism, nationalist enthusiasms, hysterical and mystical 
Christianity, and vivisectionism; all of which constituted the liturgy of Wagner's cultural apostles: 
“these latest speculators in idealism, the anti-Semites, who today roll their eyes in a Christian-Aryan-
bourgeois manner...”611 
In his personal life, Jews offered more intellectual sympathy and assistance while Germans forsook 
him. In Ecce Homo he complains that he sought in vain from Germans “some sign of tact, of 
délicatesse in relation to me. From Jews, yes; never yet from Germans.”612 This point is laboured in 
diatribes against the Germans in his last years and during his insanity, for he was to announce in one 
of the epistles to Jacob Burckhardt written at the time of his collapse, that he had “abolished Wilhelm 
(the Kaiser), Bismark and all Anti-Semites.”613 
Nietzsche does believe that race plays a role in culture, but uses this claim provocatively on occasions 
just as he suggests that diet or physiology affects the spiritual life; i.e. as a counterblast to the 
idealism that holds spirit or mind to be autonomous or dominant. But also he takes pains to 
disassociate himself, in work and in personal life, from those who use simple racial formulae as the 
key to history and civilisation; this as much out of respect for science as for any dislike of bigotry. 
The example of extinct nations 
Nietzsche said much about some European nations, little about others, and almost nothing about the 
rest of the world. Entirely Euro-centric, he never travelled outside of the continent and never sought 
to do so. His narrowness is based on the reality that the culture of the European nations now 
dominated the earth. The history and health of that culture must be understood in order to forestall or 
enhance certain outcomes and even the example of extinct nations like the Greeks and Romans is 
useful for instruction.  
The ancient Greeks win all the medals, not least for inventing the Ideal of Cultivation, and thereby 
becoming the spiritual fathers of Europe. Their history and literature are an unfailing resource for the 
study of culture. He believes that when we understand something about the national character of the 
ancient Greeks, then we understand what it might take in order to create their genius. It is our task to 
recreate their character where possible. 
The same applies to the Latins and their descendents who take pride of place after the Greeks. 
Lacking sympathy for the Romans during his youth, believing that although they took aboard the 
Greeks' intellect without receiving their incandescent spirit, he later admires them for the soundness 
of their political instincts, for their strength and nobility. “Nobody stronger and nobler has yet existed 
on earth...', he says, and adds that' every remnant of them, every inscription gives delight...”614 To 
both civilisations, whose nature and destiny became intrinsically intertwined, we owe the discovery of 
and foundation of Europe as a political entity. They provided “every prerequisite for an erudite 
culture... nobility of taste, methodical investigation, genius for organisation and government, the faith 
in, the will to a future for mankind...”615 
The Latins 
The successors to the Romans in Europe, the Italians and the French have privileged place. The 
Italians of the Renaissance recreated the Ideal of Cultivation, and if not bettering the Greeks, their 
achievement is unmatched in Europe. Here Nietzsche's opinions are shaped by Jacob Burkhardt.  
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In Turin during his last years of sanity, he rarely speaks of Italy other than with affection and regards 
the nation as a home of and school for culture. Probably he indulged misgivings about the future of 
the new Italian nation state, unable perhaps to determine what its political role in Europe might be.616 
France, he says, is Europe's “most spiritual and refined culture and the leading school of taste”.617 
He notes that this is so “even now” suggesting this reputation is really an inheritance of the ancien 
régime. It was in the period of Louis XIV that France acquired its esprit, the virile, aristocratic culture 
which schooled European taste. But today, it is a “coarse and stupid France that trundles in the 
foreground”, increasingly subject to democratic convulsions and German ideas. 
Still, the French have a capacity for artistic passions and superiority to the rest of Europe in their 
“ancient, manifold, moralistic culture” that endows them with “a psychological sensitivity and 
curiosity of which in Germany, for example, they have no conception...”618 Finally, they are superior 
in that their temperament, thanks to their geographical position, is a synthesis of the north and south 
of Europe, preventing them from succumbing to the dreary spirits of the north by indulging the 
contervailing vivacity of Liguria and Provence. This composite nature “makes them understand many 
things and urges them to do many things which an Englishman will never understand.”619 
If France has become weaker and more decadent than almost any other nation in Europe, it continues 
to effect significant intellectual and artistic accomplishments. 
The Slavs 
To the east of Europe, he sees the Slavs, despised or feared by German intellectuals, as an inchoate 
mass whose power may sway the destiny of Europe. Their still barbarous nature suggests a degree of 
vitality not yet properly harnessed but which promises greatness. When his anti-German feelings are 
ascendant Nietzsche equips himself with Slavic origins, mainly because his name sounds Slavic - a 
flawed etymological assumption - and because, outside of Germany he was always taken for a 
Pole.620 He was, he believed, the descendent of Polish aristocrats; an acceptable distinction since the 
Poles were reputedly the “Frenchmen among the Slavs”.621 
It was also another Scipionic rebuff to the Germans, for it deprived his countrymen of their right to 
his genius. But it did not indicate what he really thought about the Slavs, and most importantly of 
their greatest nation, Russia, whose world-historical destiny intrigued and confronted him. Like many 
other western Europeans he feared the empire's growing power. Nietzsche perceives, as de 
Tocqueville had done, that Russia and the United States would contend with the Europeans for 
domination of the world. When contemplating this he poses a number of possibilities for Europeans to 
consider. 
At times he thinks Europe should unite with Russia which, he says, is “the only power today which 
has durability in it, which can wait, which can still promise something... the antithesis of that pitiable 
European petty-state politics and nervousness which with the foundation of the German Reich has a 
critical phase...”622 Russian stillness and capacity to consider duration, which he admires so much in 
a political order, should set an example to the Europeans. The Russians have grand designs, but 
Europeans cannot see beyond their borders, and squabble with each other over minutiae. 
European nations should awaken to the positive threat that Russia poses to their security, and unite 
against its menace.623 All the more because it is an untutored Russia that may overwhelm Europe, a 
nation still endowed with a political milieu that actively suppresses genius and forces intelligence to 
flee its borders. The Russians have the greatest potential for genius, but their systematic repression of 
individuals nullifies any credit they may have established. “In Russia there is an emigration of the 
intelligence. People cross the frontier in order to read and write good books. Thus however, they are 
working towards turning their country, abandoned by the intellect, into a gaping Asiatic maw, which 
would fain swallow our little Europe.”624 
Here creeps the ancient European fear of Asia: the ageless apprehension that the populous 
civilisations of the Near-East or the tribes of Asiatic steppes - from whence came those 'Aryan' 
ancestors of the Europeans themselves - might again loose themselves on the West. The periodic 
eruptions that sent nomadic hordes of Huns or Mongols, or the disciplined armies of Islam, flowing 
westward has taught Europe's intellectuals that their continent is a little peninsula jutting from a larger 
mass. And when they are haunted by some un-named foreign dread invariably they look eastward for 
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a menace to explain it. They even invented a theoretical justification for their fear which, if it is not 
founded on the naked sense of racial difference, supposes that Europe should gird itself against the 
intrinsic decadence of Asiatic politics.  
The West‟s idea of oriental civilisation, originated by the Greeks and inherited by European 
scholarship, is of cruel despots ruling vast masses kept in physical and intellectual servitude. It was 
applied to the Persians and Indians by the Greeks, to Islamic civilisations by Renaissance intellectuals 
and to China by nineteenth century westerners. For Nietzsche, the orient has produced the religions, 
mysticism, and pessimism he associates with decadence. This is manifest in his occasional 
unflattering references to the Chinese whom he customarily pictures as clever and industrious slaves, 
labouring under the directions of traditional despotism and the teachings of Confucius, a slave 
moralist of genius. His fear of Russian despotism must therefore be regarded in the same light. Were 
the geo-political aims over Europe realised by Russia, Europe might be incapable of sustaining any 
robust intelligence thereafter. Otherwise, if it does not decide to menace Europe, Russia will 
preoccupy itself with wars in India and Asia. It might even collapse through “internal eruptions, the 
explosion of the empire into small fragments, and above all the parliamentary imbecility...”625 
The Anglo-Saxons 
Qualms aside, he is certain that the spirit of Russia and the Slavs in general, is profounder and more 
certain of genius than that of continental Europe's other great foe, the Anglo-Saxons. If the Slavs 
suffer from an excess of barbarism the English are otherwise afflicted. In Russia, the despotism of a 
single individual suppresses genius; in England it is a general culture of 'mediocrity' that 
accomplishes the same. For the English, there is seldom a word of favour; indeed his judgement is 
harsher than for the Germans. Nothing he says is new; continental intellectuals have long said of these 
islanders that they are “no philosophical race”, that they lack “real power of spirituality, real depth 
of spiritual insight”.626 
The English mind is coarser, and gloomier. Ignoble utility supervenes in everything it conceives and 
does and because it lacks any spiritual depth it still clings fiercely to Christianity. It is from England 
that Europe has received all its stultifying mechanistic ideas concerning nature and causality (not a 
fair accusation in light of the generous French contribution to the same). Nietzsche notes that, where 
the French may be regarded as the architects of Europe's noblesse, the English have designed most of 
its forms of vulgarity, in particular 'modern ideas' which represents the greatest threat to high culture 
in Europe, all the more insidious because it undermines its peoples from within: “...the English, with 
their profound averageness, have once before brought about a collective depression of the European 
spirit: that which is called 'modern ideas' or 'the ideas of the eighteenth century' or even 'French 
ideas' - that is to say, that which the German spirit has risen against in profound disgust - was of 
English origin, there can be no doubt about that.”627 
What applies to the English also applies to their descendents, the North Americans. Both pose a 
spiritual and physical threat to Europe and to the fate of high culture everywhere. “England's petty 
spiritedness,” he warns, “is the great danger now on earth. I observe more inclination toward 
greatness in the feelings of the Russian Nihilists than in those of the English Utilitarians.”628 What 
continental Europe needs in order to overcome this threat and ensure its dominance of the world is 
“an outgrowth of the German and Slav races, and we require, too, the cleverest financiers, the Jews, 
for us to become masters of the world... We require an unconditional union with Russia, together with 
a mutual plan of action which shall not permit any English schemata to obtain the mastery in Russia. 
No American Future!”629 
Elsewhere he mentions that England's colonies would be needed to help with Europe's domination of 
the world, thereby inferring English political cooperation in a united Europe. But these are passing 
reveries not firmly held convictions. They indicate the depth of his distaste for the Anglo-Saxon 
world, in keeping with a major stream of German philosophy and scholarship from the end of the 
eighteenth century: which, as we know, characterised the English and even the Latins as superficial 
rationalists and mechanists. 
The Jews 
Though stateless and dispersed throughout the nations, the Jews exert a formidable financial and 
cultural influence. Nietzsche advises us that any “thinker who has the future of Europe on his 
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conscience will, in all the designs he makes for the future, take the Jews into account as he will take 
the Russians, as the immediately surest and most probable factors in the great game of forces.”630 
Nietzsche is divided over their legacy and influence: Europe owes much to them, “good and bad, and 
above all the one thing that is at once the best and the worst: the grand style in morality”.631 As a 
consequence, from youth to maturity he exhibits strange reversals in his estimation of Jewry. The 
younger Nietzsche is not sympathetic and refers to it obliquely as “a selfish stateless money 
aristocracy.”632 yet praises the ancient Hebrews. After the middle period, as his anti-Christianity 
hardens he blames the Hebrews and praises modern Jewry for what he had once condemned it. 
In the later period he poses the history of Europe as a grand antagonism between the spirit of Judea 
and of Rome, which is to say, between the values of Judeo-Christianity and of Classical civilisation. 
As the inventors of Christianity, a religion that has deformed the European mind for two millennia, 
the Hebrews conducted a major assault on the culture of antiquity. The Bible, as the literary source of 
this misdemeanour, codifies the inverted value system of what was quintessentially a 'slave nation'. 
Weak enough to be subjected and oppressed by successive empires - Babylonians, Egyptians, Greeks 
and Romans, the Jews powerfully resist cultural extinction by calling good the values that reflect their 
position as slaves, and bad the 'noble' values of their masters. This enables them to pose an alternative 
to the dominant values of antiquity. By this means, “... a people 'born for slavery' as Tacitus and the 
whole ancient world says, 'the chosen people' as they themselves say and believe - the Jews achieved 
the miracle of inversion of values thanks to which life on earth has for a couple of millennia acquired 
a new and dangerous fascination - their prophets fused 'rich', 'evil', 'violent', 'sensual' into one and 
were the first to coin the word 'world' as a term of infamy. It is in this inversion of values... that the 
significance of the Jewish people resides: with them there begins the slave revolt in morals.”633 
This revolt, spreading like virus in the form of the Jewish inspired religion of Christianity, extends far 
beyond its origins, and becomes the voice of slave classes throughout the Roman Empire. Slaves and 
masters too are seduced by it, with the result that ultimately Rome itself, which crushed the Jews in 
their homeland, becomes the servant and actor of Jewish values: more ironically still, the capital and 
epicentre of Christianity throughout the world. 
Unsparing of the rancour of the ancient Hebrews and their contribution to the destruction of antiquity, 
Nietzsche does not participate in contemporary orgies of anti-Semitism. He praises the contributions 
of Jews to classical culture in Europe. And if not entirely devoid of anti-Semitic impulses in his 
youth, sharing Wagner's distaste for Jewish financial acumen, he later takes pains to point out how the 
Jews have more than redeemed themselves for producing a 'redeemer'.  
A cautious even handed discussion in Human All Too Human indicates the evolution of his views. 
“Every nation”, he notes, “as does every individual, has unpleasant qualities, the Jew no less than 
any other' and cites as an example the behaviour of the young 'Stock-Exchange Jew', which he 
suggests might be 'the most repulsive invention of the human species”. At this stage still in the grip of 
his objection to Jewish business enterprise, rather than Hebrew slave-morality he then praises the very 
things he was later to condemn. He reminds us that much is to be excused in a nation that has had, 
“not without blame on the part of all of us... the most mournful history of all nations, and to which we 
owe the most loving of men (Christ), the most upright of sages (Spinoza), the mightiest book, and the 
most effective moral law in all the world?” In character with his later opinions he observes that it was 
the Jewish free-thinkers, scholars and physicians of the Middle Ages who defended enlightenment, at 
great personal sacrifice, when the clouds of Asiatic mysticism were sweeping Europe. In the great 
war of Occident and East, they provided the link in the chain of culture that unites modern Europe 
with antiquity. His concludes that: “if Christianity has done everything to orientalise the Occident, 
Judaism has assisted essentially in occidentalising it anew; which, in a certain sense, is equivalent to 
making Europe's mission and history a continuation of that of Greece.”634 
With the numbers of Jews in Europe increasing, particularly in Germany, as a result of general 
westward flight from pogroms and persecution in Russia, the clamour of western anti-Semites was 
growing more excited. The “distasteful and shameful”immoderation of their feelings against an ill-
used minority did not belie the need for caution regarding the admission of Jews into Germany.635 
Unlike Italy, France and England, where the social digestive system was stronger and large numbers 
of Jews could be absorbed without threat to local culture, Germany could not arrive at such a happy 
accommodation. Germany is still weak and unformed, while the Jews are an aere perennius - 
“beyond all doubt the strongest, toughest and purest race at present living in Europe” and know how 
to prevail under the most adverse conditions.636 
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The Jews could, if they wanted, and as the anti-Semites believe they do, even now rule over Europe, 
though they are undoubtedly not working to that end. If anything, according to Nietzsche, they are 
wishing 'with some importunity' to be assimilated into Europe and to put an end to their wanderings. 
This he feels, is a sign of a weakening of the Jewish instincts, and ought to be accommodated and 
selectively met by the Europeans, as he alleges the English nobility were already doing. The financial 
acumen and spirituality of modern Jewry could constitute as significant an ingredient in the breeding 
of a European mixed race, a master race, as any other national remnant. What is more, in a united 
Europe the 'Jewish problem' would not arise for it only really exists within the system of national 
states. Yet another reason, he might add, for the abolition of nation states. 
The Germans 
A tour of Nietzsche‟s Europe must include Germany. How close and troubled is his relation to his 
fatherland: how much love and hatred, high hope and disappointment as, in his youth, he believes 
Germany can lead Europe to a renaissance of the Hellenic spirit. His writings voluminously attend to 
the problems of German culture. The youthful works, including the Birth of Tragedy and the Untimely 
Meditations almost exclusively deal with such problems, and the later works obsessively go back to 
them, despite his obvious search for a more cosmopolitan readership. His mode of address to the 
Fatherland, evolving from scolding to mockery, never conceals his certainty that German political 
developments must necessarily affect the shape of Europe.  
Germany‟s geographical position assures its people of a vital role. As the heartland of the continent, 
all other European cultures flow into and through it. This historical position dominates the entire 
character and culture of the Germans and makes it intrinsically complex as they are made up of many 
races and cultures, and materials borrowed from many nations. Nietzsche believes that “the Germans 
may well be the most composite people on earth...'637 and remarks that the German soul is 'above all 
manifold, of diverse origins, put together and superimposed rather than actually constructed...”638 As 
a people they represent “the most tremendous mixture and mingling of races, perhaps even with a 
preponderance of the pre-Aryan element, as the 'people of the middle' in every sense, the Germans 
are more incomprehensible, more comprehensive, more full of contradictions, more unknown, more 
incalculable, more surprising, even more frightening to themselves than other people are - they elude 
definition and are for that reason alone the despair of the French.”639 
Every writer thinks his own nation more complex than those with which he is less familiar, but 
Nietzsche believes complexity abides so profoundly in the nature of his countrymen that it amounts to 
a metaphysical tendency: the German he says, as opposed to the Latin, is spiritually adjusted to 
conditions of incompleteness, of Becoming. The strength of Latin civilisation is in endowing every 
moment with immediate significance; its emphasis on the present, on Being, causes it to invest its 
culture with perfect and completed forms. The Germans, however exist both in the past and in the 
future: “they are of the day before yesterday and the day after tomorrow - they have as yet no 
today.”640 Not only is it that they have not arrived at a completed cultural form, it is also that they 
place significance precisely in the sense of becoming and development, and are for that reason the 
greatest exponents of the historical sense among the European nations. The ruling idea of 
'development' is a German discovery and is its greatest endowment to European intellect. It is the 
German capacity to accommodate antithetical notions in the idea of 'development' that has hitherto 
constituted their profundity, though this quality is progressively diminishing. 
Nietzsche distinguishes between an older Germany of rustic virtues and a new German state of 
insidious ambitions. Old Germany effortlessly gave forth geniuses of music, philosophy and poetry: 
Händel, Bach, and Beethoven, Leibniz, Kant, Hegel, and Schopenhauer, Goethe and Holderlin. These 
individuals of the 'strong German type' – here Handel, Leibniz, Goethe and Bismark are mentioned - 
were capable of “existing among antitheses” and “full of the supple strength that guards against 
convictions and doctrines by employing one against the other and reserving freedom for itself.”641 
The new German however, is no longer intellectually or psychologically robust. He is shallower, full 
of convictions and petty ambition. No longer content to be considered profound like his predecessors, 
he expects to be admired for exhibiting dash in politics or war. When he is of an intellectual bent he 
turns to scholarship rather than culture and is happy to occupy a twig on the tree of learning. In new 
Germany philosophy is replaced by the fragmented disciplines of scholarship and science, which 
impede the development of fuller and richer natures.642 The ambitions of the new German nation-state 
to engage in grand politics and strut the world-historical stage draws the best way from culture and 
into political, bureaucratic and military service. 
                                                                
637 PC, pp.218-219. 
638 BGE, a244. 
639 loc. cit. 
640 BGE, a240. 
641 WP, a884. 
642 TI, p.60. 
146 
However Nietzsche will concede that even new Germans retain some of the old virtues. “The new 
German represents a great quantity of inherited and inculcated ability”643 he says, but in what? 
Clearly, “it is not a high culture that has here gained ascendency, even less a fastidious taste, a noble 
'beauty' of the instincts.” What redeems his countrymen is that they possess 'more manly virtues than 
any other country in Europe can exhibit.644 And among the Germans it is the Brandenburg and 
Prussian nobility, and the peasant of certain North German districts who “comprise at present the 
most manly natures in Germany”.645 So long as they retain this virtue Germans can hope to fulfil 
some role at the forefront of European culture. 
The aberration of German nationalism does not fully obscure the signs pointing to an overcoming of 
the national states in Europe. German contribution to this fusion would be essential, for it is, 
Nietzsche believes, the Germans' ancient prerogative, by virtue of their position in the heartland of 
Europe to act as mediators of culture, as translators and conduits between nations. The Germans' 
“hereditary position as interpreters and intermediaries between nations”, which has endowed them 
with their complex character and spirit, should become their justification in a united Europe.646 
Nietzsche is less forward-looking in this remark than nostalgic. Within it we see a hint of the pride of 
the eighteenth century Germans that although not especially adept on the battlefield or in politics - 
such ephemeral achievement being left to other nations - they were unsurpassed in poetry and 
philosophy. They believed their intellectual virtue could be attributed precisely to the fact that they 
were situated at the centre of mankind and therefore embodied the complexity and qualities of all 
other nations. In the German mind Germany was the mind of all mankind. It did not require the 
thundering of Fichte, who turned this notion into a philosophical system, to assure humanity of this, 
for it was already a conscious feeling among the Aufklärers. Schiller for example (whom Nietzsche 
may have been unconsciously echoing, as one feels he so often does), calls the Germans blessed in 
their position at the centre of Europe: they were the 'kernel' of mankind, taking and perfecting 
everything coming from the nations all around. “It is the destiny of the German' he says, 'to perfect in 
himself general humanity, to wreathe the lovely blossoms of other peoples into a crown. The centre of 
Europe's peoples, he is the kernel of mankind, as they are the flower and leaf...”647 
The Mission and Future of Europe 
These reflections on the roles of nations leave us with two key observations. The first is that the idea 
of nationality is as inimical to culture as the idea of the state and that both, being in most instances 
necessary evils, are perhaps most favourably, preliminary stages to something greater. The culture-
state does not have to be, and more desirably should not be a national state. Accordingly, he looks to 
a past when each nation contributed a certain strength or virtue to the commonwealth of Europe and 
to a future when this will occur as a conscious policy of European statesmen. The second observation 
is that Nietzsche‟s politics of culture is supra-national for Europe, but not for the world. He is not a 
true cosmopolitan, but a Europhile and it is unlikely that he would have wished to be anything else. 
For Nietzsche, the world is not Asia, not Africa, not Australia, not the Americas, but Europe. Over 
and beyond the petty national wars and empire building of the European states he sees “the United 
Europe”preparing itself “slowly and unhesitatingly”as the “only real work, the one impulse in the 
souls of all the broad-minded and deep-thinking men of this century - this preparation of a new 
synthesis, and the tentative effort to anticipate the future of 'the European'...”648 Foremost of the 
aforesaid broad-minded and deep-thinking men, among whom can be listed Goethe, Beethoven, 
Stendhal, Heinrich Heine, and Schopenhauer, was Napoleon who, “as one of the great continuators of 
the Renaissance”, wanted to unify Europe in order it may become “mistress of the earth.”649 That 
Europe should rule the world as a continental block, is the pivotal concern of Nietzsche's politics of 
cultivation, or what he calls great politics, in order to continue the project of the Greeks. 
By preferring citizenship of a united Europe he renounces citizenship of the world. Only Europe can 
continue the progress of man. However remote it grows from antiquity in time and intellect, the great 
Greek Ideal of Cultivation - the boldest and clearest expression of humanity yet conceived - still rests 
in its bosom. It is only the form of culture discovered by the Greeks, organised by the Romans and 
inherited by the Europeans that will enable humanity to progress beyond its own nature. If it has not 
always consciously lived by this ideal, Europe remains its sole repository. For the good of its own 
peoples as for mankind in general, the continent must retain its economic and military dominance and 
continue to exert power over other peoples, and oppose the accumulating might of its barbaric 
offspring, the Russian Empire and the United States of America. To this end Europe must act 
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aggressively and must actively promote itself as “mistress of the earth”. 
How to Unite 
Even as Nietzsche was writing the continent was preparing for the bloodiest wars in human history. 
Elsewhere, superstates like Russia and the United States of America are forming, but Europe cannot 
crawl from its own imbroglio. If Nietzsche regrets Europe's enormous expenditure on arms, he also 
anticipates the beneficial effects of fratricidal war among its nations. The possibility that Europe 
might be unified by military conquest does not elude him. He had praised Napoleon's briefly 
successful effort to do so and Napoleon as one who understood Europe's destiny better than anyone 
since he himself embodied the grand tradition of antiquity and the Renaissance.650 
When he speculates on world-historical developments Nietzsche leaps from conjecture to conjecture. 
At one moment he sees a German-Russian master state ruling Europe, China and India as a way to 
overcome the impasse of European political fragmentation.651 At another he thinks the problem can 
be solved by Europe becoming subject to Russia. Russia would be the granite in relation to Europe as 
Rome to Greece: the Russians as Roman masters providing the political stability and security of a 
great northern continental state and the Europeans as Greek slaves educating and intellectually 
dominating their masters.652 
Mostly he thinks of Europe as commanding its own political destiny and commanding militarily the 
world. Unification need not be enforced by a single military power but would arise naturally from 
forces already at work. Europe is working towards unity from many different directions. Nineteenth 
century technical advances in travel and communication were bringing diverse peoples closer: “With 
the freedom of travel now existing, groups of men of the same kindred can join together and establish 
communal habits and customs. The overcoming of 'nations.”653 The increase of commerce, industry, 
increasing effectiveness of transport and communications is so weakening European nationalities that 
eventually there must emerge a mixed race, the European. Right now the mutual enmity of those 
nations counteracts this tendency, but fusion is taking place slowly against occasional counter-
currents. The present nationalist tendency in Europe is a dangerous unnatural condition of extremity 
and martial law, “proclaimed by the few over the many, and requires artifice, lying, and force to 
maintain its reputation. It is not in the interests of the many (of the peoples) as they probably say, but 
it is first of all the interests of certain princely dynasties, and then of certain commercial and social 
classes, which impel to this nationalism; once we have recognised this fact, we should just as 
fearlessly style ourselves good Europeans and labour actively for the amalgamation of nations.”654 
The last consideration is that Europe can no longer sustain many separate and competing economies. 
Eventually these states will see that mutual economic interest will inevitably draw them together: “the 
small states of Europe - I refer to all our present kingdoms and 'empires' - will in a short time become 
economically untenable, owing to the mad, uncontrolled struggle for the possession of local and 
international trade. Money is even now compelling European nations to amalgamate into one power. 
In order, however, that Europe may enter into the battle for the mastery of the world with good 
prospects of victory (it easy to perceive against whom this battle will be waged), she must probably 
'come to an understanding' with England. The English colonies are needed for this struggle, just as 
much as modern Germany, to play her new role of broker and middleman, requires the colonial 
possessions of Holland. For no one any longer believes that England alone is strong enough to 
continue to act her old part for fifty years more; the impossibility of shutting out homines novi from 
the government will ruin her, and her continual change of political parties is a fatal obstacle to the 
carrying out of any tasks which require to be spread out over a long time. A man must today be a 
soldier first and foremost that he may not afterwards lose his credit as a merchant. Enough; here, as 
in other matters, the coming century will be found following in the footsteps of Napoleon - the first 
man, and the man of greatest initiative and advanced views of modern times.”655 
The Culture-State of Europe 
Nietzsche offers slim little guidance as to how the new Europe comprising great powers, their 
colonies and imperial possessions will look. He foresees current European territorial states like 
England, France, Germany, Austria-Hungary and Italy fragmenting into cantons that would form 
units of local administration. The boundaries of these cantons would be based on rational 
geographical, economic and cultural principles and would have an integrity they do not now possess 
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as mere provinces of these states. It is not clear however, whether he means that discrete cultures or 
nationalities like the Basques, or Tyroleans should become separate cantons, or whether it should 
reach down to the boundaries of Europe's traditional pays and communes. 
In the European culture-state power would be centralised and decentralised: the greater functions of 
government assumed by a Pan-European government that would only loosely supervise the cantons, 
which would have greater freedom to arrange their own affairs. Nietzsche never discusses whether 
these administrations should be monarchical or democratic. The principle of redefining the nature of 
the territorial units seemed more important: that the modern territorial state be subsumed by the larger 
entity and caused to decompose into the elements it had once forcibly united. Control by the territorial 
state would then disappear and be replaced by units exerting greater independence at the local level 
and the most overwhelming world-historical aims at the highest. Ultimately a single European world 
empire would entail the extinction of all territorial states and empires and the cantonising of all 
peoples, but subject to the values and culture of Europe. The great promise of the new territorial 
divisions would be to diminish the role of nationality in the affairs of government and create a truly 
cosmopolitan world. 
Two possibilities emerge: one would be the atomising of the world as a result of a world-government 
which, being under no external security threat would fragment, but with each fragment sharing a 
residue of the higher culture that Europe had imposed on it. This speculation is never elaborated.  
More consistently he sees a continuously administered world-state in which two different species of 
mankind would arise: one representing the lower order of clever slaves, the specialists who, in their 
one-sided development, would constitute the machineries of economy and government. Above this 
class would be an aristocracy of synthetic individuals, able to cultivate themselves and lead the whole 
of mankind to ever higher levels of accomplishment. Hence, “on that first road which can now be 
completely surveyed, arise adaption, levelling, higher Chinadom, modesty in the instincts, satisfaction 
in the dwarfing of mankind - a kind of stationary level of mankind. Once we possess that common 
economic management of the earth that will soon be inevitable, mankind will be able to find its best 
meaning as a machine in the service of this economy - as a tremendous clockwork, composed of ever 
smaller, ever more subtly 'adapted' gears; as an ever-growing superfluity of all dominating and 
commanding elements; as a whole of tremendous force, whose individual factors represent minimal 
forces, minimal values. In opposition to this dwarfing and adaption of man to a specialised utility, a 
reverse movement is needed - the production of a synthetic, summarising, justifying man for whose 
existence this transformation of mankind into a machine is a precondition, as a base on which he can 
invent his higher form of being.”656 
In its final form, Nietzsche's Europe will consist of many cantons, having strong local powers, but 
governed by a loosely organised pan-European aristocracy. And what does this arrangement recall, or 
rather, monstrously magnify other than that millennial apparition: the Holy Roman Empire? 
The hankering for a united Europe has existed among many Europeans ever since the destruction of 
the Imperium Romanum. It has come close to realisation a number of times: firstly by the Carolingian 
Holy Roman Empire, then in the Middle Ages by the ecumenical rule of the Church and, ever so 
briefly, by would be conquerors such as Napoleon and Hitler. 
What is unusual is that Nietzsche should desire this precisely when the power of territorial states in 
Europe was about to reach its zenith and nadir in the two world wars that they were to initiate. What 
is typical is the way in which his imperial cosmopolitanism joins so consistently and fluently with the 
Hellenist variety of the Ideal of Cultivation. The icon of heroism he admires and the type of culture-
state he imagines have always been historical partners. Both ideas flow undilutedly down a furrow of 
speculation that has existed for millennia, and in modern Europe, for at least six hundred years.  
Nietzsche himself is only dimly conscious of the continuity of his thought in this regard, and does not 
see how he is magnifying and superimposing the pattern of the Holy Roman Empire, and the 
particular Ideal of Cultivation for which it has most affinity, on modern circumstances. Yet it is 
precisely this fact which makes him think that he is more forward-looking than any of his 
contemporaries, and causes him to believe that his thought embodies a new event in world-history. 
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16 - The politics of spiritual reform 
"... men can consciously resolve to develop themselves toward a new culture; whilst formerly they 
only developed unconsciously and by chance, they can now create better conditions for the rise of 
human beings, for their nourishment, education and instruction; they can administer the earth 
economically as a whole, and can generally weigh and restrain the powers of man. The new, 
conscious culture kills the old, which, regarded as a whole has led an unconscious animal and plant 
life..."657 
Nietzsche's Activism 
Nietzsche wants to build a culture-state because he does not wish high culture to be the offspring of 
chance or blind experiments. Rarely does nature bring forth a genius and even more rarely does it 
brings forth an entire people of genius. In every other department of life we are used to making nature 
serve our purpose. Yet we leave chance to achieve something so essential. By creating a culture-state, 
we can ensure that genius and high culture is brought forth by conscious effort. But no European 
power employs its institutions, or arranges its society with this as its priority. Philosophers, the most 
conscious human beings, the would-be artists of society, have suggested how a cultivated society 
might be conceived and achieved, but nobody heeds their advice. The philosopher needs to know how 
to make them listen, or better still how he can change the world. 
These considerations confront Nietzsche at every stage of his life. Much as he seeks to discover and 
describe the social structure that best supports culture, he is also determined that it should exist, or at 
least begin to exist, now, in his own time. As with most theoretical youth, he suffers the pangs of 
Hamletism, wherein a powerful urge to accomplish some feat is thwarted by intellectual confusion 
over what should be done (the same problem young Marx appeared to have suffered and allegedly 
overcame) But he soon learns to classify any distinction between the vita contemplativa and the vita 
activa as a false opposition. In his late twenties he notes that "the false opposition between vita 
practica and vita contemplativa is something Asiatic. The Greeks understood the matter better."658 
Again he warns himself against overly fond contemplation of other theoretical worlds: "You should 
not flee into some metaphysics, but should actively sacrifice yourself to the culture which is 
developing. For this reason I am strongly opposed to dreamy idealism."659 
Even when most isolated, the focus of his thought is to somehow shape the development of Europe 
and believes that his publications may accomplish this. Outside and unconnected from political 
parties and cultural movements, unable and unwilling to participate in practical political activity he 
sees himself, through his writings, as an immense force for change. The easy megalomania of ideas 
sweeps him to lofty prophesies of his role and stature in the history of the politics of cultivation. 
This form of activism is profoundly characteristic in German intellectual tradition. In the early period, 
when he is convinced that spiritual reform is possible through art and education, he believes that 
communicating ideas will change people and drive reform institutional renovation. In the later period, 
he is more attached to what he calls the "politics of virtue"660 or what we might refer to as the policy 
of breeding genius, which assumes that ideals can only be created in specific environments. The only 
way to ensure adoption of a certain ethic is to have people inhabit a world in which they can be 
naturally, spontaneously predisposed to it. Nonetheless, in spite of his new bias toward material 
change, he continues to write and think in a way that suggests he is convinced that by communicating 
ethical ideas he can reshape the world  
The Modality of Change - Reform rather than Revolution 
Regardless of whether "spiritual reform" or "breeding" is the agent for change, Nietzsche is consistent 
in that he thinks the process should always be evolutive; consisting of slow incremental advances 
rather than abrupt schisms, and that the immediate hunger for action must accord with the most 
distant far-sightedness. You do not rid yourself of the past with a blow but grow out of it slowly and 
determinedly, abandoning the worst but retaining what is best. 
In yet another of those self-defining notes of the early 1870's he sets himself two tasks: "to defend the 
new against the old, and to connect the old with the new."661 Continuity and conscious management 
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of change is characteristic of the Aufklärer, though not necessarily of Germans in general, as the 
convulsive history of the nation attests. At least we can say that, in the nineteenth century, those 
attached to the Aufklärer's politics of cultivation abhorred revolution and there are many reasons why 
this remained so in Nietzsche's case. 
Static Cartesian consciousness favours revolution.662 Those who are historically conscious are by 
their nature prone to track evolution and development and better disposed to the idea of reform. They 
seek out other agents of change than the dazzling feats of statesmen and generals such as 
technological innovations, changes to trading and economic relationships, new religious practices… 
The cumulative effect of small actions and the unintended consequences of actions that are better 
observed by the historian in hindsight than those who lived through the changes. The ahistorical 
Cartesian sees only an unsatisfactory set of circumstances that can be reversed quickly by 
extraordinary measures: a single violent act or coup d'etat. 
As the Aufklärer von Schlözer observes: history's value lies in drawing you away from the "blind 
admiration of individuals, realms, peoples, and events..." "One will", he says "be liberated from the 
taste for the stories of wars and will perceive with enlightenment that greater revolutions have often 
resulted from the quiet musings of genius and the gentle virtue of the man of wisdom than from the 
violence of all-powerful tyrants... one will awake from the slumber in which our education had 
steeped us to realise that the present perfection of our loaf of bread, piece of printed paper, pocket 
watch, bill of exchange, planet globe, and hundreds of other things has been the result of discovery 
after discovery over thousands and thousands of years through which the human spirit has steadily 
advanced."663 This is the attitude to history that affects how Aufklärers seek to change the world or 
engage in politics. 
Nietzsche inhabits the Aufklärers historicised consciousness and heightens its intensity. Read any of 
his aphorisms and invariably its point is to remind us that something is a development, and if it was 
always thus it will not always remain so. He delights in revealing how what seems eternal is 
provisional, and boasts of having the longest views and most distant perspectives of the past and 
future. There is nothing that is not the result of accumulations of small, perhaps inconspicuous events 
or processes. In prophetic mode he delights in pointing to favourable developments that might arise 
from something that is undesirable now. He gleefully seeks to be two or three steps beyond the 
obvious as if to say: "you see the evil coming and cover your eyes; I look a step beyond and see the 
good that will come out of it". 
But both Nietzsche and the Aufklärers wanted to believe that individuals can make history. 
Reformism clearly has to permit that possibility. Social change as a machine process as Hegel and 
Marx envisaged destroys the spirit of activism. Reformers may not slay dragons but their eloquence 
and example might persuade a dragon to go elsewhere.664 Superior action for reformers is not political 
or military but spiritual and intellectual. Those who change the world bring new values, ideas and 
beliefs into it. Traditional men of action are merely their actors and puppets. History then, is a curious 
combination of environmental processes and Heldenleben, where the heroes are not conquerors but 
men of culture. Aufklärer historiography exaggerates the significance of the philosopher, thinker or 
religious leader and their affect on the world because there is a need to believe that spiritual reform is 
the best means for transforming the world. 
Awareness of the details of the past lengthens the field of consciousness in time and space; it pushes 
forward as well as backward. A sense of history devalues the present, by referring back to a golden 
time, or forward to a utopia that is to come. The present is a moment of incompletion and 
imperfection that is justified or condemned according to its relation to the past or future. Where the 
mood the mood of a people is agitation, criticism and optimism, as it was in the eighteenth and 
nineteenth centuries, they justify themselves by working for the future. Utopia is no longer an 
impossible or unrealisable, but something attainable by conscious and sustained efforts over 
generations. The image of the ideal could be seen as real because "the utopian image was placed in 
future time and within the boundaries of European and German space".665 That change in 
consciousness is clearly indicated by the fact that, after the Aufklärers, utopias were set increasingly 
in the future. Before this such images were invariably cast in an unreal abstract world, in a remote 
past or place, in a golden age, a faraway island. 
The idea that civilisation can improve has always existed: in the Renaissance, in the high Middle 
Ages and even in antiquity. But among educated Europeans of the nineteenth century, what we 
normally refer to as the belief in progress became pervasive. This idea of supposes that change for the 
better is attained incrementally by many small achievements. The Aufklärung represented one strand 
of this general European consciousness. What distinguished Aufklärers is that their "progress" 
develops the Ideal of Cultivation and poses spiritual goals rather than material ones. For the Aufklärer 
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progress is not bigger or faster trains, but more virtue, art, knowledge, and wisdom. All of the 
imperfections of contemporary humanity can seem tolerable in the light of what is to come.  
Nietzsche shares the Aufklärer outlook and believes progress is the realisation of an Ideal of 
Cultivation. He looks to continuous regulated development of humanity, initially through elevation of 
its spiritual life, but later through the more material processes of breeding whose purposes are 
nonetheless to produce a spiritual affect. The toleration of evil implicit in his doctrine of reform is 
again radically exaggerated, so that pain, suffering and hardship are necessary primers for the 
acquisition of almost any virtue. Those who consciously plan human destiny must coldly assume that 
the course plotted for mankind must inevitably entail untold injustice and suffering for many, before 
the desired result is attained. 
In metaphysics, Nietzsche‟s urgent need to defy becoming is reflected in his formulation of the idea 
of the eternal return which unites being and becoming. In politics it is reflected in his emphasis on 
the importance of enduring social structures: those that weather the vicissitudes of history. We must 
favour civilisations that last the longest because “...duration is a first-rate value on earth...”666 What 
makes a stable social organisation necessary is that fact that genius, the most valuable thing of all, is a 
brief incandescence. The individual genius lives and passes on but if there is no society to preserve 
the impress of his actions they are lost forever and he may as well have not existed. Society alone can 
preserve the memory of genius, and memory is the medium that alone preserves value. 
Nietzsche‟s great problem is that epochs of high culture are as short-lived as the lives of geniuses. 
Periods of invention and brilliance are almost always succeeded by decadence. The Greeks and the 
Renaissance show that when exhaustion follows even former accomplishments are threatened: “What 
does the Renaissance prove? That the reign of the individual has to be brief. The squandering is too 
great; the very possibility of collecting and capitalising is lacking; and exhaustion follows 
immediately. These are times when everything is spent, when the very strength is spent with which one 
collects, capitalises, and piles riches upon riches..."667 The survival of culture depends on a society 
that can secure and incorporate the remains of brilliance, as an investment for a future when high 
achievement again becomes possible. 
But attachment to duration, which must surely degenerate into unthinking veneration of tradition, also 
retards development and shackles genius. Change would have to occur if the system were to survive, 
but it would have to be accomplished without undermining the higher objectives. Nietzsche 
acknowledges that no outstanding cultural epoch can be sustained at its highest levels for any 
duration, individuals and nations in periods of mediocrity can labour in good conscience in 
preparation for those to come. An individual may never live to see the effects of his actions. The 
greater part of history consists in difficult, protracted preparations that are finally justified by brief 
flames of culture. Change has to be managed so that it does not damage the sense of continuous 
purpose in a society dedicated to the Ideal of Cultivation. 
This is something difficult to accomplish in a world restless with haste and obsessed with novelty 
“...what is dying out is the fundamental faith that would enable us to calculate, to promise, to 
anticipate the future in plans of such scope, and to sacrifice the future to them - namely the faith that 
man has value and meaning only insofar as he is a stone in a great edifice; and to that end he must be 
solid first of all, a 'stone'...”668 A base of enforced mediocrity must be created that can always exist in 
spite of internal and external threats. In antiquity, in spite of the brilliance of the Greeks, only the 
empire of Romans was able to promise such a base and in modern times only the system implemented 
by Napoleon could have yielded the same promise. Unfortunately, according to Nietzsche, Rome's 
great edifice was brought down by Christianity and barbarism, and Napoleon's by the Germans. 
Nietzsche's reforming disposition is informed by Prussian history, where change is implemented time 
and again - often with great success - by princes and bureaucrats, and seldom by the masses. The 
Prussian state managed change more carefully than in any other European nation, always with an eye 
to preventing ungovernable eruptions of social forces. Prussian intellectuals were used to seeing a few 
powerful officials reshape the economy or state, not least because officialdom was the most 
progressive element in that state. The natural timidity of these intellectuals (their aversion to 
revolution seemingly justified by the violent excursions of the French revolution) led to a preference 
for slow, imperceptible mining of the state‟s foundation, and made them instinctive Fabians. Many 
Aufklärers like Schiller, who had initially blessed the revolution, recanted after hearing of the 
atrocities and looked on mass eruptions with fear and suspicion. 
Nietzsche's contempt for the events of 1789 is deepened by his contempt for the "modern ideas", in 
whose name they were staged and led him to tar all revolutions with the same brush. Since revolution 
implies that authority is overthrown from below it is the inevitable recourse of the desperate against 
the privileged. This runs counter to his reflex to favour the privileged before hearing from the other 
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side. Native conservatism is strengthened by early life-experiences. Nietzsche‟s father did not live to 
influence his son directly, but was apparently devastated that Friedrich Wilhelm IV, after whom his 
son was named, was forced by the revolutionaries of 1848669 to drive around Berlin with a cockade in 
his hat. The son‟s antipathy to direct action was abetted by a household of conservative women. He 
had his own opportunity to hear of and regret revolutionary action during the Paris commune of 1871 
when it was reported, falsely, that the Louvre had been burned down. His immediate response was a 
sorrowful lament that a few minutes of vandalism could arbitrarily destroy the great work of ages. 
In his middle period Nietzsche devotes many passages to denouncing the continuing appeal of 
revolution among contemporaries. It was, he argues, the revolutionary spirit of Rousseau that 
undermined the reforming and fundamentally constructive programme of "enlightenment". 
Rousseau‟s idealism inspired political dreamers to overthrow all order in the belief that a beautiful 
humanity would arise from under the carapace of civilisation. This superstition justified the violence 
of destructive people. Enlightenment became bound to this violent and abrupt sensibility, and as a 
result it too became violent and abrupt. It no longer worked for liberation and progress but for tyranny 
and barbarism. By attaching to itself revolutionary doctrine it worked against itself. Had the reformist 
principles inherent in the movement been followed then "...enlightenment... if left to itself, would have 
pierced silently through the clouds like a shaft of light, long content to transfigure individuals alone, 
and thus only slowly transfiguring national customs and institutions as well."670 
The spiritually developed individual, the genius who, by passing on knowledge and discoveries to 
others, creates a chain of effects that transforms a nation, would have been the most certain way to 
effect this progress. Instead, Rousseau's doctrines carried the day and the violence of the revolution 
was its consequence:"Unfortunately it is well known by historical experiences that every such 
overthrow reawakens into new life the wildest energies, the long-buried horrors and extravagances of 
remotest ages; that an overthrow, therefore, may possibly be a source of strength to a deteriorated 
humanity, but never a regulator, architect, artist, or perfecter of human nature. It was not Voltaire's 
moderate nature, inclined towards regulating, purifying, and reconstructing, but Rousseau's 
passionate follies and half lies that aroused the optimistic spirit of the Revolution, against which I 
cry, "Écrasez l'infâme !" Owing to this the Spirit of enlightenment and progressive development has 
been long scared away; let us see - each of us individually - if it is not possible to recall it!"671 
This position is unchanged in Nietzsche's later period and in 1887 he notes that the nineteenth century 
has progressed beyond the naive revolutionary ideals of the preceding hundred years. The stronger 
disposition toward realism and materialism among his contemporaries is, he believes, a good sign that 
reformism is gaining back its position. The nineteenth century has become "more and more decisively 
anti-idealistic, more concrete, more fearless, industrious, moderate, suspicious against sudden 
changes, antirevolutionary; more and more decisively the question concerning the health of the body 
is put ahead that of "the soul": the latter being understood as a state consequent upon the former, and 
the former at the very least as a precondition of the health of the soul."672 
The predisposition to change by reform suggests the classical or great style that he associates with 
genius. In this mode power is applied to attain a certain end by the coldest and freest consciousness, 
with the longest and broadest perspectives of its effects. Having this form of "freedom" means you 
command and resist unnecessary compulsions; that you act always with moderation, with calm and 
deliberation. The genius of classical style eschews sudden change. Thus “... when perfect resoluteness 
in thinking and investigating, that is to say, freedom of spirit, has become a feature of character, it 
produces moderation of conduct; for it weakens avidity, attracts much extant energy for the 
furtherance of intellectual aims, and shows the semi-usefulness, or uselessness and danger, of all 
sudden changes."673 
Comparative History and the Greeks 
To change culture, or create genius you need to understand how culture and genius arises. Since high 
culture can only be known from previous examples a science of culture must exist before a politics of 
cultivation, and it can never be anything other than a type of historiography. To predict the outcome 
of human actions you need the fund of examples that only history provides. Nietzsche arrived at these 
conclusions early in his life and they affected his decisions about how he was to lead his life. His 
life‟s mission is to understand, by means of historical studies, the circumstances in which genius 
flourished or was diminished. In the composition of The Birth of Tragedy and more profoundly in 
notes during the period 1871-1873 he explicitly draws parallels between conditions for culture in 
ancient Greece and modern Germany. In the later period he reminds himself of this correlation when, 
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asking “where has the plant man hitherto grown up most magnificently?", he answers that "for this 
question the study of comparative history is necessary."674 This clearly echoes the Aufklärers who 
insisted on studying history before any larger political undertaking, who saw the writing of history as 
“a preparatory act to change"675 
The Aufklärer archetype was established in modern Europe by Machiavelli whose Discorsi drew 
models for contemporary political action through methodical study of Livy's Republican Rome, his 
preferred culture-state. In Nietzsche's case the importance of writing history is evident in the career he 
chose. As one endowed with a strong artistic impulse and keen to satisfy it in some way, he 
nevertheless chose to become a scholar, specialising in the science of reading and elucidating ancient 
texts. More noteworthy is that the object of his philological labours were Hellenic texts, the products 
of the civilisation he sees as the highest example of culture. His familiarity with these texts is 
intimate676 and he attaches unparalled significance to what they tell him. “The Greeks are the chariot 
drivers of every subsequent culture"677" So much depends upon the development of Greek culture, 
since our entire occidental world received its original impulse therefrom.678 That they are so distant is 
immaterial. Even its ruins provide us with the means to understand modern realities. Simply by 
observing the process by which the Greeks achieved their culture we moderns may be able to 
accomplish the same: “Greek antiquity provides the classical set of examples for the interpretation of 
our entire culture and its development. It is a means for understanding ourselves, a means for 
regulating our age - and thereby a means for overcoming it."679 In some sense, most of Nietzsche's 
work is a commentary on or rewriting of history, an observation not lost on his respected colleague at 
Basel, Jacob Burckhardt, who once remarked to Nietzsche that "fundamentally of course you are 
always teaching history.”680 
Burckhardt and Hypollite Taine, two contemporaries with whom Nietzsche believes he shares close 
intellectual kinship (normally professing preference for the company of the expired) were among the 
foremost historians of his century. He makes this feeling clear in two letters sent to Taine and 
Burckhardt on 20 and 22 September 1886 respectively, along with copies of his recent book, Beyond 
Good and Evil. The letters declare the respect he has for them and the intellectual ties he believes they 
share. He actually mentions Burckhardt to Taine saying: "Den Allerwenigsten jedenfalls, den 
wirklichen Räthselrathern, den historischen "Zeichendeutern". Dabei dachte ich zum Beispiel an 
meinen verehrten alten Freund Jakob Burckhardt in Basel; nehmen Sie es wohlwollend auf, 
hochverehrter Herr, daß ich dabei auch an Sie gedacht habe, dessen Muth, Feinheit, Ausdauer und 
geistige Umfänglichkeit innerhalb unsres zweifelsüchtigen Europas zu den bestbewiesenen 
Thatsachen gehört."681 
Despite the coolness with which Burckhardt treated him, Nietzsche is certain he is pursuing a similar 
line of research. Burckhardt was one of the profoundest living scholars of the Italian Renaissance and 
Greek antiquity, and Nietzsche undoubtedly owed much of his historical education to the older man. 
In the letter of 22 September Nietzsche confesses that "Ich kenne Niemanden, der mit mir eine solche 
Menge Voraussetzungen gemein hätte wie Sie: es scheint mir, daß Sie dieselben Probleme in Sichte 
bekommen haben, - daß Sie an den gleichen Problemen in ähnliche Weise laboriren, vielleicht sogar 
stärker und tiefer noch als ich, da Sie schweigsamer sind. Dafür bin ich jünger… Die unheimlichen 
Bedingungen für jedes Wachsthum der Cultur, jenes äußerst bedenkliche Verhältniß zwischen dem, 
was "Verbesserung" des Menschen (oder geradezu "Vermenschlichung") gennant wird, und der 
Vergrößerung des Typus Mensch, vor Allem der Widerspruch jedes Moralbegriffs mit jedem 
wissenschaftlichen Begriff des Lebens - genug, genug, hier ist ein Problem, das wir glücklicher 
Weise, wie mir scheint, mit nicht gar Vielen unter den Lebenden und Todten gemein haben 
dürften."682 He sees Burckhardt as a researcher into the nature of culture like himself: wishful thinking 
perhaps for although the aloof and ironic older man shared the younger's Ideal of Cultivation, he was 
by no means an activist and did not conduct his investigations in order to guide reforms. 
The Vehicles of Spiritual Reform 
Spiritual reform requires that we study history before we act. It begins with the luminary, the master, 
the teacher, the genius divulging new thoughts to disciples to pass them on to laymen who, once 
exposed, adopt new ways of living. It is individuals who must be transformed rather than institutions, 
and preferably persons of influence like princes, bureaucrats and businessmen. These inhabit the 
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world of ideas and actions, can reshape institutions and widen the circle of influence, leading to more 
material changes in the organisation of the state, institutions, customs, laws and so on all in 
accordance with the ideas of the luminary. 
In Germany this idea of spiritual reform is in sympathy with the personal Ideal of Cultivation and the 
cosmopolitan Kulturstaat. The inward Ideal of Cultivation turning itself outward confers on the 
external world its own etherealised character. Inordinately optimistic about the power of ideas, 
German intellectuals of the eighteenth century thought that they could seduce the powerful and never 
raise a finger in anger. A poem, a lecture at the podium, a sermon from the pulpit, a book, a play, all 
these could change the fate of millions when a big man listens. When princes are altered, the rest 
follows. The majority of the Aufklärers were communicators by profession: teachers, academics, 
pastors, writers, artists, critics and so on. And in a land where the pulpit had ostensibly launched the 
greatest revolutions - Luther's most particularly - it was not difficult to deny the notion had legs. To 
change the world you didn‟t need to harangue a parliament, or build barricades, simply present your 
opinions consistently and interminably through education, science, literature, and art. 
Would Nietzsche have written a word if he did not think he could sway the world? In Ecce Homo he 
claims his books are "fishhooks"683 written to snare others, not it is to be admitted, the masses, but 
individuals capable of appreciating and disseminating his ideas. But if he feels that "individuals are 
the bridges upon which becoming depends",684 they also have to be giants - giants of vocation: not as 
doctors, firemen, or plumbers, rather as geniuses of culture: artists, philosophers, statesmen, 
teachers... When we look at its vocational substance it is evident that genius in itself is nothing more 
than an embodiment of the spiritual reformer himself. The genius of culture communicates through 
words, books, sounds or artefacts and impresses his ideas and feelings upon others. In Nietzsche's 
work the influence of genius justifies all human existence, wherein “every human being… only has 
dignity insofar as he is a tool of the genius, consciously or unconsciously…"685 
That anyone can be acted on by genius is predicated on the fact that "…every individual is affected by 
an overall philosophical justification of his way of thinking and living…686 When you reshape a 
person's justification for living, you transform them inwardly, and thus, outwardly as well. But 
Nietzsche also considers a strategy more in keeping with the organic or republican model of the 
culture state. This holds that a virtue can be bred in us by enacting laws or promoting morality that 
affect the way we conduct our lives. Morality, as an external force, molds the inner life so that 
eventually the desired virtue begins to mature and grow internally of its own volition; essential if a 
morality is not to decline into empty ritual. The more communal approach of “law-giving moralities" 
is reckoned by Nietzsche to be "the principle means of fashioning man according to the pleasure of a 
creative and profound will, provided that such an artists's will of the first rank has the power in its 
hands and can make its creative will prevail through long periods of time, in the form of laws, 
religions, and customs."687 
During the middle and later periods, he begins to argue that changing our nature depends on creating 
the material circumstances in which a preferred virtue can flourish. This did not however replace his 
unconscious obsession with spiritual reform, notably evident in his call for a "revaluation of all 
values". Gestures at materialism do not represent a revolution and throughout his life, he analysed, 
criticised and polemicised against artists, writers, philosophers, religions for holding certain values. 
Seldom did he give general attention to the political and religious institutions that embodied them and 
when he does, it is more often in his private correspondence than in his published work. His ideas of 
spiritual reform coincide with three vocational possibilities that continually preoccupy him during his 
life: namely the artist, the scholar or educator and the philosopher. Nietzsche embraced or - in the 
case of artist - secretly longed to embrace each of these vocations at all stages of his life. 
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17 - Spiritual reform through art 
Art was Nietzsche's earliest interest. A capable musician and adequate composer, it was in poetry and 
literary style that he was most accomplished. He strove to make each of his books works of art as well 
as of scholarship or philosophy. His teacher at the University of Leipzig, Ritschl, remarked on his 
tendency to plan his philological essays "like a Paris romancier".688 His favourite work at the end of 
his productive life, Thus Spake Zarathustra, was also the one in which he had come closest to fully 
satisfying his poetic instincts. 
Obsession with the importance and influence of art was deepened by association with Wagner, who 
combined artistic success with powerful political instincts and ethical objectives. Wagner's artistic 
prowess was like a magnet, drawing the intellectually akin into a movement that could eventually 
spread and regenerate German culture. Eagerly boarding the maestro's bandwagon the young 
Nietzsche himself dedicated a good portion of the Birth of Tragedy, to inciting Germans to follow the 
examples suggested by Wagner's art. 
Understanding the younger Nietzsche's intentions in writing the Birth of Tragedy shows us how 
attached he is to the notion of reform through art. Ostensibly a philological investigation of the 
origins of Greek tragedy the book rapidly degenerates into a commentary on the condition of German 
culture, with the Greeks providing the higher example. Throughout the work he draws stated and 
unstated parallels between the moral condition of the Greeks and modern Germans on the assumption 
that music and theatre were the centre of Greek ethical life; that the profoundest ideas for living were 
contested on the Greek theatre; and that the Greek theatre determined what happened in the polis. 
If this seems overstated, consider this passage, which discusses the effect of Euripides drama on the 
Athenians: "... Civic mediocrity, on which Euripides built all his political hopes, was now given a 
voice, while heretofore the demigod in tragedy and the drunken satyr, or demiman, in comedy, had 
determined the character of the language. And so the Aristophanean Euripides prides himself on 
having portrayed the common, familiar, everyday life and activities of the people, about which all are 
qualified to pass judgement. If the entire populace now philosophised, managed land and goods, and 
conducted lawsuits with unheard-of circumspection, he deserved the credit, for this was the result of 
the wisdom he had inculcated in the people."689 
In eighteenth and to a lesser degree in nineteenth century Germany, this would not seem as absurd as 
it might today. The optimism that theatres and concert halls could slowly change the spiritual life of a 
nation was shared by Lessing and wholly accepted by Schiller and his generation. It was Schiller, 
after all, who advised Prince Friedrich Christian "that a theory of aesthetics is not so remote from the 
need of the present time as it may seem, and that the subject even deserves the attention of the 
political philosophers since any radical improvement of a nation must start with the ennobling of the 
character, and this under the guidance of the beautiful and the dignified."690 
Schiller thought nations could be ennobled by the example of theatre and literature. Although a 
somewhat tendentious poet, he didn‟t see the stage simply as a pulpit in the way Bernard Shaw used 
it, but hoped it might become a school for feelings. Exposure to beautiful examples in theatre provides 
more effective moral training than argument or reasoning. It refines the sensibilities of the public and 
transforms them into ethically superior individuals. Nietzsche, generally pessimistic about modernity, 
observes that in contemporary Germany "using the theatre as an institution for the moral education of 
the people, still taken seriously in Schiller's time, is already reckoned among the incredible antiques 
of a dated type of education."691 Yet Schiller's aesthetic optimism is in evidence throughout the Birth 
of Tragedy. For example, Nietzsche‟s famous distinction between Apollonian and Dionysian art poses 
essentially different ways of feeling that can underpin cultural activity. He places enormous 
importance on the effect of music, crediting it with being the foundation of tragic theatre, and 
therefore of an entire way of living. Likewise it is Wagner the musician whom he considers most 
capable of leading Germans to moral greatness, not Wagner the philosopher.692 
Two separate ideas about the relationship between art and politics occur in Nietzsche's work and 
represent different understandings of spiritual reform. The first, art as an agent of spiritual change, is 
evident in the Birth of Tragedy and diminishes in importance during the middle period, while the 
second, art as the formal drive, becomes more noticeable in the later period. 
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Idea 1 - Art as an agent of spiritual change 
The idea of art as an agent of spiritual change is related to the theme of conscious-illusion or the "holy 
lie" that appears in all Nietzsche's work and supposes that a horizon of myth or illusion has to 
surround a culture in order for it to flourish. In naive cultures religion provides the myths, in higher 
cultures such as that of Hellenic antiquity, art provides it. Nietzsche considers that the myths 
constructed by Greek tragedians healed, protected and reconciled competing forces within the polis. 
“Art masters ecstasy and the formal drive" in a people693 and harmonises impulses which, if left 
ungoverned, would lead to chaos and the collapse of society. 
A central thesis of the The Birth of Tragedy is that artistic myths were destroyed by an ungoverned 
drive for scientific knowledge, which with its naive optimism that truth may be found, endangers 
myth and strips culture of what it needs. When it is realised that truth is a fiction, the final result of 
the unbounded pursuit of knowledge is nihilism. For the purpose of living "art is more powerful than 
knowledge, because it desires life, whereas knowledge attains as its final goal only - annihilation"694 
The immense schism between values and knowledge, between wisdom and science, between the 
artistic drive and the knowledge drive proves that it is "impossible to build a culture upon 
knowledge."695 The superior Hellenic culture degenerated into Alexandrian culture precisely because 
the Greeks allowed the knowledge drive to dominate. 
Comparisons made between ancient and modern civilisation in the Birth of Tragedy allow us to 
glimpse into the political mind of the younger Nietzsche. Firstly he equates Hellenism, or artistic 
culture, with the influence of aristocracy on the polis and scientific optimism, or Alexandrianism, 
with the influence of democracy. In modern terms, art is for the ancien regime with which he is in 
sympathy, and science for liberal democracy, which he detests. In notes made while writing the book, 
he observes that it was the tyrants - Cleisthenes, Periander, and Peisistratus, who had promoted 
tragedy as popular entertainment in Athens, while Solon, the democrat, desired moderation and had a 
great antipathy to tragedy.696 The real culprit in the swing from one type of valuation to the other 
though is Socrates, with whom he credits the destruction of tragic drama, especially by way of his 
influence on Euripides. This changed the way tragedies were performed and understood. Through 
Euripides the deep tragic view of the earlier theatre was replaced by Socrate's rationalist viewpoint. In 
the long run the philosopher's influence was to destroy the naive impartiality of ethical judgement, 
promote dialectical verbiage and loquaciousness, wrench the individual from his historical bonds, and 
even eventually annihilate the science that was the great strength of Alexandrian culture.697 
This passage from the Birth of Tragedy shows how he sees this process taking place: 
"Now we must not hide from ourselves what is concealed in the womb of this Socratic culture: 
optimism, with its delusion of limitless power. We must not be alarmed if the fruits of this optimism 
ripen - if society, leavened to the very lowest strata by this kind of culture, gradually begins to 
tremble with wanton agitations and desires, if the belief in the earthly happiness of all, if the belief in 
the possibility of such a great intellectual culture changes into the threatening demand for such an 
Alexandrian earthly happiness, into conjuring up of a Euripidean deus ex machina. Let us mark this 
well: the Alexandrian culture, to be able to exist permanently, requires a slave class, but with its 
optimistic view of life it denies the necessity of such a class, and consequently, when its beautifully 
seductive and tranquilising utterances about the "dignity of man" and the "dignity of labour" are no 
longer effective, it gradually shifts towards a dreadful destruction. There is nothing more terrible 
than a class of barbaric slaves who have learned to regard their existence as an injustice, and now 
prepare to avenge, not only themselves, but all generations. In the face of such threatening storms, 
who dares to appeal with any confidence to our pale and exhausted religions, the very foundations of 
which have degenerated into scholarly religions? Myth, the necessary prerequisite of every religion, 
is already paralysed everywhere, and even in this domain the optimistic spirit, which we have just 
designated as the germ of destruction in our society has attained the mastery.698 
Here he draws a strict parallel between the fate of Alexandrian scientific culture and modern 
Germany. In antiquity slaves enabled an elite to practice cultivation. In modern Germany the working 
classes do the same. The Hellenic Greeks employed art and myth to establish and equilibrium 
between the free and the slaves and to convince both classes that this social arrangement was natural 
and appropriate. The Alexandrian period too needed a leisured class to pursue its science and 
scholarship but the nihilistic rationalism unleashed by Socrates destroyed the old values. As a result 
slaves could consider themselves oppressed and even equal to freemen. The effect was to overturn the 
productive foundation of high culture and thus even science met its end as barbaric slave values 
gained ascendency. Now the same thing is happening because of modern scientific optimism, where 
the working class, bereft of the consolations of Christianity, are rising against their masters.  
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Elsewhere the artistic spirit is given more constructive effect than merely maintaining the status quo. 
In that critical period in Greek antiquity between the defeat by the Greeks of the Persian invasion and 
the start of the Peloponnesian wars, he observes a marked tendency toward centralisation. The 
emphasis on the culture of the polis, in which myth and tragic art played the crucial role, kept the 
Greek peoples fragmented and hostile to each other. The Persian wars briefly united them, but gave 
greater power to Athens and Sparta who then entered a struggle for empire over all the Greeks. Had 
not the Persian wars interrupted their natural development union could have been achieved through 
"spiritual reform" and pan-Hellenic tragedy. This would have led to an even higher type of culture 
than before. “I think", he says, "that, if had not been for the Persian wars, they would have hit upon 
the idea of centralisation through spiritual reform...The important thing in those days was the unity of 
festival and cult; likewise it is here that the reform would have begun. The thought of a panhellenic 
tragedy: an infinitely more fertile power would then have developed..."699 Again parallels can be 
drawn with the recent unification of the Germans by the military success of Prussia rather than 
through centralisation by "spiritual reform"; a lamentable event for Nietzsche, for it meant the 
imposition of a rigid Prussian state-culture over the whole nation. 
Idea 2 – Art as the formal drive 
In the middle period, following the break with Wagner, the emphasis on art as an agent of spiritual 
change diminishes, partly out of embarrassment at his previous excesses. He even questions the 
viability of art as a substitute religion or "holy lie" and doubts its influence at all in the present, 
questioning the “right...[of] our age to give an answer to that great question of Plato's as to the 
moral influence of art? If we even had art, - where have we an influence, any kind of an art-
influence?"700 In other sections of Human all Too Human he even questions the continued spiritual 
relevance of art, implying that its decline might actually portend its replacement by a higher form of 
spirituality.701 
While not abandoning the axiom that "our salvation lies not in knowing, but in creating!" he is better 
disposed toward science, thinking of it as a preparatory stage for a higher type of creativity: 
“compared with the artist, the appearance of the scientific man is actually a sign of a certain 
damming-up and lowering of the level of life (-but also of strengthening, severity, hardness will to 
power)."702 Art is no longer a vehicle for reform, but the actual process and object of political change: 
the formal drive through which power is self-consciously applied. All human activity that obeys this 
principle may be termed art. As an undeveloped note in the Will to Power suggests: "the work of art 
where it appears without an artist, e.g. as body, as organisation (Prussian officer corps, jesuit order). 
To what extent the artist is only a preliminary stage. The world as a work of art that gives birth to 
itself."703 The self-perfecting individual (the artist of personality) and the artist who shapes material, 
words, sounds, pigments and so on, are preparing the way for the highest artist of all, the artist 
philosopher or artist-statesman who wishes to work and form humanity itself.704 
For the later philosopher the tragic artist does not so much heal but justify life and is therefore still a 
spiritual activist in some sense. The profundity of the tragic artist now lies in the fact that his aesthetic 
instinct “surveys the more remote consequences, that he does not halt short-sightedly at what is 
closest to hand, that he affirms the large-scale economy which justifies the terrifying, the evil, the 
questionable - and more than merely justifies them."705 Such a spirit may be needed to teach people to 
endure life without comforts, but more pressingly by even greater artists, the great legislators of 
Nietzsche's new Europe:"those with a genius for organisation, who possess the courage to make 
plans that encompass the distant future, who would undertake projects that would require a thousand 
years for their completion."706 
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18 - Spiritual reform through education 
Shaping ideals and habits through common instruction, is perhaps the most effective vehicle for 
spiritual reform acknowledged and promoted by Nietzsche. Inevitably so, because it invokes the Ideal 
of Cultivation itself. The culture-politician must inevitably have ideas about who in a polity should be 
educated, and whether this should be publicly or privately paid and administered.707 
Two Educational ideals: Scholar-official and Warrior-gentleman 
The aim of every polity is that the educated will confirm and further its interests. Guiding educational 
practice is the model of what the best citizen might be. Pedagogy is enlisted to produce such creatures 
either by teaching them virtues needed to support the political order, or by training them in vocations 
that enable the polity to function sweetly. Such training reflects the material character of the polity 
and the range of vocational possibilities that it permits. The cosmopolitan empire and the republican 
city-state produce different conceptions of the Ideal and politics of cultivation in keeping with 
differences in political organisation, which is also reflected in their preferred vocational models. In 
the crudest sense the model consistent with the cosmopolitan ideal of culture is the scholar-official, 
and with the republican ideal, the warrior-gentleman. 
The Scholar-official 
The vocation ideal of the scholar-official occurs in large cosmopolitan empires: in Hellenistic Greece, 
imperial Rome, Byzantium, the Holy Roman Empire, and the Catholic church throughout its history, 
and perpetuates the even more ancient vocation of the scribe. The scribe is the ancestor of the scholar. 
Scholarship cannot begin until something is written down. Likewise, bureaucracy cannot begin until 
records can be kept. The bureaucrat or official whether of a royal court, or a religious order 
(remember that offices have often been held by priests and associated with sacred duties) invariably 
has had scribal training. To produce the scholar or an official you must subject him to literary 
learning since he would be unthinkable outside of a world of manipulable symbols, records of 
transactions, knowledge and discoveries, codified laws, and written commands. It is his virtuosity in 
manipulating symbols, in learning, that he becomes a scholar and thereby gains access to a separate 
domain of power, alongside that of the warrior who wins his dominance by means of the sword.708 
Scribal training and bureaucratic administration permit the career choices of scholarship and 
administration. The scholar and the official are the two ends of a continuum. The capable manipulator 
of symbols can choose a vocation adapted to the vita activa or the vita contemplativa, or somewhere 
in between. If he chooses the first he becomes an official; if he chooses the latter he becomes a 
scholar. The official is occupied with the tasks of administration in imperial or public service, while 
the scholar can drop out, turn inward and lead a monastic existence, fully immersed in composing and 
elucidating texts, or in disputing over them. Often enough individuals can do both as occurs in well-
springs civilisations: in Mesopotamia, Egypt and the Indus valley and in China. In all these 
bureaucratic civilisations there were significant scholars who were also high-ranking administrators. 
The scholar-official has an intrinsic belief in the power of education since it from this that he derives 
influence and prestige. When only a few are literate those who read and write have social advantage. 
The scholar-official has a natural inclination to value hierarchical meritocracy, and to believe that his 
social and organisational rank is determined by his own capacity. He is doing something that most 
would think rare and difficult. He prides himself on his intelligence and capacity as opposed to an 
aristocratic ranking based on blood and inheritance. Clearly this outlook would appeal to talented 
plebeians, and historically, bureaucracies have inducted members of the lowest classes with scribal 
training. It is not incidental that Nietzsche designates the scholarly vocation as essentially plebeian, 
though he makes this point for other reasons than to observe a general historical pattern.709 
The vocational model of the scholar-official does not appear in the west until the power of the Greek 
city-states had withered and bureaucracies began to form in the Hellenistic kingdoms that succeeded 
them. This is when scholar-officials began to gather in centres of power as advisors, religious 
functionaries and administrators, not as a highly structured caste as occurred in Egypt and other 
eastern civilisations, but as an oftentimes meritocratic vocation. In clear parallel there was an 
unprecedented expansion of scholarship and science in this same period, which Nietzsche refers to 
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constantly as Alexandrianism.  
With the advance of the scholarly vocation intellectual fraternity also develops; the sociability that 
had been the basis of the earliest philosophical schools, the Pythagoreans and then the post-Socratic 
Peripatetics, Academics, Epicureans and Stoics was formalised in a way that was beyond mere 
philosophical allegiances. Not only was publically funded schooling introduced for the first time, but 
institutions of learning were established and patronised by central authorities.  
The most famous of these, like the Museum at Alexandria, founded by the Ptolemys (c.280 BC) and 
later funded by Roman emperors provided libraries and scribes that enabled communities of scholars 
to theorise and dispute in monastic isolation. In pursuit of a personal and inward Ideal of Cultivation 
the scholar invests himself with a significance that a scribe could never know. Learning links him to 
nature's highest purpose. The more he knows the more he is virtuous, and indeed powerful. In a world 
freed of bonds to any polity other than an immense and shapeless empire the Republic of Scholars 
gives him a greater sense of community and place. In Hellenism this republic emerges with its own 
parties, laws, disputes, with individuals communing not only with contemporaries but with masters of 
all the centuries, who still live and argue in the scrolls of Hellenist libraries.  
At the same time that monastic fraternities were forming the wandering scholar: the cosmopolitan 
savant who travels from city to city to meet and converse with other scholars, enters the pages of 
history. Subsisting only on the virtuosity of his intellect, and handing on the torch of learning 
wherever he can, he never really departs from the west thereafter. Although scarce for a while during 
the period of early Christianity, he reappears all the more ostentatiously in the Renaissance and 
becomes the foundation for western humanism from Petrarch until Erasmus.  
In late antiquity the vocations of official and scholar were sustained by the Byzantine Empire and 
were adopted and perpetuated by the Christian churches, the only other organisation able to support 
continuously stable bureaucracies until nation states formed in the early modern period. The same 
active and contemplative possibilities were available; scholars could enter the church hierarchy and 
lead an active administrative life, or could retreat to the Christian monastery or the universities that 
were rising up in the 12th century. Under the aegis of the church learning was less a cultivating force 
than an accessory to worship, but it provided many with a living they might not otherwise have found. 
If it resulted in a lower order of scholarship it did provide all the preconditions for an Ideal of 
Cultivation to emerge later on. 
Civilisations where the scholar-official dominates do not necessarily produce an Ideal of Cultivation. 
But once they do the politics of cultivation that arises inevitably acquires the character of scholar-
officials, as occurred when the ideal re-emerged during the Renaissance and German Enlightenment. 
The Warrior-gentleman 
The vocational model of the warrior-gentleman is older than that of the scribe and precedes 
civilisation itself. Its existence is predicated on an elite, an aristocracy, whose justification and duty is 
warfare and political leadership. Historically it is associated with compact and dynamic power-
centres: in antiquity with the city-states of Greece and republican Rome, that is, with the pre-imperial 
phases of those peoples' development; in medieval and early modern Europe, with the courts of 
Provence, the city-states of Italy and later the emerging territorial states such as England and France, 
all of whom had escaped for some time from either the direct hegemony of the cosmopolitan Holy 
Roman Empire, or the Catholic church. The basis of power with this perennial type is evidently not 
virtuosity in manipulating symbols but in bearing arms. The mode of education associated with it has 
never been strictly literary. Nor has it been merely martial. 
Warrior classes invariably sublimate their conduct beyond the violence that sustains their power, to 
chivalric refinements, courtly manners and artistic and intellectual accomplishments.  
Unlike the scholar-official, the gentleman, who is descended from the warrior, treats learning for 
itself as simply another aspect of cultivation, alongside refinement of sensibility and the exercise of 
the body. The education of the scholar-official is inherently specialist (deeper learning and subtlety 
like the focusing of bureaucratic function leads inevitably to specialisation, hierarchy and complexity) 
but the gentleman's education emphasises general knowledge and methods in order to master all 
situations in life. Dilettantism does not reflect incapacity but is positively valued. In pre-Hellenistic 
Greece, where the educational foundations of the warrior-gentleman are first fully explored and 
paideia - the characteristic Greek Ideal of Cultivation arises, all faculties: body, intellect, and virtue 
are harmoniously developed. The first major Ideal of Cultivation to arise in the west therefore did not 
originate in a scribal milieu but in one where a class of warrior-gentlemen dominated the production 
of values, ideas and literature. In the polis, literacy was not confined to a scribal class as occurred in 
the Near-East. Hence it is no accident that the pre-Socratic poets and philosophers responsible for the 
breathtaking innovations of Greek thought were seldom scribes, officials, or scholars, but free 
citizens, statesmen, and artisans involved in public life. 
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Unlike the scholar-official, the warrior-gentleman does not separate the vita activa from the vita 
contemplativa. Nor does he separate public and private engagement. His role can only be active and 
his actions can only be public in character. Outside of public service he may pursue private interests 
and pleasures but his entire orientation is to have some effect in the wider world. Once again the form 
of action he can take has two different modalities and this will depend on the kind of state that he 
inhabits: in this respect the warrior-gentleman can either be a courtier or a free-citizen. 
The courtier is a creature of the centralised state: a monarchy, empire, dictatorship, it matters not. He 
is already high born, and attracted to the centre of power, the court, where he discovers public roles 
for himself through the personal relationships he arranges there. Kings, princes and dictators may 
surround themselves with favourites, but there must also be those who can get things done: those 
capable enough of conducting military campaigns, organising diplomatic missions, passing and 
implementing laws. The courtier must have the manners and grace that will enable him to thrive in the 
thin air of the court but also have the resources and character to manage affairs in the world. From the 
Middle Ages to Renaissance books are written to describe the virtues of the perfect courtier. None are 
more famous or influential than that of Castiglione (1478-1529).710 His prescriptions, designed for the 
courts of Italy, are eagerly recited to those presenting in the royal chambers of England and France. 
The free citizen is a creature of the republican state. The republican state also has aristocrats but their 
character is shaped by the fact that they share their higher status with burghers, respected artisans or 
wealthy merchants and are more commercially minded than in courtly culture. While they continue to 
adopt virtues consistent with a warrior class they are democratised by dealing on equal terms with all 
classes and factions. The free citizen is to be found in oligarchic or democratic city-states: pre-
Hellenistic Athens, republican Rome, and Florence before the Medici, where power is diffused and 
contested by many. His manners may not be as exquisite as that of the courtier but he knows how to 
win a crowd by the power of his rhetoric. 
The courtier and the free-citizen lead public lives and their acts are the patriotic or self-interested 
works of private individuals. As a result, the warrior-gentleman is more partisan, more firmly rooted 
to locality, to blood ties and inheritance and although he undoubtedly displays strong elitist 
tendencies he is less concerned for special function and hierarchy. The duties of the scholar-official 
however are defined and circumscribed by office and can be fulfilled mechanically. 
Because the role and material circumstances of the warrior-gentleman are spontaneous and less 
formalised they present different forms of intellectual fraternity and education. Learning is not a full 
time occupation but a leisured activity. For the scholar-official the ancient library, monastery, or the 
medieval university (which retained much of its original character until at least the nineteenth 
century) is the centre of intellectual fraternity; that is to say, a long standing institution which outlive 
the reputations of individuals or groups. For the warrior-gentleman it is the court and the salon, 
which is sponsored by individuals and endure only for as long as the sponsorship permits. Under 
monarchy or tyranny, where the court is the centre of power and therefore of all other aspects of 
existence, money flows in from the tributaries of the nation and pours out again in the form of 
patronage for royal leisure and refinements. In close vicinity to the court, close to the vital money 
source, you find associations of musicians, painters, and poets, and more importantly a culture of 
discrimination among courtiers. The nature of this culture is unplanned and spontaneous; it flourishes 
in fragility, like vegetation around an oasis, on a single source and dies as quickly should it evaporate. 
A wise tyrant needs military, diplomatic, and technological talent to support his survival, but he 
acquires and retains that talent in essentially unbureaucratic ways. In a salon sponsored by an 
aristocrat or wealthy burgher, association is informal. Participants gather occasionally to commune 
over artistic or intellectual matters, but most are otherwise engaged.  
Learned societies, another type of intellectual fraternity arising in early modern Europe, started as 
spontaneous arrangements among gentleman which were later being formalised to meet the demands 
of the modern state. The first societies to be established in 14th century Italy were for the purpose of 
furthering humanist studies by amateurs. By the seventeenth century however they were established 
to pursue knowledge for its own sake, almost as non-clerical monasteries. The first of these later 
societies was founded in Rome in 1601 precisely when the city-state ceased to have any vigour and 
the weight of Spanish, Papal and French domination had stripped it of its independence. In other 
words, gentlemen no longer preoccupied themselves with politics but rather with scholarship. The 
same drift occurred elsewhere for different reasons. Academies established in England and France in 
the same century copied the Italian example and were initially gatherings of learned gentlemen. 
Gradually they were taken over by professional scholars or the state itself. Thus what started as an 
association of warrior-gentlemen became formalised with the changing character of the state to 
become an institution for the scholar-official. 
The indifference of warrior-gentlemen to formal cultural associations also applies to pedagogy and 
higher education. Although the warrior-gentleman is quintessentially public-spirited, it is ironic that 
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public education has seldom formed a part of his interests. Formal schooling is more frequently 
funded by the state in imperial phases of political development, i.e. when the model of the scholar-
official predominates, than in the phases of civic republicanism. Neither Republican Rome at its most 
patriotic nor the pre-Hellenist polis (with the exception of totalitarian oddities like Sparta and Crete) 
nor the Italian city-states ever funded programmes of public education. Tuition was always a private 
arrangement for those who could afford it, namely the elite. 
The pedagogical revolution of the Sophists in fifth century Greece and the practical education they 
promised to aspiring politicians was effected through private tuition. On the other hand public 
schooling did arise in Imperial Rome as it did in Hellenistic Greece,711 and we need only cite the 
millennial pedagogical involvement of the Church, with its far flung imperial bureaucracy, to see how 
firm this pattern appears to be. The church jealously guarded its dominance in public schooling in 
Europe until the territorial states (most of them also bent on imperial expansion) began to compete for 
this role in the nineteenth century. The Protestant churches, which lacked the wealth and 
infrastructure of Rome, began much earlier to cooperate with the secular state in public education, 
and their schools often became integrated into the state's educational system.  
So although the republican state prides itself on the distinction of its leaders and the greater 
involvement of its citizens in public affairs, it is always dominated by an aristocracy who can afford 
to prepare families for public distinction through private tuition, whereas the bureaucratic 
organisation - church or state - with its wider compass of functions has need for a diversity of scribes 
and officials and is often willing to take these from non-elite classes. It is the state that most needs the 
scholar-official, and that is most likely to give life to an intellectual class that entertains ideas of 
reform through education, even because that class owes its existence wholly and solely to some form 
of public education.  
Educational models in Germany 
Models of the warrior-gentleman and scholar-official exist alongside each other in most civilisations 
but at any time one tends to dominate. In Germany the picture is more complicated because in 
classical Weimar for example, aspects of both exist even in the same head, as occurred with Goethe, 
whose status was somewhere between courtier and bureaucrat. But it is the scholar-official who 
dominates German intellectual life, even though some level of court and salon culture persists into the 
nineteenth century. This occurs in spite of increasing republican and patriotic sentiment as German 
becomes a nation equipped with parliamentary institutions. 
The early dominance of the scholar-official is partly because Germany was unable to develop a 
pervasive republican culture until the mid 19th century: something that might have occurred had 
German principalities been more genuinely independent from Medieval times. Unlike the Italian city-
states, which at least threw off the Imperial yoke for a time, they nominally - even mythically - 
continued to accept the universal authority of the Holy Roman Empire until its destruction by 
Napoleon in 1806. Though an effective system of imperial control was never realised, German 
territories affected subordination to the leaders of this cosmopolitan agglomeration.  
The rule by the Catholic Church in many ecclesiastical territories (even after the Reformation) 
provided another source of universalist bureaucratic administration. Complex social stratifications 
persisted in Germany that elsewhere had crumbled and vanished, and a stiffer and more unyielding 
hierarchy allowed great gulfs even among the nobility, with imperial lords (Reichstandschaft), for 
example, having Federal privileges and a territorial nobility (Landstandschaft) possessing merely 
local rights secondary to those of the princes. This did not deny aristocrats and even burghers in the 
free cities like Frankfurt and the Hansa their familiar public roles, but the level and intensity of civic 
life was muted. In Catholic lands nobles gained status and independence within the church 
bureaucracy, but in Protestant principalities secular vocations in administration, military, and 
diplomacy were preferred to the lowly duties performed by the Protestant clergy. By the late 
eighteenth century a large segment of the German aristocracy was able to justify itself as a "useful" 
class working in the public service, something that contemporary French aristocracy could not have 
claimed. The difference was that, while they might have assumed that they were adopting the ancient 
career of the courtier, their sphere of action was more circumscribed than ever, being bound by the 
strictures of bureaucracy. Rather than furnishing a class of courtiers, German aristocracy provided the 
state's principle bureaucrats who, though advantaged by birth and education, still competed for their 
posts with literate burghers. 
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German intellectual fraternity and political reform 
To prepare aristocrats and low born functionaries for public service, an educational system was 
developed to give universities the final and primary responsibility. As normally occurs in scribal 
civilisation, the role of scholar and bureaucrat were interchangeable. From the early eighteenth 
century, universities communed closely with the state, and academics went from teaching 
commitments to advisory positions in a ministry and back. It was rare for a major scholar not to have 
held a significant administrative position in the educational system itself, or the clergy, or in a 
ministry. This occurred so commonly in Germany that the idea of reform through education became 
the central pillar of Aufklärer activism, for the simple fact was that the ruling official class was 
constituted of and had been educated by professional scholars. The Aufklärer intellectual, invariably 
of bourgeois or humbler birth, could take heart in this since, even if he might never rule, his tutelage 
of those who did, brought him into the establishment. The question of political reform based on 
renovation of the educational institutions was a persistent theme of Aufklärers from Thomasius to 
Wolff to Humboldt, each of whom had helped to implement new pedagogical systems. The 
Aufklärers justifiably believed that their teaching defined the social role of the nobility and warned it 
of the need for reform.712 
In Germany, the university, with its close relations to government, was more central to intellectual 
fraternity than the salon. The Aufklärer found there employment, prestige and intellectual kinship. 
That the vast majority of German thinkers, poets and philosophers between 1760 and 1820 taught for 
at least some part of their careers at university attests to its importance. There were far fewer who did 
so in France and England. To say that the university was a nursery for political activism seems a 
banality to those who lived through the 1960‟s, but we must recall that up until the mid-nineteenth 
century, Europe's intellectuals were only occasionally teachers by vocation or had worked in 
universities. In this respect, provincial eighteenth century Germany anticipated a world-wide trend 
and permitted the university to acquire a reputation for nesting schemers and founders of movements. 
The conservative order that descended on the German-speaking world after Napoleon's defeat was 
constantly disquieted by the provocations of the universities. With the enactment of the Carlsbad 
decrees in 1819 they were watched closely and student societies or Burschenschaften that had 
initiated mild nationalist agitations after their foundation in 1817 were banned.713 
The suppression of the universities did not deny them influence on intellectual and political change. 
They remained important because the middle-sized provincial capitals of Germany could not support 
national intellectual institutions like those of cities like London or Paris. In England and France 
scientific and scholarly research was directed by the national academies and learned societies; in 
Germany this function was vested in universities. Although learned societies existed in larger German 
states like Prussia (a Society of Sciences after the English and French models was founded there with 
princely sponsorship in 1700) they did not command the direction of research or educational practice. 
To compensate for the lack of a national dimension in scholarly association, a new type of fraternity, 
the congress or conference, began after 1822 and etched itself into the German intellectual psyche.714 
Conferences for doctors, scientists, classical philologists, schoolmasters, germanists, and orientalists, 
ostensibly served a professional need, since each discipline needed some form of unanimity about its 
agenda. In reality they were also political events where scholars could partake gingerly of the 
forbidden fruit of liberalism and nationalism. After the 1848 revolutions conservative reaction caused 
even congresses to be banned, but it could never prevent universities from harbouring the activists 
behind the liberal and nationalist movements. 
University fraternity also supported the ethos of the wandering scholar. In this, as in all previous 
centuries, the vocation supports a nomadic lifestyle. In eighteenth century Germany, scholars 
travelled widely in search of employment. Peregrinations from one principality to another accustomed 
them to local differences and bulwarked cosmopolitan ideals. In the next century it had the opposite 
affect. Service in various states now encouraged sympathy for German nationhood, and made 
travelling scholars the bearers of the national idea, as they chose to proclaim what the German 
peoples had in common, rather than their differences. For this reason, nationalism in Germany was a 
scholarly movement long before it ever became a popular one. 
In 18th century Germany the perception that the character and capacities of the nation could be shaped 
by interventions in the classroom, did not just occur to scholars. Even princes and their advisers were 
aware of the benefits and dangers that lurked there. State-sponsored actions to reform or curb teaching 
institutions at every level became commonplace by the end of the century and something that secular 
government had traditionally neglected now became an instrument of government. The notion of 
spiritual reform through education was now state policy. In Prussia a Secondary School Board, 
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subordinate to the Ministery of Finance, was created in 1787, enabling the state to wrest control of 
secondary education from the church. The University of Berlin, founded in 1810, became the first 
completely secular institution of tertiary education in Europe.715 Harnessing education to further 
national interest took another forward step after Prussia's defeat by Napoleon at Jena. 
Even the mediocre Frederick William III understood this much. He endorsed a proposal of professors 
seeking to replace the University of Halle that had been closed by Napoleon in 1806: "That is right! 
That is fine! The state must replace what it has lost in physical powers by intellectual ones."716 The 
call for educational reform was needed to equip a new generation of Prussians with technical and 
intellectual skills to advance the nation materially and to regenerate it morally. 
Fichte's patriotic exhortations pushed this second point interminably, though he went further than 
most contemporaries, even the Aufklärers, were prepared to go, by demanding comprehensive public 
education: "Education...", he declared, "has been brought to bear hitherto only on the very small 
minority of classes which are for this reason called educated, whereas the great majority on whom in 
very truth the commonwealth rests, the people, have been almost entirely neglected by this system and 
abandoned to blind chance. By means of education we want to mould the Germans into a corporate 
body, which shall be stimulated and animated in all its individual members by the same interest.”717 
Prussia gave particular priority to reforming its educational system and von Humboldt was assigned 
the task of implementing it. It was ironic that this arch-cosmopolitan Aufklärer should have been 
responsible for introducing an educational system, afterwards a model to Europe, designed to bulwark 
state corporatism. The fact that the doctrine of spiritual reform through education now existed as 
living practice made it eternally second nature to the German intelligentsia. 
German scholars, seeing the state's growing investment in education, and more than ordinary 
influence on the political culture of universities, believed that they were the authentic rulers of the 
nation. German politics is stamped and undersigned by the scholar's conviction of superiority, for by 
virtue of his prowess in learning he deems himself master of the plebiate, above whom he has risen, 
and also the aristocracy whose inherited privileges he begrudges. Being the teacher of those who rule, 
he imagines that the task of ruling is really no different to the process of teaching and, having 
instructed the leaders, assumes that he too has the right to govern. 
In Germany the ancient pretension of intellectuals embodied in Plato's philosopher-king, finds a new 
innocence as the scholar dreams of a new Republic where he rules over all. None more qualified than 
the low-born, but ambitious Fichte could demand, beguilingly, "the necessary creation of the 
Republic of Scholars who, from among themselves, are to elect the sovereign ruler." Not halting at 
this frank espousal of scribal will to power he identifies explicitly the practice of educating with that 
of governing: "He [the sovereign ruler] will always be an elderly man but he has been thinking about 
the state during the whole of his life, about its idea and its immediate relations in which this idea is 
realised. He knows the state and the things which must be done next. The senior government servants, 
the ministers, must also come from this highest sphere of intelligence. Planned education of the 
people and planned government are one and the same thing; legislation pronounces in accordance 
with those things to which the scholars educated the legislators. It also prepares a new education. 
They have already beforehand proved themselves the best educators of the people, and this gives them 
the right and the claim to govern the people as well. Therefore, the supreme ruler, too, can come only 
from this council of the highest educators of the people: they themselves have to elect him."718 
What Fichte expressed openly, was the tacit assumption of Germany's scholars before and after, 
irrespective of their party or creed. But we should not exaggerate its uniqueness. The German 
philosopher simply suggests a national variation of the pan-European emergence of technocracy. A 
close contemporary in France, the socialist Saint-Simon for example, encourages a different style of 
technocrat by proposing a new society ruled by scientists and industrialists rather than university 
professors. Fichte's is still the technocracy of the Schoolman, reeking of old books, but the 
Frenchman's opens doors to the new and pungent odours of the laboratory. 
The dominance of the scholar-official in Germany was balanced by the continuing vitality of salon 
culture in the 18th and even 19th centuries. It is perhaps ironic that in these highly bureaucratic states, 
private and courtly patronage should endure precisely when it had begun to diminish in England and 
France. The reason: in Germany there was not one large court, but hundreds, and they were not to 
relinquish hold of public finances to parliaments until the mid-19th century; the whim of a prince 
could always be counted on to secure finance for artistic or scholarly endeavours. A whim of the 
young prince of Weimar, Karl August, brought Goethe - then the spoiled son of a wealthy burgher 
family in the free city of Frankfurt, and renowned for nothing more than his verse - to be made 
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finally, Minister of State: a more than favourable development in this poet's fortunate life.719 
Private salons were also important, and were sponsored by higher nobility and wealthy burghers, the 
latter not infrequently Jewish. In Berlin the salons of emancipated Jewish hostesses are no less 
supportive of Aufklärers than the court of Frederick himself. As expected, courtly culture promotes 
the ethos of the warrior-gentleman but borrows heavily on forms created by the French. It is the fate 
of this ethos in Germany that it is rarely expressed in native accents. If not the French, then eyes 
turned yearningly to the model of the Greek gentleman, the kalos kai agathos, to guide educational 
practice. Though pervasive, its existence in Germany seems artificial or forced: as an ideal 
superimposed on reality, rather than springing naturally and effortlessly from a material foundation. 
The nexus of the court with officialdom and the university was perhaps too tight and the gentleman 
could not avoid eating at the same table as the scholar. 
The fact that Aufklärers of humble birth accepted the model of the warrior-gentleman in spite of its 
unnatural relation to their circumstances was reflected in the forms of pedagogy they commended. 
They urged for the return to the classical Hellenic education rather than specialised vocational 
knowledge. Even the bureaucrats resisted simply technocratic training. Herder, who had been 
appointed General Superintendent in Weimar, which made him head of Protestant clergy in the state 
and therefore responsible for schools, pointed to this in his School Addresses. “We are men before we 
become members of a particular profession", he warned, "and woe betide us if we do not remain men 
exercising this calling... It is not for his precious studies that a man should educate himself, but for 
life, for the use and application of his knowledge in all human situations and callings. What I learned 
as a theologian I try more and more to forget, and my office compels me to do so. Just because of that 
I am becoming a better tested man and more useful citizen."720 
Although he proclaimed a pedagogy for doers and for citizens abounding in civic virtue, Herder 
actually favoured one more suitable for receptive and observant scholars and enlightened officials. 
The same affect can be seen in the reform of the Prussian educational system initiated by Von 
Humboldt, who explicitly made paideia the goal of education so as to raise the level of nobility and 
intelligence of those working for the state. Focusing on secondary and higher education, his reforms 
revitalised the teaching of ancient languages, which despite their foundation in Medieval legal 
practice and theology, were recast as a humanistic study of ancient republican virtue. The teaching of 
Greek, which had not been widespread, was a priority. In the same Helenophilic spirit secondary level 
academic schools, considered a preparatory stage for further university studies, were renamed 
Gymnasia, and at the universities, whose principle purpose was to prepare students to join the 
bureaucratic elite, vocational training was actively scorned. Alongside the teaching of civic virtue, a 
larger component of mathematics was introduced at the secondary levels to cultivate in students a 
faculty for Wissenschaft, or detached, objective analysis. This same approach was continued and 
deepened in the university curricula, which suggest the idea of bureaucracy as a "value-free" 
instrument of government. 
At bottom these reforms encouraged bourgeois children to help build and remodel the state. A 
pedagogy more appropriate to the warrior-gentleman was pasted over the reality of a growing 
technocracy. As the century bore on, this technocracy served not just German government but also 
German business. The expansion of the commercial classes in power and numbers, with their need of 
specialist and technical vocations eroded the role of the classical education. Those teaching and 
learning paideia became an embattled enclave, resenting the lack of piety or respect which the new 
classes conferred on them and resented even their clumsy attempts to ape the forms of the classical 
education. Humanistic university departments such as philology and philosophy (in which the young 
Nietzsche was to work) had the strongest ethical investment in the pedagogy of paideia, and were the 
most embattled, for they saw themselves losing their role as instructors of the elite. In these 
departments ran the vehement belief that the nation's virtues were imperilled and that reform could 
only be guided by a return to classical education. It was no accident that the concerns and methods of 
this enclave were the substance of Nietzsche's life and work. 
Nietzsche's embrace of the scholarly vocation 
Nietzsche's politics of cultivation conforms completely with the type of German education we have 
described. He too superimposes the virtue of the warrior-gentleman over the ethos of the scholar-
official. His own life is an uneasy embodiment of both tendencies, but shows an emphatic drift from 
the sentiments of the scholar in his youth, to those of the gentleman in the later work.  
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The dominance of scholarly prejudices during his youth is not surprising, since despite his abiding 
interest in art, he remained as an inartistic scholar and educator until thirty-five years of age. Studying 
philology firstly at the University of Bonn and then Leipzig, and finally taking a professorship in this 
discipline at Basel in 1869 when he was twenty-four, he consciously and with deepest regret bade 
farewell to the possibility of an artist's life, perhaps suspecting that he might have lacked the 
necessary gifts for it. The decision to become a scholar was not an idle one and it did bear on his 
desire to engage in a politics of cultivation.  
At first sight there is a preponderance of negative reasons over positive ones to draw him to this 
vocation. He found the idea of having to choose a career detestable, the more so as many possibilities 
were open to him, given that his interests were numerous and diffuse. It pained him to think of 
relinquishing many of them to follow a single path to the vita practica. As he notes in a letter to his 
mother while still at Pforta: "The decision as to what subject I shall specialise in will not come of its 
own accord... I happen to be in a position of possessing a whole host of interests connected with the 
most different branches of learning, and though the general gratification of these interests may make 
a learned man of me, they will scarcely convert me into a creature with a vocation. The fact therefore, 
that I must destroy some of these interests is perfectly clear to me... but which of them will be so 
unfortunate as to be cast overboard? Perhaps just the children of my heart."721 
It was easy enough to omit what repelled him. It was easy to shun the path to the seminary that many 
of his immediate ancestors had trodden. When he began to study theology at the University of Bonn it 
was no more than obligation to a family tradition and the wishes of his mother, since his religious 
scepticism was already clear. It was also easy to refuse the vocations of bureaucrat, businessman and 
all other pursuits that were not sufficiently "cultivated", but from there the going was harder.  
In thrall to the ideal of paideia, he finds it difficult to consider a vocation like scholarship, which 
demands one-sidedness in the domain of knowledge, and compromises harmonic development of 
body and intellect, something he imagines the Greeks mastered consummately. “The Greeks were no 
scholars," he tells Von Gersdorff in April 1867, "but neither were they brainless athletes... 
Sophocles... distinguished as he was in the domain of the spirit, was yet able to dance with grace and 
understood the art of playing at ball"722 - a marked contrast he feels, with the physical clumsiness of 
the modern scholar. However, he realises that choices he has already made have diminished his 
chances in other careers. In May 1868, he writes resignedly to his friend Rohde: "Here is no room for 
anxious self-examination: we simply must [become scholars], because we have before us no more 
suitable career, because we have closed the way for ourselves to other more useful positions..."723 
If in the end his scholarly career is the result of eliminating other possibilities rather than following a 
strong urge, he believes that it does offer some consolations. Despite life-long diatribes against 
scholars he does allow a certain nobility in the vocation, in its rigour, in disciplined honesty that does 
not shrink from unpalatable truths. Though the unfortunate fate for every scholar is to specialise, he 
accepts this as a needed check on his unbridled Faustian thirst for knowledge.  
Realising he cannot accomplish any sound or lasting achievement unless he narrows his focus, he sees 
in scholarly discipline a path to effectiveness. A discipline, any discipline, would serve to sharpen his 
wit and prevent him dissipating his energies. The opportunity for personal education that academic 
life permitted would also benefit in the longer term. If the younger Nietzsche suspects that he might 
leave the university eventually, it is still a place where he is free to cultivate himself, so long as the 
drudgery could be endured. He listed a number of these practical benefits in the same letter to Rohde 
of May 1868, observing that: "We both approach this academic future without any exaggerated 
hopes. Still I think it possible that in the position of a professor one may acquire and maintain, firstly, 
adequate leisure for one's own studies, secondly a useful sphere of influence, finally a situation fairly 
independent both politically and socially."724 
Obviously just any scholarly discipline would not suffice, and it was inevitable that he elect to study 
classical philology. This among a narrow range of possibilities, given the explosion of 
departmentation whose fragments confront us today had then only just ignited. While at Bonn, where 
he made his choice, the only serious competitor to philology was philosophy, as he had for a time 
considered taking subjects in this area. The interest in philology was raised in the first instance by his 
ability in Greek and Latin studies at the Gymnasium and it was natural to continue in an area where 
talent was manifest rather than in one where it wasn't (he had, for example, failed mathematics and 
was hardly inclined to undertake a mathematically based discipline).  
The interest in the culture and history of antiquity reaches back to childhood. Lastly, most 
importantly, his concern for the Ideal of Cultivation almost commands that he obtain closer 
acquaintance with classical antiquity, and this could not be better obtained than through the science of 
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philology. In this aim he was fortunate in his teacher, Ritschl, whom he followed to Leipzig from 
Bonn and who was renowned for the methodical approach he brought to the study of texts. The 
intellectual rigour he desperately sought could thus combine with his deepest aims. There is 
something uncannily appropriate about it in view of his earnest attachment to the Ideal of Cultivation. 
Philology, the study and interpretation of texts, is perhaps the most ancient form of learning of the 
vocational scholar. From its extensive practice in Hellenistic civilisation, it became the queen bee of 
western humanism, laying the eggs from which all other learning has since hatched. The Italian 
humanists were nothing else if they were not first philologists, gathering, preserving and interpreting 
the remaining fragments of ancient books. And if they had not been, the ground for the growth of 
modern science would not have been prepared. In this way the young Nietzsche was transported to 
the world and mores of classicism, not only by his interests but by his vocation, the overlay of modern 
scientific interpretive methods notwithstanding. It added to an already strong disposition toward 
monastic devotion and piety in the tasks of culture. 
By dedicating himself to scholarship and excelling in philological research, producing work on 
Theognis (whom he became interested in while still at school) and the sources of Diogenes Laertius, 
he merited election to a professorship at Basel University. Here he took the task of teaching philology 
most seriously. Or rather he wished to teach something larger through the vehicle of philology. 
The recovery and elucidation texts would mean nothing if it were not more deeply rooted in the 
greater goal of reforming the spirit of his students, making them apostles of a higher culture. It was 
with this pious intention that he operated even as a student. On nearing the completion of his studies 
at Leipzig in 1869 and preparing to enter into the practice of his vocation, he expresses hope in a 
letter his friend Von Gersdorff that he wouldn't become a blind specialist."Philosophical seriousness 
is already too deeply rooted in me," he claims, referring to both his attachment to Schopenhauer and 
his desire to advance the cause of culture; he would prefer to "communicate to my pupils that 
Schopenhauerian earnestness that is stamped on the brow of the sublime man… I should like to be 
more than a mere trainer of efficient philologists. The present generation of teachers, the care of the 
coming generation - all this is in my mind."725 
As teacher, he intends to wear the mantle of cultural leader, to be supremely positioned to supervise 
and reform the spirit of the nation through its young. He therefore awaits time “when serious men, 
working together in the service of a completely rejuvenated and purified culture, may again become 
the directors of everyday instruction, calculated to promote that culture..."726 
Nietzsche's scholarly activism 
In this early period he accepts without question the assumptions of the Aufklärers that education can 
reform German culture. Even one institution would be enough to effect what is needed. In a letter of 
January 1872 to Rohde, he confides that he is seeking to make a public gesture in support of this 
conviction. "Let me tell you a great secret", he whispers, “and begging you to keep it to yourself, that 
among other things I am preparing a Promemoria about the University of Strasburg in the form of an 
interpellation for the Reichstag, to be delivered to Bismark. In it I wish to show how shamefully a 
great opportunity was lost of making a truly German Educational Institute for the regeneration of the 
German spirit and for the total extermination of what has hitherto been called 'culture'."727 
It is not apparent that the gesture was made, but the confession indicates the character of his activism. 
Regenerating culture through education would involve reworking the aims of educational institutions 
to ensure that a select few, those capable of genius or at least of recognising it, receive correct 
instruction. Nietzsche's educational institutions would be "for teaching culture", as opposed to 
"teaching how to succeed in life".728 And as always, he sees the principle of pyramid at work: the 
broad base of those labouring in these institutions merely support the narrow pinnacle of the cultured 
few. The small number of really cultured people "would not be possible if a prodigious multitude, 
from reasons opposed to their nature and only led on by an alluring delusion, did not devote 
themselves to education..." There is, he says, a "ridiculous disproportion between the number of 
really cultured people and the enormous magnitude of the educational apparatus."729 
Thus far his youthful responses to education follow the habits of several generations of German 
intellectuals. With regard to his feelings concerning intellectual fraternity, we should observe that 
Nietzsche craved for could never adequately satisfy intellectual companionship other than for brief 
periods with friends like Rohde, Wagner and Lou Salomé His insistent hope was to discover like-
minded friends and almost all of his books can be seen as attempts to secure this kind of kinship.  
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This is evident at all periods of his life. In sketches of 1873 of what were to become his Untimely 
Meditations, he plans that the essays will represent an attempt “at a construction, at historical 
classification, at public classification," and lastly "at [attracting] friends."730 He pushes a similar line 
much later in Ecce Homo where he states overtly that all his writings after Beyond Good and Evil had 
been "fishhooks", to snare the like-minded.731 There are two main reasons that Nietzsche had 
difficulties in fulfilling these desires: his evangelical urge to multiply himself by converting other 
intellects (he sought friends he could dominate, but few of worthy intellectual stature wanted to 
accommodate him) and a somewhat prissy sociability kept him from wider circulation. He presented 
himself as one who could don masks in society, but possessed no Alciabidian facility to acquit 
himself in any milieu, particularly when he considered it "coarse" and "uncultured". 
Unable as a child, to endure the "rougher" municipal school in Naumberg, he transferred to the more 
select Cathedral Grammar school. Nevertheless, attempts at conviviality with "rougher" members of 
his class proved unsuccessful. As a student in Bonn, in an effort to throw himself into what he called 
the muddy waters of life, he joined the Franconia Burschenschaft (student society) but retreated from 
the mandatory beering and whoring. He later returned his sash to the society with a priggishly worded 
note of resignation. The modern Burschenschaft, he imagined, had compromised the lofty ideals of 
their original founders, the students of the Wars of Liberation. 
Having tastes altogether spiritual he required intimate surroundings and friends who valued his 
cultural prowess. The university environment might have provided this, and it did to a greater extent 
at the University of Leipzig, where he discovered more congenial companions, but it wasn‟t enough. 
The scholars were still not scholarly enough; they had narrow interests and could not communicate 
concerns for general culture. He complained that the university still did not provide the freedom for a 
genuinely radical existence that could be completely devoted to the cause of culture.  
Unable to discover institutions appropriate to his needs he tried to found his own: the first during his 
boyhood in Naumberg when, with a small of group of friends, he formed a cultural society called New 
Germania. The society's meetings, it appears, were conducted with cultish ritual and solemnity. 
Nietzsche later indicates the nature of fraternity in a semi-autobiographical segment of the lectures On 
the Future of our Educational Institutions. Referring to it in the subjunctive he describes it as: "a kind 
of small club which would consist of ourselves and a few friends, and the object of which would be to 
provide us with a stable and binding organisation directing and adding interest to our creative 
impulses in art and literature; or, to put it more plainly: each of us would be pledged to present an 
original piece of work to the club once a month, - either a poem, a treatise, an architectural design, 
or a musical composition, upon which each of the others, in a friendly spirit would have to pass free 
and unrestrained criticism."732 
The happy memory of New Germania haunts him as he discusses with Leipzig friends plans to found 
a new monastic institution dedicated wholly to the contemplation of culture."We shall sooner or later 
cast off this yoke..." he affirms to Rohde in December 1870, in reference to their irritation with 
academic drudgery, "and we shall form a new Greek Academy - Romundt will certainly join us in 
that." Apparently inspired by the grandeur of Wagner's plans to establish an artistic capital in 
Bayreuth he asks whether Rohde might not be aware of it, imagining perhaps that this new Academy 
might supplement and parallel in scholarship Wagner's efforts in music-theatre. "We shall then be our 
own mutual teachers" he continues, "and our books will only be so much bait wherewith to lure 
others to our monistic and artistic association. Our lives, our work, and our enjoyment will then be 
for one another; possibly this is the only way in which we can work for the world as a whole."733 
To prove his seriousness he informs Rohde that he would limit his expenditures, try his luck in 
lotteries and if he were to write books, demand the highest possible fees: "In short we shall make use 
of every legitimate means in order to establish our monastery upon a secure material basis... If only 
this plan would strike you as being at least worthy of consideration!"  
Unsurprisingly the idea went no further. Yet it shows how deeply his early ideas of cultural reform 
depended on a sense of scholastic intellectual fraternity. Accordingly we should not neglect to 
mention his one success in founding a cultural organisation. While at Leipzig, as he was later to boast 
to Georg Brandes734, he did play a role in founding the Philological Society of Leipzig. This society 
continued to exist for many years after his departure from the city, but of course was a specialist 
institution and not the monastery he devoutly longed for. 
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Nietzsche's pedagogical ideas 
With his youth so closely bound up with goals of learning and teaching, it was not incidental that 
almost all of the works of this period address some aspect of educational practice. Discounting the 
The Birth of Tragedy, itself a work of scholarship, the public lectures delivered in Basel On the 
Future of our Educational Institutions, the essays on The Use and Abuse of History, David Strauss, 
the Writer and Confessor, and Schopenhauer as Educator, as well as a large number of unpublished 
philological fragments, all concentrate in some way on the effects of pedagogy.  
Of these it is the lectures On the Future of our Educational Institutions, delivered in 1872, that deal 
specifically with the question of reform through education. In these talks what Nietzsche refers to as 
German educational institutions are fairly explicitly the Gymnasien, (what in most English 
translations are called "public schools" or "grammar schools") and universities, the academic stream 
of German education whose purpose was to develop the nation's political and intellectual elite. It was 
with this stream that he had been familiar since boyhood, and it was natural for him not to overlook 
the purely technical stream of German secondary schooling: the realschulen, the trade schools run 
separately to the Gymnasien which had no pretensions to higher learning other than to equip children 
with specific technical skills. It was impossible at the time for a student of the Realschule to attend 
University, so all references to "public education" apply to higher education only, and not to 
elementary schooling or technical training. 
The talks he presented in Basel were fundamentally a conservative attack on the educational 
institutions of his homeland, and oppose certain educational innovations as "distortions and 
aberrations of the originally sublime tendencies given to them at their foundation"735 which he 
attributes to Friedrich August Wolff736. These consisted in the introduction into secondary schooling 
of the pedagogy of classical education, paideia, and it is explicitly the undermining of this that he 
attacks. The unwanted novelties stem from two seemingly antagonistic forces: "a striving to achieve 
the greatest possible extension of education on the one hand, and a tendency to weaken it on the 
other." The first-named is an attempt to spread learning among the "greatest possible number of 
people", the second would "compel education to renounce its highest and most independent claims in 
order to subordinate itself to the service of the State."737 
Nietzsche sees the spreading of education to the masses as a democratic attack on the aristocratic 
foundation on high culture. He lists three main reasons for its current expansion: the greedy lust for 
gain and property, the memory of religious persecution, and the prudent egoism of the state. Greed is 
the main culprit since the growing economy sees education as useful for advancing wealth. In service 
to this economy education no longer addresses the eternal demand of culture, but the ephemeral need 
to make a student up-to-date and develop him “so that his particular degree of knowledge and 
science may yield him the greatest possible amount of happiness and pecuniary gain."738 In the 
second case, the rising liberal intelligentsia sees that the best means to undermine the power of 
religion is to promote secular education. Recall that this perception is made during the struggle 
between Bismark and the Catholic Church, the Kulturkampf, which had broken out in Germany the 
year before.  
The state supports itself by training officers to fill its bureaucracy and military services. Spreading the 
base of higher education causes its enfeeblement by dilution. Everywhere there is a haste to prepare 
students for life, when the task of teaching for culture requires time and patience. The effect of 
popularising higher education has been to turn what were institutions for culture into institutions for 
knowledge, and the scholar who works in them, who used to be considered cultured, is now nothing 
more than a narrow specialist.739 Worse than that, the present institutions have slipped a further step 
down the hierarchy. They have allowed the journalist to supplant even the scholar. With the 
fragmentation of knowledge as the fundamental character of contemporary civilisation, the task of 
cementing the divisions between specialities has actually been abandoned by the scholar and left to 
the journalist, who accomplishes this in the most superficial way. The journalist, the servant of the 
moment, the master of ephemeral knowledge, is the now the real educator of modern Germany and 
through newspapers distracts attention from those who should be the rightful teachers of the nation, 
those who are timeless, the geniuses of culture. 
The onslaught on the old aristocratic pedagogy can only be contained if the number of higher 
educational institutions are restricted, and the numbers of teachers working in them reduced. It is only 
by "limiting and concentrating education" that culture can be conserved.740 
Independence of these institutions from the state must be assured, but most importantly, pedagogical 
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reform must occur in the Gymnasien where the earliest training for culture takes place. Pedagogy 
should reflect the aims of culture, which is not to merely acquire knowledge or develop your 
"individuality", but to form yourself and your surroundings from your deepest nature. Using 
contemporary pedagogical jargon, he sees a drift from purely formal education (Formelle Bildung), 
whose object is to develop mental faculties, to one in which material education (Materielle Bildung) 
the teaching of facts, has primacy. The real focus of classical education however, and indeed the 
secret of imparting form, lies in severe and disciplined training in the use of the mother-tongue: 
“Every so-called classical education can have but one natural starting point - an artistic, earnest and 
exact familiarity with the mother-tongue: this, together with the secret of form, however, one can 
seldom attain to one's own accord, almost everybody requires those great leaders and tutors and must 
place himself in their hands. There is however no such thing as a classical education that could grow 
without this inferred love of form."741 
Those who do not take their mother tongue seriously do not "possess even the germ of a higher 
culture."742 The eventual independence and self-assurance of the pupil can only be attained by 
rigorous drill in writing and speaking German. Discipline in this early stage will render the pupil's 
intellect supple and vigorous when the fetters are finally removed. Thinking, the careful use of 
language, as he states elsewhere, "has to be learned in the way dancing has to be learned..."743 Yet 
the formal training of the mother tongue is being supplanted by an historicist-scholastic method, and 
German is being taught as an arid arrangement of facts: an easier task for the teacher that relies on 
nothing but memory and an altogether lower grade of ability. Likewise students are encouraged to 
seek easy individuality when they are still too immature to rightfully hold opinions. Modern teachers 
encourage independence of thought in those too young to consider the most important questions, 
whereas the main aim of education should "be the suppression of all ridiculous claims to independent 
judgement, and the inculcation upon young men of obeisance to the sceptre of genius.”744 
He proposes somewhat tautologically that "a thorough reformation and purification of the public 
school can only be the outcome of a profound and powerful reformation and purification of the 
German spirit."745 Reforming the German spirit requires reforming of educational institutions. The 
genius is both the director and goal of education and Nietzsche‟s pedagogy is no more than tutelage in 
obedience to the precepts of geniuses. Institutions can‟t be assured of teaching these precepts unless 
the right type of educators work in them and right now such men do not seem to exist. In other 
respects most of this critique of modern education expresses the same anxieties that oppressed 
German scholars in the 1830's and 1840's. They had already ventured Jeremiads against the 
cheapening of education through the materialism of the rising bourgeois class or the needs of the 
machine state.746 Nor does Nietzsche avoid paradoxically overlaying a classical education, an 
aristocratic conception of virtue, on the reality of the scholar-official. 
Most leading Aufklärers wanted classical education to be offered only to a small elite. Not even 
Herder wanted more than that. Offering classical education to the greatest number would seem to be 
in the interests of the scholar, but there are other reasons why he opposed it. Possibly he saw he could 
gain greater leverage by concentrating this education in the minds of a powerful few than dispersing it 
among the many. And while professedly an aristocratic privilege; in the hands of the scholar it 
became a meritocratic accomplishment. Nietzsche's genius is not an aristocrat of the blood but of the 
spirit. Restricting access to classical education is not promoting the privilege of inheritance but 
provides a foundation for meritocracy by demanding recognition of, respect for and obedience to 
those who by force of talent scale the hierarchy of culture. In this his prejudices are inescapably 
bourgeois. 
How Nietzsche becomes a gentleman 
In later life Nietzsche's references to spiritual reform through educational institutions diminish. It is 
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not that he now subsequently questioned its significance as an agent of change, as he had in the case 
of art, merely that other agents of spiritual change, such as morality, command close attention. His 
complaints about modern education and his recommendations for pedagogical practice don't change at 
all, only that ideas that required five lectures to divulge now can be expressed in a single epigram.  
This, from the Twilight of the Idols summarises the fundamental ideas of his youthful lectures: "The 
essential thing has gone out of the entire system of higher education in Germany: the end, as well as 
the means to that end. That education, culture, itself is the end - and not "the Reich" - that educators 
are required for the attainment this end - and not grammar-school teachers and university scholars - 
that too has been forgotten....There is a need for educators who are themselves educated; superior, 
noble spirits, who prove themselves every moment by what they say and by what they do not say: 
cultures grown ripe and sweet - and not the learned boors which grammar school and university offer 
youth today as "higher nurses". Educators, the first prerequisite of education, are lacking... hence the 
decline of German culture. What the "higher schools" of Germany in fact achieve is a brutal 
breaking-in with the aim of making, in the least possible time, numberless young men fit to be 
utilised... in the state service. "Higher education" and numberless - that is a contradiction to start 
with. all higher education belongs to the exceptions alone: one must be privileged to have a right to 
so high a privilege. Great and fine things can never be common property: pulchrum est paucorum 
hominum. What is the cause of the decline of German culture? That "higher education" is no longer a 
privilege - the democratisation of "culture" made universal and common. . . .No one is any longer 
free in present-day Germany to give his children a noble education: our "higher" schools are one and 
all adjusted - as regards their teachers, their curricula and their instructional aims - to the most 
dubious mediocrity... Our overcrowded grammar schools, our overloaded, stupefied grammar-school 
teachers, are a scandal: one may perhaps have motives for defending this state of things, as the 
professors of Heidelberg recently did - there are no grounds for doing so... "747 
If his views concerning education did not change in later life, his youthful belief that his personal role 
as a scholar and educator was significant and counted for something did. His fundamental 
dissatisfaction with his vocation, evident from the first, became more insistent with time. In letters to 
friends like Von Gersdorff and Rohde he complains again and again of the tedium of scholarship and 
teaching, of the lack of academic freedom748 and, in later life, looks back with revulsion on the days 
spent thumbing through books.  
His intolerance of the minutiae of philological research is evident in his correspondence, and in the 
content of published work such as The Birth of Tragedy which, brimming and overflowing with ideas, 
political concerns, propaganda, inflated style, concedes - and indeed, in the most contemptuous 
fashion - a bare minimum to the rituals of scholarship. It is not without reason that he afterwards 
confessed that he should have written the book as poetry. As it turned out, most who praised it when 
it was published were not philologists, while most who abhorred it were.  
Palpable damage was done to his career by its appearance, since it prompted a virulent and not 
entirely unjustified attack by Wilamowitz-Moellendorff, still a young student himself but later to 
become one of the century's most esteemed philologists. As a result a number of potential students 
were lost to Nietzsche at Basel in the shorter term, as well as prestige. Apart from The Birth of 
Tragedy, important a work though it is, he never again published another major philological study and 
his scholarly career, which began so promisingly, cannot be counted an unqualified success.  
His final, irreconcilable divorce from scholarship occurred with his retirement from his teaching post 
at Basel in 1879, ostensibly for reasons of illness - though it gave him leisure to write without 
tiresome distraction - and he began a new life of seasonal wanderings in Switzerland, Italy, and 
Provence, subsisting comfortably enough on a pension bequeathed him by the university. No longer 
constrained by the classroom and the book, his scholarly dispositions begin to crack and peel away. 
He feels that he has stepped completely outside his former vocation and can look upon it as a mere 
phase of his life, even a necessary stage in his development rather than a goal gone wrong.749 And 
though old habits persist everything he writes now consciously, even self-consciously, displays the 
spirit of that other kind of being, the gentleman. 
What is it that suggests this change of disposition? Firstly there is the reform of his literary style. His 
early writings, though overtly literary, were not inconsistent with his vocation. But they seem 
ponderous when compared with his new books of epigrams that appear just as his departure from 
academic life seems imminent. Part I of Human all too Human, the first book written in the new style, 
was composed while on a year's leave from teaching duties in 1876. 
The change of style not only implies a new way of thinking but a new way of living. It presages a 
severance with scholarship, denying at minimum that he is a scholar in mind if not in body. The 
epigram is least of all the literary vehicle of the scholar and quintessentially that of a gentleman of the 
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ancien régime. It is the distilment of worldly wisdom, written by men better acquainted with life than 
with books. His taste, he claims, is no longer German, but wholly in sympathy with the spirit of the 
ancien régime, with Corneille, Racine, and Moliere, with Descartes, with the epigrammists 
Montaigne and La Rochefoucald, and with Voltaire, to whose memory he dedicated the first edition 
of Human all too Human. None of them were scholars; none of them contained their lives within the 
walls of an academy. The location of their sociability was the salon, the court, or the 
battlefield."Voltaire", he muses in Ecce Homo, "was above all, in contrast to all who wrote after him, 
a granseigneur of the spirit - like me."750 
His new way of thinking, he claims, has nothing of the shuffling, plodding character of the scholar; 
intellectually it is at home with the physical discipline of the French nobleman schooled by his 
dancing master. His thoughts have "light feet"; they dance, for "dancing in any form cannot be 
divorced from a noble education."751 In Ecce Homo he goes so far as to describe Beyond Good and 
Evil as a "school for the gentilhomme, taking this concept in a more spiritual and radical sense than 
has ever been done."752 Again the use of the French word "gentilhomme" explicitly relates his thought 
the ancien régime, and to a type of aristocracy that Germany never possessed. Nietzsche a 
grandseigneur, a gentilhomme, a nobleman; his identification with the model of the warrior-
gentleman may be explicit, but there is more. Listen carefully to the words "more spiritual and 
radical". Is this the utterance of a real aristocrat, one of flesh, blood and property or merely the 
prejudice of a bourgeois lad, meditating on the quality of his virtue and talent as opposed to the 
inheritance he does not possess? 
But this opera buffa plays on. His contempt for the idea of a vocation is singular. A gentleman of 
course does not have one; “a higher kind of human being... doesn't think much of "callings".753 A 
gentleman is not defined by what he is, not by what function he fills in life. Likewise his reading 
becomes studiously unscholarly. At university it had never been voluminous, and strayed wherever 
possible from his speciality. Now an eager dilettante, he reads widely for his cultivation, particularly 
in the physical sciences. Physical impediments taken into account, he elects to read fewer books in 
later life, and boasts of this in his own. Another indication of the new spirit is evident in his 
affectation of military pride, with his reverence for his training as an artilleryman, the discipline and 
simplicity of his regimen, and the increasing pugnacity of his style. Writing, he imagines as a form of 
duelling, as he clashes quills with the likes of Wagner, and the spokesmen of "modern ideas". 
His spurning of the institution, university, monastery, or otherwise, as a foundation of intellectual 
fraternity is fundamental to the new mood. It is in the credo of the free-spirit, absolved of all ties and 
formal associations. Now he reminds the reader that he belongs to a tribe who is „homeless‟ and 
contrivedly so, for “we are too openminded... we far prefer to live on mountains, apart, 
'untimely'.”754 
The new Nietzsche is self-sufficient, able to wait for a time when he will be understood. He cultivates 
distance and reserve, yet grows bitter at his isolation, blaming this on German friends. Complaints 
about loneliness and isolation, expressed regularly enough in his youth and which might have merited 
the dignity of silence, now pour out in books and in letters to friends and even to comparative 
strangers. He writes to friends that he has no friends, no recognition, yet a voluminous 
correspondence with some of the most distinguished intellectuals of Europe, increasing in the later 
stages of his sanity - with Brandes, and Strindberg joining the fold - diminish this claim. In Peter Gast 
too, he possesses an indefatigable disciple who sacrifices time and energy to the master's needs.755 It 
is clear that he wanted to be thought a hermit, as someone independent and aloof from institutions, 
rather than to really be one,  
If he chooses to embody and promote the model of the gentleman in opposition to that of the scholar, 
and prefers not to participate in educational institutions, he never abandons the idea of reform through 
education. The change in his disposition is marked by new found certainty about his real role in life 
and culture, the self-realisation of which provides him the deepest satisfaction, for it was not simply 
as a gentleman that he wants to exist but as an educator of special calibre: who stands far above the 
scholar, a master, a "great educator", in short, a philosopher. It is therefore Nietzsche's participation 
as a philosopher in the politics of cultivation that we now consider. 
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19 - Philosophy and Reform 
Philosophical Titanism 
The "scholar and scientist...are fundamentally different from the philosopher"756 who, according to 
Nietzsche is really:757 a reformer who stands far above others in spiritual order of rank. As an 
educator of educators, he does not work within institutions but lives and thinks independently of 
them. The philosopher's way is from the ethos of the warrior, as opposed to the scribe and therefore, 
like all aristocratic culture, is generalist and synthetic. The scholar is "a jobbing workman who 
instinctively opposes synthetic undertakings and capacities in general", who feels wronged and 
diminished by the "otium and noble luxury of the philosopher's psychical economy".758 
This is how Nietzsche compares his life as a philosopher with his former life as a scholar. Yet his 
attention to its siren calls were not altogether a late development. When first attending Bonn 
University, he had considered taking philosophy before deciding to concentrate on philology. In 1871, 
while at Basel, he applied, unsuccessfully, for a chair in philosophy at the university.759 Undoubtedly 
his firming interest in the subject followed his reading of Schopenhauer while at Leipzig, which 
enabled him to look at philosophy, not merely as another scholarly specialty, but as the foundation for 
all branches of knowledge. Moreover it could reconcile Nietzsche's disparate artistic and intellectual 
impulses, because its close attention to ethical questions made it a very practical intellectual activity. 
A philosophy like Schopenhauer's could shape or reform human life. Nietzsche grasped at it as a way 
by which he could accommodate art, scholarship and pedagogy, and harmonise his knowledge drive 
with his formal drive. 
It is not incidental, that from the point he practices the politics of cultivation as a philosopher, his 
need to consider himself either an artist or a scholar recedes. Philosophy, as their true master, stands 
above both in the scheme of great politics. By redefining his vocation the burden of needing to 
specialise ceases to preoccupy him. And on leaving his teaching position at Basel in 1879 to live, in 
full satisfaction and self-awareness, as a philosopher, the danger posed to him by the fragmentation of 
knowledge and action diminishes. It is no longer broached as a painful matter in his writings and 
correspondence. He sees that every modern philosopher must first overcome specialisation before 
becoming what he is, and that if "he will let himself "specialise" ... he will never reach his proper 
height, the height from which he can survey, look around and look down."760 
None of this would make sense if we assume Nietzsche‟s understanding of philosophy was a modern 
one, which confines its task to synthesising or discovering certain types of knowledge. In his 
understanding, the philosopher is neither scholar nor priest, but a descendent of the warrior, the 
statesman, the legislator: those who set guidelines for living. Necessarily, the real goal of philosophy 
is not to determine truth, but to acquire wisdom, which is a purely practical knowledge aimed at 
defining a superior ethos. Philosophy that seeks truth has nothing in common with one that seeks 
wisdom since an ethos can never be "true" or "false" in itself, and therefore outside the claims of 
verity. Those who seek wisdom are in any case opposed to the pursuit of truth since they do not 
accept that such a thing can be found. Nietzsche's philosopher therefore does not employ the usual 
methods of judging actions and beliefs: he makes his assessments using criteria outside of the 
oppositions true and false and good and evil. 
The modern philosopher has abandoned the aim of acquiring wisdom and only seeks truth. He no 
longer has the right to investigate all of nature as he used to, but has relinquished this to the scientists 
and chooses to inhabit a grimy cellar in the great castle of knowledge where he seeks knowledge of 
knowledge itself. He has become nothing more than a scholar, with the consequence that "science is 
flourishing today and its good conscience shines in its face, while... the whole of modern philosophy 
has gradually sunk... reduced to 'theory of knowledge'..."761 
The fact that science has mastered philosophy also indicates the progress of democratisation in the 
modern world. Science, once subordinate to philosophy, has turned its master into its imitator. At this 
point of its degradation Nietzsche demands: “How could such a philosophy rule!"762 The philosopher 
who, he supposes, once gave foundations to the culture of the Greeks, is no longer equipped to 
legislate. "Can philosophy serve as the foundation of a culture? Yes, but now no longer: it is much too 
refined and sharpened. One can no longer rely upon it. In fact modern philosophy has permitted itself 
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to be drawn into the current of modern education. It in no way controls this education. In the best 
cases, philosophy has become science.”763 
That Nietzsche should conceive of philosophers this way shows how much better versed he is in the 
texts of antiquity than of modernity, which he reads cursorily. With the exception of Schopenhauer, 
he is only lightly familiar with the great Germans, Kant, Hegel, Leibniz, and acquaints himself with 
no more than their main ideas. Of the French, in spite of his admiration for them, he knows even less 
and of the English, an amount sufficient to establish his distaste for them. 
He learns more of modern philosophy from the lectures of colleagues, secondary literature and 
historical surveys such as that of Lange. Yet his knowledge of the Greeks, and most significantly, the 
earliest philosophers, the pre-Socratics, is detailed and extensive; insofar as any knowledge about 
individuals based on fragments of their works or the hearsay of the Hellenistic age can be. His 
philological researches place him, perhaps more than any contemporary, profoundly in touch with the 
manner of thinking of the earlier Greek philosophers: Heraclitus, Parmenides, Xenophanes, 
Anaximander, Anaxagoras, Empedocles, Pythagoras, Thales, Democritus, Socrates.... By this means 
he reaches to the sources and foundations of western philosophy, to a philosophical heroic age, the 
like of which has never been repeated, to a time when the most daring leaps of imagination captured 
the principle ideas of science and ethics that the west has since lived by.  
Throughout 1873, he worked on a subsequently aborted book he titled Philosophy in the Tragic Age 
of the Greeks, with the aim of describing their achievements, which believed paralleled and 
necessarily derived from the same spirit as contemporary tragic dramatists. 
These philosophers, he advises, were "self-liberators", for they experienced the atmosphere of the 
Greek polis and its and customs as a constraint and barrier, when it was a real danger to exhibit such 
traits.764 "Every nation", he says, "is put to shame if one points out such a wonderfully idealised 
company of philosophers as that of the early Greek masters... All those men are integral, entire and 
self-contained, and hewn out of one stone. Severe necessity exists between their thinking and their 
character. They are not bound by any convention, because at that time no professional class of 
philosophers and scholars existed. They all stand before us in magnificent solitude as the only ones 
who then devoted their life exclusively to knowledge. They all possess the virtuous energy of the 
Ancients, whereby they excel all the later philosophers in finding their own form and perfecting it by 
metamorphosis in its most minute details and general aspect."765 
The pre-Socratic philosophers come closer than anyone else to exemplifying Nietzsche's idea of the 
super-human. In this short paragraph we see listed most elements of what we have demonstrated to 
constitute his definition of genius: "integration", "self-containment", "necessity between thought and 
character", "finding one's own form"... He believes that their courageous independence brought them 
to the foundation idea of all philosophy: that the opinions of the people are in error. In comparison 
major thinkers who follow Socrates such as Plato, Aristotle, Epicurus, Pyrro, Zeno... philosophise in 
the period of the decadence of the city-state, and no longer display the heroism of the earlier age."The 
Pre-Socratics did not share the Post-Socratics' detestable pretension to happiness. Furthermore, 
these early Greeks did not chatter and revile so much; neither did they write so much."766 
Hellenistic philosophers feel the need to give reasons because they court the approbation of the mass 
and tie philosophy to dialectic and argument, and therewith to ineffectiveness. They congregate in 
schools and become despised. The pre-Socratic philosopher sets down laws and ideas in contempt of 
all justification, keeping apart from but nonetheless being held in awe by the people. Regardless of 
the validity of these idealisations, it is evident that Nietzsche philosophises, quite consciously, in the 
way he believed that pre-Socratics had done. He seeks to follow their example and accordingly does 
not resort to the vulgarity of argument, or logic to support his thoughts. 
Lower intellects dabble in dialectic, higher ones know that the logic or grounds of an idea are already 
found within and will be quickly found by any who care to think. Like Heraclitus, whom he idealises 
above all others, he hurls down judgements as Jove his lightning bolts, as if they are unprecedented 
and illuminate everything. This habit, sometimes referred to as philosophical titanism, is not just 
characteristic of Nietzsche or the pre-Socratics. His claim that his manner of philosophising is directly 
descended from the Greeks, is evidence of a more general pattern, because we cannot forget how, of 
all Europe's nations, Germany has always boasted that it is the truest descendent of Greece - a boast 
which, by the way, perished only recently with the death of Heidegger. 
The starting point of philosophical titanism, as prepared by the Greeks and perpetuated by the 
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Germans, is that popular opinion is worthless, myopic and unreal. No titan could reach this point 
without severing allegiance with his fellow men on the basis of his superiority. Whether an aristocrat 
by blood or no, he becomes one by feeling, and having no other pattern or precedent for such other 
than that of the warrior, transfers the love of heroism, greatness, conquest, and fame into the realm of 
thought. Thus the titan imagines that everything that can be done by the hero of deeds can be done by 
the hero of philosophy, only thoughts, unlike deeds, can travel on the wings of Mercury. Unfettered 
and unencumbered by the dull world of objects they go anywhere and can do almost anything. Excess 
then, is more than usually the outcome of a titan's speculative forays.  
If he is always at minimum a warrior of ideas, he is also more than usually a conqueror eager to carve 
out an empire of the spirit, and a place in history. It is not merely the deluded or the mad of whom we 
speak, but men who have captured the ear of the most discriminating intellects. Philosophers, even 
relatively modern ones like Hegel, Nietzsche or Heidegger have not been so modest as to deny that 
their thoughts are anything less than major historical events. Nietzsche, the most disarmingly honest, 
believed that his speculations broke the history of mankind in two. This species of intellectual is 
altogether of a different type to the modern "professional" philosopher, who might, if he is lucky, 
quiver with elation for having discerned some tomato seed on the manure heap of truth. His is the 
squeaky-voiced conceit of the scholar or expert, whom the blunt-fingered philosophical titan 
disdainfully brushes aside. 
Like the scholar the titan thinks he has the right to rule not just because he is more intelligent or 
virtuous, or wiser, but because his vision is vaster and he can bring purpose to life, which is 
intolerable if it is merely banal. To be tolerable it must be invested with feelings of immensity. So he 
straps chains of logic between the commonplace and the cosmos, using these to lift us up to the 
majesty and greatness in and around us. Having discovered such feelings in himself the titan wishes 
all of us to resonate with them, and thinks he can do this by exhorting and instructing us. Setting aside 
what this "feeling of greatness" might be, the pattern for representing them is always the same. As 
Nietzsche points out:"Philosophical thinking... is always on the track of the things worth knowing, on 
the track of the great and most important discernments. Now the idea of greatness is changeable, as 
well as in the moral as in the aesthetic realm, thus Philosophy begins with a legislation as to 
greatness... That is great she says and therewith raises men above the blind, untamed covetousness of 
his thirst for knowledge. By the idea of greatness she assuages this thirst: and it is chiefly by this that 
she contemplates the greatest discernment that of the essence and kernel of things as attainable and 
attained... The philosopher tries to make the total chord of the universe re-echo within himself and 
then to project it into ideas outside himself... whilst he feels himself swell up to the macrocosm, he 
still retains the circumspection to contemplate himself coldly as the reflex of the world."767 
Titanic philosophy may be the mighty confluence into which separate tributaries of knowledge empty 
their waters, but its procedure is not simply accretive. Polymathy is not philosophy. Philosophy seeks 
general ideas lurking behind branches of knowledge. It wants to find the common ground behind 
them and does this by "delicate selective judgement by taste, by discernment, by significant 
differentiation."768 By locating the ground of being the titan can find principles by which all us can 
live effectively. Here again the idea of physis, which is at the core of Nietzsche's philosophy as it is 
with the pre-Socratics. Embracing this idea, the titan believes his duty is to live in accordance with, 
and to perfect his nature, and therewith the nature all around him. It is this that enables him to feel as 
though he is "swelling up to the macrocosm". As Heraclitus succinctly remarks, "the greatest 
perfection (arété) resides in thinking wisely: to speak the truth and to act in accordance with nature 
(physis) - this is wisdom.769 And with this one aphorism, he encapsulates the substance of Nietzsche's 
ethical thought, powerfully reminding us how three thousand years of intellectual endeavour have 
barely altered the practice of ethical inquiry. 
Since the philosophical titan is obliged to speculate in the grand style, he cannot claim authenticity if 
he does not also live in the same manner. Not only must he think like a hero, he must be one. How 
can one concerned with the conduct of life better teach than by example? The emphasis on deeds that 
reflect thought was fundamental to the philosophical culture of antiquity, even in the Hellenist period. 
Compendia like that of Diogenes Laertius are as concerned to relate the deeds and bon mots of 
philosophers as to outline their thought. In consequence titanic philosophy, no less than religion, 
honours its martyrs. In antiquity the deaths of Socrates and Seneca were models of dignity, and in the 
Renaissance, Giordano Bruno, recalls their spirit with his taunt to the inquisitors: that they delivered 
their judgement to execute him with more fear than he received it.  
They admired the sage in antiquity less for what he believed than for his contempt of danger and of 
tyrants, for his frugality and for his self-sufficiency. The true sage did not shuffle along the corridors 
of an academy, but courted danger: like Heraclitus, through display of lofty solitude; or, Socrates, by 
                                                                
767 PTAG, a3. See also TP, PAT, p.14:"...the task of culture is to see that what is great in a people does not appear among them as a hermit or exile" and 
Plans & Outlines, PAT p157: "the aesthetic concept of greatness and sublimity: the task is to educate the people to this concept. Culture depends upon 
the way in which one defines what is "great" . 
768 PTAG, a3. 
769 Heraclitus, fragment 107, in Fairbanks, op. cit. 
175 
going into the market place; or, Diogenes of Sinope by submitting to personal privations. Being 
utterly persuaded by such behaviour, Nietzsche considers that philosophers who cannot sacrifice their 
existence to principles do not have credibility. Reflecting on Diogene's example, he notes that"....all 
the philosophy of antiquity was directed toward simplicity in living and taught a certain frugality - the 
most important remedy against all thoughts of social revolution. In this respect the few philosophical 
vegetarians have accomplished more for man than all the more recent philosophies. And so long as 
philosophers fail to muster the courage to seek a totally transformed regimen and to exhibit it by their 
own example, then they are of no consequence."770 
Nietzsche constantly sought to present himself as existing under a radical regimen. Following his self-
realisation that he was a philosopher, he was deeply dissatisfied to be teaching at a university. This 
occurred quite early and undoubtedly at the suggestion of Schopenhauer who was never more than a 
privatdozent. It is impossible, he thinks, to be entirely true to oneself in the employ of any institution, 
since there is always a compulsion to make concessions and surrender fragments of your integrity. 
For a start it is impossible to criticise or offend the institution from which you take your bread. The 
younger Nietzsche is tormented and embarrassed to see how many great thinkers were independent of 
either bureau or academy: Socrates, Spinoza, Schopenhauer, three he esteems most highly, were all 
free men. Peering out ruefully from behind the bars of his institution, he remarks to Rohde in 1870, 
that he has “become aware of the importance of Schopenhauer's teaching about the wisdom of the 
universities. A thoroughly radically truthful existence is impossible here. But what is important is that 
nothing truly subversive can ever emerge from this quarter. "771 
From the beginning of his career he intimates that he will eventually abandon it, but his departure is 
hardly crowned by dramatic or heroic resolve. Ten years after employment he resigns from his 
position at Basel on the grounds of ill-health, and for his pains is bequeathed, by the university, a 
modest but useful stipend. With the security it affords him can live frugally yet independently, and to 
publish and to travel for the remainder of his days. He has not much property, yet he is not in penury. 
What more does a philosopher need? He does not deny that it was the accident of illness that provided 
him with the means to sever himself from his dependence. In a letter to Brandes he baldly states that 
"this illness has been the greatest help to me; it has set me free; it has restored to me the courage to 
be myself. My instincts are those of a brave, even of a military beast. The prolonged struggle has 
slightly exasperated my pride of spirit. After all, am I a philosopher? But what does it matter?”772 
Notice the "titanic" form of self-representation, which reminds us of the bluster of Homer's warriors. 
Needing to embody heroic values, Nietzsche constructs his own life as though it were a war fought on 
many fronts and dramatises the events of an otherwise refined and unremarkable existence. 
His debilitating but hardly mortal ill health is represented as a valiant struggle of spirit against 
corporeal weakness; that in the face of such pains he can maintain undying cheerfulness is seen as a 
triumph of will. His practice of philosophy is the ride of a sturdy knight through a land of death and 
devils. The truths arrived at by his honest thinking, he believes, are so horrible that they must require 
real courage to endure them: "How much truth can a spirit endure, how much truth can a spirit dare? 
This slogan (a variant of Sapere aude!) he says, "became for me the real standard of value. Error is 
cowardice - every achievement of knowledge is a consequence of courage, of severity toward oneself, 
of cleanliness toward oneself..."773 His wandering and isolation is interpreted as spiritual and physical 
exile, as rejection and abandonment by his contemporaries who are shamed by his honesty and 
courage. In summa, he is the loneliest man who has ever lived and has suffered more than anyone 
else, yet above it all he rejoices in his steadfastness and his transcendence. 
The ethic of "overcoming", one of the most popular and influential elements of Nietzsche's work, is 
the material for the braggadocio of cheeriness in his later writings which is constantly saying, "You 
can't say I don't bear my afflictions bravely. You can't say I'm not redoubtable." 
Undoubtedly his receptivity to life's pains, to the loneliness of not being understood, was exceptional, 
but the events that inspired it were not. Without denying the intensity of his discomfort, only one 
compelled to enact heroic drama could publically represent private pains as major historical events. 
But such conduct is entirely in the character of philosophical titans. 
Philosophy and Spiritual Reform 
From his youth, Nietzsche relates philosophy to the task of spiritual reform, and the politics of 
cultivation. He constantly speculates on his tasks as a philosopher and how to reform his fellow men. 
His notebooks abound with definitions and redefinitions of the philosopher's cultural task. That these 
occur less frequently in the published works indicates how much they are private reflections serving a 
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self-clarifying purpose. 
They appear in great clusters in the notebooks of 1873, when he was composing the Philosophy in the 
Tragic Age of the Greeks and perhaps firm his resolve in his vocation. A number are listed below, to 
indicate their tone and emphasis. 
We learn that the philosopher: 
1. - is a "brakeshoe on the wheel of time.”774 
2. - is a self-revelation of nature's workshop; the philosopher and the artist tell the trade secrets 
of nature.775 
3. - is the continuation of that drive by which we incessantly deal with nature by means of 
anthropomorphic illusions.776 
4. - is seeking [not truth, but] the metamorphosis of the world into men. He strives for an 
understanding of the world with self-consciousness. He strives for an assimilation. He is 
satisfied when he has explained something anthropomorphically. just as the astrologer 
regards the world as serving the single individual, the philosopher regards the world as a 
human being.777 
5. - should recognise what is needed, and the artist should create it.778 
6. - must become the supreme tribunal of an artistic culture, the police force, as it were against 
all transgressions.779 
We also learn: 
7. -...philosophy seeks to master this [knowledge] drive; it is an instrument of culture.780 
8. -[Nietzsche's] general task: to show how life, philosophy and art can have a more profound 
and congenial relationship to each other, in such a way that philosophy is not superficial and 
the life of the philosopher does not become mendacious.781 
9. -the individual who wishes to rely upon himself requires ultimate knowledge, philosophy. 
Other men require a science which is slowly augmented.782 
10. - philosophy must be "able to concentrate a man."783 
11. -[Nietzsche's task as a philosopher is] to comprehend the internal coherence and necessity of 
every true culture; to comprehend a culture's preservatives and restoratives and their relation 
to the genius of the people.784 
The multiplicity of definitions does not conceal that the Ideal of Cultivation is the common point of 
reference, since the philosopher's primary duty is to sustain or improve the health of a culture. In his 
early work, Nietzsche describes the philosopher as a cultural physician: a person who, being 
inordinately wise, can diagnose an ailing culture, and recognise the correctives to restore it to health. 
He uses the phrase "philosopher as cultural physician" throughout his life, but most frequently in his 
early work, to the extent that he actually planned and began to write a book with this title in 1873, and 
even considered it as an alternative to what became Philosophy in the Tragic Age of the Greeks. 
The idea of philosopher as physician accords with the organic metaphor of culture and the need for 
spiritual cohesion within a nation. If philosophers have not always fulfilled this role, he was certain 
that in antiquity they attempted to do so. Today, instead of supporting cultural cohesion, they actively 
promote the forces leading to fragmentation.”What is lacking today", he laments, " is anything which 
can unite all the one-sided forces: and so we observe that everything is hostile to everything else and 
that all the noble forces are engaged in a mutually destructive war of annihilation. Philosophy is an 
example of this: it destroys, because there is nothing to keep it within boundaries. The philosopher 
has become a being who is harmful to the community. He annihilates happiness, virtue, culture, and 
finally himself. Formerly, in the role of the cultural physician, philosophy had to be in alliance with 
the cohesive forces."785 
Nietzsche's idealised view of the accomplishments of the pre-Socratics provides examples of how 
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philosophy produces correctives and palliatives in an already vital culture. In the notes of 1873 he 
refers to what philosophers actually did to rescue their culture from spiritual hazard, something he 
rarely discusses elsewhere. The decline of myth was the main problem facing the Greek city-state 
when the pre-Socratics were active. Civilisation was founded on myths, which provided boundaries 
and stability to political structures, but they were not universally shared. Each polis had its own, 
entrenching its particularism and confirming its hostility to others. Undermining the scaffolding of 
myth in each polis meant undermining its political structure. Thus, “if the polis was based upon myth, 
then abandoning myth meant abandoning the old concept of the polis."786 
In these circumstances philosophers opposed the old and narrow myths with equally more universal 
principles. Thales, for example, " proposed, though he did not accomplish, the foundation of a league 
of cities: he ran aground on the old mythical concept of the polis. At the same time he had a 
foreboding of the enormous danger to Greece if this isolating power of myth continued to keep the 
cities divided. In fact, had Thales brought his league of cities into being, the Greeks would have been 
spared the Persian wars and therewith the victory and predominance of Athens."787 
Others worked in different ways to similar ends. Democritus, Nietzsche observes, opposed myths 
with cold abstractions and scientific thinking. Anaximander struggled against myth insofar as it 
coddled people and made them superficial, thus leading the Greeks into danger.788 He was also a 
founder of colonies789 Heraclitus opposed pliancy and excessive sociability by pride and solitude790 
and struggled against myth insofar as it insulated the Greeks from the barbarians. He appears to have 
torn down the barrier separating the barbaric and the Hellenic in order to create greater freedom and 
to broaden narrow points of view.791 Empedocles wanted a "scientifically grounded Pythagorean 
manner of living... love, democracy, communal property."792 A democrat with social reform up his 
sleeve,793 he opposed cruelty in battle and political strife with the reform of the sacrifices, which is to 
say he condemned meat-eating and blood sacrifice, and urged the use of surrogates. He also opposed 
the practice of lies and deceit with the general philosophic enthusiasm for truth, no matter what the 
consequence. Parmenides, was a lawgiver who wanted to grant mankind rest from political passion.794 
Anaxagoras' philosophy was a mirror image of early Athen's "legislation for men who have no 
laws.”795 The strict ascetic views of Pythagoras, Empedocles and Anaximander opposed the flabby 
cosiness of life796 and indeed “all of the early philosophers took pains to alter the concept of the polis 
and to create a Panhellenic way of thinking."797 
Nietzsche depicts most of these actions as reactive and remedial. The pre-Socratics do not seek to 
impress an ideal form upon the polis according to presumed universal principles. They reproach 
harmful habits or tendencies and encourage nascent possibilities. Their thoughts and deeds, albeit in 
the titanic mode, are a kind of tinkering with the political organism. They might pronounce in the 
agora, admonish in the market place, stage plays, place books in the temples, or put virtues on public 
display, but in one way or another - whether to be mistrusted, revered or feared - they are heeded and 
their contribution is an essential component of the harmony of the polis. 
As Nietzsche continued to grapple with the problem of the philosopher's contribution to the politics of 
cultivation the metaphor of the philosopher as cultural physician was almost entirely displaced by 
another, already in evidence in the youthful work, that represented the philosopher as a statesman, a 
legislator: one who sets down laws for the long durations of a civilisation. Such a philosopher would 
not literally codify laws - though he might well do so! - but would impress unwritten evaluations 
upon the spirit of a people until these become integral to their way of life. His evaluations would 
begin as moral systems, "law-giving moralities" as Nietzsche would refer to them, which would reify 
in political and social structures.  
He concedes that philosophers embody many contradictory characteristics, but in general as he 
observes in an especially illuminating note of 1884, that "after having tried in vain for a long time to 
attach a definite concept to the word "philosopher"" he had “recognised at last that there are two 
distinct kinds of philosopher: 
1. those who want to ascertain a complex fact of evaluations (logical or moral); 
2. those who are legislators of such evaluations."798 
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Those belonging to the first philosophical type referred to are essentially scholars or scientists since 
their interest is to "master the world of the present or the past by concentrating and abridging the 
multiplicity of events through signs: their aim is to make previous events surveyable, comprehensible, 
graspable, and usable - they assist the task of man to employ all past things for the benefit of his 
future."799 The very process of gathering knowledge about the world involves a series of evaluations 
that effectively anthropomorphise it and make it familiar to humanity. This type of philosopher seeks 
knowledge in its ultimate, most comprehensive form, but has no effect on the world beyond this. 
Those of the second type however, who embody the titanic impulse, are able to employ this 
knowledge in the most far-reaching way, for they are "commanders; they say: "thus it shall be!". They 
alone determine the "whither" and the "wherefore", what is useful and what constitutes utility for 
men; they dispose of the preparatory work of scientific men, and all knowledge is for them only a 
means for creation."800 
The philosophical commanders are reformers who change the world, set up grand goals and point out 
paths for mankind to follow. Their evaluations are eternal reference points that guide all practical 
decisions about the way we live. But who are these "commanders" who accomplish such grand 
designs? Are they generals or politicians or bureaucrats? Do we attend when they bark an order or 
compose an oration? How do they actually command? Nietzsche holds that command is given by 
means of "law-giving moralities", that is to say, doctrines we believe and structure our lives around. 
What may begin as the conscious word of a philosopher may in time, it is supposed, become 
instinctive and second nature to us as it seeps into our religions, customs, laws, and habits of thought. 
By encouraging us to believe in a certain way the titan shapes us like clay."Law-giving moralities are 
the principle means of fashioning man according to the pleasure of a creative and profound will, 
provided that such an artist's will of the first rank has the power in its hands and can make its 
creative will prevail through long periods of time, in the form of laws, religions, and customs. Such 
men of great creativity, the really great men according to my understanding, will be sought in vain 
today and probably for a long time to come."801 
Between 1884 and 1885, Nietzsche uses the terms breeding ideas or cultivating ideas interchangeably 
with the concept of law-giving moralities. These terms attribute greater activism to legislators and 
suggest that their main aim is to have a practical effect on our lives, and to promote his ethos. But 
what legislators wish us to believe - for pragmatic ends - does not have to be the truth. The titan does 
not have to believe the dogma he wishes to promote. After all, are not all moralities intrinsically 
untrue, with no validity on earth or heaven, save in the heart of the believer? If nothing is true, lies are 
permitted. Useful lies that cajole or terrify us into submitting to the will of the titan. 
And so we return once more to Nietzsche's abiding interest in the doctrine of the "noble", "holy" or 
"beautiful" lie. It is the prerogative of the legislator to employ myths, eschatologies, moralities, or any 
nonsense to achieve his ends. These were methods used unabashedly by the past titans as by priests. 
Unlike the dishonest liars of the present, "neither Manu nor Plato, neither Confucius nor the Jewish 
and Christian teachers, ever doubted their right to tell lies..."802 
These honest liars sought power through the lie, precisely in the knowledge that they did not possess 
it physically or militarily. The most extreme and clear-sighted usage of this means, outside of Plato, is 
to be found, Nietzsche advises, in the ancient Hindu Law of Manu of the priestly caste, the Brahmans. 
The whole book of Manu, he states, is founded on a "holy lie", with the aim of breeding and 
maintaining entirely separate races through the caste system.803 Every philosopher, in his capacity as a 
great educator and using the guise of a truth-teller will be found to use lies. "Assuming one thinks of a 
philosopher as a great educator, powerful enough to draw up to his lonely height a long chain of 
generations... An educator never says what he himself thinks, but always only what he thinks of a 
thing in relation to the requirements of those he educates. He must not be detected in this 
dissimulation; it is part of his mastery that one believes in his honesty. he must be capable of 
employing every means of discipline: some he can drive to the heights only with the whips of scorn; 
others, who are sluggish, irresolute, cowardly, vain, perhaps only with exaggerated praise. such an 
educator is beyond good and evil; but no one must know of it."804 
Nietzsche as Philosophical Titan 
So much for the past but is not Nietzsche also a titan, and has he not also set grand goals for 
humanity; therefore does not Nietzsche too tell lies? Certainly he believes that in modern Europe “a 
doctrine is needed powerful enough to work as a breeding agent: strengthening the strong, paralysing 
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and destructive for the world-weary."805 His efforts to provide one however are curiously ineffectual.  
The entire later period of Nietzsche's politics of cultivation, in which he does not oppose modern 
ideas, but sees them as a preparation for greater developments, can be seen as working from this 
principle. Modern ideas will create a new slave class, therefore let it happen and spare the labour of 
the coming master class. On the other hand Nietzsche's work overflows with commands as to how life 
should be lived, nowhere more than in Thus Spake Zarathustra which reeks of holiness. Zarathustra 
is Nietzsche's Book of Manu, but it is by no means a work of conscious untruth. In Zarathustra, 
Nietzsche means what he says, with perhaps one exception, and that is the doctrine of Eternal 
Recurrence, which he describes as the "great cultivating idea".806 
Through promulgation of this idea, that the world waxes and wanes in an identical series of cycles to 
all eternity, he hopes that the weakest who cannot bear the notion will perish and those who can will 
prosper. It will, he thinks, determine the fate of races and bring the future masters to the surface, since 
"those who find it the greatest benefit are chosen to rule."807 The eternal recurrence will bring 
forward the greatest types of genius, because in order to endure the idea one requires "freedom from 
morality... the enjoyment of all kinds of uncertainty, experimentalism",808 one would have to be 
formidably rich in spirit to exist in a universe that has no apparent purpose or destiny. The doctrine, as 
the perfect expression of nihilism, could only be borne by a being capable of creating his own values, 
who could delight in the conscious exercise of will to power. 
Nietzsche was so serious about using the eternal recurrence as his own breeding idea that he planned, 
possibly around the period he was completing Thus Spake Zarathustra, to write an entire book based 
on it. This may seem more significant than it was since he revised the scope of his magnum opus on a 
number of occasions during his last years, each time preferring one theme over another, but settling 
most consistently for the title Revaluation of All Values. In any event the plan of the book that he 
sketched is instructive since it shows systematic intention to prove simultaneously the truth of the 
doctrine and to demonstrate its ethical effects if it is believed; a strange combination of intentions one 
must suppose if he seriously intends to deceive us that it is truth. 
"1. Presentation of the doctrine and its theoretical presuppositions and consequences. 
2. Proof of the doctrine. 
3. Probable consequences of it being believed (it makes everything break open). 
a) Means of enduring it; 
b) Means of disposing of it. 
4. Its place in history as a mid-point. Period of greatest danger. Foundation of an oligarchy above 
peoples and their interests: education to a universally human politics. Counterpart of Jesuitism."809 
Although there is no evidence in notes or published works to suggest that Nietzsche did not believe it, 
he evidently felt he could used it cynically (vide the reference to Jesuitism) as a "holy lie" to breed 
higher men. But if he really believes the idea is it any longer a lie?  
We could toy with this proposition at length and wonder that Nietzsche, even for a moment, actually 
imagined that the idea could have any ethical effect at all. Regardless of its place in his metaphysics, 
it is its political role that most concerns him. But can it really be seen as so terrifying? Is it a more 
perfectly nihilistic proposition, for example, than to believe that after death there is nothingness and 
after the extinction of humanity, nothingness again? 
Before Nietzsche, several generations of Europe's most earnest thinkers and poets faced and endured 
such infinitely more nihilistic propositions, but without arousing any orgy of psychic strength. In view 
of these and other considerations the eternal recurrence must be counted as one Nietzsche's strangest 
oddities. We acknowledge its existence and set it aside before we pass on. 
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20 - Breeding 
If you want Utopian plans, I would say: the only solution to the problem is the despotism of the wise 
and noble members of a genuine aristocracy, a genuine nobility, achieved by mating the most 
magnanimous men with the cleverest and most gifted women. This proposal constitutes My Utopia 
and my Platonic Republic.810 
The Idea of Breeding 
So significant political acts can be accomplished by spiritual reformers: individuals who, though not 
able to mobilise masses or armies at a command, use art, education or philosophy to make us 
reconsider how we think and behave. The slow process of spiritual reform using all the varieties of 
communication available - speeches, laws, books, music, pedagogy, paintings, or treatises - is the 
most certain way to exhort or seduce us into new intellectual and ethical habits, and change the 
material culture of artefacts, organisations and social structures into one beneficial for the production 
of genius and virtue. The material world will follow the spiritual one, and if people change their 
thoughts, they can change their circumstances. 
This idea dominates Nietzsche for most of his life, but early on he also poses a contradictory view 
which, in his last three years of sanity, coexists with the first on equal terms but is neither reconciled 
nor harmonised. This belief is that new habits of mind do not greatly reshape actions, which are so 
wedded to material circumstances. The only way to encourage new habits of mind is to create 
conditions in which they can exist. So when, in Beyond Good and Evil, he states that his politics 
fundamentally fixes on "the serious, on the 'European problem' as I understand it, on the breeding of 
a new ruling caste for Europe..."811 the means he proposes for attaining this end are both spiritual and 
material in character.  
Breeding, as we have described it, wherein the philosopher instils certain virtues in individuals by 
imposing moralities upon them, now takes on a more literal, more corporeal, and even biological 
meaning. Now it is supposed that the physical nature of men must be changed before his capacity for 
virtue can be increased. The new guiding premise, as stated in 1887, is that one must “...not... preach 
morality... in any form, as if "morality in itself", or any ideal kind of man, were given; but... create 
conditions that require stronger men who for their part need, and consequently will have, a morality 
(more clearly: a physical spiritual discipline) that makes them strong.”812 
This elaborates logically Nietzsche's view of nature and genius as will to power. With genius 
redefined as the consummate form of the organisation of power, the original "spiritual" conception of 
higher culture had to lose ground and the concept of "breeding" acquired explicitly biological 
connotations. Breeding statements with the physical emphasis increase in his works from about 1886, 
after he completes the last book of Thus Spake Zarathustra, and occur most frequently throughout 
1888, his final year of stupendous productivity, when the riddles of nature and humanity seem to him 
utterly revealed. Most of them can be broken down into two broad types: either they refer to the 
breeding of genius from "without", by constructing appropriate political and social environments, or 
they refer to breeding from "within", by improving biological makeup. One means is environmental 
and the other eugenic.  
Environmental Breeding: The Politics of Virtue 
The idea that more virtuous, talented or energetic individuals could be bred within an appropriate 
political environment is one of the primary ideas of the politics of cultivation. It is manifestly the aim 
of many of the real and mythical, constitutions of antiquity, of Solon, Lycurgus, or Plato, and in the 
Renaissance the intention of Bruni and Machiavelli's excursions into political speculation.  
Nietzsche acknowledges Machiavelli as an antecedent when, in what was possibly a draft of the 
introduction to the intended Revaluation of all Values, he refers to the need to create what he calls a 
"grand politics of virtue". The treatise which was to follow and which was to deal with this subject 
was "...intended for the use of those whose interest must lie in learning, not how one becomes 
virtuous, but how one makes virtuous - how virtue is made to dominate. I even intend to prove that to 
desire the one - the domination of virtue - one absolutely must not desire the other; one automatically 
renounces becoming virtuous oneself... This treatise... posits an ideal of these politics, it describes 
them as they would have to be, if anything on this earth could be perfect. Now, no philosopher will be 
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in any doubt as to the type of perfection in politics; that is crude Machiavellianism. But 
Machiavellianism pur, sans mèlange, cru, vert, dans toute sa force, dans toute son âpreté, is 
superhuman, divine, transcendental, it will never be achieved by man only approximated."813 
The allusions to Machiavellism are not to immoral application of power for its own sake, but to the 
Renaissance thinker's idea of developing virtù (meaning efficiency rather than "goodness") in a 
population by means of political organisation. For Machiavelli the form that most guaranteed this was 
civic republicanism which, he believed, expected greater energy and talent from its citizenry than any 
other. Nietzsche, of course, does not share this view, but agrees with Machiavelli that immoral means 
are often needed to produce ethical affects and states repeatedly in his final years "...every means 
hitherto employed with the intention of making mankind moral has been thoroughly immoral..."814 
More specifically, the practice of breeding desired human types, of establishing necessary 
environments for such types by means of morality requires that one exist beyond all subjection to 
moral conditions. "The morality of breeding and the morality of taming are, in the means they employ 
to attain their ends, entirely worthy of one another: we may set down as our chief proposition that to 
make morality one must have the unconditional will to the contrary."815 
In other words, the philosopher ruler cannot simply be a "holy liar", a myth-maker or story-teller; he 
must be able to enact laws to achieve practical effects, even if they be unjust in implementation. He 
would not for example legislate that slothful people become energetic and industrious. A just decree 
has no effect without tangible causes to change behaviour, such as by rewarding or endangering self-
interest. An environment contrived to punish sloth and reward industry would force or motivate 
individuals to acquire the desired virtue. 
The philosophical ruler that wants to breed genius must operate from an ethical position "beyond 
good and evil", and engage his people in the grand designs of discipline and suffering needed to 
accumulate the capacity to will. According to the principles outlined, high culture is possible only in a 
culture of the strong willed and such strength is gathered and stored by people in times of adversity, 
danger and distress. Pointing to the Renaissance, he complains that we acknowledge the greatness of 
the individuals of that epoch, but refuse to see what desperate conditions made it possible for them to 
exist. Merely to be an individual was dangerous, and a proportionate ferocity and strength was needed 
to survive at all. No one became an individual by behaving nicely.  
You cannot expect greatness without the circumstances that make it possible. To produce rare and 
sublime individuals, you need means that may seem opposite to this intention. The severe and 
restricting moralities of an aristocracy impose great physical and spiritual hardship but are actually 
anti-individual, and assure only that a single type or species of human begins to form within their 
boundaries. Yet the consolidation of a group in this way is only the beginning of a long preparatory 
process: it forces those within it to become stronger, like clay stiffening within its mold, awaiting the 
time when the hard casing can be removed. Then a different situation pertains, and you no longer 
need to subject individuals to hardship, as they already possess sufficient inherited strength. The 
ancient moralities can be relaxed, or rather; individuals grow too strong for them and are able to 
follow laws of their own contrivance. The interests of the group no longer have to be supported. The 
aim now is to protect and ease the circumstances of individuals so that all the power of generations 
accumulated in them is released in all forms of genius. Nietzsche outlines this process in summary in 
Beyond Good and Evil, showing how he imagines environmental breeding would operate.  
In the first instance, he says, 
"...a species arises, a type becomes fixed and strong, through protracted struggle against essentially 
constant unfavourable conditions. Conversely, one knows from the experience of breeders that 
species which receive plentiful nourishment and an excess of care and protection soon tend very 
strongly to produce variations of their type and are rich in marvels and monstrosities (also in 
monstrous vices). Now look for once at an aristocratic community, Venice say, or an ancient Greek 
polis, as a voluntary or involuntary contrivance for the purpose of breeding: there are human beings 
living together and thrown on their own resources who want their species to prevail usually because 
they have to prevail or run the terrible risk of being exterminated. Here those favourable conditions, 
that excess, that protection which favours variations, is lacking; the species needs itself as a species, 
as something that can prevail and purchase durability in its continual struggle against its neighbours 
or against the oppressed in revolt or threatening revolt, precisely by virtue of its hardness, uniformity, 
simplicity of form. The most manifold experience teaches it which qualities it has principally to 
thank... that it still exists and has always been victorious: these qualities it calls virtues, these virtues 
alone does it breed and cultivate. It does so with severity, indeed it wants severity; every aristocratic 
morality is intolerant, in the education of the young, in the measures its takes with respect to women, 
in marriage customs, in the relations between young and old, in the penal laws... In the end however 
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there arises one day an easier state of affairs and the tremendous tension relaxes; perhaps there are 
no longer any enemies among their neighbours, and the means of life, even for the enjoyment of life, 
are there in plenty. With one stroke the bond and constraint of the ancient discipline is broken: it is 
no longer felt to be a necessity, a condition of existence...Variation, whether as deviation (into the 
higher, rarer, more refined) or as degeneration and monstrosity, is suddenly on the scene in the 
greatest splendour and abundance, the individual dares to be an individual and stand out..The 
dangerous and uncanny point is reached where the grander, more manifold, more comprehensive life 
lives beyond the old morality; the "individual" stands there, reduced to his own law-giving, to his own 
arts and stratagems for self-preservation, self-enhancement, self-redemption."816 
Political and social environments make virtues necessary for the group and therefore possible, but 
when those conditions are removed, stronger individuals can find virtue for themselves. If they are 
not to be isolated, chance events, formations of genius can only be bred in specific environments, and 
if these do not exist, they must be contrived artificially. The Greek polis was such a contrivance. 
According to Nietzsche the Indian caste system was another. Devised by Aryan conquerors 
determined to perpetuate hegemony over subject races, it employed tools of environmental breeding. 
The object of the hegemony, as instituted by the dominant caste, the Brahmans, descendents of the 
original conquerors, and as revealed in the lawbook of Manu, is "to breed no fewer than four races 
simultaneously: a priestly, a warrior a trading and farming race, and finally a menial race, the 
Sudras. Here we are manifestly no longer among animal-tamers: a species of human being a hundred 
times more gentle and rational is presupposed even to conceive the plan of such a breeding."817 
Two different methods for creating moral environments are implicit in the system of Manu; one, 
Nietzsche calls "breeding" and the other, "taming". Both employ morality but have different goals. 
The aim of breeding is aristocratic: to raise a more powerful and healthier class of beasts, but taming 
seeks to make some beasts meeker and less dangerous. Taming provides a morality appropriate to an 
underclass and is used everywhere by priestly hierarchies to render the human beast malleable and 
pliable. They have made men physically and spiritually sickly, "through the depressive emotion of 
fear, through pain, through injuries, through hunger..."818 
To demonstrate that his terminology is not merely metaphoric, Nietzsche reminds us that the very 
different types taming and breeding produce represent "zoological termini."819 They are literally 
different animals, and the differences are exaggerated further by diverging practices of hygiene and 
nutrition. Thus we come to the second aspect breeding: the biological foundation of genius. 
Biological Breeding: Eugenics 
Breeding from within, commonly called eugenics, is again not a modern idea. It has been practised by 
civilised and uncivilised peoples for millennia, being understood as simply the application of 
principles derived from animal husbandry to humanity. 
The public practice of eugenics has either been associated with coercive states, or it has occurred at a 
much less visible level through the customs or design of social classes or private families. The state-
sponsored forms of eugenics have always been the most visible and least common. A state-based 
breeding policy requires an exceptional centralised power that can place its own interests before those 
of the family. The earliest example we have, that of Sparta, famed for its robust men and women, 
excited the imagination of Plato, the first theoretical eugenicist of the West. This is paralleled by the 
religious eugenics of the ancient and indeed modern Hebrews. In modern times we see variations of 
the practice in the American south where economic considerations motivated landowners to breed 
stronger slaves, and in coercive states like eighteenth century Prussia. Frederick William I, unable to 
satisfy a penchant for tall grenadiers by press-ganging all over Europe, forced his tallest soldiers to 
marry Dutch peasant girls (the Dutch being the tallest people in Europe). Modern Germany again 
resorted to state-sponsored eugenic practices in the well-recorded endeavours of the Nazi epoch. 
Does Nietzsche prefer authority for biological regulation to fall to the state, the community or to the 
family? As always his speculations present a series of vacillations and obscurities from youth to 
maturity. The problem is compounded by the fact that most of these occur in undeveloped notes, and 
were never substantially presented in his published works. 
Eugenic principles are implicit in much of what he writes, even if he does not elaborate on them. This 
is particularly the case in his youth where his eugenic musings are most guarded. This reticence is 
noticeable in the incomplete essay of 1871 titled The Greek Woman. He recalls Plato's demand that 
the state should - in lieu of marriage - arrange solemn nuptials for the bravest men and the noblest 
women to produce beautiful offspring. In this principle proposition, he says, Plato "indicated most 
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distinctly, indeed too distinctly, offensively distinctly - an important preparatory step of the Hellenic 
will towards the procreation of genius."820 Clearly his sympathy is with Plato on this point, since he 
savours its provocation. In his last three years of sanity, he is less fastidious, and militantly 
provocative. In late nineteenth century Germany and Europe eugenics was well regarded but focused 
on principles of race. It was widely supposed that a race's vigour depended on its purity. Nietzsche 
seeks to shock by insisting on miscegenation as the superior biological breeding principle. He is 
genuinely convinced that "race mixture" would assist a people to"...strive for fullness of nature 
through the pairing of opposites..."821 
Women and breeding 
The real focus of Nietzsche's eugenic ideas however is the institution of marriage, of which there are 
two forms: bourgeois and aristocratic. Both are contrivances for breeding in the environmental and 
biological senses. 
The bourgeois form, which elevates the status of women, is the most modern and dominant, but is 
declining, having abandoned breeding as its highest purpose. The older aristocratic form places 
woman in obscurity. Privately, as suggested by his personal life, Nietzsche appears to be sympathetic 
to an elevated style of bourgeois marriage, but intellectually he wishes to promote the idea of 
aristocratic marriage as an antidote to the perceived corruption of the former.  
Despite counsels against marriage for those contemplating the "free-spirited" philosophic life, 
Nietzsche many times considered marrying but finally did not, being unable to find anyone he 
deemed suitable. In writings of the middle period, he suggests that the kind of marriage he would 
have been seeking was a type of higher friendship, a contract for producing descendents, which 
diminished sexual or romantic passion as reasons for bonding. “Marriages which are contracted for 
love", he advises, “have error for their father and need for their mother."822 Later he claims that the 
ideal of love has so usurped any real justification for the institution that it will ultimately disappear: 
“modern marriage has lost its meaning - consequently it is being abolished."823 While acknowledging 
how marriage permits two people to gratify their sexual desires at society's convenience, and how 
attraction and good will between both parties must exist prior to the formation of any bond, he 
considers these to be lesser issues. Fundamentally marriage must ensure that specific types of 
individuals are joined, not for their indulgence, but as sacrifices to the higher purpose of perpetuating 
family and class. Modern marriage is being subverted by the shamelessly sentimental ideal of love, as 
institutions in which the wife alone serves her husband's sexual needs.  
This will always encourage men to choose their partners for less than the highest purpose. And if this 
disturbing tendency is to be avoided then the higher type of bourgeois marriage, one not founded on 
the mere satisfaction of sexual appetites, might have to promote and tolerate "concubinage" as its ally. 
Men will then turn to "nobler" women for marriage, but if unsatisfied sexually can console 
themselves with a more "sensual" type. Thus: "the noble and liberal-minded women who take as their 
mission the education and elevation of the female sex, should not overlook one point of view: 
Marriage regarded in its highest aspect, as the spiritual friendship of two persons of opposite sexes, 
and accordingly such as is hoped for in future, contracted for the purpose of producing and educating 
a new generation,- such marriage which only rarely makes use of the sensual [will] probably need a 
natural auxiliary, namely, concubinage. For if, on the grounds of his health, the wife is also to serve 
for the sole satisfaction of the man's sexual needs, a wrong perspective, opposed to the aims 
indicated, will have the most influence in the choice of a wife. The aims referred to: the production of 
descendents, will be accidental, and their successful education highly improbable. A good wife, who 
has to be a friend, helper, child-bearer, mother, family-head and manager, and has even perhaps to 
conduct her own business and affairs separately from those of the husband, cannot at the same time 
be a concubine; it would in general, be asking too much of her. In the future, therefore, a state of 
things might take place the opposite of what existed at Athens in the time of Pericles; the men, whose 
wives were then little more to them than concubines, turned besides to the Aspasias, because they 
longed for the charms of a companionship gratifying to both head and heart, such as the grace and 
intellectual suppleness of women could alone provide."824 
Here Nietzsche accepts a traditional maternal role for women, but allows that they receive greater 
independence and equality with men. This type of marriage remains a voluntary breeding 
arrangement entered into by individuals without communal or state-imposed guidelines. Eugenic 
considerations do not serve the more enduring sense of aristocratic lineage. They remain solely the 
concern of those who are bonding for the welfare of immediate descendents. There is no wider or 
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more distant biological goal. The choice of partner, if by minds not befuddled by lust, is left to the 
wisdom and judgement of a couple who seek mutual advantage in their bond.  
In the later period, Nietzsche extols the virtues of the older aristocratic form of marriage organised, 
not for immediate descendents, but for the greater family, the most distant generations; i.e. whole 
classes and races. Marriage of this sort was "a question of the breeding of a race... thus of the 
maintenance of a fixed, definite type of ruling man: man and woman were sacrificed to this point of 
view. It is obvious that love was not the first consideration here; on the contrary!... What was decisive 
was the interest of the family, and beyond that - the class. We would shiver a little at the coldness, 
severity, and calculating clarity of such a noble concept of marriage in every healthy aristocracy, in 
ancient Athens as in the eighteenth century..."825 
Where this style of breeding comes to the fore, woman moves to the rear, and the community or state 
takes precedence in decisions regarding who should bond with whom. The younger Nietzsche makes 
this point effectively in the early essay The Greek Woman, where he observes that the subordinate 
position of women in aristocratic Greece is an indicator of the state's power in regulating breeding 
practice. In the polis "the Hellenic woman as mother had to live in obscurity, because the political 
instinct together with its highest aim [i.e. the breeding of genius] demanded it..."826 
Men involved in the affairs of the polis were the sole source of regulation, as opposed to the family. 
Women, being house-bound, were denied access to the one source of influence they might otherwise 
enjoy. Nor did men seek higher friendships with their wives; such refinements could be found with 
freer women, courtesans. If anything, the household was where men recuperated from their political 
exertions, and wives and mothers found their highest function in pouring a salve on men's wounds. 
It was in the household, in the conservative atmosphere of the feminine that any respite could be had 
from political fractions. Only after the disintegration of the principle of the polis, Nietzsche argues, 
did woman attain to power in the household. When the state declines, she "had to step in as helper; 
the family as a makeshift for the State is her work; and in this sense the artistic aim of the state had to 
abase itself to the level of domestic art."827 In other words the great work of shaping individuals, what 
we call the politics of cultivation, became the work of the family, where woman could exert her 
influence. What is arrived at is the arrangement we called "bourgeois marriage" where the state plays 
little part and women have make good the deficiencies of the state in their position as domestic rulers. 
In the later work Nietzsche prefers a diminished role of women within the aristocratic state. His 
sentiments are manifestly anti-feminist, claiming that the onset of the industrial age and the decline of 
the aristocratic and military spirit has enabled woman to aspire to the economic and legal 
independence of a clerk; "Woman as clerk", he states, "stands inscribed on the portal of the modern 
society now taking shape."828 
As a result the dominant position of women within the family has declined, and since the French 
revolution their influence has lessened in proportion to the increase in her rights and claims. The 
education of women, and encouragement for them to read newspapers and play politics undermines 
their essentially conserving instincts, and multiplies the damaging affects of political and social 
factionalism. This blunting and enfeebling of the instincts of modern men and women can only 
enfeeble culture. Hence it is necessary that"... a man who has depth, in his spirit as well as his 
desires... can think of woman only in an oriental way - he must conceive of woman as a possession, as 
property with lock and key, as something predestined for service and attaining her fulfilment in 
service - in this matter he must take his stand on the tremendous intelligence of Asia, on Asia's 
superiority of instinct, as the Greeks formerly did: they were Asia's best heirs and pupils and, as is 
well known, from Homer to the age of Pericles, with the increase of their culture and the amplitude of 
their powers, also became step by step more strict with women, in short more oriental..."829 
Against the modern trend Nietzsche speculates on how marriage in its aristocratic form might be 
reawakened and again be made to serve culture by breeding biologically superior specimens. In a note 
of 1888 from the Will to Power he considers measures that could be taken to this end and that 
"advantages of all kinds" might be made available "for fathers who bring many boys into the world, 
possibly a plural vote; a medical certificate preceding every marriage and endorsed by the local 
authorities, several definite questions must be answered by the couple and by doctors ("family 
history"-); as an antidote to prostitution (or as its ennoblement): marriages for a period, legalised 
(for years, for months), with guarantees for the children; every marriage warranted and sanctioned 
by a certain number of trusted men of the community, as a matter of concern to the community."830 
What this sanctions is greater state or community involvement in decisions regarding marriage. The 
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family's role is secondary and extinguished if the spirit of these measures is considered. He also urges 
prohibiting breeding to those who threaten to produce children whose lives will miscarry, 
intellectually or physically, or pass on congenital sickness. They must be dissuaded from breeding by 
any means, even the most drastic. In 1888 he advises that "there are cases in which a child would be 
a crime: in the case of chronic invalids and neurasthenic of the third degree... Society as the great 
trustee of life, is responsible to life itself for every miscarried life - it also has to pay for such lives: 
consequently it ought to prevent them. In numerous cases, society ought to prevent procreation: to 
this end, it may hold in readiness, without regard to descent, rank, or spirit, the most rigorous means 
of constraint, deprivation of freedom, in certain circumstances castration."831 
All of the measures listed here would require a complex edifice for systematic breeding, even if it is 
not Nietzsche's intention that this should be so. You would suppose that the least level of authority 
required to establish and police eugenic practices would be the local community, and closely 
thereafter the state, even though he does not say specifically that the state should be so engaged, and 
notes only that it should accomplished by "society", or "trusted men of the community". But when the 
private task of procreation is a matter of public interest, can it be doubted that the state would become 
guardian of eugenic practice? 
Conclusions 
In his final phase, Nietzsche's activism is transfigured by his focus on breeding principles. This 
significant, but seldom acknowledged aspect of Nietzsche's politics of cultivation, overlays his 
continuing emphasis on spiritual reform but also undermines it. In asserting that physical 
circumstances have to be created before desired behaviour can arise, he undermines the basis for 
spiritual reform and the philosophical titan is now a law-giver who encourages the introduction of 
moralities that will create those environmental circumstances. For Nietzsche, high culture, the 
morality of the strong, can only arise within an aristocratic caste and "the new philosopher can arise 
only in conjunction with a ruling caste, as its highest spiritualisation."832 
Although he offers no palpable recommendations on how this might arise in modernity, he does in his 
later career resort to a characteristic response, perhaps unconscious, perhaps not, that allows history 
itself, rather than makers of history to carry us forward. Perhaps he is not unlike Marx in this respect, 
thinking that laws of history will take us where we want to go, without even requiring us to help it. So 
increasingly he looks benignly on the future of Europe, and sees in every material and seemingly 
unavoidable development an outcome favourable to high culture. The decadence of Europe, which 
had worried and chafed him for years, now portended its reversal. What he had regarded previously 
regarded as undesirable tendencies: democratisation, modern ideas, nationalism, were now material 
bases on which the new aristocracy, the new philosophic titans could build.  
Fortunate conditions were being prepared for culture unwittingly by history. It merely takes a sleight 
of perception to recast history in this way. Was it that the diminished influence he accorded spiritual 
reform forced him to this stratagem? Those who no longer believe greatly in the power of 
contemporary individuals often recourse to the might of the process.  
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21 - Conclusion 
Ethical ideas, the underlying standpoints from which people evaluate or justify their existence, change 
very slowly within the long history of civilisations, and are generally invisible even to those who 
actively speculate about ethical questions. 
For the most part, ethical discussions reflect hasty adaption by successive generations of those same 
underlying standpoints to their ever-changing needs. As each generation succeeds and then clashes 
with its predecessor over years and decades, it rarely does more than give new names to the same old 
suppositions, which strike it as being original and unprecedented. Only rarely are there truly profound 
changes that are actually at odds with these fundamental ethical standpoints. When this happens they 
accompany equally profound changes to the material organisation of a civilisation. 
If we use the microscope and focus on an idea that concerns a single generation or individual, we see 
the language used to discuss it and how various protagonists defend or attack it. If we use the 
telescope we see how the idea gathers and shapes in the literature of civilisations over millennia, and 
observe long trends or patterns. Through the telescope we see the grand outline of events but miss the 
detail. With the accuracy of the microscope, we see a fragment but lose sense of peripheries and 
dimensions as a whole. 
In this essay we have tried to use both instruments. We have focused on an individual, Nietzsche, 
obsessed with his own generational conflict, to illustrate the character of a millennial idea called the 
Ideal of Cultivation. However facile the knowledge gained by glancing investigations it does clarify 
the enduring nature of the Ideal of Cultivation, making it recognisable in all its forms, and to indicate 
the influences that make someone reformulate it in their milieu.  
By doing this we have not sought to prove that Nietzsche was not really original or merely an 
unconscious stooge of his environment. Such historically conscious thinkers can never be dispensed 
with in this way, for they have the entire history of thought at their disposal and can make ethical 
choices determined by complex and subtle biographical factors that take precedence over 
environmental ones. Our aim rather is to show that even "original" thinkers like Nietzsche only ever 
adapt the deep structures of ethical ideas to a specific context. Fundamentally, his presuppositions are 
little different from those available to the thinkers of antiquity. 
Nietzsche's model of the Ideal of Cultivation, like that of intellectual predecessors in Germany, 
resembles the inward-looking ideal characteristic of the phase of Greek civilisation known as 
Hellenism. Both Germany until the late nineteenth century and Hellenistic Greece were essentially 
cosmopolitan, imperial and bureaucratic in character. German civilisation differed in retaining even as 
late as the mid-nineteenth century more of the vestiges of courtly power and culture than Hellenist 
Greece ever did. This fact conferred on the German Ideal of Cultivation, or Bildung, a more complex 
character that is reflected in attempts by individuals such as Nietzsche to revert to a more purely 
aristocratic or courtly variant of the ideal. Imposed on this complexity was the fact that Germany in 
the late nineteenth century, which had subsisted for so long without a civic religion, was embracing 
its most modern form, namely the nationalism of the territorial state.  
In a reversal of the phases of Greek civilisation, Germany was moving towards a national and 
republican orientation from a cosmopolitan and imperial one. The upsurge in national religion in 
Germany and the West reflected deeper changes in the structures of civilisation: in the modes of 
production, in a relentless democratic trend, in the dominance of science both as an ideology and as 
the bulwark of technological advance, all of which entrenched the decline of medieval animism and 
other-worldliness and introduced a new type of secular orientation. It was the very phenomenon of 
rapid transition that Nietzsche interpreted as a "crisis" in the system of values of modern Europe, and 
led him to conclude that Europeans no longer had a fixed idea of how they should live. 
So, although Nietzsche was antagonistic to otherworldly doctrine, it was the new and dominant forms 
of this-worldliness that he saw as the major competitor to the Ideal of Cultivation. His thought can be 
perceived as an unusual moment in the history of this ideal, for it was not religion, as it has been most 
often, but secularism, whether of a eudemonic, corporatist, or nationalist type that threatened it most. 
And just as he saw himself fighting a rear-guard action against the remnants of other-worldliness, he 
was already bouncing against another deadly foe in the eudemonic doctrine of progress; that held the 
perfection of nature to consist solely in improving our physical comfort.  
Nietzsche believed that modern secularism had taken a vulgar turn because Europe's old aristocracy, 
hitherto the bulwark of high culture, had been undermined, and with it the principles of an aristocratic 
organisation of civilisation. With the base lacking, he sought, through a "revaluation of all values" to 
create a new spiritualised species of aristocracy, or meritocracy, much as disaffected scribes and 
intellectuals have always done, believing that only those with the highest virtue and most developed 
faculties should rule. His active preference was for an intellectualised warrior caste, rather than what 
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he calls the "the pattern of unchanging community with priests at its head - this oldest of the great 
cultural products of Asia in the realm of organisation"833 
Certainly the perturbations of the spirit suffered by nineteenth century scholars and intellectuals 
concerning the fate of the Ideal of Cultivation are little known today. What preoccupied some of the 
most significant students of humanity a mere two and three generations ago, is now barely 
comprehensible, due in large measure to the fact that they were among the last generations to be 
educated with classical humanist texts. It is easy to select randomly isolated individuals living 
between 1850 and 1950 whose work displays this concern: in France, there is Hyppolyte Taine or 
Ernest Renan; in Germany, scientific and philosophic examples abound: Max Weber and Georg 
Simmel in the social sciences, Karl Jaspers in philosophy and Thomas Mann in literature; in Spain, 
the philosopher Ortega Y Gasset; in Switzerland, the historian Jacob Burckhardt; in England, 
Matthew Arnold; in Holland, the historian Huizinga; in Italy, in this century, the reactionary Evola; in 
Denmark the literary critic Georg Brandes...  
The list could go on in this arbitrary way but it is more instructive perhaps to follow social networks; 
Taine, who corresponded with Burckhardt as well as Nietzsche. Nietzsche who worked with 
Burckhardt and corresponded with Brandes; Jaspers, who knew and admired Weber, and so forth. 
Such webs of association can be spun easily when distinguished scholars of a generation or two 
invariably knew or knew of, or were even taught by each other. We would be exaggerating greatly 
however if we presumed that we do not still hear lamentations about the fate of the Ideal of 
Cultivation. These tend now to come mainly from historians and academics working in the 
humanities. That is, academics who have some familiarity with classical texts. There has long existed 
in America, for example, where the gulf between the modern and the old is always most sharply felt, 
a strain of cultural pessimism dedicated to berating each new generation for its ignorance of cultural 
excellence, or for just plain old ignorance itself.834 As is the way with these things, each new 
generation of pessimists thinks the situation is worse than it used to be. 
In the face of the nineteenth century belief that the Ideal of Cultivation was dwindling we must ask 
whether today this ideal can provide justification to individuals and peoples in the new cosmopolitan 
and democratic civilisation of the west. If it cannot, we must ask whether it is because the new 
civilisation is intrinsically inimical to it, or because other secular ideals are simply more successful.  
Is the democratic world incompatible, as Nietzsche believed, with this offspring of aristocratic 
civilisation? The question, which embodies Nietzsche's profoundest error, is the easiest to refute, for 
he interpreted every historical example of high culture in terms familiar to him; namely from the 
perspective of the cosmopolitan empire. Burckhardt, a patrician Swiss, who had a better 
understanding of republican ideals, could see that it was the tension between democratic and 
aristocratic forms (if not the forms themselves) that provided the dynamism for the achievements of 
antiquity and the Italian Renaissance. If anything republics that were most democratic produced the 
most renowned examples of high culture: compare Athens to Sparta, and Florence to Milan to recall 
this fact. The view that the Ideal of Cultivation can only occur in a rigidly aristocratic milieu is safely 
diminished by looking at these examples. And it is doubtful whether any high culture could have 
occurred at all if the magnified class structure that Nietzsche envisaged actually existed.  
There is nothing different about modernity that would prevent it from accommodating this ideal. If, at 
present, we inhabit an historical oddity, a large and complex civilisation that is substantially 
democratic, it is not, of course, without reasonably well-defined class structures. In the modern west, 
the principle of the separation of classes is the same as it ever was and or will be: there are still 
administrators and there are still servants. It is only that the gulf between them is remarkably closer, 
given the pervasiveness of public education, which permits individuals to transfer from one class to 
the other. Moreover, the complexity of hierarchies and professions has rendered the boundaries 
between rulers and ruled as a blurring and phasing rather than a sharp distinction.  
All forms of corporation from government bureaucracies, to business enterprises, to trade unions and 
other professional bodies are able to exert partial powers that are counterbalanced by others. Though 
occasionally generally dormant civic participation can be wakened, it is fundamentally the official 
and the functionary, or what we call the corporate manager, who rules the west today. In this respect 
our civilisation still resembles, in its rudiments, the Hellenistic period of antiquity. This is not to say 
that it is fated for the same end, simply that similar ethical types are likely to exist who reflect the 
nature of, and shapes of power that dominate. If an Ideal of Cultivation were to occur here what form 
would it take? Who would provide the icon of heroism appropriate to it? Would it be the warrior, 
courtier, the republican politician or the sage? 
The model of the warrior or courtier can be discounted quickly. The former lives only in cinema and 
popular fiction and is universally disparaged by the intelligentsia; the latter is barely comprehended, 
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even in the profession of diplomacy where it sustained a flickering astral existence after the extinction 
of aristocratic society. The model of the republican politician, while it could be conceivable and 
attainable in the modern west, clearly does not have heroic status; it despised rather than admired. The 
model of the sage, as he was depicted in late antiquity at least, does not deeply touch the modern 
psyche, though in principle it is this which would be most accessible to modern conditions.  
For all their differences, each of these models represents a type of administrator; each poses a 
different solution to the problem of how power is used. They are identical in another important 
respect: all are profoundly anti-specialist, standing outside of and above the varieties of professions 
and technicians. Blatantly non-expert in outlook and in the form of education they require, which 
values adaptability and capacity deal with the vicissitudes of daily administration. Hence, if a new 
icon of heroism is to be constructed from this civilisation, it would have to be based on the type who 
currently rules. This of course will not be the warrior, or the republican politician, or the sage, but the 
corporate manager, and it is on this model - however absurd or laughable it may sound - that any new 
Ideal of Cultivation would form, if it ever does. Nietzsche‟s nostalgic desire for older models is 
fatuous here. For good or ill, the old ideal based on Greek texts has gone forever. The querelle des 
anciens et modernes that agitated intellectuals at the dawn of the modern world has been won 
resoundingly by moderns, who no longer even remember that there was an argument. 
The qualities required of individuals engaged in administration are the same today as in every 
preceding civilisation. There is no reason to suppose that an Ideal of Cultivation that aims at synthetic 
understanding and synthetic capacity should not also arise here. Yet, scrutiny of the trends in modern 
education and values barely hints that it is taking place. The fragmentation of labour and knowledge 
is unprecedented. Nothing can be done in business or government without relying on a range of 
intermediaries and experts of every type and quality. Every process and every area of existence has 
been staked out and claimed by some career specialist or other. This phenomenon, in its necessity and 
in its absurdity, is integral to our civilisation and cannot be wished away. At the same time as modern 
civilisation offers education to all, it also promotes ignorance, narrowness, one-sidedness and the 
values of the expert. The natural inclination of the specialist is to oppose the goals of synthesis and 
thereby deny the possibility of an Ideal of Cultivation. In consequence we have reached the point 
where administrators themselves do not stand outside and above separate disciplines but actually 
regard themselves as a type of expert in their own right. Throughout the world theologies of 
management theory and social science are now at work transforming banalities into a species of 
"higher knowledge". 
The other fact that may allow an Ideal of Cultivation to develop is in the alleged increase of leisure 
afforded by the productive efficiencies of modern civilisation. As we have seen, the undertaking by 
individuals to "perfect their nature" is generally not a materially productive or lucrative activity. 
Those engaged in such an enterprise must be of either independent means, or must have some 
considerable degree of leisure at their disposal. Of course, historically this is one of the primary 
reasons why the ideal has only ever been adopted by aristocracies or wealthy elites, these being the 
only groups so fortunately endowed.  
It has been the much touted accomplishment of modern civilisation that it can provide greater 
numbers than ever before with time to pursue their own happiness in the one hundred and twenty 
eight hours of the week in which they do not labour for a living. Leaving aside whether this claim is 
true, partly due to worldwide propagation of free market infantilism, adoption of U.S. slave values, 
and the collapse of organised labour, we can say that the availability of leisure has been equalised 
among working and managerial classes. In fact, for the latter, long hours at work is deemed virtuous 
and leisure something only for holiday periods. The few who could enjoy total leisure appear to prefer 
attending to business. Hence, the never-ending success of technology in wresting from work its 
burdensome and onerous nature, has merely created more sedentary forms of duty and made all of us 
white-collar professionals of one sort or another. 
The luxury of idleness remains a technical possibility however and if it ever becomes a political 
reality, it is possible that an Ideal of Cultivation may again become a dominant ethical system. After 
all, there are already so many popular forms of "self-development" in existence today, as many and 
more than crowded the Hellenistic world, where culture was also highly personalised. 
Characteristically, many of these appear to be related to the aspirations and activities of young 
professionals, the corporate managers.  
Indeed it is the Hellenistic variant of the ideal that is easiest to sustain within our teeming cities. On 
the other hand, our dogged industriousness causes us more than ever to subdivide our existence into 
the time for work and time for entertainment. In each life the conduct of one is peripheral and 
unrelated to the other. First of all we must work to exist, while the interstices of the day that remain 
are to be filled with divertissements. Due to this subdivision, even the provision of entertainment has 
been industrialised, to the extent that the practice of what has hitherto been referred to as "high 
culture" is to be regarded as either entertainment for those who receive it or an industry for those who 
produce it. Even the most precious of modern aesthetes is not ashamed to refer to his hobbyhorse as 
an "arts industry". 
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The pessimistic view of nineteenth century scholars is that an Ideal of Cultivation will be impossible 
to sustain in the present civilisation, but that does not mean it is doomed. 
From the perspective of the long duration, it is unlikely that any major new developments in ethics, 
not already anticipated in antiquity, will occur until a mode of living other than that based on the city 
emerges. Nietzsche himself was deeply aware that "the only kind of culture which has been 
established until now is the culture of the city." and that "we still live within this culture today."835 It 
would therefore entail the greatest hubris, as doom-telling always does, to imagine that the ideal of 
perfecting nature has disappeared or will disappear from the face of the earth forever.  
To be sure, it will be forgotten in some generations, but it will be remembered again in others. It will 
be called by new names and lived by in new ways but the possibility of it emerging will never perish 
completely so long as there is such a thing as civilisation. Whether we hold this to be a good or bad 
thing is of course not a question for scholarship. The purpose of this essay merely has been to point to 
its existence and to define the shapes that this ethical system has assumed in various times and places. 
By doing so, we will learn to recognise it more readily when or wherever it arises in the world. If 
nothing else, we cannot permit ourselves to be closed to the possible ways in which people 
individually can lead their lives, or advance ecumenical aims. The Ideal of Cultivation has played an 
essential role in the inspiration and development of the west. Wherever we may now be headed, and 
however little interest in it we currently may display, it is an ideal we should not forget. 
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Abbreviations of works by Nietzsche  
 
U# TGS The Greek State – 1871 
F#  OMW On Music and Words – 1871 
F# TGW The Greek Woman -1871 
P BT Birth of Tragedy - 1872 
F# SGC The Relation of Schopenhauer's Philosophy to German Culture - 1872 
F* TP The Philosopher - 1872  
F* TPT The Pathos of Truth - 1872 
U FEI The Future of Our Educational Institutions -1872 
F# HC Homer's Contest - 1873 
P TOS I,I Untimely Meditations I David Strauss the Confessor and the Writer- 1873  
U# PTAG Philosophy in the Tragic Age of the Greeks -1873  
F* PCP The Philosopher as Cultural Physician - 1873  
F* PHT Philosophy in Hard Times - 1873  
F* TLES On Truth and Lies in an Extra Moral Sense - 1873  
P TOS I,II Untimely Meditations II - The Use and Abuse of History - 1874 
P TOS II,III Untimely Meditations III - Schopenhauer as Educator - 1875 
F* SSW The Struggle Between Science and Wisdom - 1875 
P TOS II,IV Untimely Meditations IV - Richard Wagner in Bayreuth - 1876 
P HAH I Human all too Human Part I - 1878 
P HAH IIA Assorted Opinions and Maxims (1st supplement to HAH I)- 1879 
P HAH IIB The Wanderer and his Shadow (2nd supplement to HAH I)- 1880 
P DD The Dawn of Day -1881 
P GS The Gay Science -1882 
P Z Thus Spake Zarathustra - 1883-1885 
U WP The Will to Power - 1883-1888 
P BGE  Beyond Good and Evil - 1886 
U PC1 Peoples and Countries - 1886 
P GM  On the Genealogy of Morals - 1887 
P COW  The Case of Wagner- 1888 
P TI  Twilight of the Idols -1888 
P AC  The Antichrist - 1888 
P EH  Ecce Homo - 1888 
P NCW  Nietzsche contra Wagner - 1888 
P DOD  Dithyrambs of Dionysius - 1888 
U SL2 Selected Letters of Nietzsche 
 KG3 Kritische Gesamtausgabe 
F = Fragment (unpublished) 
P = Published by Nietzsche 
U = Unpublished by Nietzsche 
* Early Fragments collected and published in Philosophy and Truth, [PAT] Selections from Nietzsche's Notebooks of the Early 
1870's. Translated and edited with introduction and notes by D. Breazeale. New Jersey, 1979. Comprises translations of 
Nietzsche's unpublished fragments during the period 1871-1875. Where above fragments are cited page numbers refer to PAT 
above. 
# = Early Fragments collected and published in Early Greek Philosophy and Other Essays, [EGP] trans. M. A. Mügge, Oscar Levy 
edition II. Where above fragments are cited page numbers refer to EGP above. 
1 =Peoples and Countries occurs in Volume 13 of the Oscar Levy edition of Nietzsche's collected works. This title has been given 
to 27 aphorisms which were intended by Nietzsche to form a supplement to BGE, but were subsequently omitted by him. 
2 =SL will refer to two different collections of letters; one translated by A. N. Ludovici, edited by Oscar Levy, London, 1921, and 
the other by C. Middleton, Chicago, 1969. Letters are referenced by recipient and date rather than page number. 
3 =Kritische Gesamtausgabe, edited by G. Colli and M. Montinari, Berlin and New York, 1975. All citations in the text which are 
in German refer to this collection. German references will be used if existing English translations cannot readily be located. Most 
citations from this collection are from either the Briefewechsel or the Nachgelassene Fragmente [NF]. 
Wherever English translations of Nietzsche's works are cited, the section or aphorism numbers (indicated by the abbreviation 'a' 
before the number) will be used in preference to page numbers. In the case of GM and EH where chapters and subdivisions are 
used then the chapter and section will be cited e.g. (EH, III-2). Exceptions to this practice will be TOS I and II, TI, PAT and EGP, 
which will be referred to by page numbers. 
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Chronology 
1840 Frederick William IV - King of Prussia 
1844  Oct 15 Nietzsche born near Leipzig (Röcken) 
1847 Bismark enters political life 
1848 Revolution - Frankfort national Assembly 
Frederick William refuses crown of new empire 
Granting of new Prussian constitution 
Wagner's Lohengrin/ banishment from Germany 
1849 Nietzsche's Father dies 
1851 Bismark appointed envoy in the Federal Diet 
1854 Wagner's Rheingold, Die Walküre 
1858 Attends Schulpforta (also attended by Klopstock, Fichte, Schlegel, Ranke, etc) 
1860 Burckhardt's Civilisation of the Rennaissance  
1862 Bismark becomes Prussian Minister president 
1864 Denmark annexes Schleswig - War won by Prussia/ 
Sep Leaves Schulpforta, goes to Bonn to study for two semesters with Art-historian A Springer/philology 
with Otto Jahn and Ritschl/joins Frankonia fraternity and withdraws from it in1865 
1865 Oct Goes to Leipzig to study philology with Ritschl 
First Reads Schopenhauer in Leipzig/Wagner goes to live at Tribschen 
1866 Prussia-Austria fight Bohemian War - Prussian victory 
Nov Working on Theognis, an interest awakened at Pforta 
1867-68 Serves with mounted field artillery in Naumberg /Contributes to the Litterarisches Centralblatt (age 22), 
participates in the founding of the Philological Society of Leipzig 
1868 in autumn Nietzsche returns to Leipzig and meets Wagner in nov Wagner's Meistersinger performed that 
same year 
1869 Leaves Leipzig University/goes to Basel as professor, and becomes Swiss citizen to do so/ in May first 
visits Wagners at Tribschen 
1870-71 Franco-Prussian War - serves as a nurse in 1870, returns to Basel in Au after contracting dysentry 
1871 New German Empire proclaimed/doctrine of papal infallibility- beginning of the Kulturkampf/Paris 
commune 
1872 Birth of Tragedy published/ 
Wagners settle at Bayreuth 
Fragments: The Philosopher, The Pathos of Truth, 
1873  Untimely Meditations - David Strauss 
Fragments: Philosophy in the Tragic Age of the Greeks 
The Philosopher as Cultural Physician, 
Philosophy in Hard Times 
On Truth and Lies in an Extra Moral Sense 
1874 Untimely Meditations - use and abuse of history 
David Strauss dies 
1875  Untimely Meditations - Schopenahuer as educator 
F. A. Lange dies 
 Fragments: The Struggle Between Science and Wisdom 
1876 Untimely Meditations - Richard Wagner in Bayreuth 
Begins writing Human- all too Human 
Railways nationalised/Wagner's Ring cycle completed/in Oct he takes year holiday from teaching duties/ 
spends time in company of Dr Ree and Malwilda von Meysenberg in Sorrento/last meeting with Wagner 
1878 Human- all too Human Pt I 
Two attempts on the life of the emperor/Bismark introduces anti-socialist measures 
1879 Assorted Opinions and Maxims (1st supplement to HAH) 
Retires from teaching post at Basel/spends summer in st Moritz and Winter in Naumberg 
1880 The Wanderer and his Shadow (2nd supplement to HAH) visits venice/spends Su and Au in Marienbad 
andWinter 1880-81 in Genoa 
1881 The Dawn/Reform Bill- social insurance/Meets Lou Salomé/spring 1881 in Recoaro (near Vicenza) 
1882 The Gay Science /Parsifal produced at Bayreuth 
1883 Thus Spake Zarathustra I and II 
Makes plans to deliver a series of lectures at the University of Leipzig -non-event/breaks with Lou 
Salomé/Wagner dies in Venice 
1883-88 The Will to Power (Revaluation of all Values) 
1884 Thus Spake Zarathustra III 
1885 Thus Spake Zarathustra IV (published 1892) begins to write Beyond Good and Evil 
1886 Beyond Good and Evil published 
1887 On the Genealogy of Morals 
1888 The Wagner Case, 
Twilight of the Idols, The Antichrist, Ecce Homo,Nietzsche contra Wagner,Dithyrambs of Dionysius  
William I dies, Frederick III brief reign and dies, William II new emperor 
1889 Jan 1 early days of January collapses - Onset of Insanity 
1900 Aug 25 Nietzsche dies 
 
